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This is a socio-psychological study of Mao Tse-tung, who was at the head of the Communist Party of China for forty years and ruled China's destinies for twenty-five. The author has used a vast array of information characterising the main episodes of Mao Tse-tung's career, Mao's own writings and pronouncements, reminiscences of political personalities and publicists who met him, and researches of Soviet and Western sociologists into the history of the CPC and present-day China.

The reader is given an insight into the basic aspects of the ideological and power struggle over the heritage of Mao Tse-tung.

FEDOR BURLATSKY

# MAO TSE-TUNG

An Ideological  
and  
Psychological  
Portrait



Progress Publishers

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**МАО ЦЗЕ-ДУН.**

**ИДЕЙНО-ПСИХОЛОГИЧЕСКИЙ ПОРТРЕТ**

*На английском языке*

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## Foreword

In this book I have attempted to give an ideological and psychological portrait of Mao Tse-tung.

I have used diverse source material characterising at least the principal milestones of Mao Tse-tung's life. First and foremost, mention must be made of the widely known books and articles by Edgar P. Snow,<sup>1\*</sup> Agnes Smedley,<sup>2</sup> Anna Louise Strong,<sup>3</sup> and Emi Hsiao (Hsiao San),<sup>4</sup> the diaries of P. P. Vladimirov<sup>5</sup> published under the title of *Special Region of China*, the recollections of Wang Ming,<sup>6</sup> Otto Braun (Li Teh),<sup>7</sup> and other political and military personalities, journalists, and writers, who had been in direct contact with Chinese leaders. Also, mention must be made of Soviet studies: the collections *A Dangerous Policy* (Issues I-V), and books by O. Borisov, V. Burov, L. Delyusin, A. Grigoryev, B. Gulik, V. Krivtsov, M. Titarenko, M. Kapitsa, M. Sladkovsky, A. Rummyantsev, S. Tikhvinsky, and A. Titov.

I found the works of Western sociologists Stuart R. Schram,<sup>8</sup> Robert Lifton,<sup>9</sup> and Stanley Karnow<sup>10</sup> extremely helpful. I used these and other works written from various standpoints: laudatory, as in the case of Emi Hsiao and Edgar Snow, or totally negative, as in the case of Chang Kuo-tao,<sup>11</sup> in order to try and compile a comprehensive judgment of the intellectual image of the late Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

To say that this was a difficult task would be an understatement. Mao Tse-tung headed the Communist Party of

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\* The references are to be found at the end of the book.—Ed.

China for nearly 40 years, and a great nation for more than 25. Perhaps only two persons in the twentieth century can rival this record at the helm of power: Franco in Spain, who outlived even the ideology of Falangism, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who ended his days as the ruler of an island. Then, again, Mao Tse-tung stands alone as having been able to maintain the role of ideologue and leader throughout the period of his reign. The thirst for activity or, to be more exact, the thirst for power proved to be beyond his physical strength. Far from waning, his ambition to be the acknowledged teacher of the Chinese and all the other peoples of the world grew with age.

Four decades of unrelenting struggle: triumphs and setbacks, flush of power and fear of losing it, and new and stinging disappointments. These were four decades of momentous changes in the world, of feverish quests for an historic turn in the destinies of China itself: the people's revolution, the Great Leap, the "people's communes", the "cultural revolution"... It would be impossible to list everything that was put to the test, seen, and experienced.

It is hard to perceive the thinking of a man, who in some sense held the destiny of a nation of 900 millions in his hands. What were the thoughts, drive, and feelings of this man, who wielded this unparalleled power and was charged with this great responsibility?

These difficulties lie in wait of any publicist attempting to assess the behaviour motivations and innermost thoughts of any political personality of our dramatic age, whether he is Winston Churchill or Franklin D. Roosevelt, or especially if he was a tyrant of the Adolf Hitler or Francisco Franco type. But these difficulties become all the greater when the subject is Mao Tse-tung, a representative of the China about which the world is, in effect, only beginning to learn seriously.

Mao Tse-tung (as, indeed, modern China itself) was a closed book for the external world. Like the viewers of a classical Chinese opera, we frequently only saw the mask we were shown. But we are eager to know the living face.

Of all the judgments that we read and heard about Mao Tse-tung, we felt that the most interesting were some of his own pronouncements:

"In me is the spirit of a tiger, and it is overshadowing, but along with it is the spirit of a monkey," Mao Tse-tung

wrote in a letter to his wife Chiang Ching.<sup>12</sup> "We should combine Karl Marx with Chin Shih Huang Ti,"<sup>13</sup> he said at a meeting of Party activists. "War and dictatorship are our bread and butter."<sup>14</sup>

Maxims of this sort may seem to be nothing more than twaddle. But it should not be ruled out that, perhaps, they are what unriddles this personality.

Generally speaking, a portrait of Mao is given by his own writings and pronouncements. For that reason, in this book the reader will find an analysis of the most significant of Mao's writings, chiefly his *Selected Works*, Vols. I-IV. Mao's pronouncements in the 1950s-1970s, during the period of the Great Leap, the "communes", and the "cultural revolution", in which he spoke most candidly of his cherished views, of his symbol of faith, are also revealing. Many of these pronouncements are to be found in Vol. V of his works, which was published posthumously.

How did it happen that the name of a man previously associated with a great revolution has become a synonym of hostility for the USSR and other socialist countries? This is one of the fundamental questions I have pondered.

It would be wrong to overlook China's past, but it would be an even greater mistake to ignore its present and its future. In the same way that the history of China, a unique and great civilisation, cannot be understood solely in terms of Western standards, it is impossible to form a judgment of China's future by standing with one's back to the West and looking only to the East.

In contemplating the activity, views, and motivations of the man who so strongly influenced the destiny of a nation of 900 millions, I was inspired by Pushkin's celebrated lines:

*You will not escape the judgment of men  
Just as you will not escape God's.*

## PART ONE

# Ideological Infantilism

In one of his talks with Edgar Snow,<sup>1</sup> to whom he gave the first-ever story of his life, Mao Tse-tung narrated the following revealing episode of his boyhood. One day, when he was 13, he played hooky, for which his father called him an idler in the presence of visitors. The boy made an impertinent reply and rushed out of the house. His father followed, catching up with him near a pond. Mao could not swim, but he said he would jump into the pond if his father came near him. The father, Mao Shun-sheng, ordered the boy to stand on his knees in front of him in token of obedience. The boy refused, but said that he would stand on one knee if his father promised not to beat him. The father gave that promise. "That war ended," Mao related, "and I realised that if I openly stuck to my rights my father would compromise. But if I was quiet and obedient, he would only scold and beat me more."<sup>2</sup>

We are inclined to believe this story. Much of it is characteristic, particularly the boy's recalcitrance, his rebellious nature. One must picture the Chinese family and Chinese traditions in order to understand that this behaviour was unusual, to say the least. Confucianist canons, by which many generations of Chinese abided unswervingly, require three kinds of piety: son to father, subject to emperor, and all to ritual and traditions. But in Mao's case, he defied one, perhaps the most important, of these canons in his early youth (he disliked his father and subsequently often spoke of this).

There is symbology in one more detail: the boy did, in fact, get down on one knee. To use Mao's own metaphor,



in boyhood he had recourse to the strength of a tiger and the cunning of a monkey. As the reader will find, Mao often had to accept compromises: with vacillating supporters, with rivals for power, and with foreigners. Indeed, in some way these compromises smacked of the behaviour of the boy bending only one knee to his father: he did not submit entirely, and this allowed him to "save face" although the bending of the knee gave the impression of submission and agreement.

However, let us return to Mao's early years. He was born on December 26, 1893 in the village of Shaoshan, Hsian-gtan county, the southern province of Hunan.<sup>3</sup> According to Mao himself, his father had saved some money when he was a soldier and upon returning to his native village had become a small trader. He bought rice from the peasants and sold it to merchants in the town for a higher price.

There was little Mao's father could do in the way of giving his son an education, for he himself had only had two years of schooling and knew the minimum number of characters to be able to keep accounts. Mao's mother was the only person of his childhood whom he remembered with veneration. An illiterate and deeply religious woman, she was a strong influence over her son, binding him to Buddhism. As a matter of fact, it is quite possible that Mao owed his first acquaintanceship with simple dialectical categories, notably the struggle of opposites in nature and society, to Buddhism and Taoism. He applied these categories readily later in life.

In his early boyhood his studies were unsystematic. He had to stand up against his father, who was impatient to have him help run his business.

At the age of eight Mao went to a normal school, but at 13 he had to drop his studies on his father's insistence. At the school instruction was based on learning canonical Confucian books by heart. Without the teachers knowing it, Mao, like many other pupils, read old Chinese novels during lessons. To do this he had recourse to a bit of slyness: he would have the classical work on the desk before, and under it he would hide his favourite novel.<sup>4</sup>

At 13 Mao left school and began working in the field and helping his father to keep accounts. When he turned 14 his father married him to a girl six years his senior (nothing more is known about her).

Mao's father planned to turn his business over to his son. But the son had a will of his own. He ran away from home and began to take lessons from an unemployed law student. This went on for six months. Then, under the guidance of an old Chinese scholar he continued studying Chinese classics and reading contemporary literature.<sup>5</sup>

At 17 Mao enrolled in a school in Tungshan, Hsianghsi-ang county, Hunan province. His teachers noted his capacity for learning and his knowledge of Chinese classics, particularly of the canonical books of Confucius. He wrote compositions in the classical style, but the classics were not his sole attraction. He recalls two books sent to him by a cousin. They were about the reformatory work of Kang Yu-wei.<sup>6</sup> He liked one of them so much that he learned it by heart, and became a fervent admirer of Kang Yu-wei.

Emi Hsiao, who wrote a book about Mao and Chu Teh, recalls meeting Mao during his school years.

"We then told each other of the books we read... In secret from his father and teachers, he read many old Chinese novels: *Travels in the West*, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, *The Pirate*, *The Yo Fei Chronicles*, *Shuo Tang*. He began telling me about these novels (I was so captivated by the adventures of their heroes that I later found and read these books). But I, too, had read some novels Mao had not read. And, in my turn, I began relating the stories to my new friend. Mao listened and then said:

"They're good books, but rebellions are what I like most to read about'.

"The bell went. We had to return to classes.

"Hand in hand we walked to the door. Mao noticed a book in my hand.

"What's that you've got?"

"Biographies of great people'.

"Let me read it'.

"A few days later he returned the book politely, looking sheepish.

"I'm sorry, but I've soiled it'.

"I opened the book and saw that it was full of marks and notes in black Indian ink. The pages about Napoleon, Peter the Great, Wellington, and Washington were marked the heaviest. Mao said to me:

"China, too, must have people like them. It must be rich and have a strong army. Only then will we avoid

what happened to Indochina, Korea, and Formosa. There is an old saying: When the first cart breaks down, the second stands in thought'." <sup>7</sup>

Most of the pupils at this school were children of landowners: they were well dressed and their manners were different.

There was no way that the son of a peasant could vie with them. He had only one good set of clothes that he kept for special occasions. Moreover, he had come to the school after a long break and was several years older than his class-mates. Mao was the Gulliver of his class.

The poorly dressed, tall new boy was mocked and scorned. He did not find a common language either with the other boys or with his teachers, and in early 1911 he left this school.

The reader will agree that Emi Hsiao draws an interesting image. The boy doggedly looked for a niche of his own, for his own road in life (even if Emi Hsiao back-datedly embellished the future leader of the CPC). But if one looks retrospectively at the intellectual image of the young Mao one finds a disturbing quality. It is his excessive fascination with the martial spirit, regardless of whether it concerned emperors, brutal conquerors, or insurgent peasants.

Mao's attitude to social problems was contradictory. As the son of a rich peasant and trader he belonged to the intermediate strata. Psychologically, this was the hardest condition: he did not mix with peasant children and was not accepted into the circle of landowners' sons. During the famine of 1910 hungry peasants asked their more fortunate neighbours for rice. But Mao's father continued carting rice for sale in the city. The hungry villagers seized his grain and he was furious. "I did not sympathise with him," Mao recalled. "At the same time I thought the villagers' method was also wrong." <sup>8</sup>

In the meantime, turbulent events were coming to a head in China. Peasant risings and urban unrest were sweeping across the entire country. The Wuchang revolt exploded in Central China on October 10, 1911. It triggered the revolution of 1911, whose aim was to depose the monarchy and establish a republic.

This movement was organised largely by the Tung-meng Hui, a revolutionary society, which in effect led the revolt

in Wuchang. It was founded at the close of 1905 by Sun Yat-sen, who also formulated its programme principles: *nationalism* (overthrow of the Manchu (Ching) Dynasty), *people's power* (establishment of a republic), and *national welfare* (egalitarian right to land). Lenin wrote highly of Sun Yat-sen, calling him a noble and heroic revolutionary democrat.<sup>9</sup> However, Lenin noted the utopian elements in the platform formulated by Sun Yat-sen, who believed China would avoid capitalist development.

The Ching empire fell under the onslaught of the Hsin-hai revolution. The act of abdication of the Ching Dynasty was published on February 12, 1912. However, the republican regime was in fact only a cover for the nation's domination by the warlords, the landowners, and the compradore bourgeoisie.

The Nationalist Party—Kuomintang—which absorbed the Tung-meng Hui along with other liberal-bourgeois organisations that had sprung up during the revolution, was formed in Peking in August 1912. But its programme marked a significant retreat from the programme proclaimed by Sun Yat-sen.

The intellectual life of that period was influenced mainly by national-democratic ideology. This was understandable, because the first decade of the twentieth century witnessed intensified political and economic expansion by the imperialist powers, which were out to divide China into spheres of influence.

In this situation national liberation was the key demand of all the progressive parties and groups in China.

Mao himself said that a pamphlet by Chen Tien-hua was one of the first political writings to attract his attention. Its spirit was chiefly anti-colonial. It opened with the sentence: "Alas, China will be subjugated!" "After I read this," Mao recalled, "I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realise that it was the duty of all the people to help save it."<sup>10</sup>

It will be noted that Mao's initial political emotions were stirred by the national problem. It is hardly possible that at the time he himself could surmise that this would capture his imagination and become the basis of his spiritual world for the rest of his life. In parallel Mao was powerfully impressed by the idea of China's technological modernisation. He read a book by a group of Chinese reformers,

who believed that China's weakness was due entirely to its shortage of Western technology: railways, steamships, telephone, telegraph, and so on.

In 1911, after the revolution had broken out, Mao joined the army. In the army he picked up socialist ideas for the first time from *Hsiangkiang jihpao* and other newspapers.

Six months later he left the army and lived in his native village for some time, helping his father.

In 1913 he went to Changsha, capital of Hunan Province, determined to continue his education. But he could not make up his mind about a profession: for some time he even toyed with the idea of enrolling in a police school. In the long run, he decided to become a teacher and in the same year enrolled in a normal school, which he finished in 1918.

In Changsha Mao heard of Sun Yat-sen and the Tung-meng Hui programme. In a leaflet, written by him and posted on the wall of the school, he tried to expound some of his own views. This was the first public expression of his political sympathies. Subsequently, he called this piece of writing "somewhat muddled". At the time he had not given up his admiration of Kang Yu-wei. He did not see the difference between him and Sun Yat-sen. In his leaflet he advocated that Sun Yat-sen should become the President and that Kang Yu-wei be made Premier.<sup>11</sup>

Mao had a good knowledge of Chinese classical literature and endeavoured to express his thoughts in the spirit of its traditions. At the Changsha normal school he continued reading Chinese philosophers and writers, summing up their thoughts in his diaries. His student compositions were posted on the wall of the school as models.<sup>12</sup>

As a student Mao wanted the career of an intellectual. Later he said that the life of peasants, from whom he had sprung, was alien to him. He felt that "the intellectuals were the only clean persons in the world, and that the workers and peasants seemed rather dirty beside them". He said he could put on the clothes of other intellectuals, because he thought they were clean, but he "would not put on clothes belonging to a worker or peasant" because he "felt they were dirty."<sup>13</sup>

He said that his "political ideas began to take shape" while he was a student at the Changsha normal school.<sup>14</sup> A group of serious students formed around Professor Yang

Chang-chi, a neo-Confucianist who taught ethics, logic, psychology, and pedagogics. EMI Hsiao wrote:

"Yang Chang-chi was educated in Japan and England, but he remained true to the traditions of Chinese philosophy. We were greatly influenced by him. He had the knack of holding the attention and respect of his listeners. Subsequently, when we formed the first Communist cell we remembered him with affection, grieving that he had died, and were confident that had he been alive he would have been a Communist, too.

"We, his young students, imitated our teacher in many things. He never ate in the morning, and washed in cold water the year round, even in winter. Mao and I tried to do the same. If my memory serves me right, for a year or two we never had breakfast and bathed in any weather. Mao called this sun and rain bathing. Mao and I did everything to toughen our bodies.

"Mount Yulu towered on the bank of the Hsiang River opposite Changsha. Buddhist temples stood on its thickly wooded summit. Practically nobody went there, so that the temples provided quiet and seclusion. On one school holiday Mao Tse-tung did not go home to his village. Instead, he went to one of these temples. He slept on a bench in the open and used newspapers to protect himself against the mosquitoes. Rice and beans were his only food. There, on the hill, he read and brooded.

"One day he said to me:

"There are two kinds of people: some can only do small things, others are capable of big things, of becoming organisers'." <sup>15</sup>

Mao, quite evidently, classed himself in the latter category. Why not? Perhaps that was the period when he had set his mind on joining the movement for China's national rejuvenation and sensed he could accomplish much in the way of organisation? His abilities as an organiser were to serve him well in later years. But his dilemma was that for a long time he could not decide the channel into which to direct his efforts.

He had always wanted to specialise in social sciences. The natural sciences did not interest him, and his marks for these subjects were invariably low. <sup>16</sup>

Mao continued to be stirred by books about great men of China and the world. Of the European personalities,

Napoleon was his favourite. As he grew older, his sympathies did not change. In February 1964 the 70-year-old Mao Tse-tung told a delegation of French parliamentarians that he was an admirer of Napoleon and had read all his writings. Although Robespierre was a great revolutionary, Mao said, he personally was more impressed by Napoleon.<sup>17</sup>

Hsiao Yu, a fellow-pupil of Mao with whom he travelled in Hunan in 1917, tells a significant story. It seems that there was an argument about the Emperor Liu Pang (202-196 B. C.), founder of the Han Dynasty. Mao maintained that Liu Pang was the first emperor in China's history who came from the people, a successful revolutionary who swept away the Ching tyrant and founded the Han Dynasty. He should, therefore, be regarded as a great hero. Hsiao Yu, on the contrary, said that Liu Pang was a bad man, much too egoistic and egocentric for an emperor; he removed a despot only to become a tyrant himself—cruel, perfidious, and devoid of human feeling. Hsiao Yu reminded Mao of Liu Pang's treatment of the army commanders who had risked their lives for him. When Liu Pang's army was victorious and these men became prominent Liu Pang had them killed for fear that one of them would attempt to usurp the throne. In reply, Mao declared that if Liu Pang had not done away with his army commanders his throne would have been in constant danger, and he would not have been emperor for long.

A pragmatic line of thought.

"I knew quite well," Hsiao Yu wrote, "that Mao Tse-tung would not wish to continue the argument further lest I might criticise him directly. We both knew that he was identifying himself with Liu Pang in his ambition."<sup>18</sup>

It was thus not Robespierre but Napoleon and Liu Pang, the prospering sovereigns, who impressed the young Mao.

Mao later spoke frankly to Edgar Snow about his far from youthful (he was 25 at the time) hero worship of ancient China's great rulers. He recalled that for a long time he believed emperors and other statesmen were honest and wise men. He was fascinated by the successes of Yao, Shun, Chin Shih Huang Ti, and Han Wu Ti.

His favourite books were historical descriptions of the epoch of "embattled kingdoms", of episodes of the wars of the Han Emperor Wu Ti against the Huns, of the stormy events of the period of the Three Kingdoms, when, to use

his words, the situation was in constant flux and talents constantly appeared — the novels *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* and *Water Margin*,<sup>19</sup> which told of these events. The heroic spirit of these works touched the young Mao's heartstrings. Peasants in revolt, the "benevolent bandits" of Shih Nai-an's novel *Water Margin* made a lasting impression on Mao as men with an envious and noble destiny. It was not accidental that these books were strongly recommended to CPC cadres.

Mao was very much interested in the political and military history of the West. According to Emi Hsiao, he esteemed Bismarck and even Kaiser Wilhelm I. Already then Emi Hsiao believed that Mao would be a good general "because he talked so brilliantly about war".<sup>20</sup>

Mao began writing as a contributor to the journal *New Youth* (*Hsin Ching-nien*), which was edited at the time by Chen Tu-hsiu.<sup>21</sup> This was an enlightened journal, which called for the democratisation of science, denounced ignorance and superstition, and popularised Marxist views.

In those years Mao was strongly influenced by the movement for a new culture preached by his favourite Professor Yang Chang-chi. This school sought ways and means of combining advanced Western ideas with China's own great intellectual heritage.

In April 1917 Mao had his first article published in *New Youth*. This article dealt with the development of physical culture, a task which was set in the context of the problem of reviving the military spirit of the Chinese. Mao wrote: "Our nation is wanting in strength. The military spirit has not been encouraged.

"The physical condition of the population deteriorates daily. This is an extremely disturbing phenomenon... If this state continues, our weakness will increase further. To attain our goals and make our influence felt are external matters, results. The development of our physical strength is an internal matter, a cause. If our bodies are not strong, we will be afraid as soon as we see enemy soldiers, and then how can we attain our goals and make ourselves respected?"<sup>22</sup>

Thus, Mao featured the problem of restoring the national greatness of China, whose society was still undifferentiated in Mao's mind. He suggested reviving the spirit of military valour as the guarantee of the nation's salvation.



His thinking is shown in a note made by him in the margin of an ethics textbook in the winter of 1917-1918: "We must develop our physical and mental capacities to the fullest extent... That is why our country's three bonds (between the ruler and the subject, between father and son, and between husband and wife. —*F. B.*) must go, and constitute, with religion, capitalists, and autocracy, the... evil demons of the empire."<sup>23</sup>

Mao helped to set up and was active in the New People's Study Society (*Hsin-Min Hsueh-hui*). Emi Hsiao relates the story of this society's foundation.

"Short leaflets, appealing to young people, appeared in all of Changsha's schools. They called for unity and were written in the new, terse, elegant style. The signature said: "Name of 28 strokes" (the name Mao Tse-tung is written in three characters composed of 28 strokes).

"A few score of hot-headed young people, mostly Mao's fellow-students at the normal school, responded to the appeal. The New People's Study Society was the result of this campaign.

"About twenty people gathered in the house of Comrade Tsai Ho-sen at the foot of Yulu, on the far side of the Hsiang River. At dinner they discussed the society's rules and programme. The society was formalised on the same day. Mao refused to be its secretary, but agreed to be the deputy secretary. The programme and rules were somewhat abstract. But the important thing was that the city's advanced young people were united in an organisation for the first time."<sup>24</sup>

Some historians believe that the society was initiated by Tsai Ho-sen, while Mao was only active in its work. But all agree that in those days Mao was entirely under the influence of the liberal, enlightenment movement for a "new culture", which was far removed from revolutionary theory.

Mao's long and profound attraction for anarchism dates from 1918. In Peking he made the acquaintance of active anarchists, corresponded with them, and even attempted to form an anarchist society in Hunan. He believed that in China administration had to be decentralised and was generally in favour of anarchist methods of work. He read the works of Pyotr Kropotkin and other anarcho-socialists with fascination.

The October Revolution in Russia and the establishment of Soviet power gave a powerful impulse not only to the liberation and democratic, but also to the socialist movement in China. The first revolutionary-democratic associations of students, which subsequently produced many prominent personalities of the Communist Party of China, sprang up. The May 4 Movement emerged in 1919. This was a major political action by the students, urban petty bourgeoisie, and workers in protest against the Paris Peace Conference's decision to turn over the former German concessions in Shantung to Japan. Huge student demonstrations rolled across the entire country. The first national United Students' Association was formed. Workers joined this movement. Factory workers in Shanghai and railway workers in Nanking staged strikes in 1919. The first workers' trade union and the first Marxist study circles soon appeared.

In Peking, where he went in 1918 on the recommendation of Professor Yang Chang-chi, lecturer at Peking University at the time, Mao got a job as assistant to Li Ta-chao, then librarian at Peking University.<sup>25</sup> Already in those days Li Ta-chao was an erudite Marxist and an outstanding personality.

In 1919 he organised a Marxist study group in Peking. Mao had the possibility of joining it. But at the time, as he himself subsequently related, in his head there was a "curious mixture of ideas of liberalism, democratic reformism, and utopian socialism,"<sup>26</sup> to which were added scraps of anarchist and Marxist ideas.

At the time Mao was captive to illusions about national unity. Under their influence he wrote the article "The Great Union of the Popular Masses", published in Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of the journal *Hsiang River Review* (*Hsiang-kiang Ping-lun*) for 1919. Mao, who returned to Hunan in early 1919, became its editor. As this article shows, Mao was at the time still unable to distinguish between the workers and the bourgeoisie, or between the "red flag of the Bolsheviks" and the banner of the May 4 Movement.

In this article Mao asserted that the ideas of democracy and enlightenment proclaimed by Chen Tu-hsiu were precisely what China needed. He described the Chinese nation not only as united but also as a powerful progressive force. He displayed no particular interest in the condition

of the workers, with whom he had no contact, or in the condition of the peasants, from whom he had sprung.

As editor of *Hsiang River Review*, he backed the "new culture" movement and called for the replacement of the pompous and archaic Wenyen by the simple, popular Paihua: he wrote in the latter language. But even this moderate call for enlightenment displeased the authorities, and *Hsiang River Review* was closed. Mao undertook to edit another student journal in Changsha, *Hsin Hunan*.

In December 1919 he went to Peking to present his condolences to the daughter of Professor Yang Chang-chi, who had died. In 1920, upon returning to Changsha, he was appointed headmaster of an elementary school. This gave him a better financial and social standing and he married (second marriage) Yang Kai-hui, the late professor's daughter.

It would be naive to look in this young man for qualities of the future leader of the CPC, much less of the future political and ideological leader of a huge nation. People are hardly born with these qualities, which are moulded slowly under the impact of historical circumstances, in the process of struggle, under the influence of interested groups and strata, which promote their own leader. As regards the young Mao, it is quite certain that in China in those years there were hundreds of radical students who keenly felt their country's national humiliation, thought with nostalgia of China's heroic past, and were vague about how to set the nation on the road of rejuvenation.

Mao was painfully aware of his own humble status of son of a peasant scorned by rich and distinguished families. He failed to enroll in the university and had to rest content with the education he had received at the normal school. Was the humiliation felt by the assistant librarian the reason of his life-long dislike of scholars, of educated people? Was this when the idea that "the uneducated should overthrow the educated" was born? It is hard to say. As we will see, contempt for intellectuals was more than psychology with Mao. It was ideology. But, one way or another, at the time Mao joined the Communist Party he only had some experience of participation in the radical-democratic and nationalistic student movement. He had no experience of participation either in the workers' or the peasants' movement.

The ideological infantilism of the CPC's future ideologist was long-lived. For a man whose basic motivations stemmed from China's national humiliation, the quest for lasting ideological positions, for a class basis for his incipient political activity was not easy at all. Even his first acquaintanceship with socialism and Marxism did not dramatically change his views or his social orientation. We see no awakening of a serious interest in the working-class movement or in its ideology, Marxism-Leninism.

## The Pendulum Begins to Swing

We shall not go into the details of all the events of Mao Tse-tung's life and work in the 1920s-1930s, much less of the history of the CPC of that period. We shall only note of some episodes characterising Mao's ideological posture and his first theoretical publications.

The ideological infantilism that we noted in the preceding period of Mao's life played a notable role in his subsequent theoretical and practical work. His political thinking in the 1920s was reminiscent of the swinging of a pendulum—the amplitude of his “right” and “left” vacillations was that wide.

If one is to believe him, he became a “Marxist in theory and, to some extent, in practice” in the summer of 1920 after reading the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Karl Kautsky's *The Class Struggle*, and Thomas Kirkup's *A History of Socialism*. It must be noted, however, that these works can only be classed in one and the same category by a man with little knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. Kirkup attacked Marx's fundamental economic postulates, holding that they were “narrow, one-sided, or historically incorrect”. He wrote with sympathy of Bakunin's “catechism” and of the views of Kropotkin, calling anarchism “revolutionary socialism”.<sup>1</sup>

In the spring of 1921 there were six small Communist groups in China (in Shanghai, Peking, Changsha, Wuhan, Canton, and Tsinan). Chinese students (one of whom was Chou En-lai) formed a Communist group in Paris.<sup>2</sup>

After preliminary consultations the 1st Chinese Communist Party Congress was held in Shanghai in July 1921. It

was attended by two delegates from each of the six groups, altogether 13 persons. Mao represented the Hunan group. Li Ta-chao and Chen Tu-hsiu, who were to become leaders of the CPC, were unable to attend. At the congress there were observers from the Communist International (Comintern) and the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern).

The first sitting took place in a girls' school in the French concession in Shanghai. The school was closed for holidays and it was felt that this would ensure the security of the underground congress. However, the police noted the appearance of strangers in the school. In order to ensure security it was decided that the delegates should leave the city and hold the closing sitting in a boat in a lake near Shanghai. The delegates gave out that they were a boat-party. The observers from the Comintern and the Profintern did not attend this sitting.

This congress set the revolutionary army of the proletariat at the task of deposing the capitalist class and establishing the proletarian dictatorship. It underscored that the working-class movement had to be organised, noted the class-proletarian character of the Communist Party, and recorded its opposition to cooperation with other parties. It elected a Provisional Bureau with Chen Tu-hsiu as its chairman and, in principle, declared itself in favour of the CPC joining the Comintern.

There is nothing to indicate that Mao Tse-tung distinguished himself at congress. Chang Kuo-tao, who attended it, recalls that Mao moved no proposals.<sup>3</sup> Little is known of Mao's activities in the next two years.

The 2nd Congress, held in Shanghai a year later, adopted a manifesto with two programmes—maximum and minimum—and decided that the CPC should join the Comintern. Mao represented the Hunan CPC Committee and although he was in Shanghai at the time he did not take part in the congress. His explanation was that he had meant to be present at the congress, but “forgot the name of the place where it was to be held”.<sup>4</sup>

In the summer of 1922, acting on recommendations of the Comintern and on decisions passed by the 2nd Congress, the CPC sought cooperation with the Kuomintang. In June 1923 the 3rd Congress, which concentrated on the CPC's tactics, in other words, its attitude to the Kuomintang, de-

cided that the Kuomintang had to assume leadership of the national revolution.<sup>5</sup>

Mao was one of the most vigorous proponents of this line. At the congress he renounced his former stance, which had been that the trade unions should be independent organisations. He urged their subordination to the Kuomintang. This energetic and quick volte-face gave him a new status in both the CPC and the Kuomintang. At the 3rd Congress he was elected a CC member, and soon afterwards (in January 1924) was appointed head of the Organisation Department to replace Chang Kuo-tao. At the 1st Kuomintang Congress Mao was elected an alternate member of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang. His ideological "pendulum" swung steeply to the right. Let us see how far he went along this road.

In 1924 the Kuomintang was reorganised along stricter principles of centralisation into a political party. Mao was extremely active at the forum of Kuomintang leaders, who came from all parts of China. He was a member of the committee formed to edit the congress documents. In 1924, when the Kuomintang set up courses to train leaders for the peasant movement, nobody was surprised that on the recommendation of the CPC Mao became one of the directors of these courses, although he had previously taken no special interest in the peasant movement.

Mao's theoretical work evidently dates from that year. But the ideas propounded by the then 30-year-old Mao were clearly immature and contradictory, although the character of his errors was typical of the formative period of his views and of subsequent years. For instance, at the 3rd Congress of the CPC he maintained that neither a national nor a mass Communist Party could be formed in China, that only the Russian Army in the north could bring revolution to China.

In July 1923 the weekly *Hsiang Tao*, central organ of the CPC, printed an article by Mao Tse-tung under the heading "The Peking Political Upheaval and the Merchants",<sup>6</sup> in which he asserted that the merchants should lead the imminent national revolution.

"The present political problem in China," he wrote, "is none other than the problem of the national revolution... The merchants, workers, peasants, students, and teachers should all come forward to take on the responsibility for a

portion of the revolutionary work, but because of historical necessity and current tendencies, the work for which the merchants should be responsible in the national revolution is both more urgent and more important than the work that the rest of the people should take upon themselves."<sup>7</sup>

The merchants and the national bourgeoisie were thus, in Mao's eyes, the main driving force of the liberation movement. He backed up these views with practical action in the Kuomintang. As a member of the standing committee of the Shanghai organisation of the Kuomintang he worked with one of the Kuomintang leaders, Hu Han-min, and was derisively called the latter's "secretary".<sup>8</sup>

At the 4th CPC Congress in January 1925 Mao Tse-tung was criticised for his pro-Kuomintang attitudes. Not only was he not elected to the new Central Committee; he was not even invited to the congress.

Mao told Edgar Snow that at the close of 1924 he fell ill and returned to Hunan to recuperate,<sup>9</sup> but this was more a diplomatic illness than anything else. He was under heavy criticism from CPC members opposed to his efforts to establish cooperation with the Kuomintang even at the price of some of the CPC's independence.

The "swing momentum of the pendulum" of Mao's ideological and political attitudes was particularly marked in the mid-1920s, when within a short span of time he moved from extreme right to extreme left positions.

In 1925-1927, when there were signs that the rupture between the Kuomintang and the CPC was growing wider, Mao remained fervently pro-Kuomintang. Even Stuart R. Schram, who wrote sympathetically about Mao, had to note this. He writes: "In this triangular relationship of Moscow, the Kuomintang, and the Chinese Communist Party, the position of Mao Tse-tung during the crucial years 1925-1927 was on the whole close to that of the Kuomintang . . . This fact is obviously a source of extreme embarrassment to Mao himself and to the historians now writing in Peking, who . . . have distorted the record of his activities during this period."<sup>10</sup>

These are the hard facts. Indeed, Mao intimated to Snow that he continued cooperating with the Kuomintang in the hope of enlisting its support for his new view about the role of the peasants in the revolution. But it was not the Kuomintang, to which the true interests of the poor and middle

peasants were alien, that drew the attention of the CPC to the countryside. It will be recalled that the Peasants' International (Krestintern) was founded in October 1923 and had its first congress in Moscow in 1924. In May 1924 it wrote a letter to the CPC underscoring the immense significance of the "peasant problem for the Chinese revolution".<sup>11</sup>

For his part, Mao alleged in his talks with Snow that his views about the role of the peasants underwent a change only as a result of their increased activities, particularly in 1925.

"Formerly," he said, "I had not fully realised the degree of class struggle among the peasantry, but after the May 30 Incident (1925), and during the great wave of political activity which followed it, the Hunanese peasantry became very militant. I ... began a rural organisational campaign."<sup>12</sup>

Mao spent the winter and spring of 1925 in his native village of Shaoshan. In the autumn of the same year he returned to Canton, where he played an important part in the Kuomintang apparatus, continuing to help train leaders for the peasant movement. Moreover, he was appointed to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee Propaganda Department, first as secretary, then as deputy director, and finally as director. The Kuomintang 2nd Congress (January 1926) passed a resolution on Mao's report to that congress.

The resolution states in part: "The Party's success depends on where its centre of gravity is. The centre of gravity of the Kuomintang is among the incalculable mass of exploited peasants. The Propaganda Department should tirelessly draw the attention of Party members to this issue and orient them on this centre of gravity."

During this period Mao wrote two articles, which, his present Chinese biographers claim, laid the "beginning for a new line in the CPC". These were "Different Classes of the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitude to the Revolution" and "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society". Both articles were published in the Kuomintang journal *Chung-kuo Nung-min* in February 1926. How did their author see the pattern of class relations in China?

He endeavoured to impose the overall pattern of class stratification of the developed Western countries on the



structure of China. He held that in every country the population fell into five categories: the big, middle, and petty bourgeoisie, the semi-proletariat, and the proletariat. Hence, he divided the rural population as follows: he bracketed the big landowners with the big bourgeoisie, the small landowners with the middle bourgeoisie, the independent peasants with the petty bourgeoisie, the semi-tenants with the semi-proletarians, and the farm labourers with the proletariat.<sup>13</sup> As he saw it, in addition to the "compradore bourgeoisie, the bankers, the big merchants, the industrialists, and the big landowners", the "big bourgeoisie" included "officials and their myrmidons"—the top executives of banks and compradore merchant and industrial enterprises, the militarist officials, the politicians, a segment of students who were receiving their education overseas, a segment of teachers and students at higher and specialised schools, and the leading lawyers. The composition and numerical strength of the proletariat were defined as follows: factory workers—about three million; the agricultural proletariat—some 20 million; and lumpen-proletariat—20 million.<sup>14</sup>

Mao's pattern mirrored neither Marxism's general approach to analyses of classes in society nor the specific character of China of those years. The peasantry cannot be regarded through the prism of belonging either to the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The peasants are a class in their own right. Landowners cannot be identified with the bourgeoisie either by the character of their property, or their conditions of labour and mode of deriving income. Attention must be drawn to the lumpens (Mao estimated their number at 20 million), whom in those years and subsequently he regarded as the key reserve of the working-class movement.

Mao's political preferences are seen in his calling the Kuomintang the "leader of the masses" and making no mention of the Communist Party.

In "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society" (in the *Selected Works* it is headed "The Classes of Chinese Society") Mao wrote that the middle bourgeoisie was in fact the national bourgeoisie and that its aspiration to form a state in which it would be predominant was illusory. His rationale for this conclusion was that a decisive clash was taking place in the world between two gigantic forces—the revolution and the counter-revolution. "Each has hoisted a

huge banner: one is the red banner of revolution held aloft by the Third International as the rallying point for all the oppressed classes of the world, the other is the white banner of counter-revolution held aloft by the League of Nations (!?) as the rallying point for all counter-revolutionaries of the world. The intermediate classes are bound to disintegrate quickly, some sections turning left to join the revolution, others turning right to join the counter-revolution." <sup>15</sup>

Mao rounded off this affected pattern with a fairly typical accord—a division into ideological friends and foes. As a result, the principal characteristic of the class structure is not the social condition but the ideological criterion (later this was a key approach in Mao's interpretation of the demarcation of forces in the nation).

Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925. His last words were addressed to the Kuomintang and to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. He urged the Kuomintang to maintain its alliance with the masses, cooperate with the CPC, and cement friendship with the USSR. However, the Kuomintang leaders soon ignored these exhortations. Right-wing elements, who were out to rupture cooperation with the Communists and suppress the working-class and peasants' movements, won increasing power in the Kuomintang. The first step in this direction was taken by Chiang Kai-shek in March 1926. He removed Communists from leading positions in the Kuomintang and from political work in the army, and made a number of arrests. However, the Communists and other left forces in the Kuomintang managed to prevent the break-up of the united front.

Mao continued taking part in many of the measures organised by the Kuomintang in the peasant movement. In late 1926 and early 1927 he conducted an inquiry into peasant organisations in some districts of Hunan. This six weeks' inquiry resulted in the "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Human Province" (March 1927), which was published in Kuomintang journals and in pamphlet form (April 1927).

Some biographers laud this work, calling it the "peasant manifesto of Mao Tse-tung". Are there grounds for this?

If the consummation of the democratic revolution is expressed by 10/10, Mao wrote, the participation of urban dwellers and the army will be equal to 3/10, and of the

peasants, accomplishing the revolution in the countryside, to 7/10.<sup>16</sup>

Who were these "urban dwellers"? Workers? The bourgeoisie? Who controlled the army? Who was at the head of the revolution: the workers, the national bourgeoisie, or the poor peasants? All this remained vague. As regards the idea that the peasants had a special role to play in the imminent revolution, it will be recalled that on the recommendation of the Comintern this idea was introduced into the key documents of the CPC of those years.

In April 1927 Mao was appointed a member of the Kuomintang-dominated Standing Committee of the Provisional Executive Committee of the All-China Peasant Association. At the time Mao was still insisting on cooperation not only with the Kuomintang but also with Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>17</sup>

Meanwhile, on April 12, 1927 Chiang Kai-shek effected a counter-revolutionary coup in Shanghai. Within a few months Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang. A wave of mass arrests of revolutionary workers and peasants swept across the country. The united national front was broken. Civil war erupted.

The Communists were faced with the task of forming their own armed forces. The People's Liberation Army dates from the mutiny on August 1, 1927 of Kuomintang army units commanded by Chu Teh, Ho Lung, Chou En-lai, and Yeh Ting. At the same time, peasant guerrilla units were formed in Kiangsi and Hunan provinces. Mao helped to raise these units.

The 5th Congress of the CPC was held in Wuhan two weeks after the coup orchestrated by Chiang Kai-shek. On the plea of illness Mao did not attend the congress. He faulted the CPC Central Committee, which shortly before this had removed him from the post of head of the CC's Peasant Department.

At an emergency conference on August 7, 1927 the Central Committee called for armed uprisings. Moreover, it drew up a programme for a series of risings in the countryside. At this conference Mao was elected a member of the CC and an alternate member of the Provisional Politburo.

The CC's theses "On the Political Situation and the Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party", adopted at the August conference, declared that the democratic revolution could triumph only through an unremitting class struggle against

the warlords, the landowners, and the bourgeoisie. To prosecute a revolutionary war a new revolutionary army had to be formed—this, the theses stated, was a cardinal task.<sup>18</sup>

CC representatives were sent to the provinces, where in the course of the revolution of 1925-1927 the peasant movement had reached the largest dimensions, to organise what is today known in the history of the CPC as the Autumn Harvest Uprising. Mao went to his native province of Hunan.

On August 20, a few days after he arrived in Hunan, he wrote to the CC: "A comrade who came to Hunan informed me that in its new instructions the International noted that Soviets of Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Deputies should be set up in China without delay.

"Upon hearing this, I danced with joy. Objectively speaking, China has long ago come to its 1917, although everybody is still of the opinion that we are in 1905. This is a gross mistake."

Further, he wrote that he now appreciated that the Kuomintang could not win the support of the people, that it was no longer possible to march under its banner for this would spell out defeat, that the Kuomintang banner was a black banner, that the red banner had to be hoisted immediately, with determination.

What motivated this volte-face relative to the Kuomintang?

The main thing, of course, was Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup, which ruled out further cooperation. On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung can be believed when he speaks of his admiration of the peasant movement's successes, which he had observed in Hunan and other provinces.

The Autumn Harvest Uprisings ended tragically everywhere. A plenum of the CPC Central Committee (November 1927) analysed the reasons for the failure of these uprisings and specifically mentioned the mistakes made in Hunan. In its decisions it was stated that as the authorised representative of the CC in Hunan Mao Tse-tung had been the central figure in the provincial committee. He, therefore, bore most of the responsibility for the mistakes of the Hunan Provincial Committee. The plenum relieved Mao of the post of alternate member of the CC Provisional Politburo.<sup>19</sup>

What were the mistakes imputed to him? The biggest was his dependence solely on military force. At the plenum it was declared that an uprising, whose goal was solely to seize the cities without enforcing an agrarian revolution in the countryside and without mobilising the revolutionary masses for participation in the revolution, an uprising that did not orient the masses on the seizure of land and power was purely "military opportunism".<sup>20</sup> "The most dangerous aspect is reliance entirely on military strength and on military preparations."<sup>21</sup>

At least two major points about this important plenum must be noted. The first is that it drew attention to the petty-bourgeois origin and nature of most of the CPC leaders and to the general predominance of the petty-bourgeois element in the Party. The second is its use of the concept "Maoism". This new deviation was characterised as "military adventurism" and a "gun movement". At the 6th CPC Congress one of the delegates said: "After August 7 (i.e., the August conference.—*F. B.*) . . . the so-called Autumn Harvest uprisings began. The Central Committee pointed out at the time that this was military opportunism, i.e., Maoism, because it was Mao Tse-tung who kept insisting on the use of bayonets."<sup>22</sup>

In the autumn of 1927, when the Hunan uprising was crushed, Mao fled together with a handful of peasants and fugitive Kuomintang soldiers. This was when his knowledge of classical literature about bandits of the past stood him in good stead. He established his first base in the Chingkan Mountains (Ching kangshan) on the boundary between Hunan and Kiangsi provinces. These mountains were part of the Lohsiao Range (Lohsiaooshan).<sup>23</sup>

Mao told Edgar Snow of an episode of this period. Two former bandit chiefs, Wang Tso and Yuan Wen-tsai, joined the Red Army in the winter of 1927. They were made regimental commanders, with Mao as the commander of the "army". As long as Mao was at the Ching kangshan base these former bandits were "faithful Communists and carried out the Party's orders". Later, when they were left alone they returned to their bandit habits and were killed by the peasants, who by that time were organised and able to defend themselves.<sup>24</sup>

An indicative episode, you will agree. The bandits were "faithful Communists" as long as they were under Mao's

command, but when he left they returned to their bandit habits . . . What vanity! It could move not only bandits from the Chingkan Mountains but also the mountains themselves!

In later years when he explained why there were so many declassed elements in his army, Mao declared that qualitative changes in the character of such people had to be secured through political education because the "subjective generated the objective".

However, Mao's own temperament and imagination were of no little significance here. His attraction for romantic bandit heroes was evident in his articles on classes in Chinese society written in 1926. He maintained that declassed elements—soldiers, bandits, highwaymen, beggars, and prostitutes—were potential revolutionaries. He displayed similar sympathy for secret societies. He believed that the two bandits in his army belonged to a secret society, whose chiefs had taken part in the revolution of 1911.<sup>25</sup> Mao's liking for bandits aroused apprehensions in the CPC Central Committee, which instructed Chu Teh to contact Mao and rectify some of his mistakes. Mao's main mistake was formulated as follows: "Mao was behaving like the bandit heroes of *Water Margin*. . . sallying forth to carry out exploits on behalf of the masses, instead of rousing the masses to undertake an . . . armed insurrection."<sup>26</sup>

The situation in Mao's numerically small—only 1,000-strong—unit was saved in early 1928 with the arrival of 40,000 well-armed troops under Chu Teh.<sup>27</sup> The Fourth Red Army was formed in the spring of 1928 on the basis of these two detachments. A Soviet government of workers, peasants, and soldiers of the boundary region between Hunan and Kiangsi was set up on the example of other countries. Mao was soon elected secretary of the newly formed CPC Special Committee of the Hunan-Kiangsi border district.

## Forces Are United

Here we shall not dwell on all the ups and downs of the revolutionary struggle in China under the banner of Soviets (1927-1937), the national liberation war against Japanese imperialism (1937-1945) and, last, the civil war

(1946-1949). We are interested in Mao Tse-tung's ideological and political stand in different periods. Let us begin with the question of building up armed forces.

Following the defeat of the revolution of 1925-1927 the CPC leadership felt that energetic steps had to be taken to form military units, accumulate armaments and build up armed forces in order to be able, when the situation improved, to begin hostilities against the Kuomintang, first in individual provinces and then, if possible, throughout China. Within the framework of this general line there were many important nuances expressing different tactical approaches to this task.

As early as during the revolution of 1925-1927 the leadership of the CPC, as, indeed, of the Comintern, repeatedly noted that the key aspect of the Chinese revolution was the struggle between the armed forces of the two sides: reaction and the people. According to the terminology of that period, in China the armed revolution was fighting the armed counter-revolution. Initially, the forces fighting on the side of the people comprised a united national front. The second period, which followed the breakdown of the united front with the Kuomintang, saw the Chinese Communists begin forming armed forces.

The debate about the role of the armed forces in the revolution touched upon many problems: whether to concentrate on forming an independent Red Army or only on political work in the army of the adversary; methods of combining the formation of army units with work among the masses, including Party, trade union, local government, and other mass work; tactics to be used against the Kuomintang troops, and so on. An attentive comparison of the CPC Central Committee's instructions at the close of the 1920s and in the early 1930s with Mao's views shows that on the whole in these issues Mao expressed the Party line with all its vacillations. Even when he articulated more or less independent views, they were not free of the misguided notions widespread in the Party.

Mao's stand, as that of other figures in the CPC, was in fact based on "trial and error". The Party was only beginning to accumulate its own experience of forming a genuinely revolutionary army, of organising the guerrilla struggle, of conducting large-scale military operations, of setting up strongholds in the countryside, of assuming power

in the provinces, of enforcing agrarian reforms, and of drawing the masses into the revolutionary movement.

Clear-cut directions on forming the Red Army were given in the decisions of the 6th CPC Congress (June-July 1928),<sup>1</sup> which stated that the most pressing task was that of strengthening the Red Army, setting up revolutionary bases, and promoting the agrarian revolution with the confiscation of the landed estates and their distribution among the peasants as its slogan. The formation of the Red Army, the congress stressed, was the main condition for the upswing of the revolution.<sup>2</sup>

The new approach was later adopted also by Mao Tse-tung, who wrote to the CPC Central Committee on April 5, 1929 that the formation and reinforcement of the Red Army were the main conditions that would facilitate the struggle in the cities and speed up the revolution.

Mao Tse-tung unquestionably contributed to the build-up of the Chinese Red Army. But it would be impossible to prove that his was a larger contribution than that of many other CPC leaders, chiefly of the celebrated Chinese general Chu Teh and also of Peng Teh-huai, Fang Chih-min, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Ho Lung, and Liu Po-cheng, to mention a few.

In the CPC the debate was not so much over whether a Red Army should be formed as over the revolutionary movement as a whole. In this context special attention should be given to the adventurist exhortations of Li Li-san.

Let us recall some facts. Li Li-san, who was the actual leader of the CPC in the early 1930s, enunciated his views most fully and openly at a Politburo sitting on April 7, 1930. The tactics proposed by him were as follows. China was a country in which the conflict between the imperialists had reached its zenith and in which the forces of imperialism were most vulnerable. The Chinese revolution would give an impetus to the world revolution because imperialism would send all its forces to suppress the Chinese revolution and this would make the revolutionary explosion all the greater in the Western countries and the Eastern colonies. The triumph of the revolution in China would usher in the triumph of the world revolution.

What were the implications? After the uprising commenced in China it would be necessary to involve the So-



viet Union in a big war with the imperialist powers, a war that would signal the beginning of the world revolution.

At a Politburo meeting some months later (August 1930), Li Li-san put it more bluntly: "When Wuhan is in our hands, we shall be able to speak with the Comintern and the Russian fraternal Party and tell them that the time has come for a world war and for the Soviet Army to interfere." He maintained that an uprising in Manchuria would be the prologue of an "international war" because Manchuria was in the hands of Japanese imperialism. As a result of this uprising Japan would mount an offensive against the USSR and this would trigger an "international war". "Our strategy is aimed at precipitating an international war," Li Li-san said. "The Comintern, possibly, will find this wrong, but I am convinced that I am right. Mongolia (the Mongolian People's Republic) should declare itself a part of Soviet China and move its troops to the north. The Chinese residing in Siberia should be armed and moved here... The Comintern should now set an offensive course. Chiefly, the Soviet Union. It should prepare for war energetically... The Comintern should change its policy and go over to the offensive. This is not Trotskyism... The five-year plan (having the USSR in mind.—*F. B.*) can be fulfilled provided this offensive course is adopted... Otherwise, the Comintern will not discharge its duty to the revolution!" Li Li-san regarded China as the centre of the world revolution and held that it was possible even "to sacrifice the Soviet Union in the interests of the Chinese revolution"(!).

This was an unambiguous plan. A more open and thoughtless piece of adventurism and nationalism will not be found in the history of the world liberation movement, which knows adventurists of the Nechayev and Trotsky type.

What was the Politburo's attitude to this monstrous plan? Far from making a denunciation, the CPC leadership took it seriously and used it as the basis for the Party's practical activities. This eloquently indicates the level and character of the political leadership in the CPC.

Of course, Li Li-san articulated the most extreme school of adventurism in the CPC. But he was not alone. On June 11, 1930, i. e., before its sitting in August, the Politburo passed a resolution "On the New Revolutionary Up-

swing and Conquest of Power First in One or Several Provinces", in which it called for uprisings in the summer of 1930 in Nanking, Wuhan, Shanghai, Peking, Kwangchow (Canton), and other major industrial centres. This plan was clearly a provocation, for in the cities there were neither an organisation that could lead an uprising nor a mass movement. It was a calculation on an international conflict that would create the conditions for the victory of the Chinese revolution.

What about Mao Tse-tung? What did he think of this plan? It is hard to say what his reaction was because he did not attend the above-mentioned sittings of the Politburo. However, two circumstances are known. The first is that on his part there was no semblance of protest or criticism, although he received the relevant documents and information. And the second is that he and the Red Army units under his command committed themselves to Li Li-san's adventure. More, the above-mentioned resolution was based on a plan proposed to the Central Committee by Mao in April 1929—this was a plan for gaining control of Kiangsi Province in the course of one year. Further evidence is provided by the decision of a combined Party conference on February 7, 1930, over which Mao Tse-tung presided. The substance of this decision was that an attack should be organised against the city of Nanchang, capital of Kiangsi Province.

This decision, it must be noted, preceded the CC's circular No. 70 calling upon all units of the Red Army to seize the major cities. Upon receiving this circular, Mao and the commanders of other army units set about organising attacks on Nanchang, Wuhan, and Changsha, but their attempt ended in a fiasco.

On the basis of these facts it is not hard to assess the worth of the assertions of Maoist historians that Mao Tse-tung was in the fore in demanding the rectification of Li Li-san's line, that he "never supported it but, on the contrary, rectified with much patience the 'left' mistakes".<sup>3</sup>

True, this was the period when he was forming an idea of the mistakes, weaknesses, and difficulties of the communist movement in China. But these ideas were being accumulated by the entire Party, by its leadership. We find serious criticism of the left deviation in the CPC in the pronouncements of Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu), Po Ku

(Chin Pang-hsien), Chang Kuo-tao, and other CPC leaders of those years.

It would be in order to note something else: the long crisis in the political and ideological leadership of the CPC, a crisis that commenced when the Party was founded and grew particularly acute in the early 1930s, when Li Li-san's left opportunism prevailed, and in the period of the struggle to overcome it. This crisis had an objective foundation.

In a country like China, that had not known the capitalist stage of development and was burdened by semi-feudal relations and age-long traditions of imperial rule, it was incredibly difficult to give life to a proletarian communist movement. A huge effort was needed to rouse the nation's millions and direct them towards the national liberation and bourgeois-democratic revolutions. But it was even more difficult to found an organised communist movement when the proletariat numbered hardly 2 per cent of the population and had not gone through anything comparable with the class struggle and class self-identification of the proletariat of capitalist countries. It was a formidable task to form an effective alliance of the working class with the peasants, to combine the aims of the peasant war, national liberation, and social reconstruction.

The weakness of the CPC leadership mirrored these objective difficulties. Also of no little importance was the fact that petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry were the social base for moulding cadres in the CPC, and that unlike the situation in Russia most of the intellectuals steered clear of the communist movement. Much of the CPC leadership consisted of semi-intellectuals, of people who had had an inadequate education and knew little about the international experience of the revolutionary struggle, the experience of the October Revolution, and Marxist-Leninist theory.

Strange as it may seem, many CPC leaders had a poor understanding of the conditions obtaining in China itself. As distinct from what took place in the West European Marxist revolutionary movement, the formation of the CPC was not accompanied by profound theoretical analyses of the Chinese economy, social relations, traditions of power and administration, and the genesis of the embryonic capitalist relations.

Whereas the West European communist movement had at its disposal the works of Marx and Engels and also of

other theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, whose writings preceded or paralleled the creation of revolutionary proletarian parties and facilitated their ideological self-identification; and whereas in Russia the proletarian movement produced a leader of the calibre of Lenin, who long before the Party was formed and in the period of its formation had worked out its philosophical, ideological, and political principles, the revolutionary proletarian movement in China neither had nor could hardly have had such a sound theoretical basis. The movement itself was much too undeveloped. The cultural accumulations in revolutionary thought and social philosophy were much too insignificant.

It would be wrong, of course, to assert that nothing at all was done in the way of theoretically elaborating the problems of the Chinese revolution. Many documents of the CPC and pronouncements of its leaders contain important propositions on fundamental problems of the struggle of the Communists and the people for a democratic, anti-feudal revolution and for the transition to the socialist revolution. Nevertheless, relative to many basic problems of the CPC's strategy there was a vacuum, which at the same time concerned the problem of assimilating the international experience of the revolutionary movement and ascertaining the specific national features of the communist movement in China. This was one of the causes and, at the same time, one of the symptoms of the crisis in the CPC.

In the case of Mao Tse-tung, his contribution to theory in that period was confined to a few articles, reports, and letters, most of which we have mentioned. He was only beginning to test his ability to analyse significant ideological and political processes in China and in the Chinese revolution. He was only beginning to ponder the strategy and tactics of the CPC.

All the more natural that one should ask how Mao Tse-tung became leader of the Party in 1935, was able to beat off the other claimants and, within a relatively short time, concentrate all power in his hands? The answer, we feel, lies in the historical features of the period, in the obtaining correlation of forces in the CPC, and in Mao Tse-tung's distinctive features as a politician.

While in the mid-1930s he had not come forward as the ideologue of the CPC, it is unquestionable that his main

qualities as a politician had taken shape. That was what ensured his advance to the CPC leadership. He realised before anybody else that in order to become the Party's leader he had to have his own group in the Central Committee, and he worked day and night to put together a "stronghold" in the Party.

This quality of Mao Tse-tung as a politician is seen distinctly when one reads the materials and documents of the CPC of that period, the reminiscences of people who supported or opposed him, of the people whom he managed to win or force to his side, of people he moved into the background or even expelled from the political scene, of people who observed him with sympathy or dislike in the late 1920s and the early 1930s. Mao Tse-tung displayed outstanding ability in the power struggle that was constantly rending the Chinese leadership.

At the 6th Congress of the CPC Chou En-lai spoke of frequent squabbles in the Party top echelon motivated not by divergences over political issues but exclusively by personal ambitions. He said there was no inner-Party democracy, that Party committees were not elected, and that committee secretaries were usually appointed; patriarchalism, factionalism, feuds, and power-hunger flourished among the petty-bourgeois intellectuals in the Party's leading cadre. "Our understanding of discipline," he said, "is much too mechanical and even absurd, with the result that the measure of punishment had gone so far as the shooting of one's own comrades." <sup>4</sup>

Other delegates said much the same thing. They noted that a "principle" widespread in the Party was: "Those who agree with me can live, those who disagree must die." <sup>5</sup> "Factions spring up in the CPC," said one of the delegates, "not over differences but simply as a result of the mandarin race to the top. Many Party members want to be leaders." <sup>6</sup>

This was also admitted by Li Li-san: "In the history of the CPC there have been innumerable cases of savage inner-Party group struggle, especially of unprincipled struggle (that in many cases were squabbles). Because the group struggle in the CPC is not political but the most unprincipled, it is very hard to find material about it (with rare exceptions). Because of the unprincipled character of this struggle, all the groups participating in it were amorphous,

sometimes organising themselves and sometimes acting in a totally unorganised manner.”<sup>7</sup>

The petty-bourgeois origin and non-Marxist views of many of the Party cadres were one of the main reasons for these unhealthy phenomena. One can refer to the fairly probing, self-critical analysis made in a resolution of a CC plenum in November 1927. This resolution, headed “On the Immediate Organisational Tasks of the CPC”, states that one of the paramount organisational drawbacks of the CPC, a drawback of enormous political significance, was that the most radical elements of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie joined the CPC, which formed the far left wing of the national liberation movement. These elements comprised the initial nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party.

“In the Communist Party of China this stratum was the principal proponent of the opportunist, semi-Menshevik line that underlay the Party’s entire policy until the counter-revolutionary coup in Wuhan, and left its imprint on the actions of the Party leadership.”<sup>8</sup>

In the CPC there were many instances in those years of petty-bourgeois elements taking over the leadership: Li Lisan was a typical case. But, I would say, Mao had more qualities of a leader of this type than anybody else. Let us illustrate this with a few examples.

Our first example concerns the relations between Mao and Chu Teh. These relations showed Mao’s ability to reach a compromise and ultimately subordinate other leaders to himself.

Their first meeting took place in the Chingkangshan period, when Chu Teh joined Mao with a military force that was several times larger than the force commanded by the latter: the principle of “who commands the army is in command of the Party” was frequently applied in the CPC. The two men clashed over some military issues, but the bone of contention was power and subordination, as often happened in the CPC.

Peng Teh-huai, who witnessed the clash, later related that Mao was hard to get along with, that he relished squabbles, that he insulted the commander-in-chief Chu Teh. “Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung were not on speaking terms. Mao Tse-tung’s methods were very brutal. If he was not obeyed he would find a way to have his will done: it was beyond him to unite veteran functionaries. Mao Tse-tung

went out of his way to accentuate the role of lumpens, believing that they were the vanguard of the revolution; this was a lumpen line. Moreover, he erred also in the question of the kulaks. He was a narrow-minded empiricist."

Nevertheless, Chu Teh soon cooperated with Mao and even accepted his leadership. If it is borne in mind that Chu Teh's prestige in the army and the CPC was incomparably greater than Mao's, one can imagine what it cost Mao to win the veteran soldier to his side.

Also indicative is the way Mao shaped his relations with Chou En-lai, who was sent in 1931 to the Central Soviet Region as head of the CPC Central China Bureau. This meant that Mao had to take orders from Chou En-lai. Mao wasted no time in starting a covert struggle against Chou.

Hsieh Ling-hsiao, who was involved in this struggle, later recalled that Mao went to all lengths to dissolve the new bureau, but this was not easy to do because Chou had his own supporters, was vested with military authority, and held a high post in the Party. This gave Mao no peace and he ordered his supporters to mould the opinion that the Central China Bureau was irrationally and incorrectly organised. Behind Chou En-lai's back Mao called him the "Red supreme ruler" and a "bureaucrat". "In his heart of hearts he wanted Chou En-lai's downfall, but outwardly made believe he wished him to become the General Secretary of the Central Committee. But the wily and astute Chou En-lai only answered with a smile."

At an enlarged conference of the CC Central Bureau in Ningtu in August 1932, Chou En-lai used the authority given him by the CC to remove Mao Tse-tung from the leadership. In addition to criticising Mao's views on military issues, he charged that Mao "did not understand Marxism". Chou insisted on open criticism of Mao's misconceived propositions. However, the CC leadership, which was in Shanghai at the time, did not endorse this move because Chiang Kai-shek had started his fourth campaign against the Chinese Red Army. They felt that in that situation it would be wrong to weaken the unity (albeit formal) in the leadership.

What did Mao do in this situation? He found it expedient to plead illness and take a holiday. This temporising on the pretext of illness or withdrawing voluntarily was to become one of Mao's favourite dodges. The propitious moment he expected soon came.

The arrival of CC leaders headed by Po Ku in the Central Soviet Region in Kiangsi (early 1933) renewed Mao's chances in the power struggle. On the recommendation of the Comintern representative, the Provisional Politburo of the CC and the CC Bureau of the Central Soviet Region were merged with Po Ku appointed to head the Provisional Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee. Po Ku's appointment gave Mao the opportunity to use the conflict between Po Ku and Chou En-lai to strengthen his own hand.

True, as yet Mao was not a member of the CC Secretariat and was not invited to many sittings of the Central Committee. He did not attend the Central Committee's fifth plenum in January 1934. However, he was present at all sittings of the Military Revolutionary Council, even presiding at some of these sittings. As Chairman of the Provisional Soviet Government he wasted no time in forming a faction of his army henchmen against Po Ku and made every effort to win the support of Chou En-lai.

As early as at the close of the 1920s he won the backing of a fairly influential group, which he used to attack first Chu Teh, then the CPC committees in Hunan and Kiangsi provinces, and, lastly, the CC leadership. This group included Lin Piao, Chen Yi, Chen Che-jen, Tsen Shan, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Mao Tse-tan (Mao Tse-tung's brother). With the help of this group Mao consolidated his authority and influence first in the Fourth Red Army (under Chu and Mao) and then became head of the General Front Committee, subordinating to himself not only all the military and guerrilla units operating in Southeast Kiangsi and West Fukien, but also the Party and Soviet government bodies in these regions. Members of the leadership of the Kiangsi Provincial Party Committee, who maintained direct contact with Mao Tse-tung and were later brutally repressed, noted at the time that Mao was captive to militarist psychology and Bonapartism, that he "was determined to realise his ambition of becoming an emperor in the Party".

In the meantime, the situation in China was rapidly deteriorating as a result of the aggression started by the Japanese in 1931.

The attempts of the Japanese to seize Shanghai in early 1932 and the escalation of Japanese aggression set the CPC the new task of forming a united anti-Japanese front. This



entailed a re-examination of the strategy and tactics of struggle, and adoption of new slogans and a new programme of united action by the anti-imperialist front. The Party's call for the immediate overthrow of the Kuomintang and the establishment of Soviet power was found to be an objective hindrance to the mobilisation of the people for a national liberation struggle. In early 1932, acting on the recommendation of the Comintern, the CPC Central Committee called for a national-revolutionary war against the Japanese and other imperialists.

The 2nd All-China Congress of Soviets was convened in Juichin, capital of the Soviet regions, in January 1934. It summed up the achievements of the revolution and elected the Central Government of Soviet China. Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman. At the congress he said:

"Our Soviets and the Chinese Red Army bear a great responsibility for the salvation of the Chinese people. The victory of the Chinese revolution would signify not only the liberation of the 450-million-strong Chinese people but also a step towards the liberation of all the oppressed Eastern peoples from imperialist tyranny. It would deal the death-blow to the Japanese and other imperialists, who are seeking to kindle war in the Pacific."<sup>9</sup>

In October 1934 the Red Army set out on its Long March to the northwest. The army was in movement practically all the time and fought the enemy uninterruptedly. It surmounted enormous difficulties, crossing impassable mountain ranges and China's deepest and most fast-flowing rivers, marching across deserts and swamps, braving frosts and a sultry sun, snow and rain, and beating off Kuomintang troops in Kwangtung, Hunan, Kwangsi, Kweichow, Yunnan, Szechwan, Kansu, and Shensi provinces. In October 1935 it finally reached North Shensi and entrenched itself in Northwest China.<sup>10</sup>

On the Long March the Red Army was commanded by Chu Teh, with Chou En-lai as the Chief Political Commissar and Chairman of the CC Military Council, and Otto Braun (Li Teh), sent by the Comintern, as the military adviser.

In the period of the Long March a conference was held in the town of Tsunyi at which Mao was at last in a position to fulfil his long-prepared plan of assuming power in the CPC. He insisted on the convocation of an enlarged Polit-

buro conference, which took place on January 7 and 8, 1935. Again, on his insistence, it was attended not only by members and alternate members of the Central Committee but also by leading personalities of the Political Department and General Staff, and the commanders and political commissars of the various Red Army units (army groups, corps, detachments, and divisions). Moreover, it was attended by top officials of the Central Soviet Government and its executive agencies. This produced an alignment of forces favourable to Mao because his standing in the army and local government organs was stronger than that of Po Ku and other CC members, who had shortly before arrived from Shanghai.

Comintern representative Otto Braun, who witnessed these developments, wrote that the non-CC members formed an overwhelming majority and, in contravention of the Party Constitution and all norms of Party life, were given not a consultative but a casting vote. Of the 35-40 participants, two-thirds, and possibly three-fourths, were not members of the Politburo and not even members of the Central Committee.

In his *Chinese Notes* (1932-1939) Otto Braun analyses why the internationalists were defeated at the Tsunyi Conference and mentions the following circumstances. First, after the blockade was breached practically all political activity and Party work were concentrated in the army, which, as I have already said, consisted almost entirely of peasants commanded by professional soldiers. Mao Tse-tung had the support of many commanders and political commissars, with whom he had been associated in many years of struggle. Evacuation from the Central Soviet Region infected them with disaffection and uncertainty, which Mao went to all lengths to encourage. Second, many of the veteran revolutionary leaders, for instance, Chiu Chu-po, Wang Ming, Hsiang Ying, Fang Chih-min, and Chang Kuo-tao (with the exception of Chiu Chu-po and Fang Chih-min, all were members of the Politburo) did not come to the Tsunyi Conference. Further, the Party's leadership included younger people like Po Ku, Lo Fu \*, and Chou En-lai, with only the latter having support in the army. Third, and last, the Party

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\* In the Party he was known as Chang Wen-tien.—Ed.

was still weak ideologically, and the composition of the Central Committee was more or less fortuitous. Eighty per cent of the CC members and alternate members were not elected at the 6th Congress; they were coopted after that congress. The same may be said of the Politburo. According to statistics for 1934, the social origin of the Central Committee members was 11 per cent working class, 26 per cent peasants, 26 per cent white collar workers and intelligentsia, and 37 per cent landowner and merchant classes. The fact that in 1934-1935 the leadership of the CPC was cut off entirely from the outside world was to prove calamitous.

Mao used the situation, the new mood in the Party, imputing all the blame for his errors to his political opponents and recovering the ground he had lost after his setback at the Ningtu Conference, which had removed him from the Party leadership and from military authority. Employing his usual tactics, he concentrated his attacks on Po Ku and sought an alliance against him with Chou En-lai despite the fact that it was Chou who was responsible for his ousting at Ningtu. Power in the Party meant more to him than personal grievances. Moreover, Chou, for his part, displayed his usual flexibility and yielded to the claims of a stronger personality. Mao owed his triumph in Tsunyi also to Lin Piao, Chen Yi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and other members of the close-knit group he had formed long before.

Outwardly, the scenario of the Tsunyi Conference was as follows. The first speaker was Po Ku, then General Secretary of the Central Committee, who reported on what had been done to check Chiang Kai-shek's fifth campaign and on the first stage of the Western campaign. A co-report was delivered by Chou En-lai. Without denying that there had been mistakes, they declared that on the whole the political and strategic leadership of the Central Committee had acted correctly against Chiang Kai-shek's fifth campaign.

This was strongly criticised by Mao Tse-tung, Lo Fu, Lin Piao, and other military and Party leaders. As a result, the conference passed a resolution, penned by Mao Tse-tung, "On the Results of the Struggle Against the Enemy's Fifth Campaign", which stated that the Po Ku report, the Chou En-lai co-report, and also their military leadership, tactics, and strategy during this campaign had on the whole been misguided.

But Mao's triumph was not yet complete. He was elected a member of the CC Secretariat, but Po Ku was still General Secretary of the CC, while Chou En-lai remained at the head of the military leadership. One can imagine the moves Mao had to make in order to gain the upper hand in the Party and the army quickly.

The first move, taken in February 1935, was Po Ku's replacement as General Secretary by Lo Fu, who was Mao's ally at the time. Lo Fu's first act was to suggest Chou En-lai's replacement by Mao Tse-tung as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army's 1st Front; this was done in March 1935. True, Lo Fu soon relieved Mao of that post, for a struggle developed between them for domination in the Party. This was countered by the formation, on Mao's suggestion, of a triumvirate consisting of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, and Wang Kia-hsiang to direct military affairs. Sharp disagreements immediately surfaced in the triumvirate over the issue of who was to be chief, with the result that this temporary group disintegrated. This brought new forces to the leadership. At a CC Politburo sitting in Lianghokou on June 28, 1935 Chu Teh was named Commander-in-Chief of the combined First and Fourth Red armies, and Chang Kuo-tao was made Political Commissar. For Mao these appointments meant a new stage of the power struggle, this time against Chang Kuo-tao, who was likewise determined to rule the Party.

It is hard to believe that all this took place during the Long March, when commanders and men of the Red Army performed miracles of courage and displayed fortitude in the fighting against an enemy many times superior numerically.

One of the most dramatic battles was fought at the Lu-shan Pass. It was there that Mao Tse-tung wrote the first of his Long March seven poems:

*The mountain pass is iron-clad.  
But with mighty stride  
We shall cross the peak today!  
The mountains are blue as the sea.  
And the setting sun  
Is growing blood-crimson.*<sup>11</sup>

The crossing of the Tatu River was a legendary feat of the Long March. It commenced, as did the crossing of the

Wukiang, with a sudden attack on a small enemy garrison guarding the pass, the seizure of boats, and an assault by a group of 18 men on enemy positions on the far bank. But several days were needed to ferry the entire army, and it was decided to seize a suspension bridge 100 kilometres to the north. Infantry units were assigned to reach the bridge in a single day. This was announced when the men were already on the march, for no time was left for a meeting. Early in the morning, after several manoeuvres to confuse the enemy, they reached the bridge and captured it.

The men moved towards the town along suspended chains, carrying grenades and machine-guns. They built the bridge floor in the face of enemy fire, the killed and wounded falling into the river. They pushed their way across burning wooden structures and finally took the town by assault.

Swamps were one of the most formidable barriers. Every incautious step took a man to his death in the mire before the eyes of his comrades if these comrades failed to pass him a pole in time.

Many died in the swamps. The remaining Red Armymen finally reached their destination, Shensi Province, in October 1935 after manoeuvres to deceive the enemy, innumerable ambushes, and savage fighting.

Mao described this in the following verse:

*The sky is high, the clouds are pale,  
We watch the wild geese  
Flying to the south,  
Until we lose sight of them.  
If we do not reach the Great Wall  
We cannot be called men.  
High on the crest of the mountain  
The wind unfurls our banners.  
In our hands we hold a rope.  
When will we tame  
The grey dragon?*<sup>12</sup>

We have mentioned these episodes of the Long March to give the reader an idea of the courage and heroism of the men and commanders of the Chinese Red Army, which not only successfully completed the march but in the long run ensured the triumph of the people's revolution. Despite the

incredibly difficult conditions of the Long March the Chinese Party and military leaders were able to organise resistance to the armies of the Kuomintang and the local warlords.

A new round of the struggle between Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-tao unfolded during the most dramatic months of the Long March. This struggle taxed the Maoist group to the utmost, for Chang Kuo-tao enjoyed considerable prestige in the CPC and the world communist movement.

We have no intention of following the twists and turns of this struggle, which dragged out for nearly two years. We shall only note that Mao took advantage of his adversary's every blunder in order to form the largest possible groups against him in the Party and military leadership. Chang Kuo-tao's undisguised attacks on all of Mao's supporters, his boasts about the victories of the Red Army's 4th Front, which he commanded, and his disputes with many Politburo members over the choice of the region to be administered by the Communists enabled Mao to muster forces for a strike at his chief rival.

The self-opinionated Chang Kuo-tao's ungovernable temper and incaution prompted him to make a rash step that had not been prepared organisationally and could only prejudice his standing. Although he had the backing only of a minority in the Politburo, he decided to change the situation then and there. He demanded new elections to the CC Politburo.

Recalling the consequences of this action, he later wrote that the January 1935 conference in Tsunyi was convened hastily. It did not criticise all the errors in the CC political line.

Chang Kuo-tao insisted on an enlarged plenum of the CC in order to reorganise the CC and elect new members to the Politburo. Mao Tse-tung strongly opposed this proposal, charging that Chang Kuo-tao was attempting to use military force to reorganise the CC. As a result, a split occurred in the CC and two opposing centres took shape: the Politburo under Mao Tse-tung and the Provisional Centre under Chang Kuo-tao.

The Politburo rejected Chang Kuo-tao's demands: most of its members had pledged to support Mao Tse-tung. A dramatic split took place in the Red Army. It had been united in Szechwan shortly before the split. Units of the 1st Front (First and Third armies), led by Mao supporters,

moved to the north, and units of the Red Army's 4th Front under Chang Kuo-tao moved to the south.

Mao Tse-tung and Chang Kuo-tao subsequently blamed each other for the split, which had greatly undermined the armed forces of the Communists. One thing is certain, and it is that Mao Tse-tung felt relieved at this turn of affairs: he had rid himself of a dangerous rival, albeit at a huge price, at the expense of the interests of the Party and the entire movement. He later resorted to this practice on many occasions. When he was faced with the choice between personal power and the interests of Party unity, he invariably decided in favour of personal power. This became the rule of his life and gave him many advantages against less self-centred rivals.

In the summer of 1936, after the Comintern had intervened, Chang Kuo-tao marched his troops to the Kansu-Shensi border region, where army units under Mao Tse-tung were stationed. But now their roles changed. The former received no leading post in the CPC and was sent on arduous march to the west, where Red Army units suffered a heavy setback. This gave Mao the possibility of dealing summarily with his hated rival.

A "case" was fabricated against Chang Kuo-tao. Incriminating material was collected and he was accused not only of errors in leading the army but also of "feudal and militarist habits".

In March 1937 the Politburo, now headed by Mao, adopted a document entitled "The Errors of Chang Kuo-tao". Broken in spirit, Chang Kuo-tao retired from Party work. He became an instructor at the Academy of Social Sciences in Yen-an. Later, in early 1938, fearing persecution, he fled from Yen-an to Hankow, made a statement against Mao and the policy of the Mao-led CC and, as a result, was expelled from the Party.

That ended the power struggle between Mao and Chang Kuo-tao. Mao triumphed. But this triumph was not due to his championing a "more correct line", as Maoist historiography asserts. There were no fundamental divergences between them. Both were men of one and the same orientation, were prone to make similar mistakes, and passionately wanted to play first fiddle in the CPC. Mao proved to be stronger. He acted more subtly and showed more willpower and restraint than his outspoken adversary.

For Mao there was still much ground to cover on the road to domination in the CPC. The following are the official posts held by him in the period from 1935 to 1945. At the Tsunyi Conference he was elected a member of the CC Secretariat (which in fact performed the role of the Standing Committee of the Politburo) and for all intents and purposes took over the direction of the CC Military Council. After the 1st Front was formed in October 1935 he was named its Political Commissar. The Communist Party School was founded in the winter of 1935. Mao was appointed its rector. From June 1936 onwards he was the Political Commissar of the Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, lecturing on the strategy of the revolutionary war in China. In January 1937 the academy was reconstituted into the Chinese Anti-Japanese Military-Political University and Mao was appointed Chairman of the Committee for Academy Affairs. In July 1938 he, along with Po Ku, Wang Ming, Tung Pi-wu, Teng Ying-chao, Lin Po-chu (Lin Tsuhan), and Wu Yu-chang, was appointed to represent the CPC in the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Council (the second was formed in 1946 in the period of the so-called 3rd United Front), the body formed for cooperation with the Kuomintang. In February 1940 Mao was made Chairman of the Yen-an National Congress "for condemning Wang Ching-wei and supporting Chiang Kai-shek", and a member of the executive of the committee for the adoption of a Constitution for Yen-an.

At the 7th CPC Congress (1945) Mao was elected Chairman of the CPC. In mid-1946, when the Kuomintang had mounted an offensive, the CC set up six district bureaus to parallel six large military units. The overall political and military direction was in the hands of the Central Committee and the People's Military Revolutionary Council presided over by Mao Tse-tung. Chu Teh was the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army. On March 19, 1947 Kuomintang troops captured Yen-an. This compelled the Central Committee to divide into two groups: one, headed by Mao, remained in North Shensi, and the other, the CC Working Committee under Liu Shao-chi, set up its headquarters in Hopeh Province. Northeast China was, in effect, the central base of the Chinese revolution during this period.

Let us consider once more why it was none other than



Mao Tse-tung who became sole leader of the CPC, a role, as we have seen, claimed by many personalities in the Party. One has to be naive to believe that history is fore-ordained down to the last detail and person, and still this "piece of fortuity" had its causes. We must look for the explanation in the historical circumstances of the period.

First, there was the atmosphere in the CPC leadership, in which various groups were locked in unremitting struggle over fundamental issues of the strategy and tactics of the Chinese revolution and over the problem of personal power, influence, and prestige.

In a situation witnessing continuous fighting with the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and other warlords, and the savage persecution of the Communists, particularly of their leaders, in the main cities, the internal discord and disunity were especially dangerous and almost one of the basic problems in the CPC. The situation demanded unity, firm leadership, discipline, and order. In the Party many people, notably among the military, saw the way out in choosing a leader capable of stopping the endless bickering and factionalism. Also, in the CPC leadership itself there were some who wanted a strong leader capable of injecting iron-clad discipline into the chaotic administration of the Party with its constant replacement of leaders, each of whom departed from the political scene with the label of "rightist" or "leftist", "opportunist", "Trotskyist", "dogmatist", or "empiricist".

The situation in China itself and in the world as a whole was similarly significant. Japan's piratical attack on China, confronting the entire nation with the threat of enslavement, accentuated the national liberation orientation of the imminent revolution. Growing numbers of workers, peasants, and intellectuals joined the patriotic, anti-Japanese movement. The Party could not hold aloof from this development and continue concentrating on the struggle with the Kuomintang. There had to be a change in the Party's strategy and tactics, and this demanded unity of action with all progressive forces against the Japanese invaders.

Mao Tse-tung had shown by his actions that for him the problem of national rejuvenation was paramount.

Emi Hsiao went into raptures over Mao's work in the mid-1930s, admiringly quoting his words in defence of

the national freedom and dignity of the Chinese people. Here are these words:

"The Chinese people are not a flock of submissive sheep. They are a great nation with a rich history, lofty national consciousness, and a profound understanding of human justice. In the name of national self-respect, human justice, and the desire to live on their own soil, the Chinese people will never let Japanese fascism reduce them to slaves."<sup>13</sup>

These were powerful words, indeed. Of course, pronouncements of this sort impressed the Communists and other progressive segments of the Chinese nation. In view of the situation obtaining in the CPC, the elements opposed to the outdated and in many cases misconceived policy line had the greatest chances of winning the struggle for leadership of the Party. Mao Tse-tung made skilful use of this favourable circumstance: the fact that he had criticised the former leaders, despite the fact that his criticism did not touch on basic political issues, was in his favour. The Party rank and file assessed his pronouncements as opposition to the Party leadership at the time. Also significant was that for many years he had been associated in military work with Chu Teh and other leading CPC personalities, work that received priority in the face of the Japanese aggression and the Kuomintang campaigns.

Further, the Communist Party suffered huge losses; its leadership, too, was thinned. The losses were especially heavy among the CPC leaders connected with the working-class movement in China. During the first six months after the Chiang Kai-shek coup in 1927 the CPC membership fell from 50,000 to 10,000. In the early 1930s a heavy toll was exacted by the repressions against Communists in Shanghai sparked by betrayal. During the Red Army's Long March to the northwest (1934-1937) the CPC's strength dropped from 300,000 to 40,000. Roughly 400,000 Communists and sympathisers, including almost all those who worked in urban party branches and among factory workers, lost their lives in the period from 1927 to 1935.<sup>14</sup>

In 1927 the Chinese warlords dealt summarily with Li Ta-chao, one of the first popularisers of Marxism in China and a founding member of the Communist Party; Chang Tai-lei, who helped to organise the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League and headed the rising in Canton in 1927, was killed; Peng Pai, who helped to set

up the first peasant alliance and the first workers' and peasants' democratic government, was executed in Shanghai two years later; in 1932 Kuomintang butchers shot Teng Chung-hsia, member of the CPC Central Committee since 1922 and one of the leaders of the Hongkong-Canton strike; Chiu Chu-po, who was high in the CPC hierarchy and had studied the experience of the October Revolution in the Soviet Union, was shot in 1935; Fang Chih-min, founder of one of the first revolutionary bases and participant in the Nanchang uprising, was murdered that same year; Su Chao-cheng, CC Politburo member, Chairman of the All-China Trade Union Federation, and head of the Canton commune government, lost his life.

All these losses affected the efficacy of the CPC's political leadership.

Another circumstance that helped to bring Mao Tse-tung into prominence was that his supporters kept the Comintern misinformed about the situation in the CPC, which was always confused and intricate. Although many people in the Comintern had reservations about Mao Tse-tung, the bitter experience with the former leaders (Chen Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, and others) showed that there was little to choose between the leaders of the Chinese revolution. Legends about the heroism and staunchness of the CPC's military and political leaders, among whom Mao's name figured constantly, were spread by the world press not without a push from Mao Tse-tung himself and the efforts of publicists like Edgar Snow and Emi Hsiao.

Lastly, Mao's personal qualities as a leader were of a definite type. What was he like, this Chinese political leader, in whose mind were combined veneration of the Emperor Liu Pang, the leaders of peasant uprisings, and Napoleon Bonaparte?

## **“Political Person”**

We can get a picture of Mao the “political person” (an expression used by Aristotle) from various sources. An accepted main source consists of the personal impressions and eye-witness accounts of Edgar Snow, who was the first Westerner to meet with Mao Tse-tung in the summer

of 1936 in Paoang, (North Shensi), and then met with the Chinese Communists in 1939 and, lastly, in 1960 and 1971.

Snow wrote a series of books and articles building up the personality of Mao and spotlighting the cause of the Chinese revolution: *Red Star Over China*, *Strong Man with a Charmed Life*, *Random Notes on Red China* (1936-1945) and *The Other Side of the River*, to mention a few. American journalists, like Agnes Smedley, who lived for a long time in Yen-an, and Anna Louise Strong contributed to the glorification of Mao Tse-tung. These journalists and writers were opposed to the colonialist policy of the imperialist powers, and, on the whole, endeavoured to inform the Western reader about the liberation struggle of the Chinese people. Naturally, they transferred their sympathy for the Chinese revolution to the people heading it, chiefly to the CPC leader Mao Tse-tung. As a matter of fact, Edgar Snow might have had (as we shall see) other motives.

After his first series of talks with Mao he wrote: "It was here (in Paoang) that at last I found the 'Red' leader whom Nanking has been fighting for ten years — Mao Tse-tung (pronounced Mao Dzu-dung), chairman of the 'Chinese People's Soviet Republic' to employ his official title. I could write a book about Mao Tse-tung. I talked with him many nights, on a wide range of subjects, and I heard dozens of stories about him from soldiers and Communists. He told me of his life, how he fell in love with the daughter of his professor at Peking National University, how he became a leader in the Kuomintang and the Nationalist Revolution, why he became a Communist."<sup>1</sup>

This effusive intonation was the keynote of the books written by Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedley, and Anna Louise Strong, and was subsequently adopted by many bourgeois students of modern China. Although from the outset I have deplored the cult of Mao, I intend, in order to be objective, to use these sources as well.

A large contribution to the laudation of Mao and his role in the Chinese revolution was made by Emi Hsiao, from whose book we have already used some quotations. It was he, who as early as 1935 gave a characteristic that to this day underlies the assessments of Mao's personality in Chinese propaganda:

"Mao Tse-tung is today known throughout the world... His native humour, his open, ringing laughter, his anger,

terrible to wrongdoers, his paternal concern and attention for man, his inexhaustible energy, his Bolshevik drive and determination, his brilliant organisational abilities as a statesman, pen of a journalist and writer, tongue of an orator, mind of a scholar, and talent of a strategist and tactician have created a personality that is outstanding in the history not only of the Chinese revolution but also of revolutions throughout the world.”<sup>2</sup>

In the case of Emi Hsiao, one can appreciate the motivations: in the 1930s a Chinese Communist writer could hardly adopt any other attitude to the leader of the Communist Party of his country.

Not long ago China watchers received invaluable material—the diaries of P. P. Vladimirov, who was the Comintern liaison official with the CPC Central Committee and a TASS war correspondent. He worked in Yen-an from 1942 to 1945 and was constantly in contact with Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders.<sup>3</sup> Vladimirov's diaries were not intended for publication (they were published posthumously) and, naturally, were confidential and frank.

Lastly, we shall draw from the documents and materials of the CPC itself. In some the personality and role of Mao in the destiny of the Party and nation are extolled, in others they are characterised negatively. Of course, political adversaries do not usually judge each other without bias. But their judgments are often keen and to the point, hitting the mark, for hatred not only blinds but also sharpens the mind.

Thus, what was Mao like as an ideologue and politician at the time he assumed leadership of the CPC? By 1935 he had reached full maturity: he was going on to 41 and had the experience of 15 years of active participation in the communist movement and of eight years of work in the army.

Let us return to the evidence of Edgar Snow. The following are his first impressions of his meetings with Mao Tse-tung in 1936: “I met Mao soon after my arrival: a gaunt, rather Lincolnesque figure, above average height for a Chinese, somewhat stooped, with a head of thick black hair grown very long, and with large, searching eyes, a high-bridged nose and prominent cheekbones.”<sup>4</sup> He writes of Mao as being interesting and composite, a man who had the simplicity and naturalness of the Chinese

peasant, and a fine sense of humour. "He is plain-speaking and plain-living, and some people might think him rather coarse and vulgar. Yet he combines curious qualities of *naïveté* with the most incisive wit and worldly sophistication."<sup>5</sup> "He seemed to me sincere, honest, and truthful in his statements. I was able to check up on many of his assertions, and I usually found them to be correct."<sup>6</sup>

Snow characterised Mao as an accomplished classical Chinese scholar, profoundly versed in philosophy and history, as a man with an unusual memory and immense powers of concentration, as a skilled writer. More, Snow regarded him as a military and political strategist of genius.

As we see, Mao won Snow's admiration. "Simplicity of a peasant", "a classical Chinese scholar", a "military and political strategist"—all these descriptions are worth something. Was this not the source of the legend of Mao as of a "man of magical power"?

True, if one reads Snow attentively, one will find notes of apprehension: Mao liked to joke roughly, "some people think him rather coarse and vulgar", he "has curious qualities of *naïveté*", he sometimes flew into a rage, "he seemed (!) ... sincere, honest, and truthful". The most essential point is that Snow wrote chiefly what he was told by Mao himself. Mao spoke not only of political problems, but also of his private life, his relationship with friends, mentioning his own heroic exploits with no sense of embarrassment, maintaining that he had never erred, and so on.

Further, Snow wrote of his talks about Mao with other CPC and Red Army personalities, and even with rank-and-file soldiers. For instance, one soldier told him that he saw Mao giving his coat away to a wounded man. Another said that Mao refused to wear shoes when the Red Army troops had none.<sup>7</sup> It seems that already then legends, both naive and impressive for the ordinary man, had begun to be woven around the name of the future Great Helmsman.

But what strikes the eye most is the commitment of the book *Red Star Over China*. It consists of minutes of official talks intended for the press and carefully edited by Mao Tse-tung personally. This implies that the materials later published in Snow's book, including Mao's autobiographical story, were in fact statements by Mao Tse-tung himself.

More, when Snow paid another visit to Yen-an in the latter half of September 1939, Mao Tse-tung told him that he had read the Chinese translation of *Red Star Over China* and that it correctly enunciated the policy of the Party and his own views. Mao undertook to introduce Snow personally at a rally of Party members and Red Army soldiers in Yen-an as the author of a truthful book about the CPC and about Mao himself.

Strangely enough, in the autobiography of Mao recorded by Snow we find no mention of the October Revolution, the Soviet Union, or the international working-class and communist movement. Nothing is said about the Chinese working class, or of the Communist Party of China as the party of the working class. In Mao's biographical story the emphasis is mainly on the problem of China's national rejuvenation, on the question of the Chinese peasantry, and of course on the special role played by Mao Tse-tung in the revolution.

Is this accidental? Evidently, not. With the reservation that some of the things Mao told him were "off the record", Snow, as though speaking his own mind, makes some critical comments about the Comintern and the Soviet Union. He asserts that "because the Soviet Union, 'the base of the world revolution', needed peace, the Comintern became a powerful organ of peace propaganda throughout the world", that the Comintern ceased being the international organ of the communist parties and "instead became a kind of bureau of the Soviet Union", that after 1927 its activities in China "were for a while almost nil."<sup>8</sup>

Elsewhere he deliberately accentuates Mao's nationalism, writing that the passionate desire to restore China's former role as a great power was initially an important factor attracting educated Chinese to Marxism. The CPC programme at the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, envisaging a united front of the progressive bourgeoisie, the working class, and peasantry led by the CPC, and also the abolition of foreign rule and the conquest of complete independence, was acceptable to the Chinese nationalists.<sup>9</sup>

On April 9, 1949, shortly before the people's revolution triumphed, Snow published an article "Will China Become a Russian Satellite?" in the Shanghai journal *The China Weekly Review*. In this rabidly anti-Soviet article, he wrote: "Peiping might eventually become a kind of Asiatic Mos-

cow, an Eastern Rome preaching Asiatic Marxism out of Moscow's control."

Small wonder that from the very beginning his writings attracted official circles in the USA. According to Snow, his *Red Star Over China* was read by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and that on three occasions the US President invited him (between 1942 and 1945) to discuss Chinese matters.

These facts shed additional light on the high-powered publicity organised by Snow for Mao Tse-tung.

It is difficult to assume that during his long sojourns in Yen-an Snow heard no negative comments about Mao Tse-tung. Can one believe this when one bears in mind that the power struggle was at its height at the time and Mao had many influential adversaries; it would be truer to suppose that Snow made his personal choice in favour of Mao, whom he saw as a more promising personality than the others. In this, and only in this, sense he made no mistake.

Otherwise how could he have ignored Mao's other, totally different characteristics? They were quite real, and there were more than a few of them. We shall give one to illustrate this point. This is what was said of Mao Tse-tung in a decision passed by the CPC Kiangsi Provincial Committee on December 15, 1930 after his behaviour had been considered: "Mao Tse-tung, this is known to everybody, is extremely cunning, insidious, and extraordinarily self-opinionated. His head is filled with vainglorious thoughts, and in his dealings with comrades he usually resorts to orders and threats, and uses a system of punishments.

"We note and expose the schemes of Mao Tse-tung before the Party and the Youth League of the entire country in order to rally them against him, to prevent him from destroying the Kiangsi CPC organisation and from remoulding the Party into a group of his own and, as emperor in the Party, from destroying the Chinese revolution." <sup>10</sup>

On the example of the books of Edgar Snow and Emi Hsiao one can easily trace how the myths of Mao Tse-tung were born. In the vast majority of cases they were prompted by Mao himself, by his stories about himself. We saw how his biography, recorded in Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China*, a biography that still walks the earth, came to



be written. Emi Hsiao got most of the material for his book directly from Mao. As a sample let us examine what Emi Hsiao writes about Mao's personal qualities. Here is an episode from his early period in the army:

"Mao personally toured the districts, everywhere mustering workers and peasants. On one of these tours he was taken captive by a mintuan gang.<sup>11</sup> He was sent to headquarters to be shot. On the way he offered a bribe to his escorts. The men vacillated, but the non-com turned a deaf ear to persuasion. Mao saw that escape was his only salvation. The headquarters were already near, only some hundred paces away. Catching his escorts off guard, Mao ran into a field and there he managed to hide among the high-growing bushes. He hid near a pond at the foot of a hill till sunset. The soldiers looked for him, passed close many times, almost touching him with their guns. At last, it grew dark, and they gave up the search. Mao set out for the mountains and walked all night. His bare feet were bruised by the sharp stones and thorns. In the morning he met a peasant, who gave him shelter for the night and then guided him to the neighbouring district. Mao had a little money left. He bought shoes, an umbrella, and food. He soon reached the peasant detachments."<sup>12</sup>

Who, save Mao, could have been the source of information about this piece of heroics?

Or take another case, related by Emi Hsiao.

"The Reds were returning from Fukien to South Kiangsi, making their way along practically impassable mountain paths. Mao walked alongside the soldiers—he had given his horse to one of them. His straw sandals were torn. When they bivouacked he joined the others to sit in the sun, talking to the men and asking them questions. When the detachment resumed the march, Mao picked up the worn sandals thrown away by the soldiers, tied them together with a string, and slung them on his back. One of the soldiers asked in surprise:

"'What are you going to do with this junk?'

"'Why, I'll mend and wear these sandals,' Mao replied.

"The soldier gazed at Mao walking at his side, barefoot, hatless, the sandals slung over his shoulder. At the other stops none of the soldiers threw away their worn sandals."<sup>13</sup>

Where could Emi Hsiao, who did not take part in the march, learn this? Naturally, from Mao himself.

The following story by Emi Hsiao depicts Mao in the role of a propagandist:

"Mao does not like long speeches. When he addresses the troops he speaks for no more than fifteen minutes. But these few minutes leave his hearers with a deep impression.

"One day Mao was present when a company political commissar spoke for two hours. On the next day Mao went to see him.

"'Why are your feet so badly bitten by mosquitoes?' Mao asked.

"'I spoke to the soldiers in the open air. It was a long report.'

"'Yes, you spoke well. Would you please remind me of what you spoke about?'

"The political instructor was overjoyed by this praise. He began listing the theses of his report, then stopped:

"'I don't remember any more.'

"'There, you see you've forgotten it yourself, so how can you expect the soldiers to remember? While you spoke you walked, up and down, while they sat still. Imagine how they've been bitten by mosquitoes!'

"The political commissar flushed, and never again spoke for so long."<sup>14</sup>

But with the same measure of truth Emi Hsiao might have related that Mao was often long-winded: at official Party conferences and in private conversation. Mao's speeches in Yen-an (for example, at a conference on literature) lasted hours, and he then took the floor again and again for remarks, conclusions, and so on. At the 7th CPC Congress in 1945 he took the floor six times. However, legend requires a thoughtful leader sparing of words, and whose every word carries a message—precisely this image he endeavoured to impress upon the people.

Emi Hsiao sincerely admired Mao's behaviour, his obvious intellectual superiority over the company political commissar. But he involuntarily discloses Mao's secret inward gaze: he wanted not only to look wise but to have this wisdom to be accepted with the same naive delight, as in the above episode. Small wonder that Mao felt at home most of all among simple peasants, for whom every word falling from his lips was a revelation, and got along so poorly with intellectuals, especially with those who were suspicious of him.

The unsophisticated episode involving the political commissar was very suggestive of Mao's incipient dictatorial mentality, in which the "Ruler-People" (read—common people) relationship was gradually entrenched. It was suggestive of a semi-intellectual, who was self-confident only when he associated with people less educated and cultured than himself.

As a matter of fact, even in this case Emi Hsiao can be understood. As a loyal Party member he felt it was his duty to extol its leaders. Not Mao alone—he paid homage to other leaders of the CPC and to the outstanding soldier Chu Teh. It is symbolic that he brought the two names together in one book—Mao had yet to elevate himself above all the other personalities in the CPC. Emi Hsiao's book contains the following lines:

"Chu Teh lived as a rank-and-file soldier. His clothes were those of a rank-and-file soldier: short pants and leggings. Only in time of battle was he distinguished by binoculars.

"... Indeed, Chu Teh is a people's military leader, a leader of the masses. He never makes a show of himself. On the contrary, he tries to be no different, in outward appearance, from the commanders, soldiers, and ordinary people."<sup>15</sup>

It will be noted that Emi Hsiao used the same palette of vivid colours for Chu Teh as for Mao Tse-tung. The important thing for him was not so much the person as the aim of shaping the cult of a CPC leader. He believed, one must assume, sincerely that this was in the interests of the Party, that it enhanced its prestige outside China and strengthened the CPC unity.

If ever a person had no illusions about Mao, a person who can serve as an example of political perspicacity and journalistic courage, that person was Pyotr Vladimirov. From his diaries we can piece together two short descriptions characterising Mao both as a man and as a leader of a group within the leadership of the CPC and in the Party as a whole.

We'll begin with the characteristic of Mao the man.

This is what we read in Vladimirov's book about Mao's human qualities, his habits, life-style, and attitude to the people around him.

Vladimirov describes Mao Tse-tung's dwelling in Yen-an, which is now shown to all tourists, and his impressions of

his first meeting with him: "It consisted of two adjacent caves solidly panelled with boards. Deep in one cave stood a desk with some books, a pile of papers, and candles. The floor was laid out in brick. Mao Tse-tung is stooped, has wrinkles round his eyes, and speaks the coarse Hunan dialect. One senses the peasant in him." <sup>16</sup>

A striking description is given of Mao's behaviour at one of the first receptions attended by Vladimirov. Mao was served with a bottle of Dutch gin, while all the others were given *khanja* (spirits made from *kaoliang*). Mao wore shabby cotton jacket and pants. Sipping the gin from a bowl, which he held in his hand, and chewing peanuts, he made the round of the guests, asking after their health in detail. "His face was red and glistened with sweat from the gin. However, his restraint did not abandon him: it was all that same sense of his own dignity. He smoked almost incessantly... Then Chiang Ching started the gramophone, playing excerpts from old Chinese operas. Mao Tse-tung grew silent in a deck-chair, inhaling smoke and negligently flicking the ashes to the floor." <sup>17</sup>

Vladimirov gives vivid sketches of the behaviour and life of Mao and the people around him. Mao Tse-tung was flabby, above medium height, and unhurried in his movements. He was deliberately slow in everything he did, slightly inclining his head to his right shoulder.

At all sorts of receptions and parties his entourage were artificially gay, sometimes amazing people with the "naive daring of their judgments" about the most complex developments. Their free and easy behaviour accentuated Mao Tse-tung's prim modesty.

Then Vladimirov describes another meeting with the CPC leaders:

"In addition to his manner of standing aloof, Mao Tse-tung had another, purely Chinese quality. He courteously asked us about our health and requirements, invited me to sit in a leather armchair usually reserved for guests of honour, then served rice, *khanja*, and tea himself. Chiang Ching moved up a deck-chair and he reclined in it. A guard gave him a bowl of *khanja*, and Chiang Ching handed him some peanuts...

"Mao Tse-tung suddenly fell silent and then ordered some pepper. We understood that the official part was over. He pointed to me, and I was the first to be served with a

plate of red pepper. A similar plate was given to Mao Tse-tung.

"He chewed the pepper and, stretching in the deck-chair, questioned me: "You won't deny that Stalin is a revolutionary? Does he not relish red pepper? Every true revolutionary eats red pepper." He drank from the bowl and noted: "I'm certain that Alexander the Great was fond of red pepper. He was a great man and a revolutionary in his way. Stalin, of course, also eats pepper. You, Sung Ping (Vladimirov's Chinese pseudonym.—*F. B.*), should also eat pepper." <sup>18</sup>

From Vladimirov's diaries we learn of the Mao-Chiang Ching-Kang Sheng alliance, that had taken shape in Yen-an. Kang Sheng, who was not conspicuous in the Party at the time, used Chiang Ching to win more influence over Mao. He chose her not because of her feminine charms but because of her cast of mind, resolution, and vanity. This stake paid off. After Chiang Ching married Mao Tse-tung, a spiritual rapprochement took place between Kang Sheng and the CC leader and they maintained effective contact. As a result, Kang Sheng became one of the most powerful men in the Mao group.

A few words about Mao's marriage to Chiang Ching. This was his fourth marriage. After his second wife, Yang Kai-hui, died at the hands of the Nationalists in 1930, he married Ho Tze-chen, who was associated with him in revolutionary work.

Chiang Ching was an actress, who, apart from theatrical performances, had starred in some anti-Japanese films in the mid-1930s. She appeared in Yen-an in 1938 with a group of revolutionary writers and artists. She was 26. In Yen-an she was given red-carpet treatment. Soon after her arrival she attracted Mao Tse-tung's attention.

It is said that in the Politburo there was opposition to Mao Tse-tung's divorce from his third wife, Ho Tze-chen, who was then receiving medical treatment in the USSR, and especially to his marrying a woman of doubtful reputation. This was discussed at a Politburo meeting, but Mao insisted, declaring that he would permit nobody to interfere in his private life. Kang Sheng, who came from the same town as Chiang Ching, played the principal part in settling this family affair. He stood up for Chiang Ching in the Politburo and became her confidante.

For her part, Chiang Ching soon became not only Mao's wife but also his assistant. This ambitious woman managed to carve a special niche for herself in the Party through her influence on Mao. Some biographers tell us that even before her marriage she boasted that she would marry the "top man in China". She made Mao Tse-tung so dependent on her that in her absence he was capricious as a child, refusing to take medicine.

Vladimirov keenly noted Chiang Ching's new role. Even in those days, 30 years ago, when she had only just quitted the stage, she behaved as though she felt a high calling: she was not simply the wife—she was the leader's comrade-in-arms. She tried to make herself useful in all his work. She looked after him as a person and helped him as a leader.<sup>19</sup> Imperceptibly she took over some of his powers. According to available information, the Politburo finally agreed to Mao's marriage to Chiang Ching on condition she would not interfere in Party affairs.

Outward appearances are deceptive. A photograph of Chiang Ching taken during the Yen-an period shows a young and pretty woman, thin and supple as a lotus, with a tender skin and full lips. But even then a large measure of power was concentrated in her small hands. During the "cultural revolution" she interfered openly in big politics and exercised not inconsiderable influence on the style and methods of that campaign.

As regards Mao's third wife, Ho Tze-chen, whom he deserted, we have the following rapturous words from Emi Hsiao: "Mao Tse-tung's wife, Ho Tze-chen, is a girl from a peasant family. She is now 28. For the past ten years she has been wearing a soldier's uniform. She fought at the front, organised women into military units, tended the sick, and carried the wounded on her back. In battle she received twenty shrapnel wounds, eight of which were very serious. She took part in the Long March of the Red Army to the northwest; she was pregnant and gave birth to a child en route. She had to leave the baby with a peasant family. But all these terrible experiences did not break this frail, graceful, but unbelievably hardy and courageous young woman."<sup>20</sup>

Mao evidently had no particular feeling for the other members of his family. Vladimirov writes that he was indifferent to the sons of his marriage with Yang Kai-hui who were

then studying in the Soviet Union, and at no time, in Vladimirov's memory, mentioned any of them by name or took an interest in how they were getting on. He had little affection even for his baby daughter, and when he did show a paternal interest it was "due to the efforts of his wife, who tried her best to awaken his atrophied paternal feelings".<sup>21</sup> Mao had five daughters by Ho Tze-chen, and all of them were left in the care of peasant families in an unnamed region before the Long March. The marriage with Chiang Ching produced two daughters.

Indeed, one gets a curious image of Mao when one reads about his private life, about his behaviour in his family and among friends.

The first thing that attracts attention is the cultural level of Mao himself and of his entourage. As far as we can gather, it has its sources in the culture of the well-to-do Chinese peasant. Mao's Hunan accent, his inclination for coarse jokes, his partiality for *kaoliang* wine and imported gin, his mannerisms, drinking, smoking, and eating habits—qualities that Vladimirov noted—have no semblance to the behaviour of a man of the working class, of a proletarian revolutionary.

One can easily picture Mao sitting in his Yen-an brick-floored cave, lit by candles, drinking Dutch gin from a bowl, and chewing peanuts.

Try picturing him there, in the cave, as a proletarian leader of Western countries! However you strain your imagination you will not succeed! His is a different kind of personality, a different kind of subculture moulded in a different environment with its own national traditions and education.

We feel that Vladimirov was right when he said that "a profound peasant nature sits" in Mao. This is not meant as a reproach, but only a statement of fact. In itself this is neither a positive nor a negative characteristic. We must see how this nature manifested itself in the post of the CPC's political leader.

A quality distinguishing Mao was his total dedication to the role he had cut out for himself, the role of leader first of the army and then of the Party. The impression that communicated itself was that he was never forgetful of this role, even in the most intimate moments of his life. He would sit with you at the table, drinking and smoking, or dance, or

engage in a friendly conversation, or ask something of his wife, or relate an anecdote, but he never relinquished the sense of distance between himself and other people—an associate, a personal friend, a dancing partner, or even his wife. It was as though he had grown into the role, and it became part of him to a larger extent than his ordinary human qualities as a father, husband, friend, or enemy.

Mao made it a rule not to display ordinary human qualities (or, perhaps, he simply never had them?). This is seen, above all, in his indifference to his children, as we learn from Vladimirov. Yet Mao was an emotional man (this, too, was noted by Vladimirov, Snow, and many others, who had observed him at close range). But he was so absorbed in his political role that he regarded everything else secondary.

One may view this quality of Mao, as of any other "political person", differently. Besides, the quality itself is manifested differently. In some cases it is total dedication, an almost mystical sense of historical predestination as an expression of a nature with clarity of purpose and entirely in the grip of an idea. This happens when an idea or a purpose is projected not inward, towards the satisfaction of vanity, but outward, towards serving other people, groups, classes, or the nation itself.

But if this is lacking, if renunciation of the ordinary feelings and qualities intrinsic to every human being is prompted not by a calling to serve lofty ideals but by a striving to satisfy an egoistic passion for power over other people, we get the type of man so profoundly and shrewdly described by Niccolo Machiavelli in *The Prince*.<sup>22</sup> Personal power, the drive to consolidate, expand, and constantly maximalise it becomes the law of life of such a person, and then what are people to him? What are his wife, friends, children, and political associates to him? What are cruelty, good, and evil to him?

But let us draw no hasty conclusions. Let us look closer at the personality of Mao and follow Vladimirov:

"Mao Tse-tung usually works at night. He gets up late, about midday. Vainglorious to the marrow of his bones, and for that reason, perhaps, affecting such self-importance. He likes food, wine, dancing, and women, but for all others he preaches the most rigid revolutionary ascetism. Generally speaking, he is not averse to posing as a puritan. He is pain-



staking in building up his own image as a wise ruler in the traditional Chinese spirit. He is a past master at deception and, when necessary, skilled in showing how staunchly 'Chairman Mao' shares the burdens of the people: he is served with corn porridge and he eats it ploddingly, washing it down with water."<sup>23</sup>

We draw the reader's attention to yet another of Mao's distinctive qualities, which was noted by our perspicacious fellow-countryman. He writes that "by nature Mao Tse-tung is an actor who effectively conceals his feelings and skilfully plays the role he wants, even before people who know him well".

Vladimirov observed, to use his own words, "several Mao Tse-tungs". One was the press-created image of the CPC leader at conferences, meetings of activists, and plenums. Here he was astute, sometimes jocular, and attentive. A different image was presented in his meetings with Soviet representatives. On these occasions he was the living image of an ancient ruler, slightly democratised by the use of the word "comrade" and by the shaking of hands. There was yet another image, the real thing which Vladimirov saw at first hand more and more frequently when he found himself alone with Mao Tse-tung. This metamorphosis was scrupulously in keeping with national tradition and was also a tribute to the times. Mao Tse-tung always assumed the character needed in the given situation. Either simple, charming, a real "Party comrade". Or monumentally immobile, deliberately absent-minded, a sort of armchair thinker, an ivory-tower philosopher.

"As he sits in his armchair he either listens, blowing smoke into the face of his interlocutor, or talks. If he is in a good mood and calm, he speaks in a monotone, slightly stressing accented syllables; if he is agitated, he speaks loudly in a hoarse voice, with amazing oratorical stamina. He can talk non-stop for two, three, or even four hours! And this in a *tête-à-tête*! Or, without looking at his interlocutor he can be preoccupied with some thought of his own, now and then politely nodding his head."

Quoting Lu Hsin, Vladimirov writes that in any given situation Mao Tse-tung's behaviour could be characterised as follows: "In a dark corner he had prepared a different face, a different banner, in order . . . to step on the stage when the situation changed . . . You would think that this was the

gate of a temple when in fact it was the mouth of a monkey." <sup>24</sup>

Mao's emotional nature was seen also in his frequent fits of depression. Vladimirov relates an episode that sheds additional light on the character of this man. This was a strange talk with Mao Tse-tung "without gin, whisky, or the loud voices of guests". The talk was about trifles, then Mao imperceptibly changed to the subject of death, the inevitability of death, the irreversibility of destiny. Aloud he pondered over the transient character of being, over immortality. The thought of death oppressed him. Warming up to the topic, he quoted Confucius and other ancient writers and poets, and recited lines from his own poems.

"He softened and, at the same time, grew excited. Not a trace remained of his waxen monumentality. He spoke quickly, in hoarsely accented syllables. He waved away all who tried to enter. He asked questions and then developed his thoughts without waiting for a reply." <sup>25</sup>

But more than anything else he cherished his "leader" image. He would sit in an armchair for hours, expressing no emotion. In line with tradition, he presented himself as a statesman absorbed in cares, preoccupied with crucial problems, undisturbed by earthly bustle. "I believe that Mao Tse-tung deliberately developed these qualities at the outset of his career," Vladimirov writes. "They were not part of his self-expression. However, years of training made them part of his nature—the public image of a statesman of the Great Celestial Empire". <sup>26</sup>

An astute observation: "statesman of the Great Celestial Empire". Indeed, Mao had for years been assiduous in cultivating in himself and planting among the people around him the image of a statesman, a national leader, a wise ruler. This early and premature awakening of feelings of political leadership is, evidently, a sort of vocation. We say early and premature because the position of ruler of all China was still a long way off for the Yenan leader. Nevertheless, judging by everything, already then Mao felt he was something more than one of the leaders of a Party group in one of a huge country's provinces.

All the same, this was a sort of vocation, regardless of what his enemies in the CPC said. It was also a characteristic of other, notorious, or simply little known political personalities of the twentieth century. Mao felt a sort of

predestination early in life. He began playing the role accorded to him by history long before history built the stage for that role.

What induced this insight? It is difficult to say. If one does not believe in Providence, the cause-and-effect dependence between a personality and its historical role is always a bit vague. Either an individual's confidence in his predestination is transmitted to the people around him and indeed drives him to the passionately desired role; or from a multiplicity of human material historical circumstances select the one that adequately meets the situation. Who can tell? It would be more correct to assume that there is some interaction between history and the individual. They look for and find each other. But one thing is certain from the reminiscences of Vladimirov, Snow, and other politically astute observers of the Yen-an events, and it is that already then Mao was zealously building for himself the image of a national ruler with his eye not only on the immediate but also on the distant future.

He worked tirelessly night after night—and Chiang Ching tirelessly told everybody about it. He wore patched clothes and had his photograph taken in them; he wore sandals; he ate corn meal and other frugal food—and made a public display of it; he spoke constantly of the people's welfare. He was always careful to make people believe that concern for creature comforts was alien to him. Actually, he did not have to do much pretending. His personal tastes had in fact not moved far from those of the peasants, from whom he had sprung. One must believe he was sincere in his liking for red pepper, mahjong, and a simple card game. The important thing was that he made no secret of his folk habits. On the contrary, he made a display of them. Soldiers and Party cadres had heard much of the modesty and accessibility of their Chairman.

In Yen-an Edgar Snow heard much about these qualities of the people's leader: his concern for ordinary people, his readiness to share his roof and clothes with them. Eager for sensation, Snow fell for these stories, with the result that the legend of the people's peasant leader spread beyond Yen-an and began its rounds of the world, projecting an image in the exact dimension intended by its creator. In those days neither Snow nor others heard of Mao's dictum, subsequently to become famous, that the people were no more than a

"blank sheet of paper on which the most beautiful characters can be written". The first characters on this first page of the blank-paper mind of the people were: Great People's Leader of the Great People's Revolution.

But Mao was not only a man of the people, large as life, modest, and accessible. As a leader he was infallible, above error. All his predecessors in the CPC leadership had constantly erred, sliding either to the "right" or to the "left"—Chen Tu-hsiu, Chiu Chu-po, Li Li-san, Po Ku, and Wang Ming. Mao was the only one who never erred.

Let us now take a closer look at Mao Tse-tung as the leader of a group, at his behaviour among other CPC personalities. This will lift the curtain on the mechanism by which the new regime was foisted on the Party.

## Leader and Party

Who were in the top leadership of the CPC in that period? The following is from Otto Braun's article "How Mao Tse-tung Climbed to Power".

"Among the leaders, Chou En-lai was the most energetic and adroit. He had received a classical Chinese and modern European education, had considerable international experience and outstanding abilities, and was constantly manoeuvring skilfully and adapting himself."<sup>1</sup> He headed a department at the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton, when Chiang Kai-shek was chief of the academy and Commander-in-Chief of the Kuomintang People's Revolutionary Army. In 1927 he helped to organise the uprisings in Shanghai and Nanchang, but as a permanent member of the Central Committee and Politburo since the mid-1920s he committed the same mistakes as Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san or was indulgent to them. At the same time, he strengthened his own position in the army. Many of the commanders were Whampoa graduates.

To this let us add the observations of the American Robert S. Elegant, who met Chou En-lai before the revolution of 1949. He wrote: "Chou En-lai could only be what he has been, for he is the true son of his dickering mandarin ancestors, and his talents as a negotiator are matched by few Chinese. His medium of self-expression is the conference

table; he finds fulfilment in intrigue, and in the complex manoeuvring which is the blood of Chinese political life, regardless of party or political creed. He is a good administrator and a faithful agent, but hardly a maker of major policy." <sup>2</sup>

But neither in the Yen-an period nor in later years did Chou claim a leading role or come forward as a possible rival to the Chairman of the CPC. In Mao's eyes, he had one more important merit: he laid no claim to the role of ideologue. Evidently, he had realised long ago that this would be especially resented by Mao, who tolerated no competition, however slight, in the field of theory. Although Chou En-lai was, perhaps, the most educated leader of the CPC, he concentrated entirely on organisation. His motto, and he made sure to put it over, was: I am an executive, I do not form ideology and policy. Moreover, he preferred to steer clear of factional struggles, but was always in time to associate himself with the victors. In short, he was an irreplaceable assistant to the top man in the Party and the country. Mao saw through Chou and bent every effort to enlist his support. He succeeded.

Chu Teh was another notable personality in the Yen-an leadership. A popular war hero already then, he was, according to Vladimirov, unassuming and modest. After the Nanchang uprising of 1927 he, the reader will remember, united his Red Army units with the peasant guerrilla detachment under Mao. After this happened, Mao, according to available evidence, systematically undermined Chu Teh's prestige as a political leader. Chu Teh reconciled himself to Mao's claims, remained the Commander-in-Chief, but never again played a serious role in the Party leadership.

Of the senior Red Army commanders, the most prominent was, according to Otto Braun, Peng Teh-huai. After he and the regiment under him joined the Red Army in 1928, he gave his allegiance to Mao. But this did not mean he agreed with Mao in everything. Active in politics and military affairs, he was never silent when he felt something had to be criticised. He spoke with similar sharpness against positional fighting, which involved heavy casualties, and against scattered guerrilla actions. His corps was numerically the largest and the best trained in conventional military operations. For that reason the most difficult tasks were usually assigned to him.

Lin Piao was a young commander in the high command of those years. A Whampoa graduate, he rose quickly after 1927 to battalion and then regimental commander. In 1931 he took over command of the Red Army's 1st Corps, which was extremely mobile and, therefore, eminently suitable for encirclement and flanking movements. Otto Braun tells us that Lin Piao was unquestionably a brilliant tactician in guerrilla and manoeuvrable warfare. He was set against all other ways of conducting war. Politically, he was a "blank sheet of paper" on which Mao could write anything he pleased.<sup>3</sup>

In the CPC leadership a special place was held by Kang Sheng and Chen Po-ta, although the latter had received a Party reprimand for preaching Trotskyism.

From Vladimirov we learn that Chen Po-ta, Mao's scientific secretary, was a stoutish, lumbering man in glasses, with unusually long ears and deep-set eyes. According to Chen Po-ta's comrades and Vladimirov's personal observations, he was cunning and capable. Unlike Kang Sheng, he was sociable and had many friends. In the 1920s he graduated from the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. A man of outstanding talents, he published essays on the theory of Marxism and taught philosophy in the 1930s.<sup>4</sup>

Vladimirov accords considerable attention to Kang Sheng, who in Yen-an was chief of the Department of Information (*chingpaochu*) of the Liberated Regions of China, which combined the functions of intelligence, counter-intelligence, the judiciary, the procuratorship, and information. He was chairman of the cadre-screening commission and the organisational committee for preparing and conducting the *cheng-feng* campaign (rectification of the style of work), which was started in May 1941. "Kang Sheng, or Kang Hsing, as he is also called, speaks in a thin, hissing voice. He always wears a smile. One gets the impression that this smile is glued to his gaunt, bilious face. When he listens, he sucks air noisily in the Japanese manner, as though delighting in what he hears. One gets the feeling that one is dealing with a wooden man fitted with springs."<sup>5</sup>

The point is, of course, not in the personal dislike that Vladimirov felt for Kang Sheng but in the role played by the latter in Yen-an during the purge of internationalist-Communists. When one thinks of Kang Sheng one cannot help likening him to the classical figure of Joseph Fouché,

the "unchangeable minister" of the Napoleon and other regimes of his day. In a brilliant treatise Stefan Zweig wrote prophetically that people of this sort would play an ever growing role in the political life of our age: "In real life, in the sphere of the operation of political forces, decisive significance attaches—and this must be underscored as a warning against any kind of political gullibility—not by outstanding minds, not by proponents of pure ideas, but by a much lower but more adroit species—backroom manipulators."<sup>6</sup> Kang Sheng unquestionably belonged to that species.

Among the other leaders of the CPC Vladimirov singles out Kao Kang. He was courteous and truthful. He assumed an independent air. "A capable and strong-willed functionary."<sup>7</sup> He was one of the consistent internationalists.

Vladimirov's diaries give a lucid picture of the methods used by Mao to govern his group. Mao kept its members at a distance. On the evidence of Vladimirov, Mao had no friends. He only had the people he needed; absorbed in his drive for power, he valued only those he needed at a given moment. "The only righteous ways were those to power. His image and life-style breathed contempt for everything that limited power. Everything was ashes, save power. From this standpoint the life of the great men of history was an example." "He was attracted by the giants of the past precisely because their power was unchallenged. According to Mao Tse-tung, power was the only worthy thing in life, the justification of everything, a festival—it was everything."<sup>8</sup>

"The Party and the people are only a fiction (abstract quantities) that serve his aims," Vladimirov writes, "and while Mao associates with many people he is amazingly unsociable. In fact, he is alone. Callously alone. Irretrievably alone. Dangerously alone."<sup>9</sup>

The relationship between the people around Mao was not simple, not open-hearted. The group took shape not only through the efforts of Mao Tse-tung himself but also on account of the objective struggle in the CPC. It was not only Mao who went to the group, but also the group that went to him. It needed a leader both for its own elevation and (as we shall soon see) to put into effect a sum of ideas in the field of Party, military, and national construction.

The most symptomatic sign was Chou En-lai's affiliation with the group. He was in many respects a better-known

leader in the CPC than Mao, particularly in the 1920s. The fact that in the latter half of the 1930s Chou En-lai found it possible and necessary to associate himself with Mao Tse-tung was evidence of the latter's growing influence, the increasingly identical attitudes of the two men, especially in questions concerning the national specifics of the CPC and the specific nature of the tasks of the revolution in China, the role of the peasants in the revolution, the agrarian problem, and so on.

Mao's cooperation with Kang Sheng followed a different pattern. People of the Kang Sheng type—blind and ruthless proponents of any policy regardless of means—most of all need a strong master. Kang Sheng had, evidently, seen this quality in Mao Tse-tung long ago. He came to believe in Mao and became his lieutenant in his most covert and most brutal actions. Kang Sheng found common cause with Mao Tse-tung particularly on the soil of anti-Sovietism. As a diehard nationalist, he hated the CPSU and took it as a personal affront to his national pride that the Chinese Communists had recourse to its assistance and drew upon its experience.

A fortunate move on Mao Tse-tung's part was his enlistment of Liu Shao-chi, who had considerable influence in the Party and was able to fill in the gaps in Mao's Marxist education and link the CPC closer with the working-class movement of China (we shall take a more attentive look at this man later).

Chen Po-ta, who was Mao's lieutenant in ideological matters for a good thirty years, edited his speeches and writings and "fitted" them into a scientific theory, was another valuable acquisition. It is said that after finishing an article or a speech Mao would hand it to Chen with the words: "Now add Marxism to it."

Mao keenly sized up each member of his group, kept a close watch on their behaviour, left no opportunity for them to agree among themselves behind his back, and set them against each other, suppressing insubordination, settling wrongs, and giving each his place. He was particularly intolerant of people who claimed to be theorists. Only a few, like Liu Shao-chi, still maintained a semblance of independence in theoretical work and published their writings, but the condition for this was that they recognise Mao's ideological precedence.



Mao Tse-tung had to make a tremendous effort to unite this rather heterogeneous group of people, range them against the other groups in the CPC, subordinate these groups, and establish some kind of unity, time and again having to settle the inner conflicts in his own group, the vacillations of individual members who were more inclined to orient themselves in the international experience of socialism and adhere more firmly to Marxism-Leninism. Already then the group itself contained the seeds for future splits, for a struggle between the different members when new problems and new tests of the CPC generated clashes between different political guidelines and attitudes over ideological issues.

What were the means by which Mao Tse-tung and his group rose to power? Was this exclusively the result of an ideological struggle aimed at working out more effective strategy and tactics, at a more comprehensive account of the specific conditions in China and of the obtaining situation, at a creative application of Marxism-Leninism in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country?

Vladimirov writes: "In the winter of 1942 in Yen-an they started a broad campaign (actually, this campaign was launched earlier, in May 1941.—*F. B.*) for 'rectification of the style of work' or, as it was also called, 'struggle for the regulation of three styles', i.e. the Party style, the style in education, and the style in literature."<sup>10</sup> This campaign became known as *chengfeng*. The CPC leadership attached the utmost importance to it. Its initiator was Mao personally.

"Against the background of *chengfeng* the ideological struggle in the Politburo acquired a special character. Mao Tse-tung accused Wang Ming, Po Ku, Lo Fu, and other leaders of 'dogmatism', meaning that they were mechanically applying Marxism-Leninism without taking Chinese realities into account. Basically, Chu Teh and Lin Po-chu shared the views of the so-called Moscow opposition. By 'dogmatists' Mao Tse-tung meant the Communists who had studied in the USSR and headed the political work in the Party, and also the Party intellectuals who based their work on the experience of the CPSU."<sup>11</sup>

Vladimirov writes that there was never a moment of peace: meetings everywhere, clamour, placards cursing the "dogmatists", and agitated, exhausted people. Some exponents of anti-Maoist views were poisoned. As a result of this

poisoning, Wang Ming and other CPC personalities fell dangerously ill. Many veteran functionaries, who showed independence and enjoyed prestige, were put to death on Mao's orders. After such slayings Mao often dissociated himself from the executioners and put the blame on them.

Slowly but surely a new regime was installed in the CPC. Ultimately the entire leadership was subordinated to the will of Mao Tse-tung. This was strikingly illustrated at the 7th CPC Congress in 1945.

There should be no illusions about the attitude of individual members of his group in the CPC, including those who were later to become his opponents. For instance, in his report to that congress Liu Shao-chi said: "A major achievement is that Mao Tse-tung remoulded Marxism, giving it an Asiatic character in place of its European character. In its efforts to build an industrialised economy China is encountering pressure and oppression from the leading industrial states. A similar situation reigns in all Southeast Asian countries. The course steered by China will influence them."

At the same congress, Lo Fu, who was prominent in the CPC, declared that as early as at the Tsunyi Conference he had made certain advances in correctly assessing the views of Mao Tse-tung, but he (Lo Fu) was still making mistakes. Formerly, he had believed that one should study only Marx and Engels, and that it was enough to read Mao Tse-tung's articles once or twice. He now realised that Mao Tse-tung had to be studied. He had gone deep into the style and thought of Mao Tse-tung. Henceforth, he declared, he would be Mao's disciple. "In the past when we read Marxist works," Lo Fu said, "we deceived others. In future I shall have the highest regard for the teaching of Mao Tse-tung. The thought and style of Comrade Mao Tse-tung are profound but also easy to understand."<sup>12</sup>

This was a typical pronouncement. On the whole, the congress was a triumph for the ideology and policies of Mao Tse-tung and his group. The provision, inserted in the CPC Constitution adopted at that congress, that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" constituted the ideological foundation of the CPC only crowned the radical changes that had taken place in the Party during Mao's ten years as its leader. The Constitution instituted a new office, Chairman of the CPC, which was filled by Mao Tse-tung. The Party and a relatively small army were still isolated in the Special Area. But

a new regime was even then taking shape in the Party. The cult of Mao Tse-tung was becoming the law of its ideological life. Unconditional fulfilment of the instructions of the leader and his group and the suppression of all dissent were becoming the hallmarks of the CPC.

While formerly the CPC was reminiscent of a debating society in which there often were various schools of thought, discipline now reigned—but at what price! Mao's idea that "proper limits had to be exceeded in order to right a wrong", underlay the new practices in the CPC. Democratic centralism was increasingly superseded by military practices. Mao towered over the entire pyramid of Party and state authority.

However, it would be wrong to think that his triumph was absolute: the internationalist trend in the Party was suppressed, but it was not entirely smashed. A covert struggle continued. Some of the former Party leaders, who, regardless of their vacillation, had been able to oppose the planting of undisguised nationalism and anti-Sovietism, remained in the Party and continued to exercise some influence. More, in the Mao group itself one could easily discern various trends, albeit within the framework of a common platform. Kao Kang and also Chu Teh and Peng Teh-huai remained, one way or another, faithful to the international experience of socialism and to Marxism-Leninism. In other words, the unity of the Mao group was relative. An internal struggle could erupt (and, as further developments showed, did erupt) in the group at any moment in the face of the new problems encountered by the Chinese revolution.

What was the ideological platform on which the Mao group took shape and gained strength? Vladimirov's diaries leave not the shadow of a doubt on this count. A sense of wounded national pride that evolved into nationalism underlay the aspirations of the group. The edge of this nationalism was turned by Mao Tse-tung against the Comintern and the CPSU, which were championing the internationalist interests of the revolutionary movement.

Mao Tse-tung and his associates regarded the Soviet Union one-sidedly—as the source of military aid and political support, and not as an ally and the main force in the common revolutionary cause. In other words, they wanted to enjoy only rights without bearing any obligations to the international communist movement, which they were increas-

ingly prone to regard as a means for attaining the national aims of the Chinese revolution.

Vladimirov scrupulously followed the evolution of the Yen-an leaders' attitude to the Comintern and the Soviet Union. Its zigzags were determined entirely by the internal and, in many cases, even the immediate tasks which the Mao group had to tackle. In Tsunyi the political swing was, as the reader has seen, accomplished behind the back of the Comintern, which was put before an accomplished fact and an interpretation of which was carefully prepared by the Maoists.

The elaborate moves in the period of Mao's struggle against Wang Ming, who was charged with being a "dogmatist" and a representative of the "Moscow group" were planned in similar detail. From Vladimirov's diaries it is clear that there was no "Moscow group" in the CPC. But Mao was determined to isolate Wang Ming in the CPC leadership and eliminate him as a potential rival in the power struggle and, at the same time, foster a nationalistic spirit in the Party.

The situation in the Party and in the country was objectively favourable to the rise of national sentiments, which could be so easily directed into the channel of nationalism. The Japanese aggression against China spurred patriotism among all the progressive and revolutionary elements in the country, including, of course, the CPC. Mao adroitly rose to the very crest of this wave, and it carried him from one success to another in the fight for power in the CPC.

The zigzags of the Maoists were especially symbolic in their attitude to the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.

Vladimirov, who arrived in Yen-an in May 1942 and stayed there until December 1945, observed an odious picture. Instead of getting the sympathy of Mao Tse-tung and his group, the trials that fell to the lot of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces during the initial years of the war were the target of derogatory remarks and comments. Kang Sheng gloated, and Mao Tse-tung was in no respect better.

"As the Germans drew closer to Moscow in the latter half of 1941, the CPC leaders (in Yen-an.—*F. B.*) treated my comrades (Soviet representatives.—*F. B.*) with growing hostility. By December 1941 hardly any trouble was taken to disguise it. Ranking officials of the CPC simply stopped meeting

them. On the plea of pressure of work Mao did not receive a single Soviet journalist, while Kang Sheng had them shadowed," Vladimirov wrote.<sup>13</sup> What irritated the Maoists most was that at the time the USSR was unable to provide the Chinese Red Army with adequate military assistance, for this could easily have been used by the Japanese militarists as a pretext for hostilities in the Far East against the Soviet Union.

It was obvious that the destiny of the peoples of the whole world, the destiny of the Second World War depended largely on the outcome of the bitter struggle the USSR was waging against the nazi invaders. On that outcome also depended the future of the revolutionary movement in other countries, of the world communist movement, including the prospects for the Chinese revolution. It was obvious that the Chinese Communist Party and its numerically small Red Army would be unable to stand up against the Kuomintang and its imperialist backers if the CPC did not feel it had the powerful support of the USSR.

Yet the fact that at the time the USSR was in no position to provide the Chinese Red Army with massive supplies of armaments, evoked such a huge explosion of nationalistic feeling among the Maoist leadership that it overshadowed elementary sober considerations about the dependence of the outcome of the Chinese revolution on the great struggle of the Soviet people against fascism.

Also typical of Mao was the steep change of his attitude towards the Soviet Union at the end of the Patriotic War, when victory over nazi Germany was certain and near. The Soviet representatives in the Special Area of China were suddenly treated as most valued friends. They were met with smiles, doors were opened wide before them, their favour was sought, and efforts were made to establish closer contacts with the CPSU and the USSR through them.

As a matter of fact, to keep the record straight it must be noted that until the very end of the war Mao was not sure that the alliance with the USSR should be strengthened and tried to find a new patron in the person of the US ruling circles. The "pendulum" kept swinging. We shall not go into this question, but if the reader is interested he will find in Vladimirov's book an account of the meetings that Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders had with members of an American mission in 1944 and 1945.<sup>14</sup>

Cooperation with the Kuomintang gave Mao the hope, which was short-lived, that the attitude of US official circles towards the CPC might change. He looked everywhere for ways of rapprochement with the Americans. He wrote at the time: "The work which we Communists are carrying on today is the very same work which was carried on earlier in America by Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln; it will certainly obtain, and indeed has already obtained, the sympathy of democratic America."<sup>15</sup>

Ultimately, Mao Tse-tung was left empty-handed: the ruling circles of the USA preferred to stake on Chiang Kai-shek. Mao had to count exclusively on support from the USSR. This, too, was a reason for the steep turn for the better in the CPC's attitude to the USSR in 1945-1946.

One may well ask why Vladimirov's reports were ignored by the Comintern? There, evidently, were a number of reasons. First, these reports were by no means the sole source of information about the situation in the CPC and the activities of Mao Tse-tung. From the CPC there was a torrent of communications of an entirely different character, giving the assurance that the CPC was true to the international interests of the communist movement and to Marxism-Leninism, that Mao was pursuing a correct policy, and so forth. To a certain extent Vladimirov's assessments were both unexpected and unique, as were Richard Sorge's communications on the eve of Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Moreover, an exaggerated estimate should not be placed on the Comintern's influence on the CPC's internal affairs, especially during the Second World War, when the Communists were concentrating all their efforts on the struggle against fascism. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that in the world communist movement it was hoped that life itself, that the course of the revolution in China would help to strengthen the internationalist forces in the CPC and improve Mao Tse-tung himself. That is why Vladimirov's voice, even if it was heard, did not evoke the response he counted on.

Mao Tse-tung did not immediately venture openly to state his claims to an ideological school of his own. In the introduction to the draft Constitution of the CPC, drawn up in 1940 for examination by the 7th Congress, it was stated that the CPC was "guided in its work by the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the decisions of the Comintern".

But only five years later the short introduction (under the heading "Basic Provisions of the Programme") to the Party Constitution passed by the 7th Congress carried the following: "In all its work the Communist Party is guided by thought, which combines the theory of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Chinese revolution—the thought of Mao Tse-tung." This thought was defined in the report on the new Party Constitution, delivered by Liu Shao-chi, as "Chinese communism", as "Chinese Marxism", as "the overriding model of national Marxism".

What was this "Sinicised Marxism", or "national Marxism", to be more exact, the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in that period?

## "National Marxism"

Throughout the Yen-an period (1937-1947) Mao Tse-tung gave theory considerable attention. These years may, perhaps, be regarded as the most fruitful in his rise as the ideologue of the CPC.

His most significant writings of this period were: *Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War* (December 1936), *On Practice* (July 1937), *On Contradiction* (August 1937), *On Protracted War* (May 1938), *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* (December 1939), *On New Democracy* (January 1940), *Reform Our Study* (May 1941), *Rectify the Party's Style in Work* (February 1942), *The Question of Arts, Yen-an* (May 1942), *Our Study and the Current Situation* (April 1944), *Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party* (April 1945), and *On Coalition Government* (May 1945). Altogether, during the Yen-an period Mao wrote more than two-thirds of the works in Vols. I-III of his *Selected Works* (published in Chinese) and in Vols. II-IV of his works translated into the Russian.

These works deal with political, cultural, military, and many other questions of the theory and practice of the CPC and the Chinese revolution. During the Yen-an period Mao was obviously determined to achieve what he proclaimed earlier, namely, the "Sinicisation of Marxism".

It is sometimes said: "China is a sea which makes all the rivers discharging into it salty." It has always been the be-

lief that once religious or other ideological doctrines fall on Chinese soil they are absorbed by it and acquire a new form. The slogan of "Sinicising Marxism" or giving it a Chinese national form followed in the channel of this tradition.

From Mao Tse-tung's own words, conveyed by Edgar Snow, we know that in the period from 1911 to 1920 he was attracted to Buddhism, embraced the ideas of Kang Yu-wei, and was a monarchist, an idealist, a liberal, a reformist, a democrat, a utopian socialist, an anarchist...

"I had a bourgeois and partially even a feudal education. I have read many books by Confucius and his disciples," he said in November 1957. "In those days we knew absolutely nothing about Marx and Engels; we only knew that there were men called Washington and Napoleon." "I also read some books by the founders of Marxism, but I don't know how many they wrote," he declared in 1957. "I have not studied all the departments of Marxism thoroughly. Also, I have never learned foreign languages, for instance. I have only begun to study economics," he repeated in September 1959.<sup>1</sup>

Spokesmen of Maoism—Chen Po-ta and Yao Wen-yuan, to name two—credited him with "Sinicising Marxism". At the sixth plenum of the CPC Central Committee in 1938 Mao said that concrete Marxism was Marxism embodied in national form: "We must make a summing-up from Confucius down to Sun Yat-sen."<sup>2</sup>

It is not worth dwelling on Mao Tse-tung's philosophical works of the Yen-an period. Experts (both Soviet and Western) justifiably consider that they do not bear the stamp of independent thought. They are more or less conscientious expositions of Marxist propositions drawn, as a matter of fact, not from works by Marx and Engels but from pamphlets and articles written by popularisers of Marxism. It has been estimated that in Mao's *Selected Works* from 80 to 90 per cent of the passages dealing with Marxist dialectics "are copied more or less verbatim from translations of Soviet writings."<sup>3</sup> Further, it must be borne in mind that most of the works of this period (included in Vols. I-III of the *Selected Works*) are records of Mao's speeches. These were painstakingly tailored by Chen Po-ta and then thoroughly edited before they were printed in the *Selected Works* in Chinese and Russian.<sup>4</sup>



Take, for example, *On Contradiction*. Fundamentally, it gives a more or less coherent exposition of elementary Marxist-Leninist propositions on this question.

However, already in this work Mao supplemented and modified Marxist formulations, in other words, Sinicised Marxist dialectics. The purport of this Sinicisation was to accentuate the national factors of development in China and belittle the role and significance of international factors.

Mao wrote: "...Many people have accepted the universality of contradiction ... but there are still many comrades, especially the doctrinaires, who are not clear about the problem of the particularity of contradiction. They do not understand that the universality of contradiction resides precisely in the particularity of contradiction. Nor do they understand how very significant it is for our further guidance in revolutionary practice to study the particularity of contradiction in the concrete things confronting us."<sup>5</sup>

There is nothing wrong in this assertion as such. The whole point is in how the accents are placed in this piece of writing. Mao side-steps the general contradictions of the epoch and the general aims of the communist movement, the general regularities of the activity of Communists. He is preoccupied solely with vindicating the particularity of the conditions obtaining in China, the methods of accomplishing revolution in his country, and the special character of the tasks confronting the CPC. In this work we find in embryo the thought that became the litmus paper of Maoism, namely the decisive significance of thought, politics, power, and the superstructure in the drive to remake society.

Similarly, in analysing the philosophical problem of the role of politics in cognition, in his *On Practice* Mao had only one aim—to prove the particularity of the conditions of the Chinese revolution (incidentally, this work was heavily edited before its publication in the *Selected Works*).

In "Resolution on Some Questions in the History of Our Party" Mao attached a disproportionate significance to national elements when he examined the correlation between international and national factors in the Chinese revolution.

In Mao's interpretation of the history of the CPC the main aim is to prove his own infallibility and belittle the role of all the other leaders of the Chinese revolution.

From the ideological standpoint, perhaps, the most typical

for this period was Mao's speech at a conference on literature and art in Yenan in May 1942. He presented his ideology in fairly pure form, mapping out the basic propositions that underlay the CPC's policy in the cultural sphere.

The principal feature characterising his stand was his undisguised defence of utilitarianism in the approach to literature and art. He ignored the specifics of art as a special form of consciousness and culture, transferring this question entirely to the plane of politics, where literature holds a subordinate position only as a mode of implementing policy.

"Should we praise or should we expose?" Mao asked in this work. Answering this question, he wrote: there were three kinds of people: the enemy, the allies in the united front, and our own people, namely, the masses and their vanguard. Three different attitudes had to be adopted towards these three kinds of people. With regard to enemies, i.e., the Japanese imperialists and all other enemies of the people, the task of revolutionary artists and writers was to expose their cruelty and chicanery, point out the tendency of their inevitable defeat, and encourage the anti-Japanese army and people to fight them with one heart and one mind and overthrow them resolutely. In the attitude towards various allies in the united front, it was necessary to promote unity as well as criticism, and there should be different kinds of unity and different kinds of criticism.<sup>6</sup>

Literary art was analysed from only one angle, namely, the angle of whom it served. Knowledge, education, and moral and aesthetic upbringing were left outside the aims of art and literature. In addition, politics itself was understood in the narrow sense of tactics of the current struggle ("united front against the Japanese imperialists", and so forth). These, then, were Mao's principal criteria in assessing works of science, music, and fine art. If one or another opera, novel, or poem did not "work" for the current situation it was not suitable and had to be withdrawn from cultural education and, possibly, condemned.

What about the art of the past or uncommitted works of modern art, for instance, individual genres of fine art and music? Were they to be classed as hostile culture? Mao wrote that the art and literature for the landlord class were feudal art and literature, and the art and literature for the bourgeoisie were bourgeois art and literature.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, he took the correct thesis that art should serve the people only to vulgarise it to the extent of negating art. In discussing how art should serve the people he contended that the difficulty was that the Chinese workers, peasants, and soldiers were illiterate. For that reason they needed knowledge and works of literature and art that could be easily understood and which roused them to fight the enemy. Hence, the aim was not to "add flowers to a piece of brocade" but "offer fuel to a person in stormy weather". "Therefore, popularisation is the more pressing task."<sup>8</sup>

Indeed, it was admirable that the leader of the revolution was also the leading poet of China. He could easily discern the innermost mystery of the creative process, clearly formulate aims and tasks, and determine the forms of literature and art... If one or another work of Chinese or world art was incomprehensible to the illiterate person, the thing was not to make that person literate but to create simplified works that illiterates could understand, and to withdraw incomprehensible works, particularly those that were created in the times of feudal and imperial rule. Nothing could be simpler!

As Mao himself admitted, these demands evoked protests in the Party already then, in Yen-an. How did Mao act? Did he conceal his views? Did he camouflage them? Nothing of the sort. He stopped at nothing (he acted in exactly the same way later in analogous situations: when power was firmly in his hands he often changed masks, showing the "spirit of the tiger" instead of the "spirit of a monkey").

In his closing speech at the Yen-an Conference he stated his attitude without the least embarrassment: "Is this attitude of ours one of utilitarianism? According to Mao, materialists are not opposed to utilitarianism in general, but to the utilitarianism of the feudal, bourgeois, and petty-bourgeois classes. Being proletarian, revolutionary utilitarians, we take as our point of departure the uniting of the present and future interests of the broadest scope and the longest range, not narrow utilitarians who look after only what is partial and immediate."<sup>9</sup>

From this position he criticises the "theory of human essence", the theory of "love of man", the theory of "critical realism", and other literary schools.

Thus, many aspects of the ideology of the "cultural revolution" were worked out already in Yen-an. Little wonder

that in their assessments of the "cultural revolution", analysts frequently write of Mao's "Yenan syndrome."<sup>10</sup> Of course, the causes and aims of the "cultural revolution" do not boil down to reminiscences of the "thought" of Mao of the Yen-an period (more about this later).

Mao's pronouncements on literature and art give not only a better understanding of his attitude to these activities and not only a better understanding of his policy towards the intelligentsia. They characterise the principles underlying his world outlook, principles closely related to his interpretation of contradictions by a primitive comparison between one plane of art and another, by negating works of art and culture with the simplest "utilitarian" criterion.

When we speak of the writings in which (according to the estimates we have cited) only 10 to 20 per cent of the text enunciated Mao Tse-tung's own ideas we must examine, above all, the question of the role played by the peasantry in the Chinese revolution. Mao himself, and then all his foreign "popularisers", saw his theoretical elaboration of precisely this question as his main achievement.

Is this question new to Marxism? Anyone familiar with the history of scientific communism knows that it is not.

In the nineteenth century Engels keenly noted that the proletarian revolution would be successful if it was complemented with a new chapter of the peasant war. Lenin enlarged upon this idea. Needless to say, since then the thesis on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry in the revolution, with the working class retaining its leading role, has been an axiom of scientific communism.

The Comintern elaborated this idea relative to undeveloped regions of the world, where peasants form the bulk of the population. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th congresses of the Comintern (1920-1922) charted an extensive programme for drawing the peasants into the revolution under the leadership of the more advanced proletarian forces.

What was Mao's attitude? The reader will remember that at the first stage of his political career (initial half of the 1920s) he ignored this problem entirely. But then, particularly after his tour of Hunan he became an active champion of the peasant revolution. And, as frequently happened with him, he went to the other extreme: struck with the idea that the peasantry had an important role in the revolu-

tionary national liberation movement, he magnified it and ultimately rejected Marxism's most significant element, the teaching on the historic mission of the working class.

This was not only a matter of Mao's value orientations: a peasant by birth, he was a zealous admirer of peasant uprisings. It was also a matter of a theoretically misconceived analysis of Chinese society's social structure.

Whereas at the time of writing the article "The Classes of Chinese Society" Mao still had no hard and fast notion about the special role of the peasantry in the Chinese revolution, in his "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" he accentuated the role of the peasantry in the imminent revolution. He wrote that the upswing of the peasant movement was acquiring paramount significance, foretelling that before long hundreds of millions of peasants would rise in Central, South, and North China. They would be swift and inexorable as a hurricane, and there was no force that could contain them. They would tear all the fetters binding them and move forward to liberation. "Every revolutionary party and every revolutionary comrade will be put to the test, to be accepted or rejected as they decide."<sup>11</sup>

In this Mao was both right and wrong. He was right when he declared that the Chinese Communists should pay special attention to the peasant movement. But he was wrong in saying that the peasant movement, and none other, would be the touchstone of all revolutionary parties and groups. Actually, this touchstone was the attitude to the working-class movement. The peasant movements were often supported not only by the Communists but also by revolutionary democrats and even elements of the national bourgeoisie (for instance, the left wing of the Kuomintang during the period of the united front with the CPC). On the other hand, it was only the Communists who maintained a consistent stand relative to the decisive role of the proletarian movement in the liberative revolution.

Mao was even less right in his judgments of the methods and forms of the peasant revolution. As early as in the "Report" he expounded an apologia of violence that subsequently became the keynote of Maoism as an ideology. He denounced those Communists who were opposed to the "excesses" of a peasant war. Mao related with admiration that in rural communities the peasants were acting "without ce-

remony". They were going to the landlords and sprawling on the beds of their daughters and daughters-in-law. Everywhere they were seizing rich peasants and landlords, making them wear dunce-caps, and leading them about the villages. "...They have created a kind of terror in the countryside. This is what some people call 'going too far', or 'exceeding the proper limits in righting a wrong', or 'really too much'".<sup>12</sup> His conclusion was that terror was not only normal but necessary.

"... A revolution is not a dinner party, or writing an essay, or painting a picture, or doing embroidery. To put it bluntly, it is necessary to create terror for a while in every rural area, or otherwise it would be impossible to suppress the activities of the counter-revolutionaries in the countryside... Proper limits have to be exceeded in order to right a wrong, or else the wrong cannot be righted."<sup>13</sup>

A very typical argument. Typical not only of the spokesmen of the peasant wars in China (for instance, the Taipings). They are typical of the spokesmen of petty-bourgeois revolutionism generally, when the peasant question is considered in total isolation from the problems of the working-class movement. Terror in the countryside has always been the expression of the weakness of a peasant movement lacking leadership from advanced urban strata and classes. This was a sort of vengeance and not constructive work by new forces powerfully backed by national achievements.

Mao Tse-tung's extremes in the peasant question were criticised time and again by the CPC leadership. In a letter addressed to him, the Central Committee pointed out that the danger inherent in peasant mentality could be rendered harmless only by proletarian leadership. In reply, on April 5, 1929, Mao wrote: "In my view it would be wrong (if any Party member has that view) to fear that if the power of the peasantry grew it would overwhelm the leadership of the workers and bring about the downfall of the revolution.

"The point is that in semi-colonial China the revolution suffers setbacks only when the peasant struggle is not led by the working class.

"But the revolution will suffer no harm if the peasant struggle develops to the extent that the peasantry grows stronger than the working class." By stronger he, in fact, meant forming the army, and then the Party itself and authority bodies of peasants.

Subsequently—both in theory and, particularly, in practice—Mao went from error to error. For instance, in *On New Democracy* he ambiguously characterised the role of the working class in the revolution. He wrote that the basic forces determining the country's destiny were the proletariat, the peasants, the intellectuals, and other sections of the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>14</sup> An even more pronounced underestimation of the role of the working class was given in his characteristic of the new revolutionary power in China. He wrote that the above-mentioned classes would inevitably form the "basic component parts of the state structure and of the structure of political power of the democratic republic of China."<sup>15</sup>

He thus regarded the proletariat only as an element of a united dictatorship sharing power with the other participants in the dictatorship. But which of these participants would play the cardinal role? Mao Tse-tung replied—the peasants. "New-democratic politics are virtually the granting of power to the peasants. The new or genuine Three People's Principles<sup>16</sup> are virtually the principles of the peasants' revolution... The strength of the peasants constitutes the principal force of the Chinese revolution."<sup>17</sup>

Of course, in Mao's writings there are statements to the effect that the Chinese revolution could not triumph without proletarian leadership.<sup>18</sup> He wrote in this vein, for instance, in 1939. But this was written for form only. The lauding of the role of the peasants in the same work was not accidental. Mao maintained, in particular, that "peasant uprisings and peasant wars were the sole motive force of China's historical evolution". Why the sole force? What about the revolutionary struggle in the cities, and the working-class movement of modern times?

We repeat, in a country like China the peasantry unquestionably must (and does) play an immense role in the revolution and in socialist construction. And it is for this reason that in China it is especially important to combat the petty-bourgeois element and foster proletarian consciousness among the peasant masses.

In China leadership of the peasantry by the working class is of particularly great significance because the Chinese peasants have not gone through the experience of capitalist development. That accounts for not only their petty-bour-

geois inclinations but also their semi-feudal features, ideas, and morals.

In "Oppose the Party 'Eight-Legged Essay'" Mao wrote that China was a country with an extraordinarily large petty bourgeoisie and that the CPC was surrounded by this huge social stratum. He expressed anxiety over the fact that a great number of the Party members were of this class origin and that they had joined the Party "without shedding their petty-bourgeois tails, long or short".<sup>19</sup> Later, this ceased to worry him.

The history of China has shown that power can be seized with the support of the peasant movement. But the question is: can the cause of socialism win? To achieve this objective it is vital to have the support not only of the peasants but also, and above all, of the workers, whose interests and aims most fully embody the socialist ideal of reshaping society.

Mao's idea of a "new democracy", dating from the Yanan period, was also linked with the peasant issue.

As in the case of the role of the peasantry, Mao Tse-tung used Lenin's teaching, but the element of exaggeration, introduced by him, his one-sided approach distorted the essence of the question.

It was Lenin who wrote that there would be two stages of the revolution, succinctly making the point: "The democratic struggle is waged by the workers together with a section of the bourgeoisie, especially the petty bourgeoisie. On the other hand, the socialist struggle is waged by the workers against the whole of the bourgeoisie."<sup>20</sup> More precisely this (during the revolution of 1905) was when Lenin wrote that the democratic revolution would lead to a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, which would evolve into a dictatorship of the proletariat.<sup>21</sup>

In the 1920s Lenin developed this idea relative to Asia and other backward regions of the world. He underscored the desirability of a temporary alliance with "bourgeois democracy in the colonial and backward countries".<sup>22</sup> The 4th Congress of the Comintern (1922) enlarged upon these ideas of Lenin, urging the formation of an anti-imperialist united front, that would include the national bourgeoisie, in these regions.



How did Mao Tse-tung handle this problem? As in his approach to other problems, he went from one extreme to another. In the early 1920s he believed that the merchants would play the leading role in the revolution. Then he urged cooperation with the national and petty bourgeoisie. He went so far as to favour cooperation with the comprador bourgeoisie, at least with that segment of it that was "willing to take part in the national revolution".<sup>23</sup>

In *On New Democracy* he defined the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic revolution that would gradually evolve into a socialist revolution. He wrote that for a long time there would be in China a unique form of power and a unique form of organisation of authority absolutely vital and regular for China and, at the same time, differing from the system in Russia, namely, a new democratic state and a new democratic organisation of authority. This would be the power of the alliance of a number of democratic classes.<sup>24</sup>

During the national liberation revolution the "new democracy" slogan attracted large segments of the petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and even middle bourgeoisie. Confusion and muddle commenced and mounted later. Mao Tse-tung never answered the question of how the new democracy would evolve into a dictatorship of the proletariat or some other form of authority discharging its functions. In theory this has been invariably manifested in constant confusion—in the works of Mao himself and of his followers, and in the documents of the CPC—of the concepts "democratic dictatorship of the people", "dictatorship of the proletariat", "dictatorship of the working class and peasantry", and "dictatorship of coalition forces".

But the whole point was not in the "new democracy" slogan but in the united front guideline put forward by the CPC in keeping with the general lines laid down by the Comintern. This guideline was a significant factor helping to unite China's democratic forces against the Kuomintang and, ultimately, accomplish the people's revolution.

The civil war of 1946-1949 brought the people's revolution in China to consummation and led to the proclamation of the People's Republic of China. This revolution was the most important event in world history after the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia. It brought to an end the long, Communist-led national and social liberation struggle

of the Chinese working people against oppression by the landowners, militarists, and foreign imperialism. It opened up impressive vistas for the Chinese people and gave a powerful impetus to the revolutionary movement in and outside Asia.

We shall not go into the details of the revolutionary civil war in China. We shall only note some circumstances that were, in our view, decisive for the victory of the people's revolution in 1949.

First, the international situation resulting from the defeat of nazi Germany and militarist Japan in World War II. After entering the war against imperialist Japan on August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union fought bitter battles and by September had crushed the Kwangtung Army, the main assault force of the Japanese aggressors in the Asian continent. Manchuria and other Chinese territories were liberated from Japan's 14-year rule. With the active cooperation of Soviet units, the 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army led by the Communists cleared the Japanese out of North China and part of Central China. The territories liberated in 1945 measured 950,000 square kilometres and had a population of nearly 100 million. Yen-an remained the centre of all these regions. The Central Committee and the highest organs of authority of the liberated regions were based there.

The struggle against Japanese aggression, in which the Chinese Communists relied on the might and political support of the Soviet Union, created a situation that made it possible to enlarge the armed forces under their command: in 1937 the 8th Route and the New 4th armies had some 60,000 effectives, while in 1945 together with units of the people's armies operating in South China they numbered nearly 1,300,000 effectives. Moreover, the people's volunteers and guerrillas numbered about 2,700,000. Throughout the civil war the balance of strength kept changing rapidly in favour of the People's Liberation Army. While in July 1946, when the Kuomintang launched its general offensive against the PLA, it had a huge, 4,300,000-strong army, by June 1949 that army's strength dwindled to 1,500,000. By then the PLA had nearly 4,000,000 effectives and its armaments matched those of the Kuomintang forces.

With the support of the Soviet Union, the Communist Party of China won considerable prestige among the Chi-

nese people and became a mass political party. In 1937 it had 40,000 members, but by the end of the war against imperialist Japan its membership had grown to 1,200,000. The Communists were the backbone of the PLA.

The Communist Party produced many military leaders, who devised effective tactics against the Kuomintang armies. A historical role was played by Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the PLA, whose stature as a military strategist was immeasurable. He and other Chinese commanders repeatedly stressed that in the battles against the Kuomintang the PLA made use of the combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces. Also of immense importance was the supply of armaments from the Soviet Union.

As regards the internal conditions that ensured the triumph of the people's revolution, note must be made of the united front tactic, which proved politically to be extremely effective, if not decisive, in the efforts to consolidate the anti-imperialist front in China. This tactic, as we have mentioned, stemmed from the decisions of the 7th Comintern Congress, which urged consistent unity among all of China's democratic forces.

Outlined in Comintern decisions, the united front tactic against the Japanese aggressors earned the CPC not only the support of the peasants, the workers, and the petty bourgeoisie, but also the confidence of a large segment of the national bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek's constant breaches of the accord on unity and cooperation with the Communists, reached at the close of 1945 not only on the national but also on the international level, placed the Kuomintang at a disadvantage, split the alliance of the compradore and national bourgeoisie, and eroded that party's mass base. In this situation the Kuomintang was unable to maintain its authority even with the support of the USA, which had supplied the Kuomintang Government with colossal quantities of armaments.

The steadily closer cooperation between the CPC and the CPSU, the common struggle against the Japanese aggressors, and the Soviet Union's unfailing support for the Chinese Communists at talks with Chiang Kai-shek and also with the USA, Britain, and France gave the internationalists in the CPC a stronger hand and weakened the influence of the Maoists.

Mao Tse-tung had himself declared that the Chinese revolution would not have been successful without the all-round assistance of the Soviet Union and, on the whole, of the working-class movement of the Western countries.

"If the Soviet Union did not exist, if there had been no victory over fascism in the Second World War, if Japanese imperialism were not defeated, if the various New Democratic countries had not arisen, if the oppressed nations of the East had not begun to fight, if there were no struggle inside the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and other capitalist countries between the popular masses and their reactionary rulers, and if there were no sum-total of all these developments, well then, the reactionary forces bearing down upon us would certainly be immeasurably greater than at present. Could we be victorious under such circumstances? Obviously not."<sup>25</sup>

Mao Tse-tung never said a truer word!

When the revolution in China triumphed the Soviet Union was the first country to accord recognition to the People's Republic of China. Diplomatic relations were established on October 2, 1949. On February 14, 1950 the two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, and agreements on the Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dairen. The Soviet Union granted the PRC a long-term credit. Relations of friendship and cooperation developed between the two nations.

When, by force of objective reasons, friendship and cooperation with the CPSU and the Soviet Union were growing Mao Tse-tung had no alternative but to join in the common stream of the world communist movement. He was aware that without Soviet assistance the PLA would not crush the Kuomintang, which was getting massive aid from the USA and other imperialist powers, and for a time shelved his disagreements with the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties.

This proved to be beneficial during the struggle for the people's revolution and during the initial years of reforms in the People's Republic of China.

## PART TWO

# The Knot Is Tied

On October 1, 1949, speaking on behalf of the Chinese people, Mao Tse-tung formally proclaimed the People's Republic of China. A photograph of that occasion shows Mao and other leaders on the Gate of Heavenly Peace (the Tienanmen tribune—*Ed.*) in front of an enormous number of people.

Shortly before, on September 21, the 1st Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was held in Peiping (Northern Tranquility), which was renamed Peking (Northern Capital) a few days later and became the capital of the new state. The conference, which sat until September 30, formalised the new state and elected its government. Mao Tse-tung became Chairman of the government. Chu Teh addressed the closing sitting, ending his speech with the words "Long live Chairman Mao!"<sup>1</sup>

The people were given to understand in no uncertain terms that the leader of the CPC would henceforth be not merely the head of the new government but the political and spiritual leader of the nation.

Mao Tse-tung was 56 when the revolution triumphed. His climb to power had been long and arduous. Twenty-eight years, or half his life, had elapsed since the day he joined the Communist Party.

Together with the Party Mao went through the trials of the revolutionary struggle, but he did so, of course, in his own way. He never forgot the bitter lessons of the early 1930s, when he was expelled from the Party leadership, or the savage struggle against Wang Ming, the "Moscow opposition", Chang Kuo-tao, and other leaders obstructing his drive to power in the CPC, or the *chengfeng*.

The victory of the people's revolution installed Mao at the pinnacle of power in one of the world's largest countries. He was Chairman of the CPC, Chairman of the Central People's Government, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, and Chairman of the People's Revolutionary Military Council. A few years later (1954), when China's Constitution was adopted and the new office of head of government was instituted, he became Chairman of the People's Republic of China. He was known simply as Chairman. This title fused with his person and was regarded by the masses as a sort of handle to his name. He at once moved into the Imperial Palace and thereby emphasised his special position in the Party and the state.

What sort of ruler was this admirer of Liu Pang, Napoleon, and Bismarck to be like?

In the history of China, as indeed of other countries, there rarely have been people who upon seizing power by armed force renounced it in favour of individuals more capable of administering the state. Even rarer have there been cases of them resisting the temptation of donning the toga of dictator.

In England the bourgeois revolution of the seventeenth century brought the Lord-Protector Oliver Cromwell to power. The great French revolution of the eighteenth century ended with Napoleon's Thermidor coup. The peasant armed uprisings in China were even more closely linked with traditions of imperial power. It is in place to recall some examples of the past for, as the poet Alexander Pushkin said, tradition is the soul of state power.

A massive armed uprising of peasants directed against Mongol tyranny broke out in China in the fourteenth century. It was led by Chu Yuan-chang, son of a peasant. Subsequently, when he had entrenched himself in Nanking, he became emperor and founded the Ming Dynasty. In the seventeenth century Li Tzu-cheng, son of a Shensi peasant, headed a peasant army in a rising against the house of Ming, the big feudal barons, the bureaucracy, usurers, and landlords. The insurgents captured Peking and held it for a short period. One of Li Tzu-cheng's first acts was to have himself crowned emperor of the Heavenly Kingdom.

The famous Taiping Rebellion, which developed into the greatest peasant war in Chinese history, took place in the

mid-nineteenth century. It was led by a man of peasant origin, Hung Hsiu-chuan. He preached universal equality and brotherhood and proclaimed that a "Heavenly Kingdom of Great Peace" (*Taiping tienkuo*) would be established. For fourteen years the Taipings fought foreign enslavers courageously, and then founded the Taiping state with its capital at Nanking. The "Land System of the Heavenly Dynasty", adopted by the Taipings, proclaimed anti-feudal egalitarian land tenure. Although on their territory they extirpated all vestiges of Manchu rule and put into effect some democratic reforms, including the electivity of officials, the Taipings were unable to renounce the monarchical system of state power. At the very outset of the rebellion Hung Hsiu-chuan assumed the title of Heavenly King.

Needless to say, for Mao Tse-tung and his entourage these were not the only examples from their country's history. The socialist revolution, which triumphed in Russia, set the first example of a new power headed by the Communist Party. The key principles of collective leadership of the Party and the state, based on democracy and centralism, were worked out in Lenin's lifetime.

The CPSU's experience of building the world's first socialist state could not fail to exercise a strong influence on the Chinese Communists, on the CPC's leaders, including Mao Tse-tung. But valuable as international experience was, they had to work out their own solutions to the problems of administering a huge nation that had become centralised probably for the first time.

How was the new authority to be organised? What methods were to be used to govern the Party and the state? What should be the role of the CPC Chairman in the new conditions?

These were questions that had still to be answered.

The most acute problem was that of putting an end to economic backwardness, of working out the forms, methods, and rates of carrying out this historic task. Ultimately, the quest for ways of economic development became a bone of contention in the CPC, the point of departure of the demarcation between two lines—of the nationalists and the internationalists, of the "leftists" and the pragmatists. This was seen strikingly as early as the mid-1950s.

It is hardly necessary to speak in detail of the colossal difficulties that lay in wait for the Communists and the en-

tire Chinese people on the road of economic modernisation and socialist construction. The China inherited from the Kuomintang was a backward, semi-colonial country. On the eve of the revolution, roughly 90 per cent of the population, of whom 10 per cent were landlords and prosperous peasants, lived in the countryside. The social structure of the towns was also extremely backward: coolies comprised more than half of the urban population, while factory workers numbered less than 20 per cent of the total number of workers.

Feudal and semi-feudal relations were predominant in agriculture. Nearly three-fourths of the arable land belonged to landlords and prosperous peasants. Most of this land was rented on onerous terms to landless and land-hungry peasants. Approximately 70 per cent of the peasants were poor (almost all were tenants or semi-tenants) and only about 20 per cent were middle peasants.

The solution of the agrarian problem and industrialisation were, naturally, the basic task, an indispensable condition for Chinese society's social reorganisation. In those years the CPC had charted what was on the whole an effective policy based on studies of the conditions obtaining in China and on a creative use of the Soviet experience. Although Mao Tse-tung did not openly dispute this policy, he laid special stress on the task of China's national rejuvenation.

"We are determined to proceed with great national (!) construction. The work that we shall have to do is difficult, and we are short of experience. We must, therefore, spare no effort to study the Soviet Union's advanced experience... In order to build our country we must raise our study of the Soviet Union to national dimensions."<sup>2</sup>

At the close of 1949 Mao went to the Soviet Union for the first time.\* Later, in his speeches to Party conferences (for instance, at a conference of secretaries of provincial and city Party committees in January 1957) he recalled this visit with annoyance. Perhaps he felt humiliated by the very fact of going to another country: Chinese tradition required representatives of foreign states to come to the Heavenly Kingdom.

But during his visit in Moscow he sang a different tune.

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\* He visited the Soviet Union again in 1957.—*Ed.*



He spoke highly of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance signed by the USSR and China in February 1950. Before his departure from Moscow, on February 17, 1950, he made a statement in which he called Chinese-Soviet friendship "eternal and unbreakable". After touring industrial enterprises he said that the Soviet Union's economic and cultural achievements would serve as an example for the building of a new China.

The first steps of the new authority were aimed at eradicating the effects of the nation's semi-colonial and semi-feudal development. Foreign monopolies were stripped of rights and privileges. All factories owned or controlled by feudal lords and the compradore bourgeoisie were confiscated and turned over to the state.

The agrarian reform, completed in the main by the spring of 1953, was one of the most significant social changes introduced by the new authority. Within two and a half years this reform affected 450 million people. An idea of its results is that some 300 million landless and land-hungry peasants received 47 million hectares of arable land, which had belonged to landlords. This was, indeed, an outstanding achievement of the anti-feudal revolution in China.

The initial post-revolutionary years of China's development may be called the most interesting and even instructive for other developing nations. Impressive headway was made quickly. By 1952 agricultural output had grown by approximately 50 per cent. The cumulative value of industrial output more than doubled. Old irrigation systems were repaired and new ones built: this was of immense importance to Chinese agriculture, for one-fourth of the crop area requires irrigation. The movement for agricultural cooperatives commenced.

As the CPC leaders themselves noted at the time, major factors of the successful restoration and development of the nation's economy were assistance from the Soviet Union and utilisation of its experience. With the help of Soviet engineers and technicians China restored its mining, iron and steel, and other key industries, and its network of motor roads and railways. In a telegram to the Soviet Government on the third anniversary of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, Mao Tse-tung wrote: "During the past three years close friendship and co-operation between the two great allies—China and the So-

viet Union—have grown much stronger and developed substantially. The genuinely disinterested assistance rendered China by the Soviet Government and the Soviet people has not only expedited the restoration and development of China's economy but will be important to the fulfilment of the first five-year plan of China's state construction on a large scale." <sup>3</sup>

In the period of restoration the CPC's policy was that of encouraging the growth of output in all sectors of the national economy. The task was set of strengthening the economy and beginning industrialisation, with the accent on the promotion of the state and cooperative sectors. In those years the government encouraged the growth not only of the small-commodity but also of the private capitalist and state-capitalist sectors, while steadily enhancing the role of the state sector as the guarantee of the nation's socialist development.

China's first economic development five-year plan (1953-1957), adopted after the period of restoration ended, was successfully carried out, while in some indicators it was even overfulfilled. In 1957, at the close of that five-year plan period, China moved into ninth place in the world for the output of steel, into seventh place for the output of pig iron, into fifth place for the output of coal, and into thirteenth place for the output of electric power.

During that period production of the means of production increased by 210 per cent (or almost 40 per cent above the five-year plan target) and of consumer goods by 83 per cent (which was almost at the level of the five-year plan target). In 1957 the proportion of means of production in the nation's gross industrial product (exclusive of the artisan industry) rose to 52.2 per cent (the five-year plan target was 45.4 per cent), while the output of consumer goods fell short of the target growth of 54.6 per cent, reaching only 47.8 per cent. <sup>4</sup>

Private capitalist and artisan production had been in the main restructured by 1957. According to the Chinese press, in 1956 the state sector accounted for 54.6 per cent of the gross output, the cooperative sector 17.1 per cent, the state-capitalist sector 27.1 per cent, the private capitalist sector 0.004 per cent, and the small-commodity sector (uncooperated artisans) 1.2 per cent. <sup>5</sup> With Soviet assistance China built 250 big factories in which up-to-date equipment was

installed. The industrial enterprises built with the assistance of socialist countries formed the foundation of China's modern industry.<sup>6</sup>

In the political sphere the general line mirrored a certain strengthening of the position of the internationalists in the CPC leadership. The idea of a democratic dictatorship of the people was embodied in specific forms of state authority. It took into account the peculiarity of the conditions in which the Chinese revolution was accomplished and the aim of consolidating the alliance of all the progressive forces in the united front.

In the new coalition government, set up in 1949, there were representatives of eight parties and groups, and also "democratic independents". As Chairman of the Central People's Government, Mao Tse-tung had several deputies, one of whom was Soong Ching-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen. In those years he gave much of his attention to foreign policy. His biographers have computed that from the moment the PRC was proclaimed (1949) to Mao's retirement from the office of Chairman of the PRC in 1959 he gave some 70 formal audiences to top-level diplomats at the presentation of credentials.

The experience of enforcing the agrarian reform, the experience of restoring the economy with the use of national capital and the encouragement of small-commodity production, the experience of setting up a broad alliance of democratic forces under CPC leadership during the initial years of the People's Republic of China were and still are of international significance. Had China followed up the successes of the democratic revolution and gradually advanced along the road of socialist construction it would undoubtedly have registered new achievements in economic development and in socialist transformations.

But this did not happen. The closer China drew to tasks of a socialist nature the more was its development affected by negative political factors.

As early as in the first years of the PRC the suspicions of world progressive opinion were aroused by some of the methods that were used to enforce reforms. These were two interrelated forms of political pressure, that had been employed in Yen-an: ideological campaigns of the *chengfeng* type and the accompanying mass repressions. These methods became widespread in the period of the agrarian re-

form, particularly during the period of the first five-year plan.

At a CPC conference on the agrarian reform Mao Tse-tung urged the peasants to kill "not one or two, but more landlords", warning them, however, against killing all landlords without discrimination. He regarded public executions of landlords as justified and even useful. First, because in the past many landlords had treated their peasants brutally, and second because retribution against the landlords would make the peasants more appreciative of the radical changes in the countryside. During the period of the agrarian reform, there were public trials of former exploiters in many villages. They were executed there and then, in front of everybody.<sup>7</sup>

The first reforms in the countryside saw relatively few victims. Western sources speak of "hundreds of thousands", which add up to less than half of one per cent of the total number of landlords.<sup>8</sup>

A tide of repressions swept across the nation later, in early 1951, when on Mao's recommendations the "Regulations on Punishment for Counter-Revolutionary Activity" were adopted on May 20, 1951. Under this law political and ideological crimes were punishable by death or long imprisonment.

Public trials at which "dangerous counter-revolutionaries" were sentenced to death were held in big Chinese cities in March 1951. In Peking alone there were within a few months nearly 30,000 rallies attended by over 3,000,000 people. Long lists of executed "counter-revolutionaries" appeared daily in the newspapers.

In October 1951 it was officially announced that 800,000 "counter-revolutionaries" were tried during the first half of that year. Later Chou En-lai said that 16.8 per cent of the "counter-revolutionaries" brought to trial were sentenced to death. Western estimates vary, placing the number of people executed in 1951 from 1-3 to 10-15 million.<sup>9</sup>

The massive ideological and political campaigns launched by the CPC in 1951-1952 were on the whole dictated by the objective need to break the resistance of bourgeois, feudal, and semi-feudal elements to the restrictions imposed on them by the people's democratic system.

But in parallel there were campaigns against progressive intellectuals and Party cadres who disagreed with Mao's

ideology and practices. In the autumn of 1951 he set in motion a movement for the ideological re-education of the intelligentsia. It commenced with a pre-arranged campaign, the signal for which was the discussion of the film *The Life of Wu Hsun*. In that campaign many intellectuals were charged with disseminating bourgeois views.

The movement for ideological re-education affected chiefly the university intelligentsia. Committees were set up at institutions of higher learning and under their supervision the faculty studied the works of Mao and the history of the CPC in its Maoist interpretation. This first campaign of its kind involved the use of favourite methods of the Maoist leadership: the "retrainees" were forced to "make a clean breast of it", to flagellate themselves publicly, and to accuse their friends, comrades, kin, and so on of various sins.

Many elements of these campaigns were, probably, due to the cruel practices of old China. The atrocities committed by the Kuomintang during the civil war defy description: torture of Communists, humiliation of peasants, and mass murders were common. But the question was: should the Communists follow these traditions? Was not brutality becoming part and parcel of the new state when it took the path of avenging the crimes or abuses of the former rulers?

Mao Tse-tung made a curious pronouncement on this score:

"When Chinese speak of the death of a person, they call it 'white joy'. On the one hand, the funeral, burial, and prayers for the deceased are sorrowful. On the other hand, death is called a 'joy', a blessing. And this accords with dialectics. I believe that it is indeed a joyful event... To be disapprobatory of death is to be not a dialectician but a metaphysicist."

The public executions so frequently practised in China are evidently linked with the understanding that the death of an enemy is a joyful and festive event. The rationale is, apparently, not only to eliminate potential opponents but also to create a generally festive atmosphere on the occasion of a public execution of an enemy of the revolution. As early as the 1950s crowds became actively involved in the extermination of first guilty and then innocent people. This method became an important element of the Maoist

"line of the masses" or, to be more exact, the line of manipulating the masses.

What were the educational and moral results of these mock public trials supposed to be? They were summary trials with no provision for normal inquiry, an objective evaluation of guilt, and a reasonable choice of adequate punishment. They were sham courts where everything was decided in advance by their organisers or by the spontaneous mood of a mob. Was this "white joy"? Ideological consolidation? It is hard to answer this question, for what we have before us is a psychological phenomenon based on a national tradition. But one thing is certain—cruelty and arbitrary rule were becoming a norm of the mass consciousness. Bitterness and fear were becoming endemic.

Prosper Mérimée, one of the most significant writers of the nineteenth century and a leading student of social psychology, gave an interesting moral assessment of the massacre of St. Bartholomew. He said that a judgment of one and the same deed should change with time and country. The St. Bartholomew horror was, in his view, a great crime even in its day, but "a massacre in the sixteenth century was not the same as a massacre in the nineteenth century".<sup>10</sup>

But even from this angle one cannot condone the barbarous public repentances practised in Yenan, then made widespread in 1951 and later, particularly during the "cultural revolution", when they became almost daily occurrences in the life of Chinese society. This took place not in the sixteenth but in the latter half of the twentieth century and its organisers were people who claimed they were building the most humane civilisation—communism!

At the 3rd session of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in October 1951 Mao declared:

"The campaign to re-educate the intelligentsia ideologically by criticism and self-criticism is a democratic method of education and persuasion of those who belong to the people. This method differs radically from the method used against hostile classes, who must be forcibly re-educated through labour."

It is interesting to note that the movement for ideological re-education coincided in time with the publication of Mao Tse-tung's works.

In its assessment of the results of this campaign, the official press wrote: "Ideological re-education, particularly of all categories of intellectuals, is one of the key conditions for democratic changes and progress in our country's industrialisation."<sup>11</sup>

The *chengfeng* pattern was repeated in 1954 when further persecutions were started against the intelligentsia: a campaign against the Hu Feng "counter-revolutionary clique" was mounted on Mao's instructions. Hu Feng, a literary critic who had been in the revolutionary writers' movement for many years and was elected to the leadership of the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers, was charged with opposing the principle of Party leadership of literature and art enunciated in Mao's Yanan speeches.

Material on the "Hu Feng clique" was published in the newspaper *Jenmin jihpao* in three instalments from May 13 to June 10, 1955 and also in a pamphlet entitled *Material on the Hu Feng Counter-Revolutionary Clique*. The foreword to this pamphlet and the editor's notes and comments are attributed to Mao Tse-tung.

It is noteworthy that Hu Feng was charged with, among other things, attacking Chou Yang, Mao Tun, and others exercising Party leadership of literature and art, precisely those who subsequently (during the struggle "against rightists" and in the period of the "cultural revolution") were labelled "counter-revolutionaries" and "revisionists". For Hu Feng the outcome of the "criticism" campaign was predetermined: on the charge of "counter-revolutionary activity" he was arrested and sentenced.

The campaign against counter-revolution, launched in 1955 on direct instructions from Mao Tse-tung was not confined to the persecution of intellectuals: as every campaign for the "rectification of style" or "ideological re-education" it developed into a purge of the CPC leadership. On June 10, 1955 *Jenmin jihpao* carried an article on the "Hu Feng Affair", in which it was asserted that counter-revolutionary elements had infiltrated "some governmental, military, and economic institutions, educational and cultural organs, the editorial offices of journals and newspapers, and also leading agencies of mass organisations such as the trade unions and youth associations. They have also infiltrated the Communist Party of China, some of them holding fairly high positions."

As a result, many Communists, accused of links with Hu Feng, were expelled from the CPC and arrested. The "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih affair"<sup>12</sup> was aired almost at the same time.

This "affair" was discussed at the National Conference of the CPC in March 1955, which was attended by 62 members and alternate members of the Central Committee and 257 lower echelon Party officials. The "Resolution on the Anti-Party Alliance of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih", passed by this conference, stated that as early as in February 1954 "the fourth plenum of the Central Committee had seriously warned the anti-Party elements, and that Kao Kang had not only refused to admit his guilt but committed suicide".

Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were accused of conspiratorial activities, but it was not said what issues of the Party's domestic and foreign policy they were contesting. Four years later, in August 1959, the eighth plenum of the Central Committee passed a resolution on the "anti-Party group headed by Peng Teh-huai" in which it was asserted that Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih had pursued a "misguided line" in opposition to the "correct line" "pursued by Comrade Mao Tse-tung".

Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih were accused of carrying on "conspiratorial activities aimed at seizing leadership in the Party and the state", of acting against leading members of the CC. It was declared that Kao Kang sought to become General Secretary or Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier of the State Council.<sup>13</sup>

But this was not the bone of contention. The persecution of Kao Kang, one of the top leaders of the CPC known as a firm internationalist, was an obvious indication of a struggle between two lines in the Party, a symptom of the disagreements rending the CPC leadership over a large range of issues. It is not to be ruled out that Kao Kang insisted on a more consistent employment of the Soviet experience of economic management, as had been done in Northeast China, where he headed the Party organisation. Moreover, it is not to be ruled out that Mao wanted the Kao Kang "affair" to serve as a warning to other internationalists in the CPC.

At the Party conference in March 1955 Kao and Jao were called leaders of an anti-Party faction, while the confe-



rence's address called for the setting up of central and local control committees to prevent any repetition of similar cases.

The tensions in the Party could be seen in the contradictory stance of the CPC leadership following the removal of Kao Kang, Jao Shu-shih, and their supporters. One tendency was to tighten control of all Party organisations and bolster centralism by forming central and local control commissions.

But the decisions of that same March conference contained instructions aimed against tendencies "towards personal dictatorship and fragmentation, which undermine the principle of collective leadership", against "suppression of inner-Party democracy and criticism" and "against conceit, self-complacency, and tendencies towards the worship of individuals".<sup>14</sup>

It is known that at the sixth enlarged plenum of the Seventh Central Committee (October 1955) Mao Tse-tung sharply attacked the people urging a relaxation of political repressions.

"Some people say," he declared, "that we have no conscience at all. We say that relative to the bourgeoisie the Marxists have not much conscience. This is precisely a case when it is better to have less conscience. Some of our comrades are overly humane."

After dwelling on the methods of ideological struggle, he advanced a thesis which played a dramatic role during the "cultural revolution". He proclaimed that people guilty of serious ideological errors were, in fact, enemies of the revolution. This prepared the ideological vice into which it would be easy to place any opponent of the "thought" of Mao. Regardless of his post, an enemy of the "thought" of Mao had only one fate: this was demonstrated by what happened to Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih.

The 8th CPC Congress, held in September 1956, was a major event in the life of the Chinese people. The situation was complex. On the one hand, significant advances had been made in economic and social development. On the other, errors and difficult, unresolved problems were piling up, particularly in the Party's ideological work, in its policy towards the intelligentsia, and in inner-Party life. Nevertheless, the congress passed profound and, on the whole, correct decisions.

As was noted by many Chinese leaders at the congress, its work proceeded under the beneficial impact of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Its resolutions required the unswerving observance of the principle of collective leadership and the eradication of the personality cult. Special stress was laid on the enormous significance of the Soviet Union's political support and economic aid to China. "Without the great internationalist solidarity of the proletariat of the various countries, without the support of the world's revolutionary forces our socialist cause cannot advance to victory,"<sup>15</sup> it was stated.

The congress decisions declared that in order to build socialism China had to proceed with socialist industrialisation, with priority for heavy industry.

It was acknowledged that a hallmark of the transitional period in China was that not only the peasants and the urban petty bourgeoisie but also the national bourgeoisie were allies of the working class. It was believed that the transition to the socialist management of capitalist industry and trade had to be peaceful. The congress determined that the transition period would take a fairly long time—approximately three five-year plan periods or even a little longer.<sup>16</sup>

Today, when one rereads the CC political report delivered at the 8th Congress by Liu Shao-chi and considers it in the light of subsequent developments, one is struck by many points that unquestionably reflected the bitter struggle in the CPC leadership on key questions of socialist construction and inner-Party life.

The introduction itself contains a warning against "right" and "left" errors. It is stated bluntly that errors of this kind had been made in previous years. The "right" deviation consisted, according to Liu Shao-chi, of resting content with the successes achieved by the bourgeois-democratic revolution, of demanding a halt to the revolution, of refusing to recognise that it had to evolve into a socialist revolution, of a reluctance to implement a policy of restricting capitalism in town and country. The "left" deviation from the general line consisted chiefly of demanding the building of socialism "in one fine morning", the liquidation of the bourgeoisie by expropriating or reducing capitalist industry and trade to rapid ruin by quick replacement, of refusing to see that socialism had to be achieved by a gradual advance, of dis-

believing that it was possible to attain the aims of the socialist revolution peacefully. The report denounced both deviations, but in enunciating concrete issues Liu Shao-chi returned again and again to a criticism of the "left" deviation.

It was stated at length that the CPC and the Chinese Government were planning the gradual transformation of agriculture on socialist lines. Here the accent was placed on the need for building the appropriate material basis and implementing a policy taking the situation in the country into account so that the mass of the peasants and artisans would join the cooperatives willingly, voluntarily. Relative to the national bourgeoisie, it had to be made to go along with the socialist reshaping of the private sector "more or less willingly".

Further, it was stated that since the latter half of 1955 the Central Committee and Mao Tse-tung had "put an end to rightist, conservative views in the Party", which had fettered the active participation of the peasants in cooperatives. As a result, the lower-type cooperatives began to be transformed en masse into higher-type socialist cooperatives capable of organising production more efficiently.

These words merit closer scrutiny. Indeed, there had been indicative developments in 1954-1955. While the higher Party and state agencies were preparing to endorse the final variant of the first five-year plan, Mao Tse-tung made an attempt to impose his own policy in the economy and social reforms. However, he at first encountered resistance in the CPC leadership.

This may be judged from indirect evidence. In June 1955, at the second session of the National People's Congress the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Li Fu-chun (subsequently branded as a proponent of "economism") recommended that no more than one-third of the peasants should be cooperated by the close of 1957. This recommendation received official approval and was included in the session's resolution of July 30.

However, on the very next day, July 31, Mao Tse-tung spoke at a conference of secretaries of Party provincial, city, and regional committees, stigmatising those who were allegedly slowing down socialist reforms in town and country. "Throughout the Chinese countryside a new upsurge of the socialist mass movement is in sight. But some of our

comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet, always complaining that others are going too fast."

He criticised Party officials who were insisting that attention should be concentrated on consolidating existing cooperatives rather than on accelerating the pace of collectivisation. He labelled as right deviationists those who "believe that the present situation in the cooperative movement is critical", and also those who felt that "the several hundred thousand existing semi-socialist cooperatives" could not "be consolidated". He maintained that "the Central Committee of our Party decided that the number of agricultural producers' cooperatives should go up to a million. This means a little more than a 50 per cent increase". In the next breath he demanded a 100 per cent increase and appealed to the local CPC secretaries.

Of course, this was regarded as an order and cooperation proceeded at top speed. In July 1955 the cooperatives embraced 16,900,000 peasant families (14 per cent), but within a year, by June 1956, the number of peasant families in the cooperatives had exceeded 108,000,000 (90.4 per cent). The gradual, planned development of the cooperatives was abandoned. Higher forms were introduced throughout the country, and 75 million families soon found themselves in higher-type cooperatives, with only 35 million remaining in the lower-type ones.

The Chinese press withheld publication of Mao's speech until mid-October 1955. An enlarged Central Committee plenum (from October 4 to 11, 1955) passed Mao's "amendment" to the five-year plan. Characteristically, the people invited to that meeting (388) outnumbered the members and alternate members of the CC (163). This, evidently, indicated the existence of covert opposition in the CC to Mao Tse-tung recommendations.

The plenum reappraised the five-year plan targets, which envisaged reconstituting 80 per cent of the private industry and trade into mixed state-capitalist enterprises. In November 1955 the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce called for immediate and voluntary socialisation. This significantly accelerated the socialisation of industry.

Also, many people were astonished at how quickly the more than 500 million peasant population was cooperated. It is not clear what the actual social and economic conse-

quences of this were. This is a difficult question to answer, but it is indicative that at the CC plenum in October 1955 Mao himself had to explain the negative effects of this hasty cooperation.

"The cooperatives are partially to blame for the loss of draught animals, but the main reason does not lie in this," he said. "These animals perished on account of the difficulties in resolving the grain problems, and also of the price of hides, the age of the animals themselves, the drought, and the floods.

"The situation in rural areas grew tense last spring, and some people said that this was due to the establishment of a large number of cooperatives. Under no circumstances can this be asserted. The main reason is the fuss raised by the landlords, kulaks, and prosperous peasants; even those of them who had no shortage of grain bought it up. The tense situation was partially due to the difficulties in resolving the grain problem, and partially to false notions."

As far as one can gather, the cooperation rate in agriculture was not the only controversial issue of that period. There were disputes also over the rate and methods of socialist industrialisation. Although China started its industrialisation from a lower level than the USSR, it could rely on getting economic assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries and use the scientific and technological achievements of all countries.

Echoes of the debate over the industrialisation problems were heard in Chou En-lai's report to the 8th CPC Congress on the second five-year plan. He warned: "Another view, that we can close our doors and carry on construction on our own, is wrong, too. Needless to say, the establishment of a comprehensive industrial system in our country requires assistance from the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies for a long time to come." However, this report gives grounds for assuming that Chou En-lai was more inclined to side with Mao in the question of the rates of economic development; he was possibly motivated by group considerations rather than principles. In this issue he might have been expected to clash with Liu Shao-chi, who urged planned, gradual economic development.

Following a backstage struggle, the congress adopted a fairly realistic programme for the nation's economic ad-

vancement. Provision was made for a twofold increase of the total industrial output in 1962 over the 1957 level, with priority growth rates for the production of the means of production, and roughly a 35 per cent rise of the total agricultural output.

There were serious disagreements also over questions of inner-Party democracy and of socialist democracy in general. This was seen in the principal reports and in the speeches of many delegates, and also in the decisions, particularly in the new Constitution of the CPC. That there was discord was most strikingly shown by the disparity in the assessments of the above-mentioned questions in the speeches of Mao Tse-tung, on the one hand, and of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and other CC members, on the other.

Mao Tse-tung gave a restrained and, essentially, ambiguous assessment of the decisions adopted at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. He made no mention at all of the condemnation of the personality cult and its consequences. The following is all he said on this question: "At its 20th Congress held not long ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union formulated many correct policies and criticised shortcomings which were found in the Party." He clearly went on record with his own opinion, although along with other CC members he approved the political report, which contained a different view.

Let us compare this guarded assessment with the statements of other Chinese leaders. "The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, held last February," said Liu Shao-chi, "was an important political event of world significance. It not only drew up the Sixth Five-Year Plan of gigantic proportions, decided on many important policies and principles for further development of the cause of socialism, and repudiated the cult of the individual, which had had grave consequences inside the Party. It also advocated further promotion of peaceful coexistence and international cooperation, making an outstanding contribution to the easing of international tension."<sup>17</sup>

In this context Liu Shao-chi noted that in the Chinese Communist Party a struggle was in progress between correct and misguided ideas, between correct and misconceived guidelines. He condemned subjectivism in politics, saying that it was a reflection of petty-bourgeois influence. How-

ever, subjectivist errors, he said, had not only social but also gnosiological roots. "If a person does not understand that a correct understanding of things can only be based on an objective and all-round reflection of reality, but insists on acting according to his own subjective and one-sided approach, then, he will go on making mistakes, great or small, even though his intentions are good."<sup>18</sup> Considering what happened later, this was a very opportune storm signal.

Liu Shao-chi strongly made the point that the tasks facing the CPC were more complex than before, and urged a profound study of Marxism-Leninism and the actual situation in China. He spoke forcefully of the principles of collective leadership and of the need to promote inner-Party democracy.

This was, in effect, also the sum and substance of the report delivered by Teng Hsiao-ping. He noted that deification of an individual could have grave negative consequences, saying: "Of course, the cult of the individual is a social phenomenon with a long history, and it cannot but find certain reflections in our Party and public life. It is our task to continue to observe faithfully the Central Committee's principle of opposition to the elevation and glorification of the individual, and to achieve a real consolidation of the ties between the leaders and the masses so that the Party's democratic principle and mass line will be carried out to the full in every field." One can only wonder at the boldness of this appeal.

The theme of collective leadership, promotion of inner-Party democracy, and efforts to combat manifestations of a personality cult was put strongly also by Peng Teh-huai and Chu Teh.<sup>19</sup>

These efforts resulted in a new formulation introduced in the CPC Constitution on the Party's ideological principles. It will be recalled that the Constitution adopted at the 7th CPC Congress declared that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was the Party's ideological and theoretical foundation. In the new Constitution this provision was dropped. It stated that Marxism-Leninism was the sole guide of the CPC in the building of socialism and communism. Considerable emphasis was placed at the 8th Congress on the need for regular congresses and Central Committee plenums and for broadly implementing a system of collective leadership in the Party.<sup>20</sup>

All this was eloquent evidence that different trends were locked in struggle in the CPC leadership and that Mao Tse-tung was manoeuvring again. At the 8th Congress he had to beat a temporary retreat from his plans of continuing to establish a personal power regime. This was both a forced and tactical concession. Mao had no intention of laying down arms.

## Fear Complex and Megalomania

We have come to a turning point in Mao's career and in the history of the CPC. From 1957 onward a revision began, on Mao's initiative, of China's economic, social, cultural, and foreign policies. The struggle against "rightist" elements, the policy of "let flowers of many kinds blossom, let diverse schools of thought contend", the Great Leap, and the communes, and then, after a respite, the "cultural revolution" were links of one and the same chain, of one line that unfolded soon after the 8th Congress of the CPC.

What caused this turn? Had it an objective foundation? What motivated Mao psychologically as the initiator of this policy?

Let us state our opinion at once. The reasons were, unquestionably, disparate, including the objective difficulties of industrialisation and socialist construction in an extremely backward country. By that time in the Communist Party of China itself there were, in effect, at least two powerful groups that stood opposed to each other both covertly and overtly. Their dispute was over not some particular points but over basic problems of the nation's home and foreign policy.

One group wanted planned socialist construction with the use of the assistance and expertise of other socialist countries. This line triumphed at the 8th Congress of the CPC. The other group—"leftists" and extremists—rejected gradual social reforms. It placed above all else China's rejuvenation, which it understood in a nationalistic spirit, and drew up reactionary utopian plans for a "military-communist leap", for outpacing other socialist countries by means of political and ideological coercion.

What was Mao's stance? We have long known his susceptibility to leftist and nationalistic ideology. We shall



have further occasion to see how this was manifested. He, and nobody else (as we shall see later), came forward with guidelines of this sort. But it was not simply a matter of his maximalism, his haste, and inclination for military methods, for ideologically "spurring" the enthusiasm of the people.

We believe that the ideological motivations for a radical revision of the guidelines laid down by the 8th Congress were linked, on the one hand, with Mao's fear complex, with his apprehensions about losing his own personal prestige and influence in the CPC and among the people, and, on the other, with his megalomania—national and personal.

We believe that this was when he began seriously to fear the triumph of the "anti-Mao" policy — either in his lifetime or after his death. This is clearly indicated by two circumstances. First, Mao was extremely worried by the decisions and entire course of the debate at the 8th Congress. And second, immediately after that congress he organised a new nation-wide campaign against the intelligentsia, a new stage of '*chengfeng*', long before the new "general line", the Great Leap, and "communisation" were charted.

The campaign against "rightist elements", which soon evolved into covert criticism of "Soviet revisionism", preceded the revision of economic policy—we should like the reader to make a note of this important circumstance. This is what indicated Mao's actual psychological motivations for the swing in 1957-1958.

It was not the new programme for economic development (leap, communes) that stimulated Mao's drive against the "rightists". On the contrary, it was the struggle against the "rightists" that created the conditions for the triumph of an extremist course in home and in foreign policy. The price for fear of "anti-Mao" had to be a demonstration of the country's greatness, to be achieved, of course, under his leadership, or at least of new great aims put forward by none other than him. His design was to crush his adversaries and, at the same time, stir a new wave of worship in the Party and among the people addressed personally to himself as the leader promising communism not in the distant future, but today, tomorrow, in a few years.

Indeed, why was a grandiose action such as the rout of "rightist elements" needed immediately after the 8th Congress? The post-congress situation did not call for a new

ideological attack. Then what was it all about? We can only assume one thing: Mao was worried that the congress and the situation in the Party were not in his favour. He realised that the nation's further development in that direction would give the internationalists, the proponents of a realistic policy in the CPC, a stronger position.

What worried him most was the incipient tendency in the CPC to restore the system of collective leadership, that had been violated for more than two decades (since 1935).

The criticism of the cult of the individual and of subjectivism by Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-peng, and other leaders was taken by Mao as a transparent allusion to himself, to his methods of leadership. The repeated calls for scientific, realistic management of economic construction, for a profound study of the experience of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries seemed to be specially directed against the voluntarism to which Mao Tse-tung had grown accustomed.

Lastly, developments reached a point where the wording "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the foundation of the Party's "ideological" work, a wording that Mao had laboured so hard to force upon the CPC at the previous congress, was dropped from the CPC Constitution. The waves stirred by the 8th Congress threatened to sink the ship of personal power built by Mao Tse-tung (and his myrmidons).

To use Mao's own favourite terminology, it may be said that he had two hypothetical possibilities: either to join in the common stream and head the work of improving Party life and setting up collective leadership, in which he would remain the first among peers as a prestigious leader of the CPC, or to go against the stream, revise the guideline set by the 8th Congress, denounce the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and return the Communist Party of China to the methods and norms of the Yen-an period.

As a person whose very nature rebelled against the very thought of democratic leadership, a person who was deeply infected by the ideology of the ruler cult in the traditional Chinese spirit, Mao could and did take the second option.

But this was not easy to accomplish. He and his henchmen had to take issue with not only the sober-minded, realistic elements in the CPC but also in the entire world communist movement. In order to keep his feet and hold out against a large segment of the Party's membership and

leaders, he had to strain every ounce of his energy and all his skill as a past master of inner-Party struggle. True, in the Party he could rely on an influential group of extremists, "leftists", and nationalists, and this was exactly what he did.

His first concern was to cast aspersions on the decisions and experience of the CPSU and their significance for the CPC. He acted not openly, but step by step, at first carefully side-stepping the issues that worried him most, namely, the opposition to his personal power regime. This is easy to trace.

As we have already seen, at the 8th Congress of the CPC Mao Tse-tung ambiguously assessed the decisions of the CPSU's 20th Congress in sharp contrast to the assessments made by other Chinese leaders. Signs of an inner-Party struggle are clearly discernible in the CPC documents entitled "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and "Again on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (1956), which stated the CPC's stand on the question of the personality cult and on steps to eradicate its consequences in the communist movement.<sup>1</sup> These documents were unquestionably the result of a compromise between the different groups in the CPC.

That this is so is demonstrated by the contradictory stand enunciated in these documents. On the one hand, it was stated that the cult of the individual was unacceptable to the world communist movement, and, on the other, the dictatorship of the proletariat was interpreted in the spirit of personal power. On the one hand, it was declared that the world communist movement should draw lessons from that experience, and, on the other, nothing was said about manifestations of a personality cult in the CPC itself.

Later, Mao Tse-tung's attitude to this issue became more explicit, as was demonstrated by his speeches at closed conferences of Party and government officials.

Witness his near-feverish activity in this period. One gets the impression that after a long interval he found his second "Yenan wind". The following are some of his speeches in 1956-1958:

"Talk at the Conference on Intellectuals Called by the Centre" (January 20, 1956); "On the Ten Great Relationships" (a report to an enlarged Central Committee plenum

on April 25, 1956); "Talk to Music Workers" (August 24, 1956); "Closing Speech at a Conference of Secretaries of CPC Provincial and City Committees" (January 1957); "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" (speech at a Supreme State Conference, February 27, 1957); "Speech at a Meeting of Party and Senior Cadres of Shanghai" (March 20, 1957); "Speech at the Closing Session of the Third Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee (October 9, 1957); "Speech at the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries in Moscow" (November 1957); "Speech at Hangchow" (January 3, 1958); "Speech at Nanning" (January 11, 1958); "Sixty Points on Working Methods" (speech at a working conference of the Central Committee in Chengtu, March 9, 1958), "Talk at the 2nd Session of the 8th Congress of the CPC" (May 3, 1958); "Talk at the Team Leaders' Discussion of the Enlarged Meeting of the Military Commission" (June 23, 1958); "Speech at a Conference in Peitaiho" (August 1958); "Speech at a Conference in Chengchow" (November 10, 1958); and "Talk at the Wuchang Meeting" (November 23, 1958).<sup>2</sup>

What characterised all these speeches? Their keynote was a re-examination of the attitude to the Soviet Union, to the Soviet experience. While in 1956 Mao brought this up cautiously, after the 8th CPC Congress he spoke with increasing bluntness and unambiguity. With his inherent doggedness he began erecting an ideological wall between the Chinese and Soviet Communists.

He believed that the time was not ripe for direct attacks on the decisions of the 8th CPC Congress, and he once again displayed his great skill in flanking attacks, in indirect measures leading to his objective. He spurred the campaign under the seemingly innocuous slogan of "let flowers of many kinds blossom, let diverse schools of thought contend". This was a shrewdly calculated step to induce forces openly hostile to socialism to write for the press immediately after the 8th Congress and thereby show the entire Party what could ensue from opposition to the cult of Mao, from any renunciation of his "thought", from "democratisation" in the Party and the nation. Mao counted on practice convincing the Chinese Communists that the guideline laid down by the 8th Congress would only shake the people's power, that it was both harmful and wrong.

To this day China analysts do not agree on the character and aims of the "hundred flowers" campaign, which lasted for about a year: from the summer of 1956 to the summer of 1957. The debate over it is due mainly to the contradictory interpretations given of it in the Chinese press itself.

When the first reports about it appeared in the press, it could have been assumed that this was a relatively stable, long-term policy of the Party to firm up its alliance with the intelligentsia. But when the campaign was quickly and quite unexpectedly halted and supplanted by the most brutal repressions in the history of the CPC against people indiscriminately labelled "right opportunists and restorers of capitalism", reports appeared claiming that this campaign had been specially designed to provoke "the growth of weeds and then chop off their heads".

There can hardly be a single explanation of the controversial character and aims of the "hundred flowers" campaign. It will sooner be understood if it is regarded from the angle of a collision between two approaches in the CPC leadership to the policy towards the intelligentsia. However, this is a broader problem concerning the very understanding of the principles of socialist democracy.

From this position it would be logical to assume that for the proponents of a realistic policy the "hundred flowers" slogan signified an attempt to consolidate the Party's prestige among the intelligentsia and to democratise the Party itself. But for Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates this slogan was a well-considered provocation, which they used not only to massacre "bourgeois intellectuals" but also to persecute the Party intelligentsia. There is no doubt that this first public action by Mao Tse-tung in response to the decisions of the 8th Congress was in effect direct opposition to them.

Let us follow developments. In early 1956 Chou En-lai told a national Party conference that the CPC would show more concern for strengthening its ties with intellectuals, for drawing intellectuals into the work of the CPC, for making their life easier. Several thousand overseas Chinese intellectuals were invited to return to their homeland with the promise that they would be given every facility for scientific and creative work.

The slogan "let flowers of many kinds blossom, let diverse schools of thought contend" was proclaimed in May

1956 by Lu Ting-yi, Director of the CC Propaganda Department, who referred to an unpublished speech delivered by Mao Tse-tung at a supreme state conference.

Due to the scanty information in the Chinese press, some Western analysts were misled into believing that Lu Ting-yi had called for unlimited criticism and thereby opened the door for any, including counter-revolutionary, propaganda. But this was not so.

He had stressed that art and literature were a weapon of the class struggle and that no freedom would be given to enemies of the revolution. He had demanded a further purge of "counter-revolutionaries", who had to be "felled by one blow". These main points of Lu Ting-yi's speech are what makes one feel that he, like many others, was quite sincere. Otherwise, why the reservation that "poisonous flowers" should not be allowed to grow.

Further, it must be noted that the "hundred flowers" slogan was mentioned by Mao in earlier works. But nobody at the time paid any particular attention to it, for the CPC leadership was pursuing a fairly hard line: campaigns to brainwash intellectuals followed one another in quick succession. For Mao Tse-tung this slogan could on no account signify a new policy towards the intelligentsia; it was the direct continuation of former policy, with the sole difference that for a short period the press was opened for critical articles in order to unmask covert adversaries of the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

The assurances given by a CPC leader had their effect. Criticisms first of various aspects of the CPC's policy on relatively unimportant issues and then of the very foundations of that policy began to appear in the Chinese press. These criticisms were far from being identical. Some were indeed aimed at shortcomings with the intention of securing an improvement in the building of socialism. Others were, on the whole, aimed at the policy of the CPC, socialism, and the USSR.

In the course of a little over a month (from the beginning of May to early June) these criticisms were published in the Party press without comment. But at the beginning of June a campaign was started against "bourgeois right elements" with persecution directed not only against actual enemies of socialism but also against many people who were loyal to socialist ideals but had offered some criticism.

Here is what *Jenmin jihpao* wrote about this campaign on July 1, 1957:

"In the period from May 8 to June 7 this newspaper and the entire Party press, acting on instructions from the CC, hardly wrote anything against the misconceived views that were stated publicly. This was done so that... poisonous weeds could grow luxuriantly and the people could see all this and be shocked and amazed that such things still exist in the world, so that the people would destroy all this scum with their own hands... In order to enable the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intelligentsia to start this war, the media, for a certain length of time, either did not print or printed very few positive statements and did not strike at bourgeois right elements who had mounted a furious onslaught... And now the reactionary class enemies have fallen into the trap... Some people say that these are secret designs. We say that they are open designs, for we had told the enemy in advance that sinister forces could be destroyed only by luring them out of their lairs. Indeed, it is easier to destroy poisonous weeds if they are given the chance to grow... Destroyed weeds can be used as a fertiliser."

The problem of intellectuals was of special significance to the CPC, which did not have a large stratum of specialists in many fields of the economy, science, and technology. All the more ill-advised (to say nothing of the moral and ethical side of it) was the policy pursued by Mao Tse-tung and his group towards the intelligentsia in 1957 and subsequent years.

Nihilism has been the hallmark of the Maoists ever since they took over the leadership of the CPC. The vocal campaigns for the "re-education" and the "restructuring of the thinking of intellectuals" were accompanied by the confiscation of "reactionary literature", the list of which included thousands of works embodying the splendid cultural heritage of China and the whole world. This was the atmosphere in which the future legions of *hungweipings*, who joined so eagerly in the massacre of "intellectuals" and the burning of books during the "cultural revolution", were brought up.

At a closed conference of secretaries of Party provincial and city committees in Chingtao in July 1957 Mao Tse-tung interpreted the campaign against "rightist elements" as solely a provocative action. Attention is attracted by the following passages in his speech:

"Bourgeois rightist elements are reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries."

"The bourgeois rightist elements I am referring to include people who have infiltrated into the Communist Party and the Youth League but whose political make-up differs in no way from the rightist elements outside the Party and outside the Youth League."

"We should not underestimate the significance of the criticism of bourgeois elements. This is a great socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts."

"Beginning from the present, the struggle will possibly go on for another 10 or 15 years. If we wage it properly we shall complete it more quickly."

"We should not start a life-and-death struggle in the Party. In the Sung epoch<sup>3</sup> a stele was erected with the precept: do not kill cadres right and left," Mao said, and then took a different tack altogether:

"Chin Shih Huang Ti<sup>4</sup> put to death only four hundred Confucian scholars with the result that he suffered failure: Chang Liang and Chen Ping<sup>5</sup> were not killed, and the Han Emperor Kao-tzung<sup>6</sup> used them. This is an example of a half-hearted suppression of counter-revolution."

In this secret speech there was no mention of the demagogic slogan "let flowers of many kinds blossom", of the desirability of criticism of the CPC by other parties, of persuasion and re-education of "rightist elements". On the contrary, the speech consisted entirely of tough words, of threats, of demands for rigid sanctions. To suppress completely those who were stigmatised as counter-revolutionaries (to put to death not all of them—which meant many!)—such was Mao's language in interpreting the "liberal" policy of the "hundred flowers" to Party activists.

More, as we have seen, this speech contained the outlines of the future "cultural revolution". As early as 1957 Mao looked for counter-revolutionaries among the Communists and members of the YCL and was thinking whether or not to begin a "life-and-death struggle" in the Party itself. Outwardly, he seemed to mean only an attack against counter-revolutionary elements outside the Party. This is further eloquent confirmation of the belief that the campaign against the "rightists" had inner-Party affairs as its target and was a direct response to the guideline of the 8th Congress.



Mao made it plain that such campaigns would be repeated time and again (this was an unambiguous warning to Party cadres) and proclaimed a "great socialist revolution on the political and ideological fronts". And, of course, he mentioned his beloved hero Chin Shih Huang Ti, who figured prominently in official Chinese propaganda for many years.

Later, as we shall see, the "anti-Mao" complex, which dates from 1957, was the CPC Chairman's inner motivation of his policy of revising the guideline of the 8th Congress. He became obsessed with guaranteeing the Party and the country against criticism of his importunate "thought" even in the distant future. He increasingly identified himself with the revolution in China: other members of the hierarchy could be regarded as revolutionaries only if they bent their knee to him. To oppose the "thought" of Mao and his personal power regime meant to oppose the revolution itself, to defend "Soviet revisionism", to "follow the capitalist road". This complex was at the back of his picture of a new line, which found expression in the Great Leap and the "people's communes".

The reappraisal of home policy, naturally, intertwined with a reappraisal of the attitude to the USSR and the Soviet experience, from which sober-thinking leaders of the CPC drew support for substantiating a realistic policy of building socialism in China. The closed meetings held in the CPC in 1957-1958 featured criticism of the CPSU and the Soviet Union. This was motivated by "errors" of the CPSU and by the claim that China had to map out its own policy of industrialisation and socialist construction more in keeping with prevailing conditions and representing a new stage in the development of Marxist theory generally.

In November 1957 Mao Tse-tung went to Moscow to attend the Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries. His behaviour on this second—and last—visit to the USSR differed sharply from his stance during his first visit. He addressed the meeting in the manner of a mentor teaching others how to understand theory and politics. He spoke of the significance of dialectics, particularly of analysing opposites in a socialist society. He said that US imperialism was a "paper tiger" whom nobody should fear. He spoke of 100 per cent and 10 per cent Marxists who should learn to get on with each other. He gave the

meeting to understand that all these were ultimate truths that should be used as a guide by all other parties.

"I believe that the dialectical method should be extended beyond the limited framework of philosophy and disseminated among the mass of the people. I suggest the discussion of this question by the politburos and CC plenums of the parties of all countries, and also at meetings of local Party committees of all levels," he said.

And further: "Perhaps, you are bored by my bringing up questions of this kind at this meeting. You see I like to talk (!) on abstract themes. Besides, I have been speaking much too long, and I am, therefore, winding up."

These statements only puzzled the representatives of the communist parties of socialist countries and, in addition, made them suspicious of the further policy of the Chinese leaders.

At that meeting Mao Tse-tung noted the immense international significance of the socialist community and the leading role that the Soviet Union was playing in it. But in that same period he spoke differently at the closed meetings in China.

In a secret directive to the Congress of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (December 8, 1956), Mao wrote: "Will the socialist camp disintegrate? I believe that it will not be so terrible or so unprecedented if it does."

"We still have people who . . . say that it is possible to adopt a position in the middle, to stand between the Soviet Union and America, and thereby undertake the function of a bridge. This method means to take money from both sides, to take something here and something there.

"Is this a good way to act? I think to stand in the middle is a useless method, and it will bring no benefit to the country. The point is that on one side there is powerful imperialism. For a long time China was exploited by imperialism. If we stand between the Soviet Union and America it will look good. We will be independent, but in fact this will not be independence.

"The USA cannot be relied upon. The American will throw us a sop, but that will not be very much—one may think that imperialism can let us eat our fill. It will let nobody eat his fill." <sup>7</sup>

Thus, it would not be terrible if the socialist camp disintegrated. But for the time being it suited China to re-

main in it: US imperialism was unreliable and would not pay much for a withdrawal from the socialist camp.

But what if subsequently a confrontation with the USSR would benefit China? The answer suggests itself, and it was given, as we shall see, within only a few years.

As a matter of fact, Mao Tse-tung thought not only of the expediency of China becoming a bridge between the USSR and the USA. His megalomania and national superiority complex led him to the naive dream of quickly outpacing these two countries, and hence all the countries of the world, economically and militarily.

"It should not happen that a few decades hence we would still not be the premier power of the world. Today America only has a little more than a dozen hydrogen bombs and 100 million tons of steel. I do not regard that as something exceptional. China must forge ahead of America by several hundred million tons of steel," he said at the talk on intellectuals arranged by the CC on January 20, 1956.

The idea of China moving into the premier place in the world was subsequently the overriding element of Mao's ideology. In order to achieve this aim it was necessary to outpace the Soviet Union's "relatively slow rates" of economic development, avoid its "one-sidedness and mistakes", and work out own, more effective methods of industrialisation and, at the same time, ensure an accelerated transition to communism.

Naturally, Mao was greatly interested in methods and rates of industrialisation. In a speech headed "On the Ten Great Relationships" (it was later given out as the CPC's starting point for independent economic and social policies), delivered in 1956, Mao said there were two methods of industrialisation: one was to develop heavy industry and ignore light industry and agriculture; the other was to develop heavy industry by stimulating the development of light industry and agriculture. The first method, he hinted suggestively, was applied in the USSR. China, he said, should adopt the second method. Hence, the whole Soviet experience had to be approached critically.

"We have put forward the slogan of learning from other countries," he declared. "... We must learn the good points of all countries and all nationalities... Some people never analyse anything. They simply follow the prevailing wind. Today the north wind is blowing, so they join the north

wind school. Tomorrow there is a west wind, so they join the west wind school. The day after tomorrow the north wind blows again, so they switch back to the north wind school." <sup>8</sup>

Mao Tse-tung was haunted by the dream of swiftly overtaking and outpacing all the industrialised nations and, at the same time, getting the nation's economy to develop harmoniously. But how was this to be achieved? Nobody had the answer. Hence, not only the Maoists' constant disenchantment with the practical results of their economic efforts but also their constant tossing from one extreme to another.

In the mid-1950s Mao Tse-tung devoted many of his pronouncements to the problem of China outdistancing the rates of industrialisation and socialist construction in the USSR. An analysis of these pronouncements shows how he gradually came round to the idea of the Great Leap and the "people's communes".

At the sixth enlarged CC plenum in October 1955 he said that the international situation was giving China the opportunity of carrying out the principal task of the transition period, that within a matter of 12 years China could in the main build socialism, and that in approximately 50-70 years, i.e., in a period of 10-15 five-year plans, it could overtake and surpass the USA. That these figures were spun out of thin air, that they contained no vestige of scientific computation hardly needs to be proved. This was pure wishful thinking. But it soon appeared that Mao Tse-tung found even this forecast much too pessimistic.

Some months later, speaking "On the Struggle Against the Right Deviation and Conservatism" (December 1955), he compared the development of China and the Soviet Union. He said China could considerably outpace the USSR in the rates of economic progress and socialist construction. He offered three arguments in support of this contention: the more than 20 years' experience of revolutionary wars; assistance from the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies; China's large, hard-working population and excellent geographical location. On this basis he declared that socialism could be built without looking round to the Soviet Union all the time.

In 1957 the launching by the Soviet Union of the first-ever man-made earth satellite inclined Mao Tse-tung to return to the belief that the Soviet experience of economic

development and socialist construction was effective. At the third plenum of the eighth Central Committee (October 1957) he said: "Formerly, in China some people ... asserted that the experience of the Soviet Union was unacceptable. America, too, ignored that experience. But the Soviet Union launched this thing, and it has been circling the earth for the past five days." This "thing" had impressed even the sceptical Mao!

However, in the same breath that he spoke of the possibility of flights "to the moon", "to Venus, and also to Mars", he again raised the question of leaving the USSR behind in development rates. He asked rhetorically if it was possible to develop faster and more effectively than the USSR, and replied that within a period of three five-year plans or somewhat longer China would be producing 20 million tons of steel annually. He held that one of the ways of achieving this was to build small steel-smelting enterprises, a project that was to prejudice the nation's economy.

The year 1956 witnessed a further critical revision of the Soviet experience's significance to China. This time, too (as in the mid-1930s), the campaign was conducted in the guise of combating "dogmatism". In this way Mao asserted the orientation on China's accelerated, leap-after-leap development.

"It took the Soviet Union 40 years," he said, "to reach a not very considerable output of food and other commodities. Of course, it would be good if our 8-10 years were to equal their 40 years. That is how it should be, for we have a larger population and quite different political conditions—we have more vitality and vigour, more Leninism(!)." He went so far as to maintain that "the line of building socialism is still being worked out, but its basic provisions have been charted".

It would have been splendid if despite all its drawbacks this line had been based on accurate knowledge, on a sober calculation of an effective programme for China's industrialisation, if China had been able to take into account not only the vast, positive experience of the CPSU but also the experience of surmounting the difficulties that inevitably confronted the Party, which had to pioneer the building of the new society. But Mao's quests were guided by entirely different motivations.

At the Wuchang Conference on November 4, 1958 he declared: "How long will China take to enter communism? Nobody knows; it is hard to foretell. 10 years? 15 years? 20 years? 30 years? Even if in 10 years, by 1968, we are ready to enter communism, we shall not do it. We shall wait at least two or three years after the Soviet Union enters communism, and then we shall enter it ourselves so as not to embarrass the Party of Lenin and the land of October. We may not enter even when the conditions for entry into communism are essentially on hand."

Today we are not in 1968 but in 1979, and Mao's prognosis hardly requires comment. But even these deadlines were much too distant for his "revolutionary impatience". Some two years after this speech Mao abandoned "waiting for the Soviet Union to enter communism" and began spurring China's transition to "communism".

Thus appeared the programme aim which mirrored the national superiority complex (how else is one to call this naive messianism?). The negative aspect of this programme was also given shape: to refute the Soviet experience as allegedly "standing still". There remained the "easy" step of working out the positive aspect of the programme. This became the Great Leap and the "people's communes", which were one of the most tragic experiments in the history of China and of all humanity.

## **"Diseased Shadow" of Communism**

A new nation-wide campaign began in China in 1958. Its objects were flies, yes flies, mosquitoes, sparrows, and rats.<sup>1</sup> Every Chinese family had to join in the campaign and collect a large sack of these pests. The campaign against sparrows was particularly intensive. Its strategy was to give sparrows no rest, to keep them in the air, flying, until they dropped from exhaustion. They were then killed. Splendid!

But this unexpectedly erupted into an ecological catastrophe. The Chinese could not believe their eyes when

they saw a white web woven by worms and caterpillars covering trees. Soon millions of repulsive insects filled everything, even getting into people's hair and in their clothes. In factory canteens the workers found caterpillars and other insects swimming in their bowls. And although the Chinese are not overly pampered, they were disgusted.

Nature took vengeance for this barbarous treatment. The campaign against sparrows and insects had to be stopped.

But another campaign was gathering momentum. Its objects were human beings—the 500 million Chinese peasants, who were involved in an unparalleled experiment of accepting new forms of existence. It was decided to use them to test an idea developed by the leader. This was the idea of the Great Leap and the “people's communes”. How did it all begin?

At the CC plenum in Lushan on July 23, 1959, after the “people's communes” policy had proved to be a disaster, Mao Tse-tung gave the following explanation of how the idea spread: “When I was in Shantung a reporter asked me: ‘Are the people's communes good?’ I said: ‘They are good,’ and he published it in a newspaper. There was a spot of petty-bourgeois fanaticism there, too. In future reporters should keep away.”

Incredible! Mao had only dropped an incautious remark about the “communes”, and a reporter had printed it, and as one man, 500 million people had plunged into a phantasmagoric life-style, leaving their families, adopting a barrack-type life, hardly sleeping or eating, in short, turning into a likeness of ants building ant-hills. And all because of an inadvertent story published in a newspaper.

Of course, there was much more to it. The facts are as follows. In early 1958 Mao Tse-tung undertook a tour of Honan Province, and the pioneer Chinese “commune” was established during that tour. It was set up in April 1958, when 27 collective farms comprising 43,800 people merged in the first commune, which was called Sputnik.<sup>2</sup> This pretentious name suggests that the Chinese hierarchy had in mind counterposing to the Soviet earth satellite something in the nature of a “social satellite” in the shape of “people's communes” and thereby register their priority in “communism”. This, in fact, was how the campaign to attain Mao Tse-tung's social utopia commenced.

During a visit to his native village he wrote the following sentimental lines:

*My memories of the past are unchanging, and I curse the inexorable flight of time.*

*I am in my native place thirty-two years ago . . .*

*I love to look at the multiple waves of rice and beans,  
While on every side the heroes return through the evening haze.*<sup>3</sup>

These "heroes" were the people who had meekly accepted Mao's thought and were returning from the fields in military formation, by companies or by battalions . . .

In May 1958 the second session of the 8th CPC Congress adopted the "three-banner" course ("general line", Great Leap, and "people's communes") on Mao's initiative. Its substance boiled down to "battle hard for three years to bring about a basic change in the feature of most areas"; "hard work for a few years, happiness for a thousand".

In 1958 the five-year plan passed by the 8th Congress in 1956 was found to be "conservative". That same year China's planning bodies suggested new variants for the second five-year plan. Ultimately, the CPC leadership decided that the targets would be a 6.5-fold growth of the gross industrial output (an annual growth rate of 45 per cent) and a 2.5-fold increase in farm output (an annual growth rate of 20 per cent). It was planned that during the five-year period the output of steel would grow from 5,400,000 to 80-100 million tons, that in 1962 the output of coal would rise to 700 million tons (a 5.4-fold increase over 1957), of electric power to 240,000 million kwh (a 12.4-fold growth), and of cement to 100 million tons (a 10-fold growth).<sup>4</sup> Five thousand large factories were to be built.<sup>5</sup> Whereas at the second session of the 8th CPC Congress the task had been set of overtaking and surpassing Britain economically within 15 years or somewhat longer, some months later it was planned to attain that target within five years or even faster.<sup>6</sup>

In August 1958, acting on Mao's recommendation, the Politburo decided to set up "people's communes", and "within 45 days it was officially reported that virtually the whole peasant population—121,936,350 families—had been brought into the new collectives".<sup>7</sup>

What were the concrete aims of the Chinese leadership?



First, let us take a closer look at the above-mentioned Politburo decision of August 29, 1958. It consisted of six points, which constituted an attempt to give this step a scientific basis. It was asserted that the "people's communes" were an inevitable offshoot of the situation. Further, it was alleged that these "communes" would substantially speed the nation's economic advance. This, it was claimed, would take place because more labour would be released and used for large-scale agrotechnical projects, and more labour would be released for transfer from agriculture to industry. In the long run, the "communes" would be the fundamental instrument leading the peasants in accelerating socialist construction, in the swift building of socialism and the gradual transition to communism.

In other words, the "communisation" policy, as its architects saw it, had two objectives: economic (boosting the efficiency of social production) and social (hastening the building of a socialist and communist society).

An idea of the methods used to accelerate economic development is given by the massive propaganda campaigns of that period. Newspapers, journals, and wall-posters contained stereotype appeals: "Battle every minute and second of the day and night, in sun and rain", "Eat and sleep in the fields and battle day and night", "Work like ants moving mountains". The latter appeal merits special attention.

The goal of the "commune" organisers was to accustom the Chinese people to entirely new forms of labour relations, public life, everyday life, family and morals, which they claimed were communist forms. It was planned that the "commune", which was ultimately to spread to the urban population, would be the universal production and everyday unit of the existence of every person. All hitherto existing social and personal forms of relations were doomed to eradication: cooperative property and private plots of land, distribution according to work, household income, participation in the management of cooperative affairs, and so on. Even the family, an institution always honoured in China, was to be destroyed, and the relationships in it were to be subject to rigid control by the authorities.

Chinese newspapers wrote at the time: "The people's commune is our family, and no special attention should be given to creating an own small family"; "Parents are the

most dearly beloved and cherished people in the world, yet they should not be equated to Chairman Mao and the Communist Party"; "Private life is secondary, and for that reason wives should not demand too much energy from their husbands".

At local level zealous officials managed within a few months not only to "communise" the nation's entire rural population, but also to estatise the property of the cooperatives and the personal property of the peasants and to militarise their labour and life.

"Commune" members not only renounced their share as cooperators but also surrendered their orchards, vegetable plots, goats and sheep, and even household utensils.

Urban "communes" began springing up at the close of 1959. The "communisation" movement in the towns soon gathered momentum and was promoted under the slogan "everything, except the toothbrush, belongs to the state". In other words, this total estatisation of property was the salient feature of this campaign.

Another feature was the militarisation of labour, the formation of labour armies, and renunciation of the socialist principle of distribution according to work. The peasants—both men and women—were obligated to undergo military training. They were formed into companies and battalions and often marched, armed, to field work. Moreover, they were transferred from place to place, to other districts and even provinces where labour was needed.

A correspondent of the Peking Hsinhua News Agency wrote at the time:

"In about a quarter of an hour, the peasants line up. At the command of company and squad leaders, the teams move to the fields holding flags. Here one no longer sees peasants in groups of two or three, smoking or going leisurely to the fields. What one hears is the sound of measured steps and marching songs. The desultory living habits that have been with peasants for hundreds of years are gone forever".<sup>8</sup>

Many "communes" began practising so-called remuneration according to needs. For their work "commune" members were given a daily bowl of soup in the public canteen and a pair of cotton shoes. Some of the more prosperous "communes" proclaimed "guarantees" of free distribution of goods and services. These guarantees covered food, clothes, medical attention, the organisation of weddings and funerals,

schooling for children, and so forth. Needless to say, consumer goods were distributed in pitiful quantities, at a level much lower than what the peasants had had at the cooperatives.

The distinctive feature of the "communes" was that they were included into the system of state administration. As the Hsinhua News Agency reported on August 31, 1958, the "communes would amalgamate industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and the army", thereby becoming more manageable. This, it was felt, would simplify management, for the upkeep of the local administrative apparatus and the funding of village schools would be borne by the "communes".

Lastly, "communisation" went so far that it penetrated the family and private life of peasants. Here is a sample of what the Chinese newspapers wrote about this:

"Collective life completely emancipates women and thereby abolishes the family as society's economic unit."

"As soon as children can be separated from their mothers they should be turned over for upbringing in the commune."

The press reported, for instance, that in 500 villages of Kiangsu Province the houses of peasants were pulled down so that they could be used as building material for 10,000 hostels and canteens. It was stressed that this concentration of homes in one place allowed for "organisation on the military pattern, the fulfilment of tasks in a military spirit, and collective life... In every centre the peasants gather within 15 minutes and at once march to the fields, enhancing labour productivity."

In the capital the workers slept at their factory workbenches. Their slogan was: "We shall not leave the battlefield until we beat the enemy."

In Hunan "people battled day and night, leaving their occupations—sleep, work, meetings, and even nursery schools—for the sake of the fields. In a women's battalion in the same province "not a single member left her post for 10 days and 10 nights".

Peasants were formed into paramilitary brigades and sent to work in the fields or to build dams; instead of working at the factories people smelted metal at furnaces built in courtyards. In response to the inexorable appeal of slogans and agitators people worked round the clock to perform an

economic miracle. "The achievements of a single night surpass those of several millennia" it was declared. "The Great Leap Forward had opened a 'new historical era' signifying that China was outstripping the Soviet Union in the 'transition to communism'." <sup>9</sup>

What were the economic and social results of the Great Leap and the "people's communes"?

Let us first turn to eye-witness accounts of how the people lived at the time. Here is one of them.

Albert Belhomme, an American, settled in China where he married a Chinese girl and was for a long time an electrician at a paper mill, related <sup>10</sup> that long before the Great Leap officials frequently addressed meetings of workers, urging them to intensify labour. At the same time, they began a campaign to "weed out doubtful elements" suspected of "bourgeois" and "capitalist" inclinations. Suicides became frequent. Belhomme said that he personally saw three men jump from a railway bridge in the path of an oncoming train. A teacher he knew leaped to his death from the top floor of a tall building. A Communist, a doctor by profession, had a liaison with a nurse. Fearing exposure, he took poison.

Trials were timed to current campaigns: when the 'right-ists' were under attack (1957), people were accused of having belonged, prior to 1949, to pro-Kuomintang or anti-communist organisations and punished for misdemeanours committed 20 years before.

Witnesses came forward and said something vague and indefinite like "he is not doing his job properly", "he is lazy", or "he has capitalist inclinations". On no occasion did Belhomme hear evidence in favour of the accused.

In the summer of 1958 the Great Leap was rolling ahead at breakneck pace. Belhomme related: "We worked day and night for a week in our shop to build seven 64-kilowatt generators. But our generators needed more power than the city could provide, so they got hold of a Polish-made 300-horse-power diesel engine to run the seven generators. A single 300-horse-power engine isn't powerful enough to run seven generators. The Party cadres refused to listen to reason. After all, didn't Mao say we could perform miracles?"

"Well, the engine ate up too much oil under the strain, and finally its bearings wore out. They got another engine and wore that one out, and then found still another and

ruined it, too. In the end, we went back to using municipal power, which meant, that the whole mill would frequently stop because the city couldn't produce enough.

"The paper-manufacturing machines were designed to turn out between seventy-five and ninety metres of paper per minute along a woolen conveyer belt. When the big production push started, the Party cadres said we could increase output by speeding up the belt. They cranked up the machine to one hundred twenty per minute... Why not try two hundred? Up it went. Then the machine started rattling and shaking—even the building was rocking—and that was it. It wasn't built to take that kind of punishment...

"We were told at a meeting in our factory in September 1958 that a country without steel was like a man without bones. So, to become strong, we must produce more steel. With that, we were ordered to build small ovens in which we would make iron... My wife and other women were given the task of cracking coal and ore with a cast-iron hammer, working twelve hours a day... Most Chinese found, moreover, that the metal produced by these primitive ovens was of such poor quality that it could not be used. Nevertheless, having decided to manufacture iron and steel in this fashion, the Communists refused to admit defeat. Rather than halt the campaign, they blindly urged people to intensify their efforts... The sky glowed red in the night from the fires of the furnaces."<sup>11</sup>

Grave consequences ensued. Agriculture was ruined to the extent that only by strict food rationing were people able to keep body and soul together, and then only because grass, leaves, and fodder were added to their diet. In the cities patrols walked the streets day and night to keep people away from tearing leaves off the trees. The people's moral image underwent a change: cases were reported of idolatry, sorcery, extortion, and embezzlement. Profiteering and a black market flourished. Ranking officials grew rich and bathed in luxury at the expense of the state and the people.<sup>12</sup> There were peasant risings, people fled from the communes, houses were pulled down for fuel, and goods were sold under the counter. People deliberately committed petty felonies in order to be sent to jail and thereby get meals and deliver their family of an extra mouth to feed.

"The People's Liberation Army, flesh of the flesh of the

peasants, was demoralised by rumours and letters from home. The soldiers openly condemned the regime. Anger mounted as the soldiers learned that their families or relations in the villages were dying of hunger. . . . Some soldiers, having read letters from home, complained bitterly, asking: 'Where did the food go?' 'Why did they not have enough to eat?' 'Is it true that the state has held back food from the people?' . . . 'After the communes were established, why have the crops become worse than before?' " 13

The following is a European eye-witness account of the experiments of using huge numbers of peasants to build irrigation canals, dams, and highways, and of gathering organic fertiliser:

"Endless files of blue-clad men and women moved along the sides of mountains as though they were a bewitched stream constantly changing its channel. This stream consisted of crowds of people, each carrying two pails of water." 14

What had analysts, Soviet and Western, to say of all this?

In 1958-1960 small factories began to be built throughout China. In those years, 40-50 per cent of the nation's pig iron was produced by small and medium enterprises. During the Great Leap years China built hundreds of thousands of primitive blast-furnaces, pig-iron and steel-smelting ovens, small coal mines, and so on. The "people's communes" built more than 6,000,000 factories. Incomplete statistics indicate that together with the factories built in cities, the total came to about 7,500,000. According to approximate estimates, this cost the nation nearly 10,000 million yuans (in 1957 total investments in construction of industrial enterprises amounted to only 7,200,000,000 yuans). Due to obvious unprofitability and the low quality of the output, the overwhelming majority of these primitive enterprises were abandoned. 15

In September 1958 about 100 million people, including the 50 million directly engaged in smelting, were switched to metal production by primitive methods, and also to mining and transporting primary materials. 16 These were mostly people with no metallurgical training. This resulted in senseless expenditure of many tens of millions of tons of coal and iron ore, billions of yuans, and billions of man-hours.

Soviet economists<sup>17</sup> note that in the 1958-1960 period a considerable quantitative growth was achieved in the output of industrial products through the manufacture of subquality goods. But beginning from the second quarter of 1960 the situation in industry began to deteriorate drastically. Chaos and output decline commenced in China's industry in April 1960.<sup>18</sup>

In January 1961 the ninth plenum of the Central Committee, which adopted the course towards "regulation", acknowledged that the nation was facing grave economic and political difficulties. The scale of capital construction was cut back sharply, and most new projects were conserved. The "people's communes" were restructured, and the ancillary plots were returned to the peasants.

Initially, the Chinese leaders felt that the damaging effects of the Great Leap would be removed within two years (1961-1962), but this proved to be unrealistic.<sup>19</sup> In fact, the "regulation" continued until the close of 1965 and embraced even a large part of 1966.<sup>20</sup>

The economic consequences of the "people's communes" policy were even more dramatic.

Western economists<sup>21</sup> note that nothing was more difficult than to ascertain the actual state of affairs in China's economy. From 1960 onward Peking has withheld all hard statistics. Nonetheless, on the basis of indirect data analysts drew the following conclusions.

In 1957 the grain harvest amounted to 187 million tons, which was roughly the equivalent of China's harvests prior to 1937. The 1958 harvest was the largest in the nation's history. However, it fell short of the 375 million tons target claimed by the Maoists in August 1958. The total did not exceed 210 million tons.

Then a decline followed: 150 million tons in 1961, and 200 million tons in 1963 and in 1964. Against the background of the population increment, this spelled out a decrease in per capita consumption compared with pre-war China.<sup>22</sup>

In the years when the crop failed the calorie intake norm was less than 1,500 per diem, and famine would have threatened the nation had stringent rationing not been enforced. Food output was stabilised at roughly the pre-revolutionary level. Some animation was observed in agriculture only after 1962, when the ancillary plots were returned and

production was decentralised "to the level existing in Soviet collective farms."<sup>23</sup>

Such were the economic results of the experiment that involved 500 million Chinese people. As regards its impact on the public mind, Mao Tse-tung himself admitted in 1959 that only 30 per cent of the population supported the Communists, 30 per cent were opposed to them, and the remaining 40 per cent were only adapting themselves.<sup>24</sup>

Who planned all these experiments? There is no doubt on this score. Their architect was Mao Tse-tung. What motivated his actions and his designs? Analysts agree on the answer to the first question, but on the second they offer various judgments and surmises depending on their sympathy or antipathy to Mao Tse-tung. Let us for our part try and find the answer to this question on the basis of the pronouncements of Mao himself and of other testimony.

"I do not claim to have invented the people's communes, only to have proposed them . . . I have committed two crimes, one of which is calling for 10,700,000 tons of steel and the mass smelting of steel. If you agreed with this, you should share some of the blame. But since I was the inventor of burial puppets, I cannot pass on the blame: the main responsibility is mine. As for the people's communes, the whole world opposed them; the Soviet Union opposed them . . . Have we failed this time? . . . No, it's only a partial failure . . . A lot of 'communist wind' has blown past, but the people of the whole country have learned a lesson."

Thus spoke Mao Tse-tung at the Lushan Politburo Conference on July 23, 1959 after the "communisation" fiasco. He spoke in a self-critical vein. However, the burial puppet was not he, but many rank-and-file cadres and ranking officials, who ventured to criticise the Leap and the "communes".

Mao said: "It is not a great art to speak incautiously. One must be more careful. It is still a good thing that robust health allows bearing the burden of responsibility. This is better than grief and inconsolability. But to bring accusations on major issues requires caution. Some people have brought three key accusations: on the people's communes, on the smelting of steel, and on the general line . . . I am indeed stopping at nothing, as Chang Fei,\* but I also

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\* A hero of the classical *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*.—Ed.



know how to manoeuvre. I say that in the people's communes there is a system of collective property, but for the transition from the system of collective property to a system of communist, public property a period of two five-year plans is much too short. It will possibly take 20 five-year periods."

Thus, formerly 45 days were enough to build "communism" in the countryside, and now—at least 100 years (20 five-year periods). The pendulum of Mao's mind had begun to swing sharply to the other extreme.

Stuart R. Schram, Robert Lifton, and other Western analysts agree in characterising the policy turn in 1957-1958 as "extreme voluntarism". This is undeniable. But it does not explain everything. Why did Mao choose that particular moment to foist his fantastic ideas on the Party and the people?

His main motivation was, I repeat, his obsession with national superiority, and also his fear of "anti-Mao" which had sunk deep in his mind since the 8th Congress of the CPC. On this were superimposed extremely backward views about economic policy and about the ways and means of stimulating economic development.

In April 1958 Mao argued hotly:

"There is nothing wrong with the craving for greatness and success. There is also nothing wrong with yearning for quick success and instant benefits... It is better to strike while the iron is hot. It is better to achieve something at one stroke than procrastinate... One revolution must be followed by another..."

"As much as we may brag about our large population and our thousands of years of history and culture, our country is no better than Belgium."<sup>25</sup> Further, he said that China's industry was embryonic, its agriculture primitive, and its people largely illiterate, but "our nation is imbued with enthusiasm. It is like an atom, capable of releasing tremendous force".<sup>26</sup>

In his many speeches of this period Mao stressed that the main thing was to maintain the people's enthusiasm at a high level. "I have witnessed the tremendous energy of the masses. On this foundation it is possible to accomplish any task whatsoever,"<sup>27</sup> he said rapturously in September 1958.

Any task?

It is, evidently, in this approach that the answer must be sought to why these ambitious plans were drawn up; even if they were unrealistic, the very fact of their adoption had to inspire an outburst of popular energy, to sustain the "temperature of revolution" and thereby ensure the leap to China's greatness and, consequently, the greatness of the leap's inspirer, Mao Tse-tung.

Where "communisation" was concerned, the negative factor was, in addition to the passionate desire to outstrip the USSR and other countries at all costs, Mao Tse-tung's poor understanding of the meaning of communism. For him communism—and this was, perhaps, psychologically the most dramatic aspect of the experiments of those years—spelled out a return to the primitive, military-egalitarian society that took shape during the difficult Yenan period and the civil war years.

We find the most detailed enunciation of Mao's ideas on this question in his speech at the Peitaiho Party Conference in August 1958, i.e., at the height of "communisation". We shall cite only a few excerpts that characterise his social views. He said:

"In the Soviet Union war communism meant the concentration of all surplus food. We, too, have a 22-year military tradition, a tradition of implementing a system of free supplies, which likewise constitutes war communism. We have implemented communism (!) among cadres. But the ordinary folk have likewise felt its impact. Engels said that very many undertakings are first carried out in the army. That is exactly how matters stand. We from the cities went to the countryside and united with the rural semi-proletariat, organised the Party and the army, ate from one and the same pot, had no days of rest, and received no wage; we had a communist system of free supply. But no sooner had we returned to the cities than we gradually began to degenerate, and old practices now run against our grain. We wanted to wear wool and broadcloth, we began to shave: cadres turned into gentry, and cash wages supplanted the system of free supply, clothes of three colours and food of five categories appeared, while in the cities we ceased to implement the line of the masses stringently."

"... We, several hundred million peasants, seven million workers, and 20 million cadres and teachers, have been overwhelmed to our necks by the bourgeois torrent. Some

of us have drowned in it: Liu Shao-chi has become a rightist, Yao Wen-yuan is also a 'good' one, no better than the river of loose sand.

"We are submitting the draft decision on people's communes to the grassroots. It is not necessary to do everything at once, it is not mandatory to organise regiments, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads. The design must be put into effect smoothly, but we cannot now abandon the people's communes. To abandon them now would be a mistake."

"... In 1952 we introduced wages. It was asserted that bourgeois ranks and bourgeois law were remarkable, while the system of free supply was said to be a backward method, a guerrilla habit that was negatively affecting initiative. Actually, we replaced the system of free supply by a system of bourgeois law and permitted the development of bourgeois ideology.

"I feel that an end must be put to this. In the case of cash wages they may be abolished gradually, because we have professors (!). But the abolition of wages must be prepared within a year or two. A result of the formation of people's communes is that we shall gradually abolish the system of wages."

All these philippics against wages and ranks, the appeals to return to consumption from one and the same pot were calculated on a response in a backward mass consciousness. True, it was not very clear what had to be done about Mao Tse-tung's personal example.

During one of these campaigns somebody put up a wall-poster in Peking asking Mao Tse-tung two questions about his private life: why he had taken up his residence in an imperial palace, and why he had abandoned his wife, who had been a comrade-in-arms and a participant in the Long March, and married an actress? For our part we can ask where the author of these questions is today? In any case, no other wall-poster asking such questions ever appeared.

But this is not the point, of course. A more serious analysis is called for. Everything that in this speech Mao proclaimed as communism had nothing to do with Marxism, with a scientific understanding of communism. The same may be said of the entire practice of setting up "communes". Apart from the name, there was nothing in common

between the communism of Marx and the "war communism" of Mao.

Marx's vision of communism is a society of abundance, a society of free people for whom food, clothes, and other material goods have long ceased to be a problem, of people devoting themselves to creative labour, of highly developed, cultured people, who know neither exploitation nor state compulsion. But Mao dreamed of a society with labour disciplined on the military pattern, a society where the individual was nothing, where the individual worked without remuneration and consumed little, where man was in effect the instrument for the attainment of aims that had nothing to do with him personally: national greatness, military superiority, the greatness of the leader, and so on. Mao's ideal was closer to the egalitarian community of the Taipings or the military settlements of serf Russia than to the free association of Fourier and, much less, to the communist associations of Karl Marx.

Everything that Mao attacked—material incentives for production, remuneration according to work, economic planning, and commodity-money relations—constituted socialism. In fact, he entirely rejected the socialist stage of society's development and proclaimed a "leap" into egalitarian society.

Were these notions a monopoly of Mao's or did they have adherents in the CPC leadership and in the Party as a whole?

There is little doubt that they had a broad basis in the Party's peasant consciousness. From the outset of "communalisation" an ideological split matured in the Party between the proponents of socialism and the proponents of "egalitarian" communism. The former, naturally, gravitated towards the USSR and the other socialist countries that had set an example of planned socialist construction as a vital stage on the road to communism proper. The latter were captive, above all, to nationalist passion, their aim being to secure China's "social" superiority over all other countries.

It is hard to judge the situation in which the new general line was proclaimed and how its opponents acted. It is not to be excluded that they, too, succumbed to the prevailing passions and in one way or another joined in the Leap and "communes" campaign. This is exemplified by Liu Shao-chi's speech at the second session of the 8th CPC Congress,

in which he proclaimed the Great Leap policy (however, one may assume something else, namely, that this was a forced concession to Mao Tse-tung or a deliberate tactical move). Attention is attracted by Liu's mention of serious disagreements in the Party leadership over the new policy. It is quite probable that he meant Peng Teh-huai and his supporters, whose opposition to the Leap and "communes" was reported much later. But most of the CPC leadership were, to one extent or another, evidently infected by the "communisation" fever.

The first symptoms of the failure of the Leap and "people's communes" policy appeared very quickly. This enabled the opposition to the extremist line to take action. At the sixth plenum of the Central Committee in Wuhan (November-December 1958) a long-winded resolution was adopted under the heading "On Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes." Outwardly, according to the usual practice in the CPC, it was concerned with saving face and spoke of triumphs: "The sun of a new form of social organisation, the people's commune, rose over the boundless horizon of East Asia in 1958." But actually, the Wuhan resolution gave the signal for retreat. Its entire content was directed against "putting the cart before the horse", criticising people who were "overzealous", who thought it was "simple" to build communism. The resolution reaffirmed that the transition to communism was a gradual process, noting, in particular, that it would take at least 15-20 years to complete the "planting of communes".

A more level-headed approach was seen also in the decisions of the seventh CC plenum (April 1959) devoted to examining how the work of rural "people's communes" was being regulated. Lastly, the eighth CC plenum in Lushan (1959) in fact recorded the Party's renunciation of "communisation". It decided that the communes should turn public property over to the production teams, and that the teams themselves should be reorganised virtually along the lines of producers' cooperatives.

In 1967 the Chinese press carried reports about statements made in the period preceding the eighth CC plenum by Politburo member and Defence Minister Peng Teh-huai, Deputy Defence Minister and Chief of the PLA General Staff Huang Ko-cheng, alternate member of the CC and Secretary of the CPC Hunan Provincial Committee Chou

Hsiao-chou, and other ranking Party and government officials, criticising Mao Tse-tung and his policies.

In a number of statements, particularly in the "Letter With My Opinion" (summer of 1959), Peng Teh-huai condemned the "habit of exaggeration" and the "petty-bourgeois fanaticism" that were compelling the Party "to make leftist mistakes". He declared that in the absence of constructive and reasonable planning the slogan "politics is the commanding force" (put forward by Mao) was an inadequate guide and that there had to be more democracy in the Party. He criticised other aspects of the CPC political leadership. Although he did not name the people responsible for the failures, it was obvious that he was denouncing Mao's style of leadership. At the plenum itself Marshal Peng Teh-huai used hard facts to analyse the shortcomings of the Great Leap and the "people's communes". Citing statistics, he showed that the nation's economy had declined steeply, that the economy had been disorganised, and that the people's living standard had fallen. In particular, he noted that in 1958 the population had received only half the foodstuffs it had consumed annually in the period 1933-1953. He said that the "three red banners" policy had led to "petty-bourgeois fanaticism". Moreover, it is now known that he criticised foreign policy as well, having in mind the budding deterioration of the CPC's relations with the CPSU and other communist parties.

Mao Tse-tung rejected this criticism, sharply attacking Peng Teh-huai's charge that "isolated from reality, we have been unable to win the support of the masses". He declared that he would tour the countryside "in order to lead the peasants with the purpose of overthrowing the government" if the situation was as bad as his critics claimed.

The eighth plenum passed a resolution branding the "anti-Party group headed by Peng Teh-huai", accusing it of opposing the "general line", the Great Leap, and the "people's communes"; Peng Teh-huai's letter was characterised as "an anti-Party action programme of right-opportunist elements". Nonetheless, there is evidence that at the plenum Chu Teh spoke in defence of Peng Teh-huai, while Liu Shao-chi and other leaders maintained a mostly neutral stand.

Thus, although the opponents of extremism were in fact supported at these CC plenums, developments rebounded

against the critics. Marshal Peng Teh-huai was placed under house arrest. Other participants in this open struggle also suffered.

The resolutions of the sixth, seventh, and eighth plenums of the Central Committee are indicative of strong opposition from elements who urged a more realistic policy.

All the signs are that the adversaries of the subjectivist line were confident that their success would be lasting. This is seen, for example, in Liu Shao-chi's article "The Triumph of Marxism-Leninism in China" printed in *World Marxist Review* in October 1959. It underscored the universal significance of Marxism-Leninism and made only passing mention of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung".<sup>28</sup> Another instance is Liu Shao-chi's speech in the summer of 1961 on the 40th anniversary of the CPC. He made it quite clear that prior to the Great Leap the CPC had based its policy on the propositions of Marx and Lenin, and that the Great Leap was directly linked with Mao Tse-tung.

Information has seeped into the Chinese press indicating that in January 1962 Liu Shao-chi convened an enlarged working conference of 7,000 ranking Party officials and pulled no punches in his criticism of the Great Leap and the "communes". He noted that "three-tenths of the present difficulties are due to natural calamities and seven-tenths to mistakes".<sup>29</sup> More, he indirectly defended Peng Teh-huai's attitude. This period witnessed the circulation in the CPC's educational network of a work, *On Self-Cultivation of Communists*, written by Liu Shao-chi in 1939. Bearing the stamp "important", this document criticised the persecution of nonconformists and the planting of subjectivist views.

What lessons did Mao Tse-tung himself draw from the experience of the Great Leap and the "people's communes"? First and foremost, he often complained that he was not very well versed in economic problems. He claimed that ideology and general politics were his strong points. At a CC conference in 1962 he said: "I do not understand many problems of economic development. I am not very knowledgeable in industry and commerce; I have some understanding of agriculture, but only to some extent, in other words, I know only a little about it." However, this did not prevent him from subsequently formulating economic policy and forcing further ill-considered experiments on the

Chinese people. More, this did not prevent his yes-men from attributing to him the authorship of the main slogans and postulates of the CPC's economic policy, for instance, that "agriculture is the foundation and industry is the main force of the national economy", "politics is the commanding force", and "reliance on own resources".

We shall be fair: the failure of the Great Leap and "communist socialisation" made Mao study the economic theory of socialism more closely. But this did not bring him to any fundamental judgments.

His notions about communist society remained amazingly schematic: "Collective property must be raised to the level of public property; we must go over from commodity exchange to the exchange of products, from exchange value to consumer value. As applied to China, these conditions may be described as follows: first, production has to be expanded and every effort made to increase the output of goods. At the same time, industry and agriculture must be developed, with priority for the development of heavy industry.

"Second, the small collective property of small enterprises must be raised to the level of public property."

With these few strokes Mao Tse-tung depicted the transition to communism and communist society itself. To build communism it was enough to go over from commodity exchange to the exchange of products, from exchange value to consumer value (!!), and from collective to public property. If everything boiled down to transformations of this sort, should one be astonished at the naive claim that communism could be built in 10 or 15 years? There was nothing in this to show that communism represented the highest level of productive forces ever attained by human society, the highest level of culture and civilisation, and the all-round development of the individual, that it was a society founded on the principles of self-administration, freedom, and equality, a society knowing none of the social problems implicit in capitalism and partially inherited by socialism.

It is a matter of record that Mao Tse-tung did not even try to analyse Soviet economic policy: promoting the balanced development of all branches of the national economy, making the economy more efficient, moving from an extensive to an intensive economy, providing larger mate-



rial incentives, improving the forms of economic management, and so forth. He ignored this policy despite the fact that it was a practical and theoretical answer to the new requirements of the times and, moreover, corrected and made good mistakes of the past.

The basic flaw of Mao Tse-tung's economic concept was his failure to understand the nature and economic laws of socialism, and socialism's historical place as an independent and long period of society's development in the direction of communism. He regarded socialism from the angle of the period of transition from capitalism to communism, as a short span of time that had to be covered as quickly as possible. This view had its roots in the social psychology of peasant radicalism.

Judging from his pronouncements, he ignored the main problem that confronted backward and poorly developed China. This was the problem of moving from backwardness to the modern level of industrial and agricultural production, to a developed social structure with a predominant working class, a new and growing stratum of intellectuals capable of serving production and social requirements, and a high level of modern education among workers, peasants, and all other working people.

Mao Tse-tung failed to see that transition to socialism in circumvention of the capitalist stage of development in no way signified renunciation of the fulfilment of tasks which capitalism carries out in the usual conditions of its development, namely, the building of a modern industry with highly developed productive forces, modernisation of the entire national economy, formation of a huge network of organisational communications, and creation of the conditions for a high level of social and political activity on the part of all strata and groups of the population. These tasks cannot be side-stepped. They must be carried out with the involvement of levers of power, the assistance of the people's state, the mechanism of commodity-money relations, and all the capitalist-evolved incentives for raising labour productivity. Before a backward country reaches a high level of economic and social development, all communist transformations are meaningless, for they only evolve into their opposite and spell out a return to pre-capitalist methods of non-economic, hence feudal or semi-feudal, compulsion towards labour. The stage of industrialisa-

tion precedes also the stage of building a developed socialist society.

Of course, all this takes time, and for a backward country like China this time must be viewed in terms of many decades. What, then, is the solution? Patience is required. The utopia of "leaping" into communism in the lifetime of a single generation must be set aside, for in fact this utopia signifies a return to reaction, slows down economic and social advancement, and gives shape to forms of social life and managerial mechanisms that are inherent neither in capitalism nor in socialism, but have their roots in initial accumulation when feudalism was clearing the way for capitalist production.

In contrast to Mao's ideas, communism signifies a transition to entirely new incentives for human activity. It replaces emphasis on economic gain exclusively with a conscious and creative attitude to labour. Outwardly simple, this is a gigantic advance in the development of the whole of human society.

Throughout the centuries and millennia of the existence of societies rent by antagonisms, people were motivated by fear and gain. The people's way of thinking cannot be changed radically by simply confiscating the property of the rich and denying them the possibility of exploiting wage labour. Society itself and each of its members must rise to an entirely new level. First, society must create a lavish abundance of goods and services, which must cease to be a problem for the most unskilled labourer, for the invalid, for the non-working elderly person, and for the child. This means that the productive forces must rise above not only the penurious level of China but also the level of the most highly industrialised nations of the world. In order to achieve that level China needs not decades but perhaps as long as a century, especially in view of its population increment, which continues to outpace the growth rate of goods and services.

But even that is not enough. The people themselves must become different—sufficiently cultured and sufficiently conscious to take from society not more than what they need to satisfy their own requirements. The people themselves must renounce not only the striving for enrichment but also all striving for power and supremacy over other people.

For Mao Tse-tung communism signified no more than the outward, formal transformation of property. He held that everything else would take care of itself. How? Where would social wealth come from? Where would a high cultural level and a conscious attitude to labour come from?

This did not worry him. He had something else up his sleeve. If people did not wish to work for society voluntarily and without remuneration, they had to be compelled to do so. Economic incentive and economic compulsion, the two mighty stimuli engendered by capitalism, would then give way to non-economic methods: military discipline of labour reinforced by mass arrests and ideological campaigns. In effect, this meant a return to feudal methods with the sole difference that property was owned by the state.

There is yet another side to this. In his "communisation" campaign Mao Tse-tung obviously counted on using China's multimillion work force united in labour armies to industrialise the country quickly. This was the period when in China special significance was accorded to Mao's theory that the decisive force was not technology but people. This was an attempt to use the hundreds of millions of Chinese mainly in the rural communities but also in the cities to accomplish a major breakthrough in the nation's development. Mao Tse-tung believed that the peasants, who produced their own food, could be used not only in production in their own localities but also as a free labour force transferable in any direction required by any economic task.

Much has been written in Marxist literature about the Chinese variant of "barrack communism". Let us consider the following question: was the etatisation of property, as accomplished in the Chinese countryside during the "communisation" period, an advance compared with cooperative forms of property?

Mao Tse-tung and his supporters, it will be recalled, had from the very outset made feverish efforts to drastically shorten the timetable for the socialisation of property in both town and countryside. Whereas in the Soviet Union the socialisation of industry and agriculture took nearly 20 years, in China it took only a little more than five years.

In the Soviet Union the industrialisation period lasted at least 15 years; in China an attempt was made to reach the same target in 10 years, despite the lower starting level of economic development. Consequently, the Great Leap and "communisation" were the continuation and deepening of the policy of a hurried and spasmodic "leap into communism", which the Maoists sought to impose upon the nation after the people's revolution. And this in a situation where they had every opportunity for using the experience and relying on the support of other socialist countries!

There is no getting away from the fact that the socialist transformation of property is a many-sided act. It pursues various aims: abolishing the exploiting classes and the social soil for exploitation of man by man; drawing the people into economic management; raising the level of the productivity of social labour. The ground for socialisation must be adequately prepared economically, socially, and culturally. Otherwise, it may acquire a lopsided and even ugly character and fail to facilitate a growth of labour productivity and the participation of the people in the management of production. This is exactly what occurred in the People's Republic of China.

The establishment of public ownership of the implements and means of production is the basis of the socialist system. But can everything be reduced to ownership? What about labour productivity, the level of distribution of material goods, culture, and the status of the individual? Under different social conditions the social significance of a simple etatisation of property is disparate.

Needless to say, the establishment of state property in the cities and of cooperatives in the countryside was a major achievement of the Chinese revolution. But it was only a step, albeit an extremely important one, and this had to be given every consideration in China with its long-standing traditions of state socialisation under feudalism.

The emergence of a modern industry in China at the close of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century was linked with the rise of state capitalism, and the first factories were owned and run by the state. China had practically no social estate that was independent of the state, such as the bourgeoisie in Europe during the period of initial accumulation and the first industrial rev-

olution. The large industrial and commercial companies formed in that period were, like the Chinese merchant marine, coal mines, and so on, the property of the state or of officials. The growth and prosperity of private companies was likewise dependent entirely on the state, in its licences and subsidies at the expense of taxes. It was not fortuitous that rather than make any effort to destroy this tradition the Chiang Kai-shek Government did everything to consolidate it. In *China's Destiny*, Chiang Kai-shek propounded, in particular, the idea that the state economy should be developed.

In this situation the Chinese leaders had to be particularly circumspect in order to give a genuinely socialist character to the socialisation of property. However, carried away by the idea of total etatisation, Mao Tse-tung, despite the realistic thinking in the CPC, believed that this would by itself automatically lead to the needed social results and ensure not only the abolition of the exploiting classes but also boost the efficiency of production.

An analysis of China's experience poses the following question of principle: should the transition period in such countries begin directly with the building of the foundations of socialism?

A more or less long-term policy of promoting the state sector in industry, of forming agricultural cooperatives gradually, by stages, of using the private sector, and steadfastly recasting the economy along socialist lines in accordance with the achieved level of economic and social development—such a policy would evidently have been more consistent with China's requirements. The facts indicate that some of the CPC leaders understood this, while Mao and his supporters did their utmost to shorten the transition period, artificially and dramatically reducing the time between the commencement of the revolution and the building of socialism, even compared with the more developed socialist countries. During the "communisation" period an attempt was, evidently, made in China to bring to fruition petty-bourgeois notions about socialism with all their specific features linked with that country's history.

Everything Mao Tse-tung said and did in the period of the "people's communes" was, to use an expression of Marx's, a diseased shadow of true communism. It was a war, barrack communism, a "communism" with conserva-

tive and even reactionary feudal hallmarks. Much as the shadow cast by the setting sun distorts an object, war bureaucracy "communism" is an ugly reflection of true communism.

## Permanent Convulsions

The 2nd National People's Congress opened on April 17, 1959 in the Huaijentang Hall, one of the most impressive buildings in the former Forbidden City of the Ming and Ching emperors.

Early in the morning hundreds of delegates began filling the hall. The picturesque clothes of the ethnic minorities of Singkiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Szechwan formed bright spots amidst the traditional dark tunics and blue padded jackets of the Chinese cadres and activists. There were scores of journalists and cameramen and photographers. For many this was the first time they had passed through the "gates of new China" and seen the enormous hall with its red lacquer walls. There was an air of excitement: Mao Tse-tung was to be replaced as Chairman of the People's Republic of China.

This was unexpected, odd, and inexplicable. In China it went without saying that Mao Tse-tung would remain head of state. Why was he turning that high office over to the Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Liu Shao-chi? What was behind it?

Until the very last minute it was rumoured that Mao Tse-tung would after all reconsider his decision and, on the insistence of the authoritative assembly, stand for re-election. But all doubt was dispersed when Deputy Premier Chen Yun took the floor and proposed the election of Liu Shao-chi as Chairman of the People's Republic of China. Some 20 minutes later the results of the voting were announced: 1,156 in favour with one "nay". Mao Tse-tung was the first to congratulate Liu Shao-chi, shaking his hand for a long time. The hall resounded with applause and chants of "ten thousand years of life to Comrade Mao!"

Liu Shao-chi had reason to see this as a personal triumph and also as a triumph of the policy he advocated. It could hardly enter his head that within a few years he, the official head of the People's Republic, would be pro-

claimed a "black bandit" and publicly stigmatised to the accompaniment of jeers from an enraged mob. This could hardly be foreseen by any of the 1,156 delegates who had gathered for the solemn act in a hall ironically called "merciful". Only one man (was his that sole vote against the election of the new Chairman of the PRC?) was, probably, already then nurturing far-reaching designs.

Had Mao given up that post voluntarily and what were his further plans? An analysis of his speeches and also of the situation in the period when efforts were started to abolish the damaging effects of the Great Leap and the "communes" suggests that he had stepped down himself, yielding to the pressure of unfavourable circumstances. This was a manoeuvre, a forced concession designed to assuage passions which had reached a white heat.

The evidence in favour of this conclusion is mainly Mao's concern that his retirement should be interpreted by the people to his advantage. On February 19, 1958 he said:

"In the period up to September of this year people (!) must be prepared for my retirement from the office of Chairman of the People's Republic of China. A broad discussion should be organised first among cadres of different levels and then at the factories and cooperatives in order to ascertain the opinion of cadres and of the masses and secure the consent of the majority. I am leaving the office of Chairman of the Republic in order to be solely Chairman of the Party. This will give me more time for the duties required of me by the Party. Moreover, this accords with the state of my health. If at the discussion it is found that the masses disapprove this proposal, they may be told that as a last resort (!) the Party will adopt the appropriate decision and I can return to that leading state post. Having all this in mind, I request that it should be explained to cadres and the masses so that no misconstruction is put on this question."<sup>1</sup>

Mao did not exclude the possibility of returning to that office. But what worried him most was that the people should have not the shadow of a doubt that he would retain his special position in the Party and the state.

Later, as the world learned from *hungweiping* wall-posters, Mao spoke bitterly of those days: "They gave me tokens of attention as to a father at his funeral."<sup>2</sup> They

"waved the red banner to the detriment of the red banner", Maoist publicists wrote many years later, intimating that Party leaders had been bent upon using Mao Tse-tung's prestige as a cover for implementing their "regulation" policy.<sup>3</sup>

Stuart R. Schram believes that after the failure of the Great Leap and the "people's communes" Mao remained not only Chairman of the Party but also the charismatic leader of the Chinese revolution. However, in 1959-1960, after economic policy became more cautious and reasonable, Mao confined his activities to international relations.<sup>4</sup>

This is inaccurate. Mao had no intention of letting home policy fall into the lap of Liu Shao-chi or anybody else. He had no intention of relinquishing his special position in the Party and the state. He merely had recourse to the "monkey method", which had time and again extricated him out of difficulties: to bide his time, to make a show of concession, and then resume the offensive. That this was the case is shown by his pronouncements ten years later, when the adversaries of the Great Leap and the "people's communes" were finally removed. This is what he said on October 24, 1968:

"Concerning my retirement—the 'cult' must be created in any case. The group needs a leader, the Central Committee needs a First Secretary. Had there not been tiny particles as a base there would have been no rain. If turmoil begins only after my death, it would be better if it started now, while I live.

"Such is the strange way of world. One may soar, but one cannot afford to fall. It must be taken into account that perhaps one part consents, while the other disagrees. The masses may not display proper understanding and say that everybody is working hard, while you are leaving at the height of the battle. It must be made clear that this is not so, that I am not leaving: I shall go to meet Marx only when we are ahead in the competition with America."

Let us for the moment leave aside the noteworthy phrase about him "going to meet Marx". It was obvious that even at the moment of his retirement from the high state office he reserved to himself the "right to a cult". He was well aware that this right gave him incomparably greater prerogatives than the office of Chairman of the PRC.



Strange as it may seem, instead of undercutting the cult of Mao the failure of the Leap and the "communes" somehow whipped it up.

This was by no means a spontaneous development. Mao skilfully used the Central Committee's consent to permit him "to concentrate on theoretical work" and give him more time to... gradually consolidate his position and prepare for a general assault on everybody who dared to stand in his way.

At the Central Committee's ninth plenum, which in fact formalised the abandonment of the Leap policy and set a course towards "regulation", Mao hinted quite broadly that he considered its decisions as only temporary. More, on his insistence, the plenum decided to continue and step up the persecution of all opponents of the policy whose catastrophic effects the economic measures worked out by the same plenum were to eradicate. The "movement to regulate the work style of urban and rural cadres", started soon afterwards, was directed against "enemies" and "bad elements", who, Mao believed, comprised 10 per cent of the entire population of 600 million! As an established regularity, this movement, which inherited much from the Yen-an *chengfeng*, gave an impetus to the next purge of the CPC—mass repressions (up to execution) and deportation of cadres to the countryside for "re-education by labour".

At the same time, Mao focussed efforts on turning the army, in which disaffection with the economic outcome of the "three banners" policy had reached relatively large proportions, into a reliable prop. As early as 1960, on the initiative of Lin Piao, who had taken over from Peng Teh-huai as Defence Minister, a campaign was launched "to convert the army into a school of Mao Tse-tung thought", accompanied by a movement to "regulate" and "rectify style" in the Party organisations of the PLA. Within only seven months—from July 1960 to February 1961—1,200 army cadres were expelled from the CPC.

In the latter half of 1962, as soon as signs appeared that the economic situation in the country was being stabilised and that the threat of famine was receding—Mao Tse-tung and his sycophants set into motion a series of anti-democratic campaigns aimed at swelling the cult of the "leader" and militarising the nation. In early 1964

these campaigns were further intensified under the general slogan of "learn from the Chinese People's Liberation Army". In 1963-1964 the Mao cult was gingered up with a series of movements: "for socialist education", "for revolutionisation", "for the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung". These movements were highlighted by "instructions of Lin Piao" that the reading or study of one or another work of Mao Tse-tung was mandatory for all military cadres.

The systematic group and individual brainwashing of Party and creative intellectuals was started in 1963. Mao Tse-tung's "instructions" that the creative associations of the Chinese intelligentsia had to be "revolutionised" on the grounds that "in recent years their cadres have been on the verge of degenerating into revisionists" were circulated in July 1964. The leadership of all the creative associations affiliated with the All-China Federation of Literary and Art Workers was "shaken up" in 1964-1965.

That same period (summer of 1964) saw the first appearance on the political scene of the notorious Chiang Ching, who had waited nearly 30 years for this hour. In the obtaining situation she decided that the time had come to "reform" the Chinese classical theatre and its repertoire.

As a matter of fact, outwardly (as had been the case time and again) Mao went to all lengths to give the impression that he was himself setting a limit on his activities. In talks with representatives of communist and workers' parties, foreign delegations, and foreign ambassadors the then 70-year-old Chairman of the CPC more and more frequently complained of poor health. He declared that he had retired from practical affairs, that he had ceased to handle questions of economic and cultural development, that he was concentrating entirely on theoretical problems. He made a show of non-participation in the polemic between the Chinese and Soviet Communists.

Reports that Mao Tse-tung was gravely ill, that he was turning power over to younger people appeared more and more frequently in the Western press.

Lao-tsu, founder of Taoism, considered "inaction", a method by which a ruler did not intervene actively in the natural course of events but relied only on moral influence, to be the ideal way of administering a state. Why should Mao Tse-tung, too, not rely chiefly on the influence of his

"thought", on his supreme authority, and leave the rest to other Party and government officials?

In 1965 Edgar Snow asked Mao specifically about his health. He wrote that Mao Tse-tung looked generally fit, although shortly before the meeting he had been seriously ill.<sup>5</sup>

One of Mao's doctors told Snow that there was nothing organically wrong with Mao, that his indisposition was due to his age. Snow had a long talk with Mao, who even saw him to his car and slowly walked back, leaning on the arm of an attendant.

In the four hour talk with Snow Mao spoke much of death. He said that both his brothers were killed, that his first wife was executed, that his son died in the Korean war, but, strangely enough, "death just did not seem to want him" although he had had several narrow escapes, including one in which he was "splashed all over with the blood of another soldier".

He saw his own death as the death of the revolution itself. He believed it was even possible for the rising generation to "make peace with imperialism, bring the remnants of the Chiang Kai-shek clique back to the Mainland, and take a stand beside the... counter-revolutionaries."<sup>6</sup>

The logic of his thinking was, apparently, that he was the sole guardian of the revolutionary spirit in China and that his life was precious to the nation.

Subsequent reports about Mao Tse-tung's health grew increasingly more contradictory, on account of his rare public appearances. In the West it was believed that he suffered from Parkinson's disease.

It is hard to say whether this was true or not, but we are inclined to believe that it was nothing more than another round of Mao Tse-tung's game of "diplomatic sickness". One thing is certain: in the early 1960s, after the fiasco of the Leap and the "communes", the great mystifier temporarily went into the shade. He did not mean to quit the political stage. On the contrary, he worked day and night on an ideological platform for a new assault on his adversaries and on the Party itself, which had tacitly gone along with his defeat in Wuhan and supported the new line proposed by Liu Shao-chi and other leaders.

This is easily discernible in the Mao-inspired collection *Long Live Leninism!* (1960), which signalled the com-

menacement of the hardly veiled polemic with the CPSU and other communist parties. It is seen in documents, drawn up under his direction, such as "Instructions on Socialist Education in the Countryside and Other Matters" (1963), "Versus Bureaucracy" (1963), and "Historical Lessons of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (1964). Lastly, it is seen in a series of articles published in the Chinese Party press after the 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, in which the general line of the world communist movement jointly worked out at the meeting was revised.

The basic theses for the forthcoming "great proletarian cultural revolution" were advanced during this period: the aggravation of the class struggle in socialist society; the dictatorship of the proletariat as the mechanism for suppressing not only elements hostile to the new power but also Party members "following the capitalist road"; the inevitability of periodic campaigns of the *chengfeng* type; the struggle against "bureaucracy, for the renewal of the apparatus of power".

At this point we feel we should return to the decisions of the Central Committee eighth plenum of August 16, 1959. One of them, in effect, called for a reappraisal of the Great Leap and "people's communes" policy, the regulation of the economy, and the reverse reorganisation of the "communes" (while retaining their name) into cooperatives. But it contained no hint of criticism of the architect of the rejected policy, Mao Tse-tung. On the contrary, it hailed his newly demonstrated wisdom. "The king is dead—long live the king!" In China this was reworded: "Mao failed—long live Mao!"

The decision's very title supports our belief that a link existed between the struggle against "rightist" elements and Mao's extremist policy. The title is: "In Defence of the Party's General Line: For Struggle Against Right Opportunism". It reads: "The general line, endorsed at the second session of the 8th Congress, namely, to strain every muscle, to forge ahead, and build socialism along the principle of more, faster, better, and cheaper, is a creative Marxist-Leninist line put forward by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, who summed up the experience of socialist construction in our country." Hence, all that had happened was correct.

"In 1959 the Great Leap in the national economy continues. Some problems that surfaced in the course of the Great Leap on account of a shortage of experience, were quickly (!) resolved or are currently being resolved under the leadership of the Party's Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung. After the people's communes were regulated on the basis of repeated instructions from the Party's Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the people's communes steered a true and firm course." Not a word about admitting mistakes!

"Hostile forces in the country and abroad had from the very outset mounted a campaign of malicious attacks on the general line, on our Great Leap and the people's communes.

"The right opportunists are directing the edge of their attacks against the Party's Central Committee and the Party's leader, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, against the cause of socialism, against the cause of the proletariat and all other working people. As a result, right opportunism is now the main danger in the country."

This is the whole point! Since the failure of the leftist policy had grown apparent, the main thing was to strike at the "right opportunists", who had warned against that policy, and, of course, spare no effort to protect the "red sun", that had to be kept untarnished!

In December 1964 Mao Tse-tung inscribed into Chou En-lai's report to the first session of the 3rd National People's Congress an insert concerning the Great Leap. True, he saw the main purport of the Leap no longer as achieving an economic miracle by means of grassroot industrialisation or other analogous methods, but as leading to a quick and epoch-making change in China's destiny. He wrote: "We cannot follow the old way of developing technology followed by all the countries of the world; we cannot crawl in the wake of others. We must smash the established norms, make the maximum use of advanced machinery, and within a not very long period convert our country into a powerful modern socialist state. This is what we mean by the Great Leap. Is this unrealisable? Perhaps this is bragging and trumpet-blowing?"

However, Mao did not suggest specific ways and means of achieving this aim. His eulogies of the Leap and his calculation on the "spirit of the people, which has been demonstrated in the nation's history", therefore, left open the

question he had himself asked: was the very idea of the Great Leap a piece of fanfare?

In 1963 Mao wrote a long document under the heading: "Versus Bureaucracy". "I have tried to generalise manifestations of bureaucracy in the following twenty points," he wrote, and then detailed the forms of bureaucracy that, in his view, had become rooted in the Party and state apparatus. What was the purpose of this document? This is what we read: "If bureaucracy has arisen, its inevitable companion is separatism towards the highest levels."

Bureaucracy is "prodigiously bloated self-opinion and self-delusion"; "official arrogance and self-worship"; "stupendous concern for the satiation of one's belly"; "a striving to use one's placemen and form a clique"; "a passion to get treatment for non-existent ailments".

After giving a superficial description of various manifestations of bureaucracy, Mao unexpectedly drew the conclusion (for which the entire document was, evidently, written) that in China the mainspring of bureaucracy was "imperialism, which had united with revisionism", meaning the USSR and other socialist countries. In fact, the source of bureaucracy in China is the personal power regime, which generated arbitrary action in the decision of major social problems and remained above criticism. All the philippics against petty manifestations of bureaucracy, therefore, have the trappings of criticism "from above", from the pinnacle of power directed at objectionable individuals who may be branded as bureaucrats.

The slogan of struggle against bureaucracy, which unfailingly evoked a quick response from the people, proved to be an exceedingly convenient platform for Mao's next attacks on various leaders of the CPC, who were thus exposed to public abuse from the *hungweipings*.

Mao's new assault in ideology was marked by the first publication of the book of quotations from his works. It was issued by the PLA Political Department in May 1964 (previously only whole works were published), and henceforth it was to play the basic role in mass education. The cult of Mao received new stimuli for growth.

A key part was played by Lin Piao. The following curious record gives a psychological picture of the mechanism by which Mao's ideological influence was promoted. It is a telephone conversation between Mao and Lin (1964), which

was made public in a *hungweiping* wall-poster during the "cultural revolution".

"*Lin Piao*: The entire nation is now diligently studying the works of Chairman Mao.

"*Mao Tse-tung*: I do not wish to be simply imitated and retold. Fundamental things should be given priority. There should be no superstitious worship. There must be new concepts, new creativity.

"*Lin Piao*: The thought of Mao Tse-tung must become the core.

"*Mao Tse-tung*: Good!

"*Lin Piao*: We should not confine ourselves to economic development. There must also be spiritual development."

Mao Tse-tung seemed to offer some objections to a "superstitious worship" of himself, but under "pressure" from the energetic marshal he agreed quickly that his "thought" should be the "core" of the Chinese people's life and activities.

The new campaign for the study of the "thought of Mao" proceeded in parallel with the polemic of the Chinese leadership against the guideline of the international communist movement.

Following the revolution, China's policy on the world scene was consistent with the political line of the entire socialist community. The steep change in foreign policy coincided in time with the switch to the Great Leap and "people's commune" policy.

True, even before these developments Mao Tse-tung had suggested some misconceived propositions on important international issues: his pronouncements on world war and revolution and also his claims to CPC supremacy in the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But, by and large, he did not yet openly claim to pursue a special course on the world scene. China had won international prestige at the 1955 conference in Bandung and at the 1954 conference in Geneva.

The first symptom that the course towards peaceful coexistence was being re-evaluated was the aggravation of the situation in the Formosa (Taiwan) Strait after the shelling of Kuomintang-held offshore islands. This action was taken in contravention of the Soviet-Chinese treaty of February 14, 1950, without consulting the Soviet Union.

At the Politburo conference in Peitaiho in August 1958 Mao attacked the line of the USSR and other socialist countries towards improving the international situation. He said that "tension is more beneficial to us and less beneficial to the West", maintaining that it was helping to enhance the influence of the communist parties and increase production in China. In April 1959 he made another admission that during the 1958 Taiwan crisis China's leadership had sought to prevent any easing of international tension and provoke a deterioration of the situation in the world, particularly of Soviet-US relations.<sup>7</sup>

The Sino-Indian conflict in the spring of 1959 was a further indication that the policy of peaceful coexistence was being jettisoned. If one recalls that the conflict was over a sector of the frontier that had no significance whatever to China and that China's leaders adopted a hard attitude during the conflict, one cannot avoid the conclusion that their aim ranged beyond the frontier problem.

It may be assumed that the Maoists were out not only to enhance China's influence in that continent but also to aggravate the international situation at the time of relaxation of tensions in the world. The Soviet Union's unremitting efforts had led to a further easing of tensions with the USA and other capitalist powers. All the signs are that Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders wanted the world to see their action on the Sino-Indian frontier as signalling their negative attitude to the relaxation of tension. Moreover, the conflict was provoked, evidently, with the further purpose of diverting attention from the CPC's setbacks in home policy (Leap, "communes").

Having demonstrated their opposition to peaceful coexistence, the Maoists steeply altered their attitude to socialist countries and communist parties.

*Long Live Leninism!* (1960) was the first work to enunciate the CPC's special guidelines on basic current issues. The crucial problems of war, peace, revolution, and communism were interpreted in the spirit of the "thought of Mao". Mao's verbal attacks on the CPSU and other Marxist Leninist parties pursued domestic political aims as well. He was intent on eroding the position of the internationalists in the CPC.

The 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow ironed out the divergences with the CPC and



charted a common platform. It is worth recalling that the CPC delegation consisted of Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, and others, who were subsequently savagely repressed. The CPC delegation wanted the meeting's Statement to contain theses and formulations mirroring the special stand of the Chinese leadership. But it nonetheless signed the Statement. This was a major achievement in the efforts to preserve unity in the communist movement.

But articles demanding a revision of the Statement appeared in the CPC press as early as 1961-1962 on the initiative and under the personal direction of Mao Tse-tung. The Maoists followed this up by openly repudiating jointly adopted documents of the communist movement and advancing the notorious "25-point proposals for the general line of the communist movement". This document set Peking's programme on all key issues of war, peace, revolution, and socialist construction against the general line of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

With the Maoists calling the tune, the tenth plenum of the Central Committee (September 1962) decided to intensify the attacks on the "modern revisionists", meaning the USSR and other socialist countries and the Marxist-Leninist parties. A new development was that the plenum's communique urged upholding not the Declaration (1957) and Statement (1960) of the Moscow meetings of communist and workers' parties but the "revolutionary principles" enunciated in these documents.

Mao Tse-tung's policy of whipping up international tension grew clear-cut during the Caribbean crisis in the autumn of 1962. China's statements were obviously designed to make mischief. With the world's attention focussed on other regions, China resumed hostilities on the Indian frontier. After the Caribbean crisis was settled, Mao Tse-tung started a new round of his anti-Soviet campaign. At the close of 1962 and the beginning of 1963 the Maoists published a series of directive articles (Mao Tse-tung was later named as their author) attacking the policies of the CPSU and other communist parties.

On March 8, 1963 *Jenmin jihpao* carried an editorial in which it raised the question of the Aikun (1858), Peking (1860), and St. Petersburg (1881) treaties that demarcated almost the entire length of the Soviet-Chinese frontier. China claimed the "right of inheritance" of all territories

ever seized by the Mongol, Manchu, and other dynasties that ruled China.

In 1964-1965 Peking issued statements declaring that China had a right to roughly 1,500,000 square kilometres of Soviet territory.

Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese leaders adopted a negative stand at the meetings in February 1965 with a Soviet government delegation that stopped over at Peking on its way to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Korean People's Democratic Republic. In March there was an anti-Soviet demonstration in front of the USSR Embassy in Peking. The anti-Soviet campaign in the press gathered momentum. In an article carried by *Jenmin jihpao* in November 1965 the Maoists stated that they intended to "dissociate themselves politically and organisationally" from the CPSU and the other Marxist-Leninist parties.<sup>8</sup>

China began a drastic cutback of all forms of its interstate relations with the USSR and other socialist countries. In the early 1970 China's economic cooperation with most of them was folded up in all areas (the share of socialist countries in China's foreign trade had dropped from 68 per cent in 1959 to 20 per cent in 1967). China withdrew its observers from the standing commissions of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It declined the proposal for the joint exploration and use of outer space by socialist countries, and walked out of the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research. It unilaterally annulled the agreement of five socialist countries on joint scientific investigations in the Pacific. It reduced to a minimum or halted scientific, technological, cultural, and sports exchanges with many socialist countries.<sup>9</sup>

The ground was thus prepared for the "great proletarian cultural revolution". Who were its architects? What were its aims?

In November 1967, when the "cultural revolution" had got into its stride, *Jenmin jihpao* printed an article that was, probably, the first account of the events that preceded this campaign.

"At an enlarged sitting of the Central Committee in 1962," the article stated, "the proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao began a fierce battle with the bourgeois headquarters... Chairman Mao's close associate Comrade Lin Biao, who holds high the great red banner of

Mao Tse-tung thought, reaffirmed at this conference the absolute authority of Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung thought, while the chief Chinese revisionist (meaning Liu Shao-chi.—*F.B.*) mounted a furious offensive at this conference against Chairman Mao and Mao Tse-tung thought. Fuming with anger he cried: 'To come out against Chairman Mao means to come out only against an individual.'

"After the conference the chief Chinese revisionist mustered his anti-Party disciples and with redoubled fury stepped up his conspiratorial activity with a counter-revolutionary restoration as his aim, clandestinely preparing public opinion for a usurpation of power in the Party and the state."<sup>10</sup>

The article further declared that at the conference Peng Chen "used every means to spread the counter-revolutionary heresy that the great leader Chairman Mao should leave the scene".

Even if this is an exaggeration of the facts, it gives a good idea of the pitch reached by the struggle in the CPC long before the "cultural revolution".

After the described outburst, of which the world learned five years later, the bitter struggle steadily mounted, albeit covertly. The Chinese press began carrying reports about the persecution or "unmasking" of intellectuals and middle-echelon Party cadres. The main contestants had yet to come out into the open.

Here we see the first characteristic feature of the "cultural revolution". It was planned in advance as an action to remove Mao Tse-tung's opponents. Reports seeping into the foreign press indicated that at a secret meeting of the Central Committee in September 1965 Mao Tse-tung proclaimed his programme for the "cultural revolution". It was to consist of several phases. The first phase would open with assaults against literary and art workers. The second would be a purge of the Party, the state apparatus, and other administration links. The third would assert the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" in the CPC and, possibly, renew the Great Leap policy in the economy and intensify extremist foreign policy.

A Western analyst wrote that Mao directed the "cultural revolution" as a guerrilla planning an offensive: he attacked, retreated, dug in, attacked again, endeavouring to isolate his adversaries and, at the same time, fortify his own posi-

tion. Later, speaking of his strategy and of the phases of the "cultural revolution", Mao divided them into three periods. The first, from the autumn of 1965 to August 1966 was mainly a mobilisation phase. The period from August to the end of 1966 was the second phase, which he called the orientation stage when the main targets had been singled out. The crucial offensive against "bourgeois revisionists and Party bureaucrats" started in January 1967.<sup>11</sup> In November 1965 the Shanghai newspaper *Wen-hui pao* printed an article by Yao Wen-yuan headed "On the New Historical Play *Dismissal of Hai Jui*". The author of the play, Wu Han, whom we have mentioned above, was accused of trying to "discredit the line of Mao Tse-tung".

That was the first salvo of the "cultural revolution". The next target was Teng To, Secretary of the Peking City Committee of the CPC, who had been editor-in-chief of *Jenmin jihpao*. In mid-1965 the Chinese press printed many articles criticising Teng To's publicist works, in which a realistic economic policy was urged. He was the first Party cadre to fall victim to the commencing but as yet unannounced "cultural revolution".

Another indicative "affair" was trumped up following the sensational "exposure" of Teng To in the summer of 1966: it was declared that at Peking University there was a "group of monarchists headed by the rector and the Party Committee Secretary". To all outward appearances, the signal for the attack on the university's leadership was given by students, who in a wall-poster charged the rector with urging the study of the Soviet experience, particularly in science and technology, and thereby with "striving to restore capitalism in China". The outrages to which the rector and many professors were subjected were described by an eye-witness.

...A paper dunce's cap or a waste-paper basket was put on the head of the "criticised". The accusations were written on the cap (basket) and on a board hung from the neck. Thus attired the criticised was forced to stand on his knees before an infuriated mob or meeting, with each person trying to insult him physically (push, seize by the arm, hit). The speakers, whose orations were time and again interrupted with cries of "Protect Mao Tse-tung!" "Throw out the revisionist scum!" and so on, listed the crimes of the criticised. The latter was not allowed to speak. He had

to take this criticism silently (sometimes for two or more hours). If he lost self-control and wept that only made his tormentors more brutal.<sup>12</sup>

Later, scenes of this sort were to be observed throughout the country. As a result, many of the criticised were killed by raging mobs or committed suicide.

As the campaign unfolded in Peking it grew obvious that it was directed against Peng Chen, First Secretary of the Peking City Committee of the CPC, member of the Politburo, and a secretary of the Central Committee. In June 1966 it was decided to reorganise the Peking City Committee of the CPC. Peng Chen was in effect removed from all his posts.

The next victim among the Party cadres was Chou Yang, deputy head of the CC Propaganda Department. For a number of years he had been the most zealous in exposing "Soviet revisionism". However, in the course of criticism he was accused of attacking the cult of Mao Tse-tung.

A scapegoat was soon found among Party economists as well. Sung Yeh-fang, director of the Economic Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, who had held ranking posts in the State Planning Commission and the Statistical Office, was proclaimed the "high priest of economism". It was found that his greatest crime was that he had pondered the problem of increasing labour productivity and making the best possible use of the nation's resources, and that for these purposes he had urged studying the experience of the USSR and other socialist countries. He had called the much-publicised Maoist slogan "politics commands everything" an "economics of idlers", contending that the "economy must take account of the law of value and aim at boosting production efficiency and the profitability of enterprises". For this "impudent" opinion this eminent Chinese economist was stripped of all his posts and subjected to persecution.

The tide of the campaign rose steadily higher, rolling directly to the foothills of China's political Olympus. After Peng Chen's removal, the "spontaneous" campaign was directed towards one goal with increasing skill: against the "ringleaders of the black gang", meaning the Chairman of the Republic Liu Shao-chi, the General Secretary of the Central Committee Teng Hsiao-ping, and many other members of the Party and state leadership.

The persecution methods were clearly designed to paralyse all, even the least, resistance to the line of Mao Tse-tung. What, indeed, was the significance of the pronouncements of Teng To, Sun Yeh-fang, and other scientific and Party cadres? Essentially, they criticised some aspects of the CPC's home and foreign policy and endeavoured to introduce corrections into that policy.

Had the situation been normal in the Party these questions would have been discussed in the usual Party procedure: some would have been accepted, others rejected. But cadres were not accused of suggesting alternatives for the solution of specific problems. They were proclaimed "black bandits" encroaching upon the people's power. These accusations were accompanied by demagogic slogans about safeguarding socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Marxism, that were allegedly imperilled by the proponents of "capitalist restoration" who had infiltrated the Party.

Also a hallmark of the "cultural revolution" was that it was conducted by a minority, albeit headed by Party leader, against the majority in the Central Committee. There was a reason why the campaign began covertly. Mao did not risk giving his adversaries battle within the framework of ordinary Party norms.

The eleventh plenum of the Central Committee was convened to consider the question of the "cultural revolution" only in August 1966. But even this plenum was held without the observance of elementary norms of Party democracy. In connection with the convocation of this plenum the foreign press played up the report that about half of the Central Committee members did not attend the sittings because many had already fallen victim to the *hungweipings*. On the other hand, it was attended by "revolutionary students" and military men who were not members of the CC.

On August 5, 1966, while the plenum was in session, Mao Tse-tung made public his own wall-poster headed "Bombard the Headquarters!" in which he accused "some persons in authority in the centre and in the localities" of having "implemented a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and attempted to suppress the stormy movement of the great proletarian cultural revolution".

In effect, this wall-poster gave the signal for the destruction of central and local Party organs charged with being

bourgeois headquarters. On August 8 the plenum passed a decision "On the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution", stating: "At present, our objective is to struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." All organisations were classified under four categories, only one of which (those that "stand in the van of the movement and dare to arouse the masses boldly") met the requirements of the Mao group. The rest were proclaimed either as lagging behind the masses, or afraid of the masses, or controlled "by those who have wormed their way into the Party and are taking the capitalist road".

The plenum proclaimed the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" supreme and ordered a campaign for the "creative study and correct application of the works of Chairman Mao". An additional 35 million copies of Mao Tse-tung's works were published.

The plenum made significant changes in the CPC leadership. Of the five deputy chairmen of the CC (Liu Shao-chi, Chou En-lai, Chu Teh, Chen Yun, and Lin Piao) only Lin Piao retained his post. The composition of the Politburo and the CC Secretariat was also changed; after the plenum they were again purged, while the Secretariat virtually ceased to function. Thus, although at the plenum Mao Tse-tung was unable to smash the opposition entirely (subsequently, he said that he had the support of only somewhat more than half of the participants), the main strike was directed at Liu Shao-chi and his supporters. Mao Tse-tung's scenario gradually grew clearer: he was determined to liquidate all opposition.<sup>13</sup>

The decisions of the eleventh plenum were a frank revision not only of the decisions of the Central Committee's tenth plenum (September 1962) but also of the decisions of both the first and second 8th CPC Congress sessions.

The reader will remember that the tenth plenum of the CC, at which the inner-Party struggle was reflected, continued the policy of "regulation" that was to supplant the Great Leap and the "people's communes" policy. However, the decisions of the eleventh plenum state that "as a result of the unfolding of the unparalleled great proletarian cultural revolution" a favourable situation was taking shape for a "new general leap".

Abandonment of the fundamental principles of the Party's policy affected foreign policy as well. At the time the tenth

plenum of the CC was convened there already were differences between China's leadership and the world communist movement. Nonetheless, the plenum's decisions contained the provision that China was endeavouring to promote friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

But there was not a word of this in the decisions of the eleventh plenum. On the contrary, they stated bluntly that the CPC general line was expressed in the notorious "25 points", and in articles in the newspaper *Jenmin jihpao* and the journal *Hungchi* attacking the CPSU and other parties. Not a word was said about cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries.

The plenum's resolution contained the provision, unprecedented even in the practice of the CPC, that "revolutionary students" would bear no responsibility for "crimes and other transgressions of the law, committed in the course of the movement, with the exception of murder, poisoning, arson, sabotage, theft of state secrets, and counter-revolutionary crimes".<sup>14</sup>

The very first comments on the CC's eleventh plenum made it plain that the campaign organisers ran into strong resistance from many members of the Party leadership. The first statements of the *hungweipings* declared that in the Central Committee a struggle was raging between "two lines", that this was "a very sharp struggle", and that Mao Tse-tung was "temporary in the minority".

With this "temporary minority" was linked the use of the *hungweipings* and then the army to crush opposition in the Party and the state apparatus. While the former gave Mao Tse-tung the semblance of mass support, the latter crushed every resistance attempt by force. This was the only way Mao Tse-tung, who commanded a minority in the Central Committee, was able to deal summarily with the political forces opposed to him and impose the continuation of his policies on the Party and the country.

...At sunrise on August 18, 1966 Mao Tse-tung addressed a rally of hundreds of thousands of young people in a Peking square, formally announcing the launching of the *hungweipings*. He said that this organisation was significant both nationally and internationally.

This rally was filmed,<sup>15</sup> and the film was shown in China and abroad. Foreign viewers were staggered, compar-



ing it with *The Triumph of the Will*, the nazi film of Hitler at Nuremberg.<sup>16</sup>

Mao Tse-tung walked slowly and stiffly, on the arm of a teen-age girl. He spoke of the formation of a "new community", of a community of immortals—of men, women, and children entering into a new relationship with the eternal revolutionary process.<sup>17</sup>

Many Westerners witnessed the demonstration of children aged 13 and older that followed. The children were flushed, excited, delirious.

Western analysts were more or less unanimous in the belief that the *hungweipings* organisation was planned and moulded in advance by skilled architects. But for the ordinary Chinese it was depicted as the result of the people's revolutionary creativity.

Within days the country was flooded with hundreds of thousands of *hungweipings*, who proclaimed a merciless war on the "old world".

In the period from August 18 to November 25-26, 1966 there were in Peking eight mass rallies of *hungweipings* with Mao Tse-tung's participation. At least 11 million people were present. They were addressed by Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, and Chiang Ching.

"In order to share knowhow" the *hungweipings* ("Red Guards") were allowed to travel free to Peking and other cities, where they were fed and provided with military uniforms. At a rally of a million and a half people in Peking on August 18, 1966 Chou En-lai said that the *hungweipings* were becoming a dependable "reserve of the army".<sup>18</sup>

The *hungweipings* broke into temples and pagodas, destroying works of religious and modern art. In their newspapers and wall-posters they wrote: "...Non-revolutionaries are bad eggs; counter-revolutionaries are broken eggs! They must dig out their guts, change their bones."

"...We tell you frankly, you all stink and you are nothing special, just rotten trash... We detest you from our hearts! We hate you!... We shall beat... crunch them."

"...We shall smite their dog mouths and our bayonets shall taste blood!"<sup>19</sup>

"There shall be neither mercy nor reconciliation. We want to settle accounts for every drop of this ocean of blood-stained hatred,"

The enemy was defined as "whoever denies or is opposed to proletarian (Maoist) line of our Party". "He will die and we will live!"<sup>20</sup>

Their slogans were: triumph of youth over age, of the new over the outworn; triumph over the old system of education, over the "revisionist clique of old men", over the old chiefs, over the old men "following the capitalist road".

The *hungweipings* saw their aim in "breaking and smashing", or initiating widespread agitation and disruption.

They identified themselves as "anti-bureaucratic" and "anti-authority", as the means of undermining the Party and state structure. Many believed that their mission was to kill all leaders, leaving only Mao Tse-tung and his closest associates.

They forced their way into people's homes, tearing off clothes and shoes from those who they considered were well dressed. They broke into shops and destroyed the clothes they believed were unsuitable, and demanded that the red traffic light should take the place of the green. They suggested renaming Peking into Red East.

Their manifesto stated:

"We are the Red Guards of Chairman Mao and we effect the convulsion. We tear up and smash up old calendars, precious vases, US and British records, superstitious lacquers, and ancient paintings, and we put up the picture of Chairman Mao."

The purpose of all this was to smash the old and plant the new, and in many cases it took the shape of defiance: "Let what is called 'human affection' ... get out of the way!"<sup>21</sup>

Who inspired this movement of *hungweipings*? On this count there is no doubt. The movement was orchestrated by Mao Tse-tung himself.

The *hungweipings* had grown up in an atmosphere of unprecedented glorification of Mao Tse-tung, of fanatical worship of him. From an early age, these young people had been brought up in a spirit of bellicose nationalism, of scorn for the culture, traditions, and experience of other nations. Their ideology was formed by an unceasing anti-Soviet campaign and they had a distorted notion of socialist construction in other countries, of the very ideals of socialism. They were easily deceived and captivated by demagogic slogans.

Where culture was concerned, the "cultural revolution" boiled down to the desecration of Chinese and world culture. The *hungweipings* "condemned" Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, Liszt, Chopin, Bartók, Chaikovsky, Shostakovich, and many Chinese composers, demanding the discontinuation of the issues and sale of records of these "feudal, bourgeois, and revisionist" works. They anathematised Shakespeare, Balzac, Tolstoy, Gorky, and other authors, whose works are the glory of world literature, and also Chinese classics and eminent modern Chinese authors, for instance, Lao She, Ten Han, and Hsia Yen.

The *hungweipings* sacked many bookshops in Peking, Shanghai, and other cities; henceforth they were to sell only works by Mao Tse-tung. In the streets of many cities bonfires were lit of books that "were inconsistent with the thought of Mao Tse-tung". The memorials of Alexander Pushkin in Shanghai and of Sun Yat-sen in Nanking were torn down.

A mandatory duty imposed by the *hungweipings* was that all dwelling-houses and public buildings should be decorated with the portraits and sayings of Mao Tse-tung. Buses, tramcars, and trolleybuses were stopped if they were not suitably decorated.

In order to victimise the families of opponents of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung", the *hungweipings* marked the houses of "criminal", much as was done on the eve of the massacre of St. Bartholomew.

Mao Tse-tung urged the spread of the "flame of the cultural revolution", which, to use his own words, he had himself kindled. On October 25, 1966, at a working conference of the Central Committee attended by local officials, he manoeuvred, as though giving Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping the opportunity of surrendering, in order to crush all opposition in the country. He declared: "Nor can we put all the blame on Comrade (Liu) Shao-chi and Comrade (Teng) Hsiao-ping. They have some responsibility, but so has the Centre." He spoke of his own mistake, which was that he had placed too much trust in others. The main purport of this speech was to laud the *hungweipings*. "Red Guards had mobilised throughout the country, and in one rush they swept you off your feet,"<sup>22</sup> he said to ranking Party officials.

However, the *hungweiping* movement encountered stiff

fening resistance in Peking, in the provinces, at factories and communes, in Party organisations, trade unions, government offices, and even some military units. The campaign then entered a new phase. The slogan of "smash the handful of people in authority in the Party taking the capitalist road" was complemented with the slogan of "the revolutionary minority must seize power".

Mao's call, "Bombard the Headquarters!", was the command to assault the organs of state and the Party, and also the YCL organisations and the trade unions.<sup>23</sup>

In September 1966 Lin Piao, who was by then the principal interpreter of Mao's pronouncements, said: "The main aim of the present movement is to reach the Party members who are in power and are following the capitalist road. To bombard the headquarters means to shell a handful of capitalist-roaders."

The phrases about the "socialist education of the people" and the "new proletarian culture" were soon dropped. With explicit bluntness it was declared that the "great proletarian cultural revolution has entered the phase of struggle for the total seizure of power".

Party committees, leading organs of the YCL, and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions were broken up. The Maoists then took over central and local media and the provincial organs of authority. Lastly, they turned their attention to the Central Committee: two-thirds of the members elected by the 8th Congress in 1956 were denounced and removed from office. Eleven of the 15 members and alternate members of the Central Committee's Secretariat, including the General Secretary Teng Hsiao-ping, were proclaimed "black bandits", and more than half the members and alternate members of the Politburo were labelled "enemies of the thought of Chairman Mao" and subjected to baiting. Eight of China's nine marshals were disgraced.

Only three of the 17 Politburo members escaped criticism and persecution. They were, needless to say, Mao Tse-tung himself, and also Lin Piao and Chou En-lai. The *hungweipings* were under the command of the Cultural Revolution Group headed by Chen Po-ta, Kang Sheng, who has been called the "hangman of the Party", and Mao's wife Chiang Ching, who prior to this had worked in the Ministry of Culture.<sup>24</sup> She was unexpectedly named Secre-

tary of the Politburo Standing Committee, although she had not been even a member of the CC. She specialised in persecuting cultural workers and in "purging" theatre repertoires, films, and university curricula.

The *hungweipings* organised public trials of Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Politburo alternate member and a CC Secretary, Lo Jui-ching, Deputy Premier and Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, and many other prominent personalities. Photographs are extant of *hungweipings* seizing Lo Jui-ching, whose feet were in plaster casts after a suicide attempt. He was dragged to the mock trial organised by the *hungweipings*. A photograph shows him standing before a raging mob with his hands tied behind his back and his face contorted with pain.<sup>25</sup>

A more subtle tactic was used against the Chairman of the PRC Liu Shao-chi and the General Secretary of the CC Teng Hsiao-ping. Until the autumn of 1968 their names were not mentioned in the press. Liu Shao-chi was referred to as the "leading capitalist-roader in the Party", but everybody knew who was meant. But the "masses" (the name applied to the mock trials) were never "shown" these two.

The following is a chronicle of the dramatic events around Liu Shao-chi and his family.<sup>26</sup>

For a long time Liu Shao-chi was criticised only at closed meetings. Mao needed him as the "negative example" personifying "bourgeois, revisionist, counter-revolutionary" evil.

The "offensive against Liu Shao-chi" was started after the preparations had been completed and a "preparatory committee" set up. Day after day, for a whole week, several thousand people thronged the streets of Peking and provincial centres, frightening the inhabitants with yells, slogans, songs, and the beating of drums, and carrying placards with cartoons of Liu. The crowds demanded his execution. At first he was accused only of opposing the "cultural revolution" and hinting at the cult of Mao.

The list of charges was soon lengthened: Liu's ancestors were landlords, he had wormed his way into the CC, he had treated his many wives badly. Demonstrators hurled invectives at his last wife, Wang Kuang-mei. She had graduated from two institutions of higher learning and was an English interpreter at the CC's Foreign Department.

She was 24 when she married Liu Shao-chi, who was twice her age.

Before marrying her Liu had divorced his fifth wife. His first wife was killed by the Nationalists in the early 1930s; the others were living. From his marriage to Wang Kuang-mei Liu Shao-chi had two daughters (he had sons and daughters from his previous marriages). The sixth wife was graceful, lovely, and clever (much was written in the West of the ageing Chiang Ching's compelling hate for her, and this was even seen as one of the motivations for Liu Shao-chi's persecution).

The passions over Liu reached a point where *hungweipings* kidnapped one of his daughters and made her denounce her father. A 20-year-old university student, she could not take the baiting and spoke to a crowd, declaring that her father had opposed Mao Tse-tung "for more than twenty years" and calling her stepmother a "royalist".

Soon afterwards *hungweipings* captured one of Liu Shao-chi's sons and put him through the same ordeal. He was an aircraft technician educated in the Soviet Union. At a rally in Peking he was forced to demand that his "dog's head" of a father "surrender unconditionally to Chairman Mao" and "bow to the people and admit his guilt" or else face "extinction".

Many atrocities were committed in the *hungweiping* prisons. In Peking sinister notoriety was won by *hungweipings* based at School No. 6 in the centre of the city. They began operating in the summer of 1966 and at once received praise from Chen Po-ta for successfully smashing "black bands" at the Higher Party School, the YCL Central Committee, and the central department store. At the school they equipped a torture chamber and a prison (this complex was called "laohaihsu", i.e., labour-corrective prison), where summary treatment was handed out arbitrarily to those believed to be opposed to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". Many people passed through this "laohaihsu"; more than fifty were tortured to death or mutilated. They included students, teachers, workers, office employees, and Party and YCL officials.<sup>27</sup>

The *hungweiping* era came to an end in early 1967, when military control over Party and state organs was proclaimed officially. They had accomplished their mission and were quickly and ruthlessly put down.

In the course of that year Mao Tse-tung made a few speeches in which he referred to the *hungweipings*. He condemned their actions as "bordering on anarchy", saying that students and intellectuals remained infected with "bourgeois ideas", that they were "leftist in form but rightist in essence". At a rally in July 1968 Mao, according to a Western observer, addressed *hungweipings* "with tears in his eyes", saying:

"You have betrayed me and, more, the workers, peasants, and soldiers of China are disappointed in you!"

Shortly afterwards a lengthy report appeared in the press to the effect that Mao had sent a basket of mangoes to workers and peasants engaged in promoting his doctrine among Tsinghua University students. The recipients of the fruit "cheered, wept, and chanted Mao's slogans". This was an enormously significant gesture: the basket of fruit was presented to workers and peasants rather than to students. It symbolised the end of the *hungweiping* era and encouragement to the worker and peasant teams spreading Maoist propaganda.

While nominally composed of workers and peasants, these teams were commanded by soldiers, whose essential purpose was to impose rigid military control over the *hungweipings*.<sup>28</sup>

What happened to the 25 million *hungweipings* who were Mao's mainstay in 1966? Activists—nearly seven million—were deported to remote provinces for physical labour in accordance to Mao's instructions: "Educated young people must be sent to the countryside so that they may be re-educated by poor and lower-middle peasants." To believe the Chinese press, Lin Piao later declared that this resettlement pursued a different objective, namely, that of abolishing unemployment among people with a higher education. The *hungweipings*, he declared, "were first deceived and in the long run turned into cannon fodder".

Young people responded to these measures with a diminution of activity. The "cultural revolution" had created an atmosphere of dread, hatred, and mutual accusation among young people. At rallies and meetings people shouted themselves hoarse and nobody understood what they wanted. For that reason, even at the height of the "cultural revolution", a segment of young people sought to keep away from public life.

In July 1967 a Shanghai newspaper lamented:

"In the course of the great Cultural Revolution a number of people have emerged who do not pay attention to state affairs and who stay out of the revolutionary movement. These people are called wanderers. They take an attitude of non-intervention in the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Instead of fighting on the battlefield, they wander about school campuses, parks, and streets; they spend their time in swimming pools and playing chess and cards... Whenever they are required to reveal an attitude, they just issue vague statements. They have voluntarily withdrawn from the political stage."<sup>29</sup>

These "Chinese hippies" became an increasingly typical phenomenon as the *hungweiping* movement ebbed.

The "romantic" chapter of the "cultural revolution" was thus blacked out—the movement of *hungweipings*, whose slogans find a response among anarchist youth in the West to this day, declined sharply. The actual organisers of this campaign with their far from romantic plans and designs returned to the forefront.

## Ideology and Power

Among the riddles of the "cultural revolution" the most difficult to fathom is, perhaps, the slogan of "seize power" advanced by Mao Tse-tung at the beginning of 1967. Who was to seize power and from whom was it to be seized?

Since 1949 political authority in China had been in the hands of the CPC headed by Mao Tse-tung. Why had he found that he had to "seize" power again in his 18th year in power in the country and his 32nd year in the Party leadership?

Either he felt his own power threatened or he wanted to assert it in other, more authoritarian forms. In Mao's mind both these motivations sprang from one and the same denominator: he thought of his power in terms of the power of China's Ruler.

In any case, it is undeniable that the threat was very serious indeed. The unbridled polemic of the "cultural revolution" period exposed many facts about the ideolog-



ical and political struggle that had been going on in the CPC for a long time.

For many years this had been a covert struggle. The people had had no possibility of judging the stand of the different factions. Then the curtain was slightly raised. True, even today the stand of Mao's opponents can be judged chiefly by analysing and trying to see through what the Maoists themselves wrote about them.

It may be assumed that despite all his verbal assurances of fidelity to Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi sought to tie in the problem of nationalising industry and cooperating agriculture with the problem of promoting the productive forces. The Chinese press wrote that during the "regulation" campaign Liu Shao-chi "fiercely attacked the general line of the Great Leap and people's communes, declaring: 'Our economy is on the verge of collapse..., there are very many acute contradictions in the alliance between the workers and peasants'." From this it may be concluded that foreign analysts were correct when they linked the "regulation" policy that supplanted the bankrupt Leap and "communes" line with Liu Shao-chi. In the Chinese press Liu Shao-chi was denounced for seeing "the aim of the economy in expanding production, and the purpose of production in increasing individual incomes and bettering the living standard"; for encouraging, to achieve this aim, material incentives and for being preoccupied "with living conditions and stimulating production"; for believing that "distribution is the motive force, the incentive for production". In the view of the Maoists, all this was "a sell-out of the basic interests of the working class, for it undermines its revolutionary spirit at the very root."<sup>1</sup>

Further, it was reported that Liu Shao-chi was joined by Chen Yun, Peng Chen, and other leaders in writing a letter to the Central Committee criticising the Great Leap. They asserted that it was "in conflict with objective laws and greatly prejudiced the productive forces", that the "people's communes are above the consciousness of the peasants" and signified "going forward much too quickly".

Analogous ideas gained currency also in scientific circles. The charge against the director of the Economic Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences Sung Yeh-fang was that he had urged achieving the maximum

rise of labour productivity and making the optimal use of scarce resources. He held that allocations had to depend on the profitability of the given project, contending that in the economy the law of value had to be taken strictly into account, that every economic activity had to be evaluated on the basis of its returns to the economy as a whole, while his principal crime was that he had taken a negative stand towards the Great Leap.

The arguments in the CPC leadership encompassed not only economic policy issues. They touched upon Party democracy, an issue that was particularly painful to Mao. At the close of 1966 the Chinese press began printing criticisms of Liu Shao-chi's book *On Self-Cultivation of Communists*. First published in 1939, it was reprinted and quite widely read in the 1960s. Although written long ago, it was now considered by the Maoists as an attack on the personal power regime. Here is what Liu wrote in it about "some leaders of the CPC":

"Having no understanding of Marxism-Leninism or merely juggling with Marxist-Leninist terminology, they imagined they were a 'Chinese Marx' or a 'Chinese Lenin', posed as Marx and Lenin in the Party. More, without a twinge of conscience they demanded that members of our Party respect them as Marx and Lenin, that they be accorded support as 'leaders', that there should be fidelity to and affection for them." Indeed, one can see why Mao was angered: these words were obviously directed against him personally. Who else claimed this role in the CPC in the 1960s?

Liu Shao-chi criticised those "who remain content with learning individual propositions and conclusions by heart", "think only of improving their position in the Party and endeavour to attain this by striking at and causing harm to others. They envy their betters, think only of dragging back those who have gone ahead of them, are not content with playing the second fiddle, care only for themselves and ignore others... They strive to provoke and whip up unprincipled arguments artificially, especially in periods when difficulties arise for the Party". These people, Liu Shao-chi wrote, "have come from different strata of Chinese society, in which to this day there are exploiting classes with their influence and vices: self-interest, intrigue, bureaucracy, and so on".

He urged the promotion of inner-Party democracy "in all seriousness, in a Party spirit", and sincere criticism and self-criticism.

Judging by the book's content, it may be assumed that it was not fortuitously reprinted in the 1960s, that the aim was to halt the unbridled swelling of the Mao cult. Liu Shao-chi was by no means the only one to urge the curbing of Mao's unbounded ambitions. During the "cultural revolution" the Chinese press mentioned Lu Ting-yi's speech at a closed meeting of the Central Committee, denouncing the personal power regime in the Party. He said: "There are people who refuse to pursue the line of the masses, but are following a different line... Without the mass the Party is like a nationalistic party that can nominally call itself communist but is in fact a nationalistic party, and if such a party is in power it means that the Party and the leader, theory and practice are concentrated in one person."

These examples confirm, as came to light during the "cultural revolution", that despite the outward unity of the CPC leadership in the 1950s-1960s, there was in the Party a fairly strong segment, whose members had for some years, albeit for different motivations, insisted on a more realistic course in politics, counterposing it to the line demanded by Mao.

It is much harder to trace the ideological and political struggle in the CPC over foreign policy issues. Some facts indicate that the adversaries of adventurism in domestic policy urged a more reasonable and realistic line on the international scene.

A careful analysis of the pronouncements of high-ranking CPC officials, branded as oppositions by the Maoists, would, probably, show more or less significant nuances of views on fundamental problems of world development. During the "cultural revolution" the *hungweiping* press now and again reported that one official or another had called for the restoration of unity with the "modern revisionists" in the struggle against imperialism, particularly in the defence of the Vietnamese people against US aggression. Reports appeared about "capitalist-roaders" saying that economic and political cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries was vital to China. Further, the opposition was charged with calling for the drawing of lessons from the fact that on account of its extremist policies the

CPC and China were finding themselves in growing isolation on the world scene.

A noteworthy report, carried by the Japanese press after talks between CPC and CPJ delegations in 1966, was that Liu Shao-chi and some other CPC officials had suggested dropping the ideological differences between the CPC and the CPSU in the face of the threat to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and combining the efforts of China and the USSR to help the Vietnamese people. Theoretically, this line was expressed in the slogan "combine two in one". However, this suggestion was rejected by Mao Tse-tung. The CPC's internationalist commitments and links were, apparently, one of the basic issues that lay concealed until the struggle between the Chairman of the CPC and the Chairman of the PRC surfaced.

But it is hard to draw definite conclusions about this. It can only be assumed that while pressing for a more realistic and reasonable line in domestic policy people like Liu Shao-chi and their supporters were unable to tie this in with an analogous approach to cooperation with socialist countries and foreign policy generally. But in the atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria deliberately sustained by the Maoists it was even more dangerous to articulate their views on these questions than to suggest corrections in economic policy.

What does this imply?

As we have ascertained earlier, two conflicting ideological groups had formed in the CPC long before the "cultural revolution". One urged planned socialist construction in China with account of the international experience of socialism, and the other, headed by Mao Tse-tung, was set on planting "war communism" and effecting a rupture with the USSR and other socialist countries.

This does not mean that the opposition forces in the CPC should be regarded as a tight-knit group. On the contrary, it is now evident that they represented different trends. A special place was held by Kao Kang, Chang Wen-tien (Lo Fu), Peng Teh-huai, and other Party veterans.

Their stance was more consistent with Marxist theory and sincere internationalism. They were the people who developed a considered alternative to Mao policies to ensure China's socialist advance. A different school was represented by Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen, and Lo Jui-ching. For a long time they had connived at building up the Mao cult, endeavor-

ouring to "combine" internationalism with nationalism. They initiated "regulation" and began a covert struggle against Mao's extremist policy only after the failure of the Great Leap and "communisation".

The ideological differences between the opposition forces were, evidently, one of the reasons for their inability to stem the Maoist offensive.

It is also evident that the struggle in the CPC and among its leaders mounted as the tasks confronting the Party and the nation grew more complex and Mao Tse-tung stepped up his efforts to impose his line and consolidate his personal power regime. The sharp aggravation of the differences in the CPC, that erupted into an open political clash, was generated by the serious and long-maturing crisis of the Maoist home and foreign policies. The "cultural revolution" was the culmination of this struggle, in which the problem of the power regime was closely coupled with ideological and political problems.

Why and how did Mao, the proponent of an extremist policy in and outside China, gain the upper hand? Why and how did he triumph despite the fact that this policy had been tested (Great Leap, "people's communes"), discredited, and even rejected by the Party? Why and how did this happen when his power in the Party had been shaken?

The answer, we feel, is that Mao was able to manipulate levers of power that tipped the odds in his favour in the Party. These were military power and ideological power. It is hard to say which was more important. In the final analysis, the officer corps was represented by members of the Party leadership. Thus, the ideological regime, the regime of personal power, was what gave him the strength to overwhelm his formidable adversaries. One can imagine how bitterly Liu Shao-chi and the other deposed CPC leaders regretted having had a hand in fostering the cult of a single leader, erecting an invisible wall in the minds of the Party and non-Party masses against criticism of that leader, against control by and responsibility to the Party and the people!

The *hungweipings* were the most visible instrument of Mao's ideological regime of personal power. But the entire atmosphere in the Party, in the army, and in the state apparatus, and the frame of mind of millions upon millions of people constituted that selfsame instrument. To bring Chair-

man Mao to book or strip him of office was to the mass consciousness tantamount to removing a deity.

We shall remind the reader of one of the most dramatic episodes of the inner-Party struggle that took place long before the "cultural revolution" was announced officially. At the eighth Central Committee plenum in Lushan Peng Teh-huai openly criticised the Great Leap and the "people's communes". On the evidence of its resolutions, the plenum in effect revised many of Mao's guidelines relative to the "communes" and the Great Leap, in other words, to all intents and purposes it agreed with Peng Teh-huai.

But what were the consequences of this to the old marshal? He was proclaimed "ringleader of an anti-Party group" and publicly disgraced. Strange? Policy was found to be incorrect, but instead of being elevated the person who raised this question was branded. You are right, so much the worse for you!

The same fate overtook Liu Shao-chi. His trouble was not that he openly opposed Mao—there is nothing about this in available information. His misfortune was that he was right, and the Party knew it. What infuriated the CPC Chairman most was to see his mistakes thrown at him. He simmered when anybody proved to be more perspicacious and far-sighted.

For the time being, let us leave aside the question of what was in the mind of Mao Tse-tung, who wielded colossal power. Let us turn to something else: how did it happen in China that the Party and the people were made to pay for an obviously misguided policy of the leadership? Why were they unable to say "no" to that policy?

The answer must, evidently, be sought in the political and ideological regime. As soon as he assumed power in 1935 Mao steadily eclipsed the other leaders, so that in the end he could with impunity ignore the will of the majority in the Central Committee, the will of the Party and the people. It was this that during the "cultural revolution" enabled him to dismiss not only the Central Committee but also the entire Party, the YCL, the trade unions, and other organisations from deciding basic problems of policy.

Indeed, there is a clear-cut watershed in the history of the CPC: before and after 1935. Until 1935 there were six Party congresses despite the severe conditions and the savage struggle and persecution. On the other side of this watershed

the first Party congress was convened only after ten years, in 1945, although there was nothing to prevent its earlier convocation: the CPC and the People's Liberation Army functioned in a compact northwestern region.

During the first 15 years of the people's power, there was in fact only one congress, the 8th, although under the Party Constitution there should have been three. Central Committee plenums were also convened irregularly. They were held from time to time, sporadically, without the observance of constitutional norms. A point of even greater significance was that by the time they were convened they were confronted with a new policy already in operation, so that all that remained was to approve ready-made recipes, not to discuss them. Mao was always reluctant to hold Party congresses and CC plenums, which with all their shortcomings, were forums for a political debate.

When socialist construction had got under way, the CPC leaders proclaimed a transition from the "new democracy" to the dictatorship of the proletariat (in other cases, they spoke of the dictatorship of the people). But a dictatorship of the proletariat means that there is a proletarian Party through which the working class, all working people, provide society with leadership. A large role must be played by representative organs of power and the trade unions, whose function is to ensure the observance of democratic principles.

What, in this respect, was the situation in China like? For years a regime was built up in the CPC and the state under which fulfilment of Mao's personal prescriptions, right or wrong, was regarded as an elementary requirement of Party discipline. The day of reckoning for this came with the "cultural revolution". Many in the CPC saw that this was a disastrous course, but they could not openly even hint as much: there were neither tradition, nor norms, nor the institutions allowing for the unpunished discussion of Mao's ideology and policy.

As we have already noted, the personal power regime of Mao Tse-tung began to take shape in the PRC long before the "cultural revolution". In China's political system one could observe: first, an excessive concentration of power in Mao Tse-tung's hands; second, the predominance of his ideology, criticism of which was ruthlessly penalised; third, infractions of democratic norms in the work of Party and

state organs; fourth, arbitrary decisions on the nation's economic and social life.

The Lushan plenum significantly shook Mao Tse-tung's prestige, so much so that there was a threat that his influence in the CPC would continue to weaken. It was then that he concocted the slogan "seize power", in order not only to retrieve his position but also to consolidate the political regime of personal power. The Maoists, as we have seen, did not stop at dismantling Party committees, the leading organs of the YCL, and the All-China Federation of Trade Unions and its branches. They forcibly removed from office people who had been elected or appointed in accordance with operating norms of the nation's political life.

Early in 1967 it was announced officially that the army would supervise Party and state organs and then economic organisations.

With the Central Committee divided, the army was given a special role. Mao Tse-tung had headed the Central Committee's Military Council for decades. During the "cultural revolution" the Military Council superseded the Central Committee and became the principal organ of central power. It will be noted that the Chinese army differs essentially from the armies of other socialist countries: from the standpoint of the principles underlying its formation, the forms of controlling it, and also the place held by it in the political mechanism.

For many years the army cadres—rank and file and officers—were educated in a spirit of personal devotion to Mao Tse-tung. This was what enabled Mao to use the army against the Party with relative ease.

Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the Chinese People's Liberation Army had time and again been a major political factor in the past. Mao Tse-tung saw the army as the mainstay of his power, measuring the prestige of the Party not so much by the growth of its influence among the people as by military victories. Following Mao's inclusion in the CPC leadership, there was a steady fusion of the Party and the army, with the latter controlling Party cadres. In the civil war the army was used to administer liberated regions and also to enforce agrarian and other important social reforms. After the people's power was established the army was frequently enlisted for the fulfilment of social, political, and even purely economic tasks. In parti-



cular, during the Great Leap and "communisation" the army was used for work in the fields, and for the supervision of labour armies that built irrigation canals, paved roads, and so on.

This was when the army began increasingly to intervene in political life. Taken out of the hands of state agencies and placed under the control of Mao Tse-tung and his group, the army was prepared long in advance for the role designated to it.

Mass campaigns were conducted in 1963 under the slogans "learn from Lei Feng" and "learn from Wang Tse". Who, for instance, was Lei Feng? He was a soldier of the PLA who died in an accident. In a diary found after his death he had written that his passionate desire was to "be an eternally unrusting cog of Chairman Mao". Lin Piao lost no time to demand that every Chinese "learn from Comrade Lei Feng and be a faithful soldier of Chairman Mao".

*Jenmin jihpao* wrote that this meant every Chinese "had to carry out instructions resolutely, quickly, and strictly, without entering into argument and without bargaining... and do what he was ordered."<sup>2</sup> Calls for militarising the Party on the pattern "First Secretary—Commander-in-Chief", "branch secretary—unit commander", and so on began to appear in the press. The slogan "the entire nation are soldiers" was widely disseminated. This meant that all organisations—state, economic, and educational—had to be restructured. The laws of war-time life were proclaimed a norm of the life of the people.

Military control committees or groups and then offices of army representatives were set up at the ministries at the commencement of the "cultural revolution". This is what *Jenmin jihpao* wrote about the functions of the army representatives in different organisations: "There must be an army representative or a representative of the militia from top to bottom in all units where power must be seized... This line must be enforced everywhere: at factories, in rural communities, in trade, finance, culture, education (institutions of higher learning, and secondary and elementary schools), Party and state organs, and mass organisations. Army representatives must be sent everywhere—from district level and higher—and representatives of the militia must be sent to the commune level and lower."<sup>3</sup>

The first attempts to set up new executive and administrative organs bore the imprint of some romantic slogans of the "left" *hungweipings*. This was mirrored in the decisions of the eleventh CC plenum (August 1966), which spoke of "cultural revolutionary groups' committees, and conferences as organs of power elected by a general vote on the pattern of the Paris Commune".<sup>4</sup> But these and other anti-bureaucratic slogans of the *hungweipings* remained scraps of paper. With the exception of the unhappy experience of the Shanghai *tsaofans*, no effort was made in China to form elective organs of the Paris Commune type.

Early in 1967 the actual power in the country began to pass to the hands of the military on the principle of "uniting the three sides" (i.e., the "revolutionary" *kanpu*, the army, and the *hungweipings* with the *tsaofans*). New Party and administrative organs, that were later called "revolutionary committees", began to be formed in 1967.

Of the 12 provincial "revolutionary committees" formed in the period from August 1967 to the close of March 1968 nine were presided over by army representatives. In the other "revolutionary committees" they were deputy chairmen.

The formation of provincial "revolutionary committees" was completed in the autumn of 1968 (this was marked by a rally in Peking on September 7). As a result, the main administrative-territorial units came under direct military control.

Militarisation spread also to the management of factories. Here is what the newspaper *Kiangsi jihpao* wrote on September 18, 1968 in an article headed "Establishment of the Military System at Factories Is the Way of Management": "Some people believe that while the military system is credible in the PLA it will not work at industrial enterprises and in other spheres. They use all sorts of arguments against enforcing the military system at factories. All their arguments are untenable."

Before the 9th CPC Congress was convened, the secret twelfth enlarged CC plenum (October 1968) ruled that supreme power would be wielded by the "proletarian headquarters" with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman and Lin Piao as Vice-Chairman. This headquarters supplanted all the higher state and Party bodies. It consisted (including Mao Tse-tung) of 14 members: five representatives of the military

(Lin Piao, his wife Yeh Chun, Chief of the PLA General Staff Huang Yung-sheng, and his two deputies), heads of three security agencies (Kang Sheng, head of the Special Investigation Group of the CPC Central Committee, Minister of Public Security Hsieh Fu-chih, and his deputy and former Mao bodyguard Wang Tung-hsing), four "ideologues" (Chen Po-ta, the Great Helmsman's wife Chiang Ching, Mao's son-in-law Yao Wen-yuan, and a Mao clan member Chang Chun-tsiao, chairman of the Shanghai "revolutionary committee"). Chou En-lai, too, became a member of the "proletarian headquarters".

The official press chanted: "The proletarian headquarters headed by Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin is now the sole leading body of the entire Party"; this "headquarters is the sole leading centre . . . of the entire nation and the entire Party".<sup>5</sup>

A military-bureaucratic dictatorship had, in the main, taken shape in China before the 9th Congress of the CPC was convened. Its hallmarks were the army's active participation in state administration and in the nation's political life, the "etatisation" of the Party, and the fusion of the Party and state machines.

The 9th Congress sat from April 1 to 24, 1969. It formalised the new political regime without ending the vagueness and instability of its forms and the internal struggle between the groups in its institutions. It is believed that Mao Tse-tung delivered a speech of "extraordinary importance" at this congress, which was held in the strictest secrecy. However, that speech as, indeed, many other documents of the congress, was not published. The press printed the communique on the opening, proceedings, and closing of the congress, the CC report read by Lin Piao, the new Party Constitution, and a report on the composition of the leading Party organs elected by the congress. Most of Lin Piao's report consisted of invectives against the deposed opposition and praise of the "cultural revolution".

The new concise CPC Constitution (preamble and 12 articles) contained some significant points. The first was that elections would be conducted "through democratic consultation". This may be understood as direct selection of delegates to the next congress. The second was the authority vested in the Central Committee to set up "a number of necessary organs, which are compact and efficient . . . to at-

tend to the day-to-day work of the Party, the government, and the army in a centralised way".<sup>6</sup> This implied the legalisation of organs of power on the pattern of the "revolutionary (or proletarian) headquarters". The third was the unprecedented step of naming a successor to the Chairman of the CPC. The Constitution named Lin Piao "Comrade Mao Tse-tung's close comrade-in-arms and successor".

The military group formed the majority in the Party's highest organ, the CC Politburo: of the 21 members of the Ninth Central Committee Politburo 15 held various ranks in the PLA. If to these are added Mao Tse-tung and Hsieh Fu-chih, who was chairman of the Peking "revolutionary committee" and had previously held the rank of general, it will be seen that in the Politburo only four members were not linked with the armed forces. In its turn, the Politburo was headed by the five-man Standing Committee: Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Kang Sheng, and Chen Po-ta. Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao (Chairman and the sole Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee) were at the apex of this pyramid.<sup>7</sup>

The Mao personal power regime did not exist in a void. It had a broad social base. First and foremost, this included the *kanpu*—officials of the Party, state, economic, and military administration apparatuses. It is estimated that these numbered between 20 and 30 million. They were appointed from above by strict selection, with devotion to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the main criterion. The key segment of the *kanpu* consisted of military and also of army technocrats. This group was the mainstay of the regime.

The dismantling of leading Party organs led some foreign analysts to the hasty conclusion that Mao had decided to eliminate the Party entirely as an instrument of power and govern the nation exclusively with the aid of the army. However, the facts did not bear out this conclusion. As might have been assumed earlier, the Maoist scenario called for the removal, crushing, and scattering of opposition elements in the Party and other political institutions. But it did not seek total destruction of the Party as an instrument of political leadership. Mao had only wanted to turn it into an obedient tool, into a Maoist Party.

The "cultural revolution" was conducted under slogans calling for a struggle against bureaucracy and for a rejuvenation of cadres. What did in fact happen?

The following are some statistics on the composition of leading CPC organs after the 9th Congress.

|                                | "Revolutionary leading cadres" | PLA cadres     | Representatives of mass organisations | Unspecified  |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| CC members . . . .             | 58                             | 73             | 37                                    | 2            |
| CC alternate members . . . . . | 19                             | 50             | 29                                    | 11           |
| Total . . . . .                | 77<br>(27.6%)                  | 123<br>(44.1%) | 66<br>(23.6%)                         | 13<br>(4.7%) |

What strikes the eye most is that the 9th Central Committee was much larger than the 8th (1956). It consisted of 170 members and 109 alternate members, i.e., it had 73 members and 13 alternate members more than the 8th CC. Thus the CC was enlarged by 86 persons (by 44 per cent), with 75 per cent more members. This enlargement was due to the need to include representatives of different factions in order to maintain a balance and avoid conflict and friction in the Maoist camp, and not to any striving to enlist younger cadres.

According to the Maoists themselves, in the 9th CC there were three groups: the military, Party-administrative cadres, and representatives of mass organisations.<sup>8</sup>

The predominance of the military hardly requires comment. Note may also be made of the lack of any pronounced successiveness between the composition of the 8th and 9th CCs. Only 53 members of the 8th CC remained in the 9th: 48 became members and five alternates. In spite of the hopes of the young people, only two *hungweiping* representatives were elected: alternate members Nieh Yuan-tzu and Chen Kan-feng. China watchers Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager<sup>9</sup> write that the data for full members was fairly good (69 per cent) but scanty for the alternates (20 per cent), and on the basis of these data the average age in 1969 was 59 for full members and 53 for the alternates. There was thus no significant difference in this regard between the 8th and 9th CCs: in both instances the average age was above 50.

Nevertheless, the main thing was not so much the social composition and educational level of the Party leadership. It was the regime in the Party, the methods and style of its work, the activity level of its members and organisations, the orientation of their activity, and the political regime in the country. From this angle attention is attracted by the attempt to formalise the results of the "cultural revolution" constitutionally.

In the autumn of 1970 Japanese and Western media (the first was *Tokyo Shimbun* on November 5, 1970) carried the draft of the new PRC Constitution. Although a new Constitution was adopted later, this draft is interesting in that it mirrored the ambitions of the "cultural revolution" script-writers. The principal concern of the draft's architects was to consolidate the personal power of Mao Tse-tung. Article 2 calls Mao Tse-tung "the great leader of all the nations and nationalities of the entire country, the head of our state, of the proletarian dictatorship, and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the nation's Armed Forces".

Leader of the nation hardly differs from the title of emperor.

"Vice-Chairman Lin Piao is the close comrade-in-arms of Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his successor, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the nation's Armed Forces", the same article declares. By an irony of fate, this point of the draft, so flattering, it would seem, to Lin Piao was the stumbling block for the "close comrade-in-arms" to the acquisition of this alluring inheritance.

Characteristically, the draft formalised not only the political but also the ideological power of Mao Tse-tung. His "thought" was proclaimed "the guideline of the entire activity of the people, of the entire country" (Article 2).<sup>10</sup> "The prime duty of citizens of the PRC is to support Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his close comrade-in-arms Vice-Chairman Lin Piao" (Article 26). In the preamble Mao Tse-tung is mentioned eight times.<sup>11</sup>

The draft Constitution, drawn up in 1970, says that a fundamental change of the ideological and political regime in China was the main purpose of the "cultural revolution", it was not a personal contest between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, as some superficial observers believed, particularly at the outset of the "cultural revolution"; it was not a power struggle between Mao's supporters and adversa-

ries, as many Western analysts believe to this day; it was not meant to rejuvenate the "establishment" or "ruling elite", or to clamp down on bureaucracy and inject new blood, as some "New Left" watchers assumed; and it was not an attempt by Mao Tse-tung to shake off the fear of death, as some social psychologists still think. The "cultural revolution" was essentially a struggle to establish the political and ideological personal power of Mao Tse-tung in China.

Within the political regime the ideological regime may be distinguished as an independent object of analysis. By this we mean: the character of the ideology prevailing in Chinese society; the mechanism by which this ideology is inculcated in the people's minds; the correlation of this ideology with other ideologies in Chinese society; and the interaction of ideology and politics.

In China, which had been governed for centuries on end not so much by laws as on the basis of a system of ideological education and compulsion, ideological values have always been pre-eminent in the system of political power.

To understand the political regimes and political practices in China in past epochs one must see the enormous significance of the orientation of the ruling circles and the people on one or another system of ideological values embodied in Taoism, Confucianism, legalism, or the egalitarian ideas of peasant movements such as the Taiping movement of the mid-nineteenth century.

While they rejected many attributes of the past, the leaders of the People's Republic of China were, nonetheless, unable to break with that tradition. The "cultural revolution" was, according to the more or less conscious scenario of its sponsors, to complete the shaping of an ideological regime founded on the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". It ploughed up the intellectual culture of China, bent on destroying all ideological values that did not fit into the Procrustean bed of Maoism.

The CC political report to the 9th Congress noted: "For half a century now... Chairman Mao has integrated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution, has inherited, defended, and developed Marxism-Leninism in the political, military, economic, cultural, and philosophical spheres, and has brought Marxism-Leninism to a higher and completely new stage.

Mao Tse-tung thought is Marxism-Leninism of the era in which imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing to world-wide victory."<sup>12</sup>

In the Party Constitution adopted by it the 9th Congress of the CPC not only formalised the special position of the leader in the person of "Comrade Mao Tse-tung" in the Party but proclaimed "Mao Tse-tung thought" the ideological foundation of the CPC, thereby reviving the thesis of the Party Constitution adopted by the 7th Congress in 1945 and annulled by the 8th Congress in 1956.<sup>13</sup>

In 1965 there was a sharp growth of the publication of Mao Tse-tung's works throughout the nation: in some provinces the increase was 20-40-fold over the 1963 level. In 1966 alone a total of 3,000 million copies of the "book of quotations" were printed in all the basic languages of the world.

The political regime established as a result of the "cultural revolution" signified, above all, the artificial and coercive narrowing of the forces dominating the intellectual culture of the Party and the Chinese people: what did not conform to the "thought of Mao Tse-tung", what came into conflict with or did not confirm it had to be extirpated. This concerned national traditions of China's cultural life and the intellectual culture of all humankind. To the same extent this concerned Marxism-Leninism.

The whole of Marxism, like shagreen leather, was contracted and changed into something quite different, Maoism. Marx, Engels, and Lenin were retained on the Maoist banners. Their portraits are still to be seen in official offices. But the ideology of Marxism was supplanted by the ideology of Maoism. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was proclaimed the highest criterion of truth. No one could, with references to Marx or Lenin, question this "thought". Moreover, any Maoist thesis or proposition closed the door to the propagation of the Marxist tenets disproving it.

The mechanism by which Maoist ideology functioned was likewise reshaped. While formerly, especially at the 8th CPC Congress, it was still possible to polemise cautiously with the Maoist guidelines (for instance, the Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping reports to the congress), and while in the period of "regulation" and at sittings of the higher Party organs criticism of Mao's Great Leap and "people's communes" ideas was still permissible, even this truncated



democracy was now inconceivable. The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was sacred and inviolable. It could only be quoted and extolled. Any attempt to comment freely on any pronouncement of Mao Tse-tung, let alone to question it openly, brought instant ideological and political death. There is no God but Allah, and Mohammed is His prophet; in China there is no theory of socialism but Maoism, and Mao Tse-tung is its prophet.

This does not mean that the ideological struggle has ceased entirely since the "cultural revolution". The very idea must be dismissed, no matter how brutal the political regime. More, in home and foreign policy China is confronted with problems so complex and acute that alternative options, judgments, and views inevitably arise and will continue to arise. But this struggle rages under the umbrella of Maoism, with the least deviation spelling death. Through the medium of *Jenmin jihpao*, *Hungchi*, the Hsin-hua Press Agency, and many other press organs, and also the radio and television the ideological stick acts with unflagging strength. It has become a major instrument of power.

The personalities that at one moment or another gain the upper hand in the international political struggle have immediate recourse to this stick in order to consummate the downfall of their adversaries. Judging by his official pronouncements, Lin Piao faithfully championed the Maoist guidelines, never permitting himself the slightest deviation from Maoist ideology and never claiming the role of ideologue. After his political fall he was promptly proclaimed an enemy of the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". In Mao-ruled China there was no more dangerous charge.

You could be a bourgeois and get your rake from capital—nobody would hold it against you. You could abuse authority, embezzle state funds, and feather your nest at the expense of the state. You would be tried, but you would be treated leniently. You might even be caught red-handed in crime—theft, swindling, brigandage, or mutilation. All these were punishable crimes, but they were not the most heinous.

A criminal for whom no mercy was shown was one who spoke against the "thought of Mao Tse-tung". Not even the European Middle Ages with their Inquisition and religious wars knew a more callous ideological regime. Prece-

dents of such religious bigotry can be found, perhaps, only in Chinese history of the periods we shall discuss later.

The point is not only in the system of punishments for "ideological crimes". The Maoist regime has developed its own methods to force its ideology on the people. In China spiritual power has always been a key element of political power. Yet Confucianism, Taoism, legalism, and other Chinese doctrines of the past appealed in the long run to reason, to common sense, although the ruling classes often used political means to give primacy to a set way of thinking. In the case of Maoism, it evolved a system of political means of ramming its ideology home to the masses.

This system included periodical re-education campaigns of the *chengfeng* and "cultural revolution" type; the compulsory study of the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung by all Chinese, not only at schools and universities, but also at factories, cooperatives, and kindergartens; an unparalleled narrowing and distortion of information on developments in China and, in particular, on the life of other nations; a thorough revision of textbooks and curricula with the forcible removal of anything that could in any way be regarded as inconsistent with the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

In other words, not only anti-Maoism but also non-Maoism was forcibly expelled from the spiritual life of Chinese society. For the Chinese there could be no alternatives in spiritual values. There was only one choice, and it was final.

In the Party, too, intellectual life was crippled and drab. Time was when leading personalities could air their views about projected political decisions. This was now taboo. While timidly stating a personal or purely professional judgment, they had, in the next breath, to refer to a quotation from Mao Tse-tung. All eyes were turned to the pedestal on which he sat. While at the pedestal silence reigned more frequently than not (not the white silence described by Jack London, but rather a "white joy"—the symbol of death, of which Mao spoke). That created a vacuum in the solution of many problems. Everybody feared falling into error in implementing the "line of Mao", which consisted of a set of conflicting postulates.

A hallmark of the Maoist ideological regime was the so-called line of the masses. To the superficial observer some of its external aspects might have looked quite democratic.

First, publication of wall-posters criticising ranking officials; second, participation of young people in discussions "on an equal footing" with their elders—students and professors, schoolchildren and teachers; third, collective creativity by workers and peasants writing verse, plays, and stories. Naive as all this was, at first glance it gave the impression of a vocal public opinion.

However, the orientation of this public activity demolished all the illusions there might have been about it. The masses could create only in the spirit of the official ideology, in the spirit of Mao's latest instructions. If one day criticism of Liu Shao-chi was encouraged, he could be criticised to everyone's heart's content, in any expressions one chose to use. He could be criticised, but Lin Piao had to be left alone. If, on any day, it was found that Lin Piao was a conspirator, an "agent of social-imperialism", then he could be villified with any invectives, but Chou En-lai was not to be touched. Whereas yesterday it was permissible to criticise Teng Hsiao-ping, today he had been reinstated in the Party's top leadership. That meant all criticism had to be retracted if one wished to avoid serious trouble. Of course, it was taken for granted that the "red sun"—Mao Tse-tung—had to be extolled everywhere and on all occasions.

In other words, the "line of the masses" was a method by which the people were manipulated and made the leader's buttress, embodying his "thought". This was a method of directing social activity along strictly defined channels. At the same time, it was a method of removing or persecuting the active segment of the intelligentsia and the politically conscious section of the working class, in and outside the Party, for the Chairman appealed over their heads directly to the simple hearts of unsophisticated "representatives" of the people.

On September 24, 1967 Mao Tse-tung declared in Changsha: "At present we have a situation in which fear of disorder is pre-eminent... If we do not take care of sedition, then what are we to do?... To bring order among cadres there must be a mass movement."

This did not imply that there should be democracy. On the contrary, Mao was adamantly opposed to representative institutions. "Some people say that elections are a good thing, that they are very democratic. As I see it, elections

are merely decorum," Mao Tse-tung told an Albanian military delegation in May 1967. For him the masses were a multitude, the mainstay of his power, a weapon to be used against political adversaries in the Party, a means for attaining an aim, not the aim itself.

As Mao saw it, the masses were not only the prop of ideological power but also an instrument "for resolving contradictions in the nation", in other words, a weapon for terrorising the more cultured and critical groups of the population, notably the intelligentsia.

Perhaps, the most consummate expression of the "thought of Mao" about the sublime simplicity of intellectual activity was exemplified by the notorious contest in the writing of verse, songs, stories, and novels promoted by the Maoists during the Great Leap. In those years the Chinese media printed rapturous reviews of what was described as the finest output of groups of workers and soldiers in Shanghai, who in a single evening produced 3,000 poems and 360 songs in, needless to say, honour of Mao Tse-tung. We shall not dispute the contention that this sort of ode-writing is indeed a "very simple matter".

Ideologically conditioned masses were involved in political and criminal sanctions against vacillating or disaffected groups of the population and specific personalities.

We have already described the methods used by the *hungweipings* for punishing ideological "crimes", but towards the end of the "cultural revolution" they themselves fell victim to these methods.

On the eve of the 9th Congress of the CPC the "youthful pioneers of the cultural revolution" found themselves the object of mass repressions. According to the foreign press, 19 youths who had been *hungweipings* were publicly executed at a stadium in Peking on January 27, 1969 following a sort of rally called a public trial (at which court proceedings were imitated). There were similar executions on February 10 and 11 of the same year in the town of Yangchenghsiang in the presence of 50,000 people.

In the mechanism of the political regime established in China after the "cultural revolution" an important place was held by cadre schools (May 7 schools), where the emphasis was on "ideological re-education". These "schools" were set up in line with Mao's instructions of May 7, 1967. The first was founded near the small town of Lioho, Hei-

lungkiang Province, high in the Siao Hingan Ling (Little Khingan Mountains). The cadres sent there (at first 14 in number) lived in the most rigorous conditions in caves; they built mud huts with their hands and ploughed virgin land. The government funds for these "schools" were kept to a bare minimum. People who had been on the Long March were among the first inmates of these "schools". Thousands were exiled to them during the "cultural revolution".

Alongside the May 7 schools, a major element of the system of ideological indoctrination consisted of "courses for the study of the thought of Mao Tse-tung" or "political education groups", which encompassed practically the whole adult population. The first of these groups were formed in the spring of 1967, and then they sprang at practically all offices, factories, cooperatives, and even in families.

Recall how the CPC leader was depicted in the Party's official documents and press. He was the "greatest Marxist-Leninist of modern times", the "greatest military strategist", and even the "greatest poet of China". The deification of Mao Tse-tung reached a point where in the press he was no longer likened to the sun; the sun was likened to him. On placards distributed throughout the country Mao was shown against the background of the sun, whose rays warmed the whole of China.

Therein lies the answer to all the riddles of political life in present-day China. Creator of a new symbol of faith and autocratic supreme ruler—was this the purpose of the great people's revolution in China?! Was this the goal of the Communist Party of China?

Some Western analysts (Edgar Snow among them) attribute the deification of Mao to the specific conditions in China. What could be said about this?

Socialist construction in China, an economically backward country with a predominantly peasant population, could not avoid acquiring some of its own features, even very essential ones. It is true that there inevitably had to be more centralisation and concentration of power than in other socialist countries on account of age-old traditions of power, the gigantic size of this land of a billion people, and the fact that in China the revolution was accomplished in the form of a hard-fought civil war.

Moreover, at some stages of China's development a high concentration level of political power and military discipline could have played a more or less positive role, especially during the civil war. But with the passage of time it grew increasingly obvious that this form of power and methods of leadership could not solve economic and social problems and were unsuitable for the nation's effective administration.

True, some people wrongly assert that the ideological regime founded on the deification of Mao Tse-tung was the factor cementing China's national unity. This was, perhaps, one of the motivations that induced many CPC cadres to support the Mao regime. They, evidently, hoped that this would help to uproot conflicting ideologies in the Party itself and in the country at large. But this proved to be a double-bottomed casket, with a semblance of unity at the top and a latent and, therefore, extremely dangerous disunity at the bottom.

## Philosopher and Ruler

An aircraft with Chinese markings crashed in the Mongolian People's Republic in the autumn of 1971. Remnants of the aircraft and the bodies of the crew and passengers, charred beyond recognition, were found at the crash site. There were almost no belongings and documents left, and it was, therefore, impossible to ascertain who was in the aircraft and why it had intruded into Mongolia. It was learned that a helicopter, that had taken off from the campus of Peking's Tsinghua University, had crashed at one and the same time. The Western press reported that all but one passenger committed suicide. For some time these incidents were passed over in silence by Chinese officials and the Chinese press. Six weeks passed before Chou En-lai made the first official statement that a Chinese aircraft carrying Lin Piao, who, it was alleged, intended to defect to the "Soviet revisionists", had crashed in Mongolia.

In this way the world learned of yet another victim of the political struggle in China. Lin Piao, who shortly before had been proclaimed the second in the Chinese hierarchy and successor of the Chairman of the CPC, was suddenly

labelled the "head of an adventurist plot against Mao Tse-tung", an "agent of social-imperialism", a "black bandit".

We shall not go into this mystery, which has the trappings of a detective story. It is still a riddle whether Lin Piao was indeed in the aircraft that crossed the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic, how and why the aircraft crashed, and if there really was a plot against Mao Tse-tung. What interests us is the political and, particularly, the ideological aspect of the incident.

In the summer of 1972 the Japanese and Hongkong press published a "top secret" letter of the CPC Central Committee, dated January 13, 1972, regarding the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy of Lin Piao".

"Project 571" (it was mentioned at the 10th CPC Congress), allegedly Lin Piao's coded plan for an "armed rising", the "assassination of Mao Tse-tung", and the formation of a new CPC Central Committee, states the following about Mao Tse-tung:

"In every case he used one force to crush another; today he uses this force to smash that; tomorrow he uses that to smash this; today he extols some people; tomorrow he labels them traitors and destroys them; today he sits with them on the throne; tomorrow they are his prisoners. The history of the past few decades shows that those whom he begins to elevate are inevitably doomed to a political death. What political personalities have been able to work with him to the end? His former secretary—the bloodiest murderer and jailer of them all, and one of his closest abettors and associates—is now in jail himself. He has shown no mercy even to his own son, driving him mad; he is a diabolic schemer and a monster of cruelty. He can bury anybody alive and blame him for every wickedness. Obviously, all who were his associates and later disgraced have in fact been made scapegoats."

If this document is genuine, notes the Soviet Orientalist M. Altaisky, it indicates that even Maoists, who have retained some sense of political responsibility and duty to the nation, see the perniciousness of Maoism sooner or later. This is demonstrated by the "Liu Shao-chi affair" and the "Lin Piao affair".

On the other hand, if "Project 571" is a fraud (as many analysts believe), the Maoists have taken it from a living

model, perhaps even much too naturalistically for material of this sort.<sup>1</sup>

After the "Lin Piao conspiracy" was exposed, the official Chinese press was at first thrown into confusion. It was unclear what ideological attitude should be taken to the former Defence Minister. The Chinese had until then regarded Lin Piao as the leader of the "cultural revolution" and the compiler of the first Mao "books of quotations". As the *hungweiping* chief, Lin Piao had worn red armband No. 2, with Mao wearing armband No. 1. The nation had to vow fidelity to Lin Piao as the "closest comrade-in-arms of Mao Tse-tung". The CPC Constitution (adopted at the 9th Congress) and the draft of the new Constitution of the People's Republic of China (discussed in 1970) proclaimed Lin Piao the successor of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

But at the 10th Congress of the CPC in 1973 Chou En-lai told the Party and the nation that Lin Piao was a "bourgeois careerist, conspirator, double-dealer, renegade, and traitor". The Party propaganda machine soon declared that Lin Piao (his wife was also a member of the Politburo, and his son held high rank in the Air Force) had "hoped to establish the Lin family as a hereditary dynasty".

Time was when the Chinese press called Lin a "leftist", and then he abruptly became a "rightist". Finally his greatest ideological crime was identified: he was neither more nor less than a disciple of Confucius.

Confucius (Kung Fu-tse) died some two and a half thousand years ago. Lin Piao perished a few years ago. What thread links these names?

It will be noted that prior to this campaign the attitude of Mao and his associates to Confucianism was extremely contradictory. Many of Mao Tse-tung's speeches, particularly at secret conferences in the CPC, contained innumerable references to Confucius. The Chinese people know that in the memorable year of 1919 he went to the revered Mount Tai Shan to visit the grave of the teacher Confucius.

Mao's private secretary, Chen Po-ta, one of the organisers of the "cultural revolution" who disappeared from the political scene almost at one and the same time as Lin Piao, held that Confucius was in some sense a progenitor of scientific communism. Liu Shao-chi had also made a pilgrimage to the philosopher's grave on Mount Tai Shan. Kuo Mo-jo, President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, went



so far as to call Confucius a revolutionary. The first brochure volume of *A History of Philosophy* was published in Peking in early 1973. The references to Confucius contained the words: "There were reactionary and progressive ideas in his theory."

Who gave the new ideological campaign its anti-Confucianist slant? Evidently, none other than Mao Tse-tung himself.

On February 2, 1974 *Jenmin jihpao* commented that the "political struggle of the masses and criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" were conducted "on the initiative and under the guidance of our great leader Chairman Mao". The comment ended with an excerpt from a poem written by Mao:

*Let the winds blow,  
Let the waves roar!  
This is better than to wander  
Idly in a wall-enclosed yard.*

The waves rose higher and the winds blew with renewed force. Within a few years the prestige of Confucius, mentor of the ill-starred marshal, was demolished in China. It was demolished methodically, fundamentally. It was demolished in Peking and Shanghai, in Kwangchow and Chengtu, in Wuhan and Tientsin. It was demolished on the radio, in newspapers, in official placards and wall-posters, on the opera stage, and at the universities. It was demolished in the streets and in people's homes, at special rallies and impromptu meetings, at the nuclear plants and in rural communities, at scientific centres and at kindergartens. This was the preoccupation of the *kanpu* of the central government agencies in their invariable tunics with superposed pockets, and of lesser *kanpu* in cotton tunics, of former *hungweipings* in cotton shoes, dark trousers and white singlets, and of children in blue pants.

Let us consider why Confucius became such a thorn in the flesh of China's rulers.

He lived in the sixth-fifth centuries B.C. when a tense political struggle raged between the fragmented Chinese kingdoms and there was disorder in these kingdoms. The philosophers of those times showed little interest in problems of the spirit and matter, the purport of life, death and immortality, the Universe and the will of the gods. They

were more concerned with the hard life of their epoch. The teacher Confucius thought and wrote of how the state should be governed, how the ruler and his subjects should behave, how the unity and might of the nation could be maintained, how the nation's wealth could be increased, and how people should reconcile themselves to poverty. He evolved a patriarchal theory that the state was a large family in which the virtuous ruler was like a father, and his subjects were obedient children.

*Lun-Yii (Analects)* or *Discourses and Dialogues* is the only work in Chinese literature that more or less faithfully conveys the views of Confucius. We know of him, as of Socrates, from the records of his pupils, who collected his pronouncements in a volume after his death. For that reason there are many versions of the *Analects*.

In China official intervention in the intellectual life of the people is a long-standing imperial tradition. From time to time, tired of military campaigns, the emperors started campaigns against the great philosophers in a vain attempt to surpass their wisdom and win glory for themselves—not only on the battlefield but also in intellectual endeavour.

In the reign of the emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti (third century B.C.) a dramatic event took place. It is known as the "burning of books" and the "burying of living Confucianists". The *Analects* were banned and burned, and 460 Confucianist zealots were buried alive.<sup>2</sup>

What motivated this cruelty? What angered the emperor? We have only indirect evidence and can only guess. The emperor was, evidently, infuriated by the counsels of philosophers, by their interference in affairs of state, by their precepts on how to govern the people, which came into conflict with the imperial power.

In keeping with the teachings of Confucius, philosophers preached the principle of *jen* or love of man, and *chungtzu* or noble behaviour, the highest standard of human virtue. Here is what we read on this score in the *Analects*:

"Where love of man reigns, there is goodness. Hence, is it wise to settle where love of man is non-existent?"

"A noble person thinks of morals; a base person thinks of how to feather his own nest. A noble person thinks of how to avoid transgressing the law; a base person thinks of how to derive benefits." "A noble person knows only

duty; a base person knows only gain." "A noble person is slow to speak and quick to act."

"The people can be made to obey, but they cannot be made to understand why." "One may refuse food. Since ancient times nobody has avoided death", but "without the trust of the people no state can stand."

"If one improves oneself will it be hard to govern the state? If you cannot improve yourself how can you improve other people?"

"One person asked: 'Is it correct to answer evil with kindness?' The teacher replied: 'How can you answer with kindness? To evil one answers with justice. To kindness one answers with kindness'." <sup>3</sup>

One can well appreciate the annoyance of the emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti with this sort of advice. Few royal advisers prospered. The example of Niccolo Machiavelli may be regarded classical in this respect. His counsels were rejected by the Medici and he was jailed, disgraced, and exiled. Foolish or weak rulers sometimes used the counsels of clever courtiers and, as a result, became the latter's slaves—witness the simple-minded Fyodor Ioannovich, the obedient victim of Boris Godunov. Wise rulers used advice, but did not divulge its source. Strong and cruel rulers sent their counsellors to the scaffold or into exile, as did Ivan the Terrible.

But the dispute between the emperor and the philosopher did not end with the burning of books and the burying alive of "faithful Confucianists". Action is stronger than the Word, but the Word outlives Action. Books were restored from ashes and held the imagination of Chinese captive for ages. They were reborn like the Phoenix or the fabulous horse-dragon, which in China typifies the highest morals and prosperity. The Phoenix and the horse-dragon, which disappeared in the reign of Chin Shih Huang Ti, reappeared in the reign of new rulers. Three versions of the *Analects* became known under the first Han emperors (second century B.C.), and later their text, together with other Confucianist texts, were carved on slabs of stone.

The canon of Confucianism, like the Christian canon, is not confined to the discourses and dialogues of the teacher himself. It consisted of *Lichi* (*Book of Rites and Ancient Ceremonies and Institutions*), *Yi Ching* (*Canon of Changes*), *Shu Ching* (*Canon of History*), *Shih Ching* (*Canon of*

*Odes*), and the chronicle *Chun Chiu* (*Spring and Autumn*). These are the Confucianist *Wu Ching* (*Five Books*).

Every cultured person, especially one who had his eye on a government career, had to have a good knowledge of the *Five Books*. In the neo-Confucianist era (twelfth century), the requirements of the Confucianist canon were pared down. There appeared what became known as *Ssushu* or the *Little Canon*, which consisted only of works containing the fundamentals of Confucianism.<sup>4</sup>

The Chinese revered the teacher Confucius for twenty-five centuries. In him they saw the source of wisdom and simple day-to-day counsel: how to treat one's father and ancestors in general, elder brothers, other people, the district head, the landlord, the sovereign. What the attitude should be to knowledge, how to learn to think and foresee the future, how to observe ritual, how to make a funeral a sad ceremony, how to be a gentle husband, how to rule the Universe. These and many other behaviour patterns are dealt with in the *Analects* or *Ssushu*.

Unlike Christianity, Confucianism has never been a religion. But it spelled out a faith that was in no way less durable and profound than Christianity or Mohammedanism. Underlying it was the recognition of the wisdom of its source—the great teacher Confucius—and the predomination of tradition: every person believed what his father, his grandfather, his great-grandfather, and his great great-grandfather before him believed.

This was against whom 700 million Chinese (we do not include children under three, whom it was most likely found impossible to drag into the campaign) lifted their hands! It was this intellectual titan who was pulled down from his pedestal in China! That was the crux of the "great revolution" in culture, in the minds and hearts of a great people! The soul was cleansed of the slime of tradition, and the mind from the cobwebs of obsolete wisdom. The pedestal, on which the small figure of the modest teacher Confucius stood for twenty-five centuries, was now free.

For what? For what purpose was this former grandeur deposed?

Perhaps to enable the Chinese to acquire modern culture, modern knowledge? Was he thirsting for knowledge of the science and technology of the last three decades of the twentieth century? Was he dreaming of a new life, of new

relations among people, of new forms of administration, in short, of socialism? That would make things understandable, although many of the forms and methods of the ideological campaigns jar upon us because of their freakishness and brutality. But tradition is, ultimately, tradition. Even when it dies it remains true to itself albeit to the ritual of its death. All this would have been so, if . . .

If it were not for the bare-bellied little boys and girls in the kindergartens, led by a charming girl in blue slacks and a white shirt, chanting: "Ten thousand years of life to Chairman Mao!"

If it were not for the miner, his face black with coal-dust from hewing coal for thirty hours, exclaiming: "I have done this in honour of the wise teacher Mao!"

If it were not for the 15-year-old *hungweipings*, boys and girls, screaming at their gatherings: "Death to the Confucianists, eternal life to Chairman Mao!"

If it were not for the surgeon declaring at the end of a delicate operation on the heart: "I performed it because I followed the teaching of Mao!"

If it were not for the soldiers shooting at dummies of "revisionists" and yelling: "All enemies of Mao will be destroyed!"

If it were not for the 200 printshops in all the large Chinese cities that had long ago stopped printing not only the *Analects* but also school physics and mathematics textbooks and were printing thousands of millions of copies of the "little red books" of Mao Tse-tung day and night.

In short, if the pedestal from which the teacher Confucius was toppled had not been immediately occupied by the familiar figure of Chairman Mao.

The Ruler was thus not defeated by the Philosopher for all time to come. After many centuries, the dispute between Chin Shih Huang Ti and Confucius became the issue of the ideological demarcation of forces in the Communist Party of China. Judge for yourself.

An article circulated by the Hsinhua News Agency on February 22, 1974 stated: "In the early 1960s the renegade, provocateur, and wrecker Liu Shao-chi, who whipped up the sinister wind of the restoration of capitalism, once again brought out his black book *On Self-Cultivation of Communists*, preached the doctrine of Confucius and Mengtsu, zealously lauded the *jen* (love of man) idea of Confucius,

and asserted that this meant 'treating people in a humane fashion'."

Most of the venom in this article was aimed at the Confucian appeal "that every person must be regarded as a human being". "All his life Confucius urged the restoration of the slave-owning system and was opposed to social reform. After China was united by the emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti, reactionary Confucianists continued their counter-revolutionary activities in order to restore the slave-owning system."

"Confucius, who propounded the principle that 'he who is successful in study will have a government career', sought by means of his pedagogical activities to train slave overseers serving the slave-owning class."

The Maoists presented their criticism of Confucius as a negation of all feudal culture, which was essentially exploitative. But then how was one to understand the fact that while demolishing the teacher, the critics of Confucius extolled Mao's hero Chin Shih Huang Ti, who was now eulogised in China as the model of all virtues?

In May 1974 the newspaper *Peiching jihpao* carried an article, signed by a group of critics at Peking and Tsinghua universities, maintaining that the emperor played a positive role in creating a centralised state ruled by a feudal monarchy and in wiping out all vestiges of the slave-owning system.

Their argument was: "It is quite wrong to say that the 'burning of books and the burying alive of Confucianists' was a death blow to freedom of thought... As the reactionaries of all times, the anti-Party group of Lin Piao and the handful of 'rightist' elements likewise condemn Chin Shih Huang Ti for having 'burned books and buried Confucianists alive', calling him a 'feudal despot'. Properly speaking, any state machine is a machine of coercion, and the power of the Chin Dynasty was also such a machine. Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung do not indiscriminately reject all violence... we always oppose counter-revolutionary violence and support revolutionary violence."

Chin Shih Huang Ti thus exemplified progressive violence. His alleged purpose of uniting China justified the means employed by him. The esteemed authors of the article did not concern themselves with the emperor's attitude to the people. In passing, as something quite irrelevant, they

inform the reader of Chin Shih Huang Ti's brutality towards not only his own courtiers and dissident philosophers but also ordinary folk. What enchanted them most was the method of struggle, that was indeed comparable to the "cultural revolution", when the burning of books and the persecution of people unconvinced by the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" were commonplace.

Criticism of Confucius brought to light not only the continuing factional struggle in China's leadership but also the conflict between Confucianism and legalism, that was to be observed throughout China's history. The legist school, which now received prominence, has nothing in common with the rule of law. It implies the power of a supreme Ruler. Small wonder that Chin Shih Huang Ti is the prototype of the legist ruler.

This is the Maoists' own interpretation of the legists. *Jenmin jihpao* wrote: "The law of Shang Yang, compiler of the laws of Chin Shih Huang Ti, was aimed at 'the destruction of law with the aid of law and at the eradication of war with the aid of war'. The conclusion: 'To govern the land by violence is an historical necessity.'" <sup>5</sup>

We have no intention of entering into a discussion of Confucius' role in history. His role is that he influenced China for thousands of years, much as the nation's experience has shown the narrowness and conservatism of his views, which came into sharp conflict with the modern epoch. Neither do we wish to enter into a polemic about Chin Shih Huang Ti's place in history.

One thing is obvious, and it is that the ballyhoo over Confucius had in fact nothing to do with the ancient philosopher himself or with his ideology. Suffice it to say that he was listed in the "same gang" as the disgraced Marshal Lin Piao, who had as much to do with philosophy as Confucius had with the art of war.

These Oriental sphinxes are truly riddled with mystery! They rise from the dead after millennia, disturbing the minds of the living and convulsing governments and peoples! An amazed world watched these torrents of live energy flowing to the tomb of a man who died many centuries ago, this dissipation of a great people's enormous vitality.

Now a few words about the cardinal ideological events following the "cultural revolution". The "cultural revolution" itself may in some sense be called a period of the

"self-purification" of Maoism. It was then that the Maoist doctrine revealed its actual content most candidly and in bold relief. It was in that period that Marxist ideas were most vigorously effaced. It was in that period that Mao Tse-tung laid claim to the role of leading ideologue not only of China but of the entire world. The 9th Congress of the CPC was a major watershed on this road. It disclosed the deep-lying trend and long-term aims of the Maoist doctrine.

At the 10th Congress of the CPC (August 24-28, 1973) the Maoists retracted to some extent, at least verbally, some of the most odious slogans and directives of the "cultural revolution". The political and propaganda documents of the congress contain fleeting references to the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leading role of the working class and its Party, the principle of peaceful coexistence, and so on.

But there is no mention in them of any of the fundamental theoretical and political problems that confronted the Party and the nation when the "cultural revolution" began to recede into the past. All the indications were that Mao Tse-tung still had no long-term programme for the nation's economic and social development or for its foreign policy.

The power struggle in the Party remained in the focus of the Central Committee report delivered by Chou En-lai and of the report on the revision of the Party Constitution delivered by Wang Hung-wen.<sup>6</sup> What should be the socio-economic policy in the immediate future? In what direction should Party and state construction proceed? What would be the CPC's cultural and educational policy? On what principles were the CPC and the People's Republic of China to base their further relations with socialist countries and communist parties? What would be the orientation for China's relations with capitalist countries? None of these questions are answered either in the documents of the 10th Congress or in other documents of the CPC.

Mao Tse-tung did not keep his promise to evolve an independent theory for the building of socialism in China. However, the Maoist ideological regime suppressed all alternative development of thought in the CPC, leaving the Party theoretically unarmed in the face of exacerbating internal and international problems. This, evidently, suited Mao, who was determined to have a free hand to deal with any twists in the future.



The "cultural revolution" was assessed at the 10th Congress of the CPC as the primary ideological and political platform for China's further development. Chou En-lai declared that Mao Tse-tung had charted the basic guideline and policy of the CPC for the entire stage of socialism. This guideline called for periodic "cultural revolutions". Chou En-lai charged that Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta had "opposed the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat", in other words, that they were opposed to repetitions of the "cultural revolution" and insisted that "the development of production had to be the principal task after the 9th Congress".<sup>7</sup>

The 10th Congress reproduced Mao's guideline towards the nation's militarisation. We shall remind the reader that the 9th Congress called upon the entire nation to "be prepared against war, be prepared against natural disasters", to "dig tunnels deep" and to "store grain". This guideline was endorsed by the 10th Congress: be "fully prepared against any war of aggression that imperialism may launch and particularly against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social-imperialism". The congress called upon the working class, the poor and lower-middle peasants, commanders and rank and file of the PLA "to strengthen without fail their preparations against wars". This provision is in the CPC Constitution adopted by the 10th Congress.<sup>8</sup>

The congress reaffirmed the policy of continuing the production of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it called for the enlargement of the people's militia. The Chinese press reported that in recent years the numerical strength of the militia had grown several times.

At the 10th Congress, as at the 9th, no statistics were given about China's industry and agriculture and not a word was said of plans for the future or of specific economic tasks. There was total silence on the question of building the material and technical basis of socialism and of satisfying the material requirements of the people. On the other hand, the significance of the slogan "learn from Taching and Tachai" was reiterated. This meant continued development of small-scale production in civilian branches of the economy without centrally planned state investments, the development of local industry run on a self-supporting basis to meet local requirements.

In other words, both domestic and foreign policy (we shall return to this later) were subordinated entirely to the goal set by Mao as early as the 1950s, namely, to convert China into a major military power.

The 10th CPC Congress postulated an enhancement of the role played by Party organisations and the restoration of the trade unions and youth organisations. What were to be the guidelines for reviving these organisations?

In the CPC Constitution, adopted by the 10th Congress, the Party organisations are given what amounts to a purely functional role. They are not oriented on charting domestic or foreign policy. Their principal task is to put Mao Tse-tung's instructions into effect. The wording about the significance of congresses and CC plenary meetings is vague. Nothing at all is said about meetings of grassroot organisations. The Party was, evidently, being restructured not as a democratic but as a bureaucratic organisation subordinated to the will of the top leadership.

On the whole, it may be said that the central aim of the 10th Congress was to reinforce the personal power regime of Mao Tse-tung and his entourage and consolidate its social base. Relative to domestic and foreign policy, the congress formalised and gave further impetus to the line articulated during the "cultural revolution" and recorded in the decisions of the 9th Congress. This was the line towards militarisation of the nation's economy and firming up the attacks against the USSR and other socialist countries on the international scene.

The most significant post-congress development was the approval of China's new Constitution, adopted at the first session of the fourth National People's Congress in January 1975 (Mao Tse-tung did not attend this congress, preferring to meet with Franz Joseph Strauss, leader of West German right-wing elements).

Attention is attracted by the following essential elements of this new Constitution.

First: it was a dramatic retreat from the democratic norms and principles proclaimed in the preceding Constitution.

Significant alterations were made in the organisation of state power. The powers of the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee were downgraded drastically. Unlike the preceding Constitution, the new Constitution says nothing of the NPC's powers to control the enforce-

ment of the Constitution or to decide the question of war and peace. It does not, as previously, guarantee the rights of deputies or of the NPC standing commissions. Legislative embodiment is given to the "people's communes" and the "revolutionary committees".

The election system is not even mentioned. Neither does it say, as did the 1954 Constitution, that the norm of representation and the procedure of electing deputies (including deputies from the ethnic minorities) to the NPC and local people's congresses are determined by the election law. On the other hand, it introduces the institution of "consultations" without defining its form or procedure.

Second: the sharp "swing to the left" of verbal characteristics of power, property, and social relations, registering the triumph of the extremists as a result of the "cultural revolution". The basic proposition on the transition period is amended in the preamble. Whereas the 1954 Constitution proclaimed that from "the founding of the People's Republic of China to the attainment of a socialist society is a period of transition" during which the fundamental task "is, step by step, to bring about the socialist industrialisation of the country" and "step by step, to accomplish the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce", the 1975 Constitution declares that the PRC has entered the period "of socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat". It asserts that throughout the historical period of socialist society "there are class contradictions and class struggle".

Under the heading *General Principles* the PRC is formally called "a socialist state of the dictatorship of the proletariat". Further, it is proclaimed that "the Communist Party of China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people" and through it "the working class exercises leadership over the state".

Third: anti-Soviet reorientation of foreign relations.

The new Constitution does not contain the preceding Constitution's provisions on Soviet-Chinese friendship and on cooperation with other socialist countries. The provision that "in international affairs, our firm and consistent policy is to strive for the noble cause of world peace and the progress of humanity" has also been dropped.

Instead, the preamble of the new Constitution proclaims Mao's slogans: "we should be prepared against war" and

"oppose the imperialist and social-imperialist policies of aggression and war and oppose the hegemonism of the superpowers".

The provisions of China's Constitution to prepare against war, dig deep tunnels, and so on, alert world opinion, especially as they were reinforced by the arguments presented at the session by Chang Chun-tsiao that a world war was inevitable and that detente was spectral.

Fourth, and last: the Constitution enshrined the personal power regime of Mao Tse-tung, relying on the army and appealing to China's masses. This must be considered in some detail.

At the congress Chang Chun-chiao underscored the following provisions of the new Constitution, which he regarded as the most significant: "The Communist Party of China is the core of leadership of the whole Chinese people"; "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the theoretical basis guiding the thinking of our nation". "The National People's Congress is the highest organ of state power under the leadership of the Communist Party of China"; "The Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China commands the country's armed forces"; "Since no chairmanship of state is instituted . . . this will certainly help strengthen the Party's centralised leadership of the structure of the state".

All these provisions had one aim, namely, to substantiate—constitutionally this time—the Mao personal power regime and open the road for a similar regime by his successors. This concentration of Party, state, and military power in the hands of the CPC Chairman placed him virtually above control.

We shall note that in the endorsed Constitution the draft's provision (which we have already mentioned) about the succession to the supreme leadership in the CPC and the PRC was dropped. Mao refused to name an official successor. This suggests that Lin Piao's inclusion in the draft Constitution's articles on succession was a subterfuge designed to unite all the other members of the CPC leadership against him. If Mao was serious about the succession he would have insisted on the retention of a similar clause in the new Constitution.

Succession has always been the Achilles' heel of personal power regimes. The Mao regime was no exception. This is

what Mao said about the succession of the leadership in an off-the-record talk:

"Before my death I wanted to build up the prestige of 'successors', but did not expect everything to go wrong. At first our intention was to make the state secure; we built the first and second line. I was in the second line. Other comrades were in the first line. Today we can see that this was not very successful, that all we got was fragmentation. I was in the second line and did not direct day-to-day affairs; I let others decide innumerable problems, moulded the prestige of other people so that when I died there would be no great convulsions in the nation.

"All agreed with this view. It subsequently proved that the comrades in the first line did not settle some affairs very happily. Some matters, which I should have handled personally, were not smoothed over, and I bear the responsibility for this. They cannot be blamed for everything."

This was spoken in connection with Mao's retirement from the chairmanship of the PRC. Liu Shao-chi was then regarded as possible successor. We know what happened to him soon afterwards.

Then, despite Liu Shao-chi's hapless experience, Lin Piao was pushed into the role of successor. Mao Tse-tung personally informed the people of this. However, this candidate, too, was dethroned and is to this day pilloried and maligned.

Who would be next? Would anybody risk this game of zero chances? There were no bidders.

Chou En-lai was much too clever and experienced to put his neck in a noose. Teng Hsiao-ping, whose political weight rose after the 10th Congress, was likewise in no hurry to fill the chair of successor to the "great helmsman". Wang Hung-wen, 38 at the time and one of the CPC Chairman's five deputies nominated at the 10th Congress, was cautiously feeling his way.

In addition to Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen, the other deputy chairmen of the CPC, nominated at the 10th Congress, were Li Teh-sheng, Yeh Tsien-ying, and Kang Sheng.

But there was nothing to indicate that any of them was given preference as the future leader of the CPC.

Perhaps, Mao counted on a collegial leadership after his natural withdrawal from the political scene? Or, perhaps,

he gave this no thought? It is hard to say. The experience of dictators, past and present, is that this most painful subject sometimes prompts incredible shifts in thinking and spontaneous decisions.

Self-limitation is much too painful for a dictator, even if it is projected into the future. It is painful to him and extremely ticklish for the people around him. It is tantamount to acknowledging somebody as equally capable of carrying the great burden of power. Alexei Tolstoy's play *Death of Ivan the Terrible* has the following scene: the tsar renounces the throne and threatens to make the cowl and retire to a monastery. While delivering this threat he watches the boyars closely for their reaction: some nod their approval, others fall to the tsar's feet, imploring him not to abandon the people, saying that he alone can hold them in obedience. Then began the tight-rope walking of the boyars around this subject: nothing happened so long as they stood still, but no sooner one of them moved than he ran the risk of slipping and falling.

During Mao Tse-tung's last years China was a paradox from the standpoint of theory: ostensibly a socialist country, it pursued an anti-socialist home and foreign policy.

In Marxist literature the opinion has hardened that the social and political structure of China which was at the initial stage of socialist construction, was deformed under the impact of Mao's personal power regime and ideology.

The power struggle in the CPC was not only over ideology. It affected basic economic, social, and political issues and was inevitably mirrored in the character, forms, and rates of social transformations. Contradictions and errors in politics inescapably affected the economy and social relations. Hence not the spurious "leaps" but the actual convulsions in the course of building the new society in China: from the impressive achievements at the early stage to the economic declines in subsequent years; from major advances against feudalism and imperialism, and in economic development to the drastic slow-down of the productive forces and the undermining of the nation's strength; from the unbounded enthusiasm of the people directed towards constructive aims during the initial years of the PRC to flaming nationalism accompanied by mounting passivity on the part of the people as a result of the disastrous Maoist experiments.

We have used the word "deformation" deliberately. We

feel it gives an accurate picture of what happened. It implies, first, that China had, indeed, scored tangible and impressive achievements in many areas of economic and social life, otherwise there would have been nothing to deform; second, despite all the tragic exigencies of the past, the main tendencies implicit in the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution continued to be felt; third, deformation is itself a departure from the objective laws established by the Chinese revolution, by the social and political forces that accomplished the revolution—laws embodied in striking social changes such as the agrarian reform, the establishment of state property in the cities and cooperative property in rural communities, the first achievements in industrialisation, and so forth; fourth, this is not an irreversible process. On the contrary, because the military-bureaucratic dictatorship, the Great Leap and “communes”, nationalism, and chauvinism are in conflict with the vital interests of the Chinese people and the aims of their revolution, the present social and political institutions cannot be regarded as stable: they may undergo the most diverse mutations as the struggle continues.

The period subsequent to the 8th Congress of the CPC or, to be more exact, the period marked by the beginning of the Great Leap and “communes” policy at home and of the policy of hegemonism in international affairs, may be regarded as a watershed of China’s development and the beginning of the deformation of its political and social structure.

Lenin wrote: “... A backward country can easily begin because its adversary has become rotten, because its bourgeoisie is not organised, but for it to continue demands of that country a hundred times more circumspection, caution and endurance.”<sup>9</sup>

The discrepancy between the magnitude of planned tasks and material and cultural poverty, which Lenin noted in writing of Russia, was particularly glaring in China.

What we observe in China is, evidently, an attempt to implement petty-bourgeois notions about socialism with all their specific features linked with that country’s history. In trying to assess the various non-proletarian tendencies using the slogan of socialism we must again refer to the primary principles defined by the founders of scientific communism. In the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* Marx and Engels wrote of diverse schools preaching socialist slo-

gans or using these slogans as a screen. They wrote of feudal socialism, petty-bourgeois socialism, German or "true" socialism, conservative or bourgeois socialism, and, lastly, utopian socialism.

They made it plain that fundamentally socialism—if it is indeed socialism—is an integral system. The stages, through which one country or another goes on the road to socialism, are another matter. They are diverse and have many points of dissimilarity, which depends on the level from which the country concerned begins its march.

In this light how is one to define the stage at which China found itself during the last years of Mao Tse-tung? We believe that on the eve of the "cultural revolution" China was at the earliest stage of socialist construction. Property was transformed: state property was established in the cities and cooperative property in rural communities. Objectively, the nation was confronted by gigantic economic and socio-political problems, chiefly by the problems of industrialisation, of becoming an industrially developed power with the working class and the scientific and technical intelligentsia predominant in the social structure. In politics the nation faced the necessity of removing the personality cult, the personal power regime, and permitting democracy to flourish in the interests of socialism.

However, these objective requirements of social development clashed with the political power representing petty-bourgeois socialism and nationalism. It might have been foreseen that the settlement of the conflict between the nation's objective needs and the personal power regime would be a painful period marked by a most bitter struggle.



## PART THREE

# Marxist or Nationalist?

Who was Mao Tse-tung? A confused Marxist or a nationalist who had borrowed some ideas from Marxism? This was uppermost in my mind when I wrote this book.

Let us once again leaf through Mao's ideological biography and note his own words about the evolution of his outlook.

In a talk with Japanese Socialists on July 10, 1964, when Mao was past 70 and had begun to think of "meeting Marx", he reminisced:

"I was involved in the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1911. I then studied for 13 years, devoting six to the works of Confucius and seven to works on capitalism. I took part in the student movement and spoke against the government.

"But it never entered my head to form some sort of party. I was not familiar with Marx, and knew nothing of Lenin, either. The idea of founding a communist party, therefore, did not come to me. I believed in the idealism of Confucius and in the dualism of Kant.

"The Communist Party was founded in 1921. It only had 70 members. They elected 12 delegates to the 1st Congress, which took place that same year. I was one of the delegates. There were two others . . . They later resigned from the Party. One other became a Trotskyite. He is still alive and resides in Peking.

"This Trotskyite and I—we still live. A third is also living. He is Tung Pi-wu, Deputy Chairman of the Republic. All the others either perished or turned traitor. From 1921, the year the Party was founded, to the Long March in 1927

we lived with the thought of accomplishing a revolution, but had absolutely no idea how to go about it, knowing nothing of methods, guidelines, and political planning.

"Later we began to understand a thing or two—the struggle taught us. Take, for example, the land question: I studied the class relationships in the countryside for ten years. Or the problem of war: ten years went on that, too. I fought for ten years, and only then did I learn the art of warfare.

"When right deviationists appeared in the Party, I was in the left wing. Then, when 'left' opportunism surfaced in the Party, I was called a right opportunist. Nobody cared a fig for me. I remained alone and deserted. I always say: in those days there was only Buddha, at first all-powerful and then thrown on the scrap heap because he stank to high heaven. Later, during the Long March, we had a conference in Tsungyi: it was then that I, the stinking Buddha, became fragrant again."

A frank tale, this. Mao had not the least intention of posing as a man who had mastered the theory of Marxism-Leninism. On the contrary, he took pains to underline (as in his interview with Edgar Snow 30 years previously) the traditionally Chinese foundations of his education and philosophy. To use his own words, at the initial stages of his revolutionary career he did not attach much significance to evolving an ideological platform—in his mind none of the leaders was proficient in theory. Perhaps, these admissions are permeated with the mood of an old man inclined to deprecate the sins and delusions of his youth?

Let us return to Mao's autobiographical tale recorded by Edgar Snow in Yen-an. We reread it retrospectively, with a knowledge of Mao's subsequent career. It strikes us that he was insistent and deliberate in making Snow believe his fidelity to the ideas of China's national rejuvenation as the basis of his political views and as the main motivation of his revolutionary work. Of course, he spoke of himself as of a Communist and a Marxist, but he was careful to note that this was secondary.

Speaking of his reaction to the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, he admitted frankly that all his sympathies were for Japan as an Asian power. He related that a teacher who had been in Japan came to the school he was studying at. He wore a false queue and was nicknamed "False Foreign

Devil". "Many of the students disliked the 'False Foreign Devil' because of his inhuman queue," Mao said, "but I liked hearing him talk about Japan. He taught music and English. One of his songs was Japanese and was called 'The Battle on the Yellow Sea'. I still remember some charming words from it . . . At that time I knew and felt the beauty of Japan, and felt something of her pride and might, in this song of her victory over Russia."<sup>1</sup>

Let me remind the reader that according to Mao himself his very first political emotions were stirred by purely nationalistic feelings engendered by the threat of the "dismemberment of China", about which he first learned from a pamphlet by Chen Tien-hua.<sup>2</sup> It told of Japan's occupation of Korea and Formosa, of the loss of suzerainty in Indochina, Burma, and elsewhere. "After I read this I felt depressed about the future of my country and began to realise that it was duty of all people to help save it."

But was the loss of the Ching Dynasty's formal suzerainty in Indochina, Burma, and other neighbouring states a threat of "China's dismemberment"? These countries had never been Chinese territory. What was it then that depressed the young man? The fate of the peoples of these countries or the downgrading of the Chinese empire's might?

To Snow's question about the aims of the Communists in the war against Japan—whether Mao was thinking of recovering all the Chinese territory seized by Japan or only of driving the Japanese out of North China—Mao replied unambiguously: "It is the immediate task of China to regain all our territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall."<sup>3</sup> Already then he was set in his mind about what "our" territories meant.

But Mao's ambitions did not stop there. He declared bluntly that China was claiming the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic. "Whenever the revolution was victorious in China, Outer Mongolia would of its own accord join the Chinese federation."<sup>4</sup>

Snow—we have already looked into his motives—regarded Mao first as a nationalist and then a Communist, and while the civil war was still raging foretold that Mao (in the event the revolution won) would inevitably clash with the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties. This belief was shared by Stuart R. Schram, although he contended that Mao was an "orthodox Marxist". He wrote that Mao

was a nationalist before he became a Communist or a revolutionary of any rating.<sup>5</sup> From this angle Schram considered the principal milestones of Mao's ideological biography.

As Soviet analysts (A. Titov, in particular) have rightly noted, unlike the finest Chinese intellectuals (Li Ta-chao, Chiu Chu-po, Chang Tai-lei, Peng Pai, and Yun Tai-ying, to name a few), who disseminated Marxism-Leninism vigorously, Mao Tse-tung did not publish a single work on Marxism-Leninism from 1921 (the year he joined the CPC) to 1936. His early theoretical works, *Analysis of the Classes of Chinese Society* and *The Different Classes of the Chinese Peasantry and Their Attitude to the Revolution* (written in 1926) were, as we have pointed out, remote from Marxist positions. Besides, at the time Mao was not interested in studying Marxist-Leninist theory.

At the enlarged Central China Bureau Conference in Ningt'u in 1929 Mao was criticised for not knowing and not understanding Marxism-Leninism. This was, evidently, the consensus of the CPC leadership at the time. Recalling this period many years later, Mao said: "... In our Party... they said that I had not a grain of Marxism, while they were 100 per cent Bolsheviks."

It should be noted that ignorance of foreign languages was widespread among Chinese intellectuals, and the lack of Chinese translations of Western literature limited the outlook of the Chinese Communists, Mao in particular. To this was added traditional nationalism, fostered by the spurious heroics of the past.

The Chinese have always regarded their country as the "Middle Kingdom". This is not surprising. For three thousand years China had no equitable contacts with the rest of the world, much less with developed nations. Even China's powerful neighbours, who were at a lower rung of social development—the Mongol and Manchu invaders—were quickly assimilated. Mao Tse-tung, too, was confident that he was doing the proper thing by playing on the patriotic feeling of his audience. He declared more than once that the "new China, this people's China should resume her rightful place among the nations—first place."<sup>6</sup>

Clearly showing defiance, Mao Tse-tung said in 1957: "Formerly my views were non-Marxist. I appreciated Marxism later. I studied Marxism a little from books and made some progress in ideological re-education, but my re-educat-

tion took place mainly in the course of the long class struggle."

One can take him at his word: he had hardly ever studied the works of Marx seriously. When his views were forming, not many of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin had been translated into the Chinese. Translations of their principal works appeared in China later, in the 1930s-1940s. Did Mao read them? It is hard to say. In any case, he hardly mentioned them in his pronouncements.

Nevertheless, a certain evolution can be traced in Mao Tse-tung's ideological views in the 1930s-1940s—from petty-bourgeois peasant revolutionism to mastery of the elementary principles of Marxism-Leninism. But even then he did not become a Marxist-internationalist in the true meaning of the word, remaining captive to the ideas of China's national rejuvenation.

From the latter half of the 1950s onward, under the impact of the objective difficulties encountered by the CPC in building socialism in an economically backward country and also of Mao's mounting claim to the role of leader of the "world revolution", his views underwent another evolution—towards the total restoration of bourgeois and nationalistic ideas under a veneer of Marxist terminology.

In an early article Mao Tse-tung wrote: "We must absorb whatever we today find useful... However, we must treat these foreign materials as we do our food, which should be chewed in the mouth, submitted to the working of the stomach and intestines, mixed with saliva, gastric juice and intestinal secretions, and then separated into essence to be absorbed and waste matter to be discarded—only thus can food benefit our body; we should never swallow anything raw or absorb uncritically."<sup>7</sup>

Let us leave these "physiological" comparisons to Mao's conscience. We shall take only the substance: what had Mao borrowed from Marxism, and what had he discarded?

He was least of all interested in the theoretical basis of Marxism—dialectical materialism. We shall not find in his writings anything approaching a serious attempt to elaborate on or give a popular exposition of problems of philosophy, natural science, the theory of cognition, logic, and so on. This also concerns his treatment of the theoretical foundations of Marxist political economy. At no time did he use facts and figures to analyse modern capitalism or

the development of capitalism in China. Economics and economic analyses had always been "unexplored territory" for Mao Tse-tung and his followers. They did not even try to seek the linkage of the theory of the class struggle and revolution with the economic laws of social development. Scorn of genuine theory, i.e., of profound knowledge of reality, inevitably brought the CPC leaders to starkly simplified, schematic, and vulgar notions about the problems of the modern world.

Relative to historical materialism, in most of Mao Tse-tung's writings we find two or three favourite subjects: contradictions in society, the role of practice as a criterion of truth, and some others, which we note by analysing his works, are interpreted one-sidedly to an amazing extent.

The theory of socialist construction in China (we have seen this ourselves) was also treated speculatively by Mao, without any analysis of the economic structure of Chinese society. From his writings we do not get the impression that he was fully aware of the existence of the objective laws of transition from capitalism to socialism. On the contrary, he set his mind on wilful, coercive, and administrative methods of reshaping society. This, needless to say, was also mirrored in his characteristic of the ideals of socialism, which he deduced not from the requirements of highly developed social production or from the class interests of the proletariat, the most advanced social force, but from notions about petty-bourgeois egalitarianism.

As long as Mao Tse-tung laid no claim to the role of "leading theorist" of the liberation movement, he borrowed eagerly not only individual ideas but also lengthy extracts from the classics of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, all his writings, even the earliest, show that he never stood firmly on the soil of Marxism. In particular, this concerns questions which Mao endeavoured to work out independently to fit the conditions obtaining in China.

The question of how sincere Mao was when he numbered himself among true or even the "most consistent Marxists" is secondary to us. It remains a fact that he rejected, distorted or juggled with the key propositions and aspects of Marxism-Leninism.

Essentially speaking, he reduced theory to a few postulates: contradictions as the justification for violence in society; guerrilla war and peasant revolution as universal means

of conquering power, the Great Leap, "communisation", and "cultural revolution" strategy as the way to build socialism and communism; war communism and the personal power regime as the embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; inevitability of a world conflict and the unfolding of civil war as the sole road to the world revolution; "intermediate zones" and struggle against the superpowers as the means of uniting the "revolutionary forces" around China.

Was it necessary to apply the general principles of Marxism-Leninism creatively with account of the huge diversity of specific conditions in China? Of course, it was. China has many essential features distinguishing it from European countries and the USA. It has a predominantly petty-bourgeois, peasant population and it has not made any appreciable progress in capitalist development. It is a country with a long, 3,000 years' imperial tradition. Moreover, there is still a tendency to underrate the features of the Chinese people's psychology, which continues to bear a deep imprint of the millennia-long domination of Confucianism and other feudal ideological schools.

An anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution knocked on China's doors in the 1930s-1940s. This should have been reflected in the policy of the Chinese Communists but not in the ideological principles of the Party, if it wanted to remain communist. However, Mao Tse-tung reshaped Marxist-Leninist theory itself in an effort to adapt it for the fulfilment of the various tasks set by the CPC. In fact, this is what he meant when he said that from Marxism "we must absorb whatever we today find useful".

Adapted to the requirements of the day, "Sinicised Marxism" could yield some results only at the early phases of the Chinese revolution, when it was mainly anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. But the closer the country drew to socialist tasks proper, the more pronounced became the one-sidedness and weakness of Maoism, which ignored the accumulated experience of socialist construction. This was what lay behind the Peking leadership's errors at the close of the 1950s: the failure of the attempts to "leap" into communism without seriously trying to build a modern industrial base, promote democracy, and raise the people's living standards. In turn, this failure and the accompanying disenchantment found an ugly outlet in the growth of nationalism, in the

striving to attain great-power aims by means of an adventurist foreign policy.

The "permanent (or continued) revolution" theory underlay Mao Tse-tung's ideology and policies during the "cultural revolution". This theory comprised the background for all the guidelines of the 1960s-1970s, running through all the Party decisions of that period. The 10th Congress of the CPC and China's new Constitution expressed it with the words: "...continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat".

All in all, this theory was the core of Mao Tse-tung's socio-political views. It underlay his approach to the problem of classes, the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the role of the CPC, the "cultural revolution" and, lastly, world politics, war, peace, and revolution. He depicted his ideology and work as Great Revolutionary Activity and himself, naturally, as the Great Revolutionary Transformer of Chinese society and the whole world. Any action and political platform formulated by him was presented from the angle of deepening the "permanent uninterrupted Revolution."<sup>8</sup>

The overthrow of the Kuomintang was Revolution; the agrarian reform was Revolution; the Great Leap was Revolution; "communisation" was Revolution; the "cultural revolution" was Revolution; the split of the communist movement was Revolution; the struggle against the USSR was also part of the "permanent Revolution".

This alone makes it clear that Mao Tse-tung regarded the revolution not as a fundamental social change but as a method of implementing policy: the physical removal of adversaries, repressions, mass insurgent movements, armed provocations along frontiers, vocal campaigns in the media, demonstrations of verbal radicalism.

The "permanent revolution" theory is invariably portrayed by the Maoists as Mao Tse-tung's personal contribution to the development of world revolutionary thought. In many cases this assessment is shared not only by "leftists" of different shades but also by anti-communist analysts of Maoism.

The Maoist "permanent revolution" theory consists of two basic elements: the "continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "unfolding of revolution on the world scene". Its foundation is the



"thought of Mao Tse-tung" on contradictions in nature and in society.

Mao explained the aims of "permanent revolution" in a speech, "60 Points on Methods of Work", delivered in 1958: "Our revolution is like a military campaign: hardly had we won the battle than a new task arose. In this manner a high level of revolutionary enthusiasm can be sustained among cadres and among the masses."

Later, he did not confine himself to references to revolutionary enthusiasm. He advanced the theory that under socialism the class struggle would inevitably continue.

On Mao Tse-tung's recommendation the following thesis was included in Chou En-lai's report ("Report on the Work of the Government") to the first session of the third National People's Congress in 1964 (*Jenmin jihpao*, January 1, 1965): "Contradictions between classes in socialist society persist and the class struggle on no account ceases after the completion of industrialisation and of agricultural co-operation, after the completion of socialist changes in industry, i.e., the abolition of private property in the means of production. Throughout this historical stage the socialist revolution must be consistently continued on the economic, political, and ideological fronts."

Lastly, in the report to the 10th CPC Congress the "teaching of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought on the continuation of the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" was advanced as a primary principle. This was the angle from which the CPC's experience following the 9th Congress was analysed and followed up with the "sensational" exposure of Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta, who, it was alleged, had produced a draft political report "opposed to continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, contending that the main task after the 9th Congress was to develop production".<sup>9</sup>

Mao Tse-tung held that class antagonisms and the class struggle would persevere in society after socialism was built despite the abolition of the exploiting classes. But the classes involved in conflict must be clearly defined. The workers and peasants? The workers and intellectuals? Or the groups in the Party holding different views on various political issues?

This example provides further evidence that Mao Tse-tung was entirely ignorant of the actual social nature of

the revolution, and the character and diversity of its forms at different stages and in different social conditions.

Chou En-lai's report to the 10th CPC Congress contains an eloquent admission that the edge of the class struggle was in fact directed not against the bourgeoisie, but against all opponents, that it was in fact a struggle not between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie but between the Maoists and their adversaries. "Enemies at home and abroad all understand that the easiest way to capture a fortress is from within. It is much more convenient to have the capitalist-roadsters in power who have sneaked into the Party do the job of subverting the dictatorship of the proletariat than for the landlords and capitalists to come to the fore themselves; this is especially true when the landlords and capitalists are already quite odious in society."<sup>10</sup>

This approach to defining a class allows for arbitrariness in identifying a person's class affiliation. Any worker, peasant, engineer, or scientist could be said to be of the bourgeoisie if he did not agree with Mao Tse-tung and his "thought". It was enough for him to state his disaffection with any of the Maoist political or theoretical dicta to be at once bracketed with the bourgeoisie or "capitalist-roadsters". A person's social origin and social status, and the motivation of his disaffection were not taken into account.

In its Maoist interpretation the concept "bourgeoisie" is not a social characteristic but a political phenomenon with, as the developments in China in recent years have shown, no bearing on affiliation to an exploiting class. The subjectiveness of this interpretation justifies any treatment of adversaries.

During the building of socialism the class struggle exists as long as there is a bourgeoisie. But Mao did not analyse the actual problems of the struggle between the working class and the bourgeoisie in China, reducing it to an inner-Party struggle for power and the leadership of the nation.

It was typical of Mao to contrapose the theory of "continued revolution" to the theory of the "development of socialist production". Marxism takes its departure from the reverse, from the tenet that after expropriation is completed the economy is the main area of the continuation of the revolution and the building of socialism, that the economy is the foundation of all other socialist changes. This is of particularly great significance to Chinese society, whose funda-

mental historic task has been and remains the surmounting of age-old economic backwardness and the promotion of production at the level of the latest scientific and technological achievements.

Mao Tse-tung's distorted views about the revolution were disastrous to the approach to the laws of socialist society's development and evolution into communism. "After the period of transition ends," Mao wrote in *Materialistic Dialectics*, "after classes are totally abolished, if one is to speak only of the internal situation in our country, politics will move entirely into the sphere of relations among the people. The ideological struggle, the political struggle, and the revolution will continue; more, they are bound to continue... The transition from socialism to communism is a struggle, a revolution. Entry into communism will be a struggle, a revolution."

Thus, Mao coupled the different stages of socialist and communist construction, particularly the stage of mature socialism and preceding periods. But this contravenes the theory of Marxism and the experience of socialist countries. This experience has shown that the class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat mounts in the period when property is socialised; after the exploiting classes are abolished, this struggle usually subsides.

The actual aim of the "permanent revolution" theory was brought into bold relief by the enormous accent on force. Mao made this a universal law for the settlement of all issues—social, political, economic, and educational. He assumed that force could be used to resolve not only the problem of expropriation, but even purely economic and cultural problems.

From this sprang the Leap theory, which gave Mao no peace. He returned to it again and again, despite all its fiascos. From this also sprang the theory of "explosions and convulsions", to which society had allegedly to be subjected in order to bolster the waning enthusiasm of the masses.

In charting the tactics of the revolutionary working-class movement, Marx, Engels, and Lenin always warned against two extremes: against underestimation of force in the struggle for socialism and against apologia of force. Let us recall how Marx characterised the role of force in the revolution: "Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power."<sup>11</sup>

There is hardly a more exact, explicit, and vivid definition of force in social development. This definition identifies the most important factor determining the posture of the Communists on this question. Here we find recognition of the historical need for force in the struggle for society's revolutionary transformation. Here we find profound understanding that force is the result of pressing economic and social requirements of social progress. Here we find a clear-cut definition of the historical boundaries for the use of force and an assessment of its possibilities.

There is not a shred of Marxism in the attempt always and under all conditions to link with force the hopes for a fundamental restructuring of society and the creation of a new economic and social system that would meet the interests of the working class and all other working people. This is precisely where Mao Tse-tung erred.

Now take the second element of the Maoist theory of "permanent revolution": the proposition on world war and the tactics of the international revolutionary movement.

"Wars should not be feared. If there is a war there will be casualties. The comrades sitting here have seen death. It is not frightening. If out of 600 million people half perish, there will still be 300 million.

"As I see it, the atomic bomb is not more terrible than a big sword. In the Second World War the Soviet Union lost 20 million people and other European countries lost 10 million. The total loss was 30 million. After the Tang and Ming emperors, wars were fought with swords, and 40 million people were killed in these wars.

"If half of mankind dies in a war, this will be of no consequence. It would not be terrible if one-third of the population remains. Within a certain number of years the population will again increase. I spoke of this to Nehru. He disagreed. If a nuclear war does break out, it will not be so bad, because capitalism will perish and eternal peace will reign in the world."

Thus spoke Mao Tse-tung at a CPC conference in 1958. He had just returned from Moscow, where he attended the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (1957). At the meeting he had expounded analogous views, but received no support. On the contrary, his speech generated amazement and protests from the other participants in the meeting, who mapped out a programme of struggle

for peace and socialism. However, upon his return to Peking Mao Tse-tung restated his ideas, appealing to the Chinese Communists.

Do his grotesque arguments about a thermonuclear war and his fiendish arithmetic need comment? What did it matter if two thousand million people burned in a thermonuclear holocaust! Capitalism would perish! It would have been interesting to ask Mao Tse-tung what fate he assigned to numerically small nations, the nations of Europe, the nations of densely populated Asia, to you and me.

But views of this kind were not simply an aberration, the product of Mao's morbid fantasy. He had been developing them doggedly for a long time, and they became one of the canons of the CPC's official ideology.

Mao insistently linked war with revolution. To back up his arguments he referred to history. Indeed, it so happened that Russia dropped out of the imperialist system after World War I, and its example was followed by China and some other countries after World War II. However, do these facts point to some intrinsic law of the maturing of socialist revolutions? Would it be right to say that war is the mandatory source or condition for revolution? This would be wrong, both in theory and in practice. Revolution springs from an explosion of class contradictions in one country or another. As the contradictions of capitalism mount revolutionary situations take shape not only in time of war but also in time of peace. This is demonstrated by the experience of Cuba, and also of Chile and Portugal.

In China the revolution was largely a war between two armies. This was due to the conditions prevailing in that country. But Mao Tse-tung sought to make this a "universal" orientation for the world communist movement, for the entire liberation movement.

When China began producing its own nuclear weapons it was unquestionable that Mao Tse-tung was aware of the consequences of a thermonuclear war. Possibly, for him these theoretical arguments were no more than a cover for a political scenario: to engineer a military collision between the USA and the Soviet Union in the calculation that China would not be involved in the conflict and ultimately become the world's strongest power. For this purpose Mao Tse-tung was prepared to expose the Chinese people themselves to the risk of a world war. To gain his end

he advanced the "intermediate zone" and "superpowers" theories.

"Between the two camps there is an intermediate zone . . . The UN estimates the world's population at 2,700 million, including about 1,000 million in the socialist countries and 400 million in the imperialist camp. The two camps are fighting for the 1,300 million people inhabiting this intermediate zone."

This is an extract from Mao Tse-tung's speech to Chinese students at Moscow State University on November 27, 1957.

We find a new presentation of the "intermediate zone" and "superpowers" theories in a speech delivered at the UN General Assembly on April 11, 1974 by CC Politburo member Teng Hsiao-ping. Like Chou En-lai, he referred to the "instructions and thought of Mao Tse-tung", declaring that the international situation was one of "great disorder under heaven".

"As a result of the emergence of social-imperialism, the socialist camp, which existed for a time after World War II, is no longer in existence. Owing to the law of the uneven development of capitalism, the Western imperialist bloc, too, is disintegrating. Judging from the changes in international relations, the world today actually consists of three parts, or three worlds, that are both interconnected and in contradiction to one another. The United States and the Soviet Union make up the First World. The developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions make up the Third World. The developed countries between the two make up the Second World.

"...The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, are vainly seeking world hegemony. Each in its own way attempts to bring the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America under its control and, at the same time, to bully the developed countries that are not their match in strength. The two superpowers are the biggest international exploiters and oppressors of today. They are the source of a new world war."<sup>12</sup>

Thus, Teng Hsiao-ping declared that the socialist camp was no longer in existence and that China was both a socialist and developing country and that it belonged to the Third World.

This, it will be noted, is a total retailoring of the "intermediate zone" theory. According to Mao Tse-tung's

pronouncements in the 1950s this zone lay between the capitalist and the socialist systems, with China belonging to the latter. Now this zone was placed between the two superpowers: the USSR and the USA. As for China, it moved to the "intermediate zone", not alone but together with France, the FRG, Japan, and other developed capitalist states allegedly interested in resistance to the "hegemony of the superpowers".

What was the character of the "superpowers"? What policy were they pursuing? Was it a policy of peace, of support for the national liberation and working-class movements or a policy oriented on war, on hostility for the revolutionary forces? These questions are ignored in this "theory".

Under this approach every country, regardless of its size and policy, was regarded in only one role: as the representative of its own national interests. Here national interests were interpreted from a non-class angle, and this interpretation was applied both to socialist and capitalist states.

Of course, Marxism denies neither the defence of national interests in the policy of any country nor the division of countries into groups depending on their role and influence in the world, on their ties with other states. But in the world system of international relations there are two basic socio-class systems: socialist and capitalist.

Military-political and economic systems, and also informal coalitions usually interact within socio-class international systems, at the same time independently influencing world politics and the international climate. Moreover, temporary alliances and associations often take shape not on a socio-class but on a special purpose international basis. One of these alliances was the anti-Hitler coalition of countries with different social systems formed to fight fascism.

We are saying this to make it clear that the Marxist interpretation of the system of international relations, an interpretation founded on a class approach, gives sufficient scope for understanding the differentiation between countries, coalitions, and their foreign policies. But this approach has nothing in common with the Maoist "intermediate zone" theory, a theory which flatly denies the cardinal fact that the world is divided into two opposing socio-class systems and takes only the criteria of the national character of the policy of any country as its basis.

The very concept "intermediate zone" does not dovetail with the facts and there is nothing to back it up with as a theory. This zone allegedly consisted of countries with conflicting interests, such as the FRG, France, Britain, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, the African states, the Latin American states, and so on. This is consonant neither with the nature of these countries, nor the character of their foreign policies, nor their actual foreign alliances, contacts, and preferences.

As a matter of fact, the concept of a "conspiracy of two superpowers" has lately been increasingly superseded by the newly invented theory of the "hegemonism" of one of them—the Soviet Union. One might think that anti-Sovietism was the central aim of China's foreign policy. However, for China the attacks on the USSR are not only an aim but also a means. For their part, means are often intermediate aims.

Today the underlying purpose is to obstruct the easing of international tension, aggravate international relations, chiefly the relations between the USSR and the USA, and in this situation bend every effort to give China more leverage in international affairs. It will be recalled that the Chinese leaders began attacking Soviet foreign policy when the USSR was taking steps to consolidate peace and peaceful coexistence and improve relations between countries with different social systems, including the Soviet-American relations.

The "permanent revolution" theory visualised a social war in Chinese society and "convulsions", tension, and ultimately a world war. It was not accidental that Mao Tse-tung said: "Our forte is war, dictatorship."

Lenin's definition of the nature of petty-bourgeois socialist ideology helps one to understand the correlation between Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. He wrote: "Extremely wide sections of the classes that cannot avoid Marxism in formulating their aims had assimilated that doctrine in an extremely one-sided and mutilated fashion. They had learnt by rote certain 'slogans', certain answers to tactical questions, *without having understood* the Marxist criteria for these answers." <sup>13</sup>

It is not hard to see why Mao kept Marxism-Leninism as his ideological banner, why with all his ambitions he did not venture to leave only Maoism on that banner. The



prestige of scientific socialism was much too great among the advanced segments of the CPC, the working class, and the Chinese intelligentsia. Apart from political calculations, there, evidently, was another reason, and it was purely psychological. Deep in his heart, Mao was always uncertain of himself as an ideologue. Had he formally rejected Marxism, there would have been a total vacuum relative to the basic characteristics of the development of China and of the world. One can imagine how absurd would have been any attempt to give Maoist terms to such key concepts of Marxism as socialism, communism, dictatorship of the proletariat, public ownership, imperialism, colonialism, and so forth. This induced Mao to give his own interpretation of customary Marxist categories, concepts, and terms.

This was not new. In the history of ideology and religion there have been many cases where one and the same teaching was given the most contradictory interpretation. A classic instance is the interpretation by the imitators of true Christianity of the famous words, "I came not to send peace, but a sword", which subsequently generated the most reactionary and brutal policies of the Church. Mao's interpretation of Marxism, as we have seen time and again, has much in common with this approach.

How did his nationalistic ideology combine with what he understood as Marxism-Leninism? Chiefly through the identification of the so-called Marxism-Leninism of our epoch with his own person. He could not, of course, offer Chinese nationalism to the world as an international ideology. He, therefore, offered the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as the "lastest and most perfect" word of Marxism-Leninism.

We have seen that at all difficult periods in the history of the CPC, at all the turning points of his own political career Mao Tse-tung grabbed at nationalism as a life-belt or a means of uniting forces against his political opponents in the CPC.

The following is an extremely typical statement. It was made at a sitting of the Supreme State Conference in January 1958.

"The past seven or eight years have shown that new vistas are opening for our nation. The last year has been particularly encouraging . . . Slogans have appeared, for instance, 'overtake England in 15 years in the output of steel

and other key industrial products' and 'more, faster, better, and more economically'... The nation as a whole now has enormous prospects: the pessimists are wrong, there are indeed enormous prospects, not medium or small prospects and, certainly not the absence of prospects. The whole point is the word 'enormous'.

"Our nation is now gradually awakening. As a result, it has been able to crush imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, put socialist reforms into effect, undertake the regulation of the style of work, and begin a struggle against the right-wingers. China is poor and illiterate. Since it is poor it is able to rise and accomplish a revolution, and since it is illiterate it can easily assimilate new ideas. The Western world is rich and literate. There people bathe in luxury, their store of knowledge is much too heavy, and bourgeois ideology is predominant.

"Today the state of our industry is entirely at variance with our position. We are a country with an ancient history, but for the output of steel we cannot rival Belgium: it produces seven million tons, while we produce only 5.2 million tons. The enthusiasm of the masses is very great and inspires us with the confidence that we can overtake Britain in 15 years."

Note the fact that Mao spoke of the nation, of China, of Chinese as in the years of his youth.

"Our nation is awakening." Was this not an answer to the famous words of his favourite hero Napoleon: "China sleeps, let it sleep—there will be misfortune when it awakes"?

"The nation as a whole now has enormous prospects", but where is the class approach, where are the interests of the workers and peasants, where are the internationalist feelings of the Chinese Communists? "The Western world is rich", but why should this evoke irritation and condemnation? What Western world did he mean: the bourgeoisie or the proletariat?

Note something else: this was when Mao began to speak disparagingly of the revolutionary potentialities of the Western countries, more and more frequently attacked the "opportunism" of the working class of capitalist countries, and ran a dividing line between the advanced "revolutionary East" and the "rotten backward West".

In Chengtu (March 5, 1958) he said: "Lenin called Asia advanced and Europe backward. This is true to this day. Europe is backward and Asia is advanced... When we speak of the international situation, we must use the example of China: it holds an important place in the world. Its development illustrates the development of the entire international situation.

"The national liberation movement is spreading in Asian, African, and Latin American countries. There anti-imperialist forces are our allies and not the allies of the imperialists. As Lenin said, we have now outflanked imperialism. Can it be said that today Asia is moving forward, while Europe is lagging behind? Look for yourself. The West is indeed lagging behind. This concerns countries such as Britain, the USA, France, Portugal, Holland, and Belgium. In the long run, who is in front? They or we? Time will show clearly who is advanced."

There is also the point that he brings into confrontation not classes (workers and the bourgeoisie) and not countries with different ideologies (socialist and capitalist), but races and continents—Europe and Asia. Does the fact that to all this he adds the word "revolution" remove the musty nationalistic flavour of this antithesis?

Lastly, during the "cultural revolution" his nationalistic feelings, inflamed by the nationalistic fervour of the *hung-weipings*, reached their pinnacle. Not only "backward Europe", not only the American "paper tiger", but also the socialist Soviet Union was then regarded as a force hostile to China, as "social-imperialism", as a "threat from the North", and he gave orders to reinforce the army, enlarge the militia, manufacture thermonuclear weapons, "dig tunnels, store grain, and prepare for war".

That closed the circle: the "Heavenly Kingdom" was once again encircled by hostile states; true, they were called not barbarous, as before, but "counter-revolutionary", "following the capitalist road", "hegemonistic", "and imperialist". The words were different, but the essence was the same, namely, traditional great-Han chauvinism. Normal at the stage of struggle for national liberation, emphasis on national identity which was, after achieving political independence, nurtured and encouraged in the interests of the ruling Mao group yielded, to use Mao's own words, a poisonous new flower that was trebly dangerous for other

nations and for the socialist consciousness of the Chinese people themselves.

Many bourgeois analysts of Maoism look for direct analogies of the Chinese developments in what took place in China centuries and even millennia ago. They look for an explanation of the savage political struggle and the abortive reforms in modern China in distant, forgotten or half-forgotten traditions. More and more frequently the familiar Kipling refrain that the "East is the East" resounds in their writings. They contend that even when the East borrows something from the West it processes it in such a manner as to give it a new character. Is this true?

It is, of course, true that the history of a nation is like a broad river now flowing serenely, with calm majesty, now foaming and frothing, roaring and sweeping away dams and other obstacles, destroying everything in its path. But though it froths and roars, it is still the same river, the same torrent, which will flow on and on as it enters a new channel.

Nations, including great people like the Chinese with a history of thousands of years, know periods of relative calm and turbulent periods of savage struggle and radical changes. Nonetheless, it cannot be forgotten that all this is the history of one people, a history not fragmented but continuous in its variability, despite all its ups and downs. Even a violent change like the Chinese revolution, which penetrated all facets of the nation's life, cannot be regarded separately from preceding history, from the nation's economic, social, and political development, from cultural traditions and national psychology, from the day-to-day life, morals, and habits of China's millions.

Time was when it seemed to many people that from 1949 onwards China had become similar or almost similar to the other socialist countries: people's power had been established, industry was being nationalised, industrialisation had commenced, the peasants were being united in cooperatives, and Marxism-Leninism had been proclaimed as the official ideology. These people least of all thought of the correlation between the present and the past or of the processes that were evolving latently in externally customary forms.

All this is a fact. But it does not imply that those superficial observers are right in contending that China is returning to its traditional, nationalistic road, that it is hold-

ing aloof from world civilisation. It does not imply that a direct analogy may be drawn between the Oriental mode of production that had persisted in China for many centuries and the nation's present economic structure. It does not imply that China's present political system may be likened to the ancient imperial power. It does not imply that Maoism may be reduced to Confucianism or any other philosophy of China's past, with its rich diversity of schools and orientations of philosophical thought. In short, it does not imply that one should close one's eyes to the opposing currents, which are bound to surface sooner or later, fundamentally, massively, powerfully. Moreover, China's history by no means fits into a simple pattern. A negative attitude to Chinese civilisation is as intolerable as Asian scorn for European or American civilisation.

More than anybody else, we Marxists take to heart the tragedy of the Chinese people, the calamities and sufferings into which they were plunged by the Maoists. Precisely because the interests of the Chinese people, of the Chinese revolution, and the unity of the progressive forces of East and West, North and South are near and dear to us, we remain unbiased in our assessment of that great nation's past. This is what allows preserving, at the cost of an enormous effort, the alliance that has been attained with the progressive and revolutionary segment of the Chinese people, instead of pushing it into the perfidious and increasingly tenacious embrace of the nationalists.

Of course, this does not mean side-tracking an historical analysis of the developments in China. On the contrary, we saw that Mao Tse-tung resurrected, encouraged and reinforced many negative nationalistic, anti-humane, and anti-intellectual traditions that had accumulated among various strata of Chinese society in the past (for instance, the traditions of legalism). Deification of Mao Tse-tung, militarisation of the administration, disdain for the individual and for the nation, and the brutal suppression of all dissidence were easier to plant for they had precedents in the past. It was hard, in fact impossible, to hope that the imperial notions of power, that had been cultivated for thousands of years, would be discarded by the masses within a matter of 25 years.

One of the most prominent proponents of legism, Han Fei-tsu, (c. 280-233 B.C.) criticised Confucianism with as

much vehemence as the Maoists were displaying. Like them, he regarded the absolute power of the ruler as the supreme ideal. He rejected the *jen* principle, asserting that strength and coercion were the foundation of order and wise administration. He wrote:

"Benevolence, sense of duty, reason, and intelligence are not what sustain the state."

"For instance, to desire to govern the people with a magnanimous and gentle policy in a troubled epoch is tantamount to riding a restive horse without bridle or whip."

"One obviously cannot govern with benevolence. Moreover, the people submit unconditionally to force and have short memories of the sense of duty."

"The people submit unconditionally to strength. He who has strength easily subjugates the people."

"Since the people are invariably spoiled by love and only submit to authority, one must always depend on strict punishment. For that reason the enlightened ruler makes his laws stringent and his punishments severe."

"Law, service, the elite, and the commons are the four elements in conflict and indefinable... Therefore, those who insist on benevolence and a sense of duty cannot be extolled, for if they are extolled it will prejudice the conduct of affairs; cultured and scholarly people cannot be employed in administration, for their employment will undermine laws."

"Those who are now engaged in administration cannot resolve the problems of the people, problems that are clear and understandable to the ordinary men and women, but delight in speeches understandable only to the keenest minds. This conflicts with the principles of administration. Therefore, the people do not need refined and mysterious speeches."

"When a wise man rules the state he does not count on good from people. On the contrary, he uses them (in such a manner) as they would do no evil. If he counts on people doing him good, there will be not more than a dozen such people, but if he uses people in such a manner as to prevent them from doing evil, the state may be united... Therefore, a ruler versed in the art of administration does not count (on people) being accidentally good, but moves forward along the road of assured success."

"The enlightened ruler accepts only hard facts, drives out those who cannot be used, does not abide by benevolence and the sense of duty, and does not heed the speeches of scholars."

"Those who do not understand the ways of administration say: 'We want to win the hearts of people.' But... the mind of the people can never be used, just as one cannot use the heart of a child."

"It is apparent that the people do not have enough intelligence to allow one to count only on it. Therefore, to elevate civil servants, to demand that they be wise and clever, and to administer with dependence on the people is to provoke sedition; this is no way to administer."<sup>14</sup>

If these arguments of the legists are compared with the postulates of the Maoists, it will be seen how much they have in common: their reliance on force as the main-spring of power, their rejection of Confucianist benevolent administration, their ideal of absolute personal power, their anti-intellectualism, and their view that the people are a blank sheet of paper. Even Mao's invention that there are contradictions within the nation has its remote prototype in Han Fei-tsu's tenet on conflict between the elite and the common people, between law and service.

To a similar extent the influence of national traditions can be seen in the emergence of the social utopias witnessed in modern China. The idea of the "communes" was drawn directly, of course, from anarchist, pseudo-Marxist sources. But the actual meaning of this idea, the principles for organising communes, the character of the relations in them, the extent of the socialisation of property, the organisation of work and administration, and the relations in the family all have their roots in China's distant past.

The treatise *Li Tsu* contains the following portrayal of an ideal society, *tatung* ("great unity"): "When the great Tao was put into practice, the Heavenly Kingdom belonged to everybody. Wise and capable people were selected to govern the Heavenly Kingdom. Trust and friendliness reigned supreme. People, therefore, regarded as their kin not only their own parents and had paternal feelings not only for their own children. The aged could live out their lives tranquilly, adults found application for their abilities, and children had the possibility of growing up in peace. All

lonely people, widows, orphans, the childless, cripples, and the sick were surrounded with care. Men discharged their duty, women were independent; wealth was not squandered and it was not accumulated in the hands of individuals; the skills of people were used in full and were not made to benefit individuals. Then there were no treachery, lies, intrigues, robbery, theft, and sedition, and people did not lock their doors when they left their homes. This was a *tatung* society" <sup>15</sup>

The Taipings interpreted the ancient *tatung* as a society founded on common property, on equal participation in the distribution of the social product, on the participation of all citizens in the administration of the state. For large segments of the Chinese peasants and, possibly, for many of the *kanpu* the "communes" were associated with the *tatung* society to a larger extent than with what was to them the unfamiliar phalanges of Fourier or the communes set up by the "Left" Communists in the USSR during the initial years after the October Revolution.

We have already noted that when we draw comparisons with the past we should pay special attention to the revolutionary traditions of the peasants rather than to feudal traditions generally. Witness, for instance, the Taiping uprising, that great peasant war that rocked the entire nation for 15 years.

The attempts of the peasant reformers with their gravitation towards levelling and the preservation of monarchist illusions in the sphere of power and administration may be traced not only throughout the nineteenth century, which was punctuated with turbulent, stormy anti-feudal and anti-imperialist risings. To one extent or another these traditions were in evidence throughout China's long history.

There are, of course, precedents for many of the negative phenomena in modern China in the actions of the classes that ruled the country in the remote past. There is little doubt that as they witnessed the outrages committed by the *hungweipings*, who made bonfires of classical Chinese and foreign literature, many enlightened Chinese recalled the barbarous burning of Confucius' books in the reign of the Emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti. It is not to be excluded that as they listened to the hysterical laudation of Mao Tse-tung by the *hungweipings* and as they observed their malicious intolerance of any opposing school of thought,



the Chinese recalled the Confucian dictum: "It is lamentable that teachings deviating from the orthodox are followed." The messiahship of the Maoists, who regard the Chinese revolution and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" as a model for the entire world is reminiscent of China's traditional claim to the role of a civilising force that beneficially influences all neighbouring "barbarians".

Indeed, nobody questions that in China much is specific and linked exclusively with the conditions of its historical development and traditions. However, phenomena are to be observed there which, albeit in different form, have always accompanied the revolutionary movement throughout the world, particularly in backward countries.

Ever since the birth of socialism and communism as a scientific theory, they have been followed, as by a shadow, by what has burgeoned in such ugly form in China. In the nineteenth century this trend was represented by anarchists of the Bakunin type, and at the beginning of the present century by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trotskyites, and other representatives of the so-called "Left" Communism.

Mao Tse-tung, who took pride in the militarisation of labour, might have been reminded of the words spoken by Trotsky at the 9th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks): "In the armed forces there is the relevant apparatus used to compel soldiers to discharge their duties. This should be duplicated in one form or another form in the labour sphere... The mass of the workers... should be transferred, appointed, and dispatched in the same way as soldiers. This is the foundation of the militarisation of labour." Trotsky had something to say about leaps as well: "...Clearly, after we have shed our initial poverty we shall be able to leap across a series of subsequent stages."<sup>16</sup> How amazingly like the arguments of the Peking worshippers of "great leaps"!

It should not be forgotten that in our epoch mankind has witnessed apologia of violence, orgies of nationalistic passions, cult of leaders, and the blood-lust of deceived crowds. Under Mao this followed a new pattern: a great country was turned into a proving ground for ideas of this sort. Its leaders, gaining possession of thermonuclear weapons, played with things like world war. In other words, this was a specific case of the long-familiar social disease of petty-bourgeois behaviour.

## Ideologue or Politician?

Let us give the floor again to Mao Tse-tung. What was his own assessment of himself, his role in new China, and his place in the liberation movement, in the contemporary world as a whole?

At the Party conference in Chengtu on March 9, 1958, he said: "Some people have spoken a great deal about the personality cult... Their own aim was that they should be revered by others. Some people, attacking Lenin, called him a dictator. He replied bluntly: 'Rather than let you be a dictator, I would be one myself'."

Of course, Lenin never said anything of the sort, and no true Communist ever accused him of being a dictator. These words were a product of Mao Tse-tung's morbid imagination. He fabricated them in order to use Lenin's name as a cover for his own dictatorship, without which he could not conceive power.

He reduced the personality cult problem entirely to a matter of a leader's personal qualities. He contended that a cult could be positive if the personality conformed to that exalted status. In fact, he ignored or rejected Lenin's experience of collective leadership under a dictatorship of the proletariat.

In Mao's mind the prestige of the leader spelled out the prestige of the nation.

The following is, perhaps, his most characteristic pronouncement on this point: "China is accustomed to being a slave and, it seems to me, wants to remain a slave. In painting me next to Stalin, Chinese artists have always made me look shorter than Stalin, blindly succumbing to the moral pressure brought to bear by the Soviet Union at the time."

One might think that the essence would have changed if the artists portrayed Mao taller. Mao identified China with himself. It would be hard to find a more pro-cult attitude to one's own self, and it could well rival Louis XIV famous words: "I am the State."

True, Mao Tse-tung was always uncertain of his claims in ideology. He had time and again admitted his poor knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, his inadequate Marxist

education. He had to find an answer. It was the "theory" that the "uneducated are tougher than the educated", that new schools of ideology had always been founded by not very scholarly people.

At the Chengtu Conference he declared: "Beginning with ancient times the creators of new ideals, the founders of new philosophical schools have been young people who never shone with scholarship. When Confucius began his career he was 23. What knowledge did Jesus have? Sakyamuni was 19 when he founded Buddhism. He acquired his knowledge later. What were Sun Yat-sen's claims to knowledge? He only had a secondary school education. Marx was very young when he started out to evolve dialectical materialism. He also developed his knowledge later. When he wrote the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* he was no more than 30, but he established a school. When he began writing his books he was only a little over 20. He criticised many of his contemporary bourgeois scholars, for instance, Ricardo, Adam Smith, and others. From history we know that people with little education always overthrow those who were more educated."

In support of his argument he listed innumerable examples from the history of China and other countries.

We find no need to contest this panegyric in favour of unlettered people. We find no need to recall that early in life Karl Marx wrote fundamental works such as *The Holy Family*, *The German Ideology*, and *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law*.

Can one generally place this argument on a serious plane? We shall permit ourselves to remain convinced that education is useful, particularly when it is a matter of founding new schools of philosophy.

What interests us is that behind the façade of these arguments we see a man who with no shread of embarrassment nominated his own person for the role of an international-class Marxist theorist. The fact that his Marxist education was not thorough was no hindrance. He had talent, intuition, and extensive experience of heading the revolutionary movement in a great country, a movement that led to the triumph of the people's revolution. Consequently, he had every reason for expecting to be hailed as the principal ideologue of international communism.

He no longer made a secret of his claims to be ranked with Karl Marx. More, he found that in this comparison he had some advantages, since Marx did not head a socialist revolution.

Let us hear Mao Tse-tung state his own case. The following is his pronouncement on the subject we are interested in taken from speeches at the second session of the 8th CPC Congress on May 3 and 17, 1958:

"There is another fear—fear of proletarian scholarship, fear of Marx... In our practice we have surpassed Marx. Practice gives birth to truth, to theory.

"Moreover, we should not forget a survival like self-humiliation and self-abasement. For more than a hundred years we Chinese have tolerated oppression by the imperialists. The imperialists impressed upon the Chinese that they had to obey foreigners. The feudal lords taught them to obey Confucius. 'Negation of what is sacred is an infraction of the law,' the Confucianists maintained, in other words, any criticism of the saints is a breach of the 'constitution'.

"... Ever since antiquity it has been observed that in their youth great scholars and inventors were despised, oppressed, ill-educated. Then they acquired learning.

"... Many examples could be given of young people unseating old, of people with a poor education besting scholars.

"... Confucius could not at the beginning boast of his status in society. He was 'young and poor and, therefore, engaged in all sorts of lowly work.'

"Marx evolved Marxism not in his mature years, not at an elderly age, but in his youth.

"... Lenin lived from 1871 to 1923,<sup>1</sup> dying at the age of 52. If one subtracts 20 years, he evolved Bolshevism-Leninism when he was 30.

"... It is said that luminal was developed not by a scientist but by a druggist working in a small German pharmacy.

"The inventor of mould—penicillin—was a dyer, not a doctor or a professor.

"... I have given you these many examples in order to show that it is not necessary to fear scholars, to fear authorities...

"Thus, today we spoke of the uprooting of prejudices, showing that people should not tremble before scholars, that they need not tremble before Marx.

"My toast to you now (he raised a glass of tea and pretended he was drinking wine) is that we should not have an inferiority complex, that we should not underrate our possibilities."

The reader can judge for himself the content, style, tone, and personal claims of Mao Tse-tung, and, lastly, his understanding of China's destiny. The Chinese revolution surpassed all previous revolutions. China was becoming the centre of the revolutionary world. What about Mao Tse-tung himself? Although he did not rate himself among educated Marxists, but having headed the greatest revolution he believed he had all grounds for laying claim to an historical place alongside Marx and Lenin, to charting a programme for the most rapid transition to communism.

An inferiority complex is, of course, not only humiliating but also wrong. Chinese civilisation, like the whole of Asian civilisation, is a peer of European civilisation. The Chinese people can be proud of many achievements—both of the past and of the present. Its contribution to the world culture is well known. This also concerns the Chinese revolution. It was none other than the Soviet Communists who always noted the historic significance of the revolution in China and felt that it would have an immense international impact, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

But this by no means implies that Asia is "advanced" or that Europe is increasingly more "backward", that the common international achievements of all revolutionary nations, of all the socialist countries, should be rejected, or that the first socialist country, the Soviet Union, should be slighted, as Mao Tse-tung did. The inferiority complex should be surmounted, but it should not be superseded by megalomania. Yet this was exactly what happened to Mao Tse-tung.

From one decade to another his pretensions grew in geometrical progression. In his report to the sixth plenum of the Central Committee in October 1938 he declared that Marxism should be Sinicised, saying that it had to be given specific "national form".

On its own merits this was a gigantic project. To adapt a teaching that sprang up in developed capitalist society, in Western civilisation, to a civilisation of an entirely different kind, to an economically undeveloped country that wanted to leap from feudalism and Oriental despotism to

the pinnacle of human civilisation, to communism, was a task requiring everything that a brilliant scientific and political mind could give it. Had Mao Tse-tung fulfilled just this one task he would have been worthy of reverence from the entire undeveloped world and the whole of mankind (indeed, this task is beyond the ability of the most brilliant mind. It can only be fulfilled by the concerted intellectual effort of China and all the other developing regions of the world). Mao Tse-tung failed to cope with this task. The summit of power is not the same as the summit of scientific thought. As we have seen, the Great Leap, the "communes", and the "cultural revolution" did not reflect China's specific requirements. Long before Mao Tse-tung, the "leaps" and "communes" lived in the minds of the "Left" Communists, while convulsions of the "cultural revolution" type had been preached by the anarchists and the Trotskyites. What national form of Marxism was there to speak of? In the long run Mao Tse-tung selected the most banal alternative for China's development: its conversion into a major military power possessing thermonuclear weapons. What was specifically Chinese about this? And what did this have to do with a scientific teaching and society's transformations along the principles of socialism and communism? Any great-power thinking unrelated to any ideology could have arrived at this simple solution.

In the 1960s-1970s Mao Tse-tung saw himself in a new role. This was the role of spiritual leader of all modern mankind. Three thousand million copies of his "little red book of quotations" had been printed in foreign languages by 1966. In the foreword we read: "The thought of Mao Tse-tung is the Marxism-Leninism of the epoch of imperialism's global downfall and the triumph of socialism throughout the world." The 9th Congress officially endorsed this towering status of the CPC Chairman. His "thought" was proclaimed the pinnacle of scientific thinking, of Marxism-Leninism of the modern epoch, while he himself was proclaimed the teacher of all nations, the chief and essentially sole Marxist theorist of the entire world communist movement.<sup>2</sup>

The "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was neither more nor less than "a great leap... marking the entry of Marxism-Leninism into an entirely new stage, the stage of the thought of Mao Tse-tung".

Teacher of mankind . . . Neither Confucius, nor Gautama Buddha, nor Jesus, nor Karl Marx ever thought of himself in this role. Here, nonetheless, it was . . . a befitting role for a simple peasant's son who secretly saw himself as a new Liu Pang, a new Napoleon, a new Bismarck! Never mind if this role was so far only recognised by Mao Tse-tung's myrmidons in China. But it had been proclaimed for all the world to hear!

For our part, we shall try to sum up our impressions of Mao Tse-tung as an ideologue and politician. He once said: "We should combine Karl Marx with Chin Shih Huang Ti."<sup>3</sup> These words, I would say, give us our guide for conclusions about this ideological and political leader of China.

Was Mao Tse-tung an ideologue, an original thinker, or a pragmatic politician, who used ideology to justify his political actions? This is not a simple question, and the answer to it is not simple, either. However, it is beyond dispute that in Mao Tse-tung the politician transcended the ideologue. His military and political career comprised the basis of his character, his interests, his own system of values, and his priorities in life.

Nevertheless, his work in ideology was just as real as his political activities. Regardless of our assessments it was a powerful factor in the life and ideology of Chinese society, an overwhelming element of the nation's political system.

We have already mentioned that we must differentiate between ideology as a system of views, a theory, a school of philosophical thought, a system of values, and ideology as part of the political regime. In the latter sense it would be hard to overestimate the significance of Maoism in modern China.

But we are interested in whether Mao Tse-tung was an independent and original ideologue, theorist, and thinker.

His role as a politician stems from his long leadership of the CPC and then of the country. But did he play a comparable role as an ideologue? At the back of this question lies not our desire to have a better understanding of this complex and manifold personality. It is also motivated by the need to foresee what influence Maoism will have in the future.

We are inclined to believe that despite Mao Tse-tung's immense efforts and his extraordinary pretensions, he was neither a major theorist nor ideologue, much less a great social philosopher. The point is not only that all his "thought"

was politicised to the utmost and most closely linked with pressing issues. And it is not only that his theoretical work held a subordinate place, or even that his level of culture and knowledge left much to be desired.

Apart from its purely political aims, Mao Tse-tung's theoretical work was a more or less conscientious attempt to apply to Chinese reality various ideas borrowed from Marxism, anarchism, Trotskyism, and so forth. Western ideas were interpreted in the spirit of specifically Chinese theories, beliefs, creeds, and traditions. The class struggle, dictatorship of the proletariat, contradictions, criteria of practice, Great Leap, "communes", "cultural revolution", and "intermediate zones" were all drawn from Marxist, anarchist, Trotskyite, or other theories. With perhaps the exception of "intermediate zones", all the above notions have their terminological analogues in Marxism, semi-Marxism, or fringe Marxism. But Mao Tse-tung interpreted all these ideas in his own way, superimposing them on the psychology and culture of the masses, in whose consciousness specifically Chinese traditions live to this day.

As an ideologue, Mao Tse-tung was contradictory to a bewildering extent.

We shall take the liberty of asserting that in this field he was confused, uncertain, inconsistent, subject to constant vacillation and, in the modern sense of the word, poorly educated. He gave the impression of walking on thin ice—one step forward, two steps back; two steps forward, one step back. After proclaiming a postulate, he would turn it into a political guideline, hasten to put it into effect, and then quickly back down as soon as it appeared that it fell short of the desired result, that it was rejected by the majority in the Party, that it was unacceptable to the people, that it was bringing down production and prejudicing the nation's or his own prestige. We have already observed these vacillations in his approach to various questions of the economic, political, or social theory and practice of the CPC.

We have seen the enormous amplitude of his vacillation in his approach to the economy of socialism, particularly the role of commodity production, and in his assessment of the significance of the Soviet experience to China.

We have seen the same pattern in the foundations of his world outlook. One gets the impression that he vacillated even in the question of Marxism's suitability in China. He



was not clear about the correlation between the significance of Marxism and various Chinese schools of theoretical thought. He returned sporadically to the question of the significance of national traditions to China, or various classical works for the education of the Chinese Communists and the people as a whole. This vacillation was also reflected in his formulations of key propositions concerning the Party's ideological foundations.

We remember that the "thought of Mao Tse-tung" was proclaimed as one of these foundations at the 7th Congress of the CPC; at the 8th Congress this proposition was replaced with the earlier declaration that Marxism-Leninism was the ideological foundation; at the 9th Congress Maoism was again proclaimed the theoretical foundation of the CPC; lastly, at the 10th Congress it was proclaimed that this foundation was the symbiosis "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought". These vacillations were mirrored not only in the inner-Party struggle but also in Mao's own lack of confidence.

His constant ideological vacillation was seen most strikingly in his practical actions. Was he sure about what the power structure in China, the mechanism of administration, and the forms and methods of planning and leadership should be like? At the outset of the "cultural revolution" it seemed that its architects were out to replace existing institutions of the political system with new institutions. Distrust was expressed for all representative forms of administration, and also for the Party, the state apparatus, and public organisations. The army alone remained above institutional criticism. What new institutions were to be set up? There was no certainty. A quest was on with indefinite aims reminiscent of a man diving into a river and not knowing what bank to swim to.

People who met Mao Tse-tung also write of this odd inconstancy. At the beginning of a conversation one got the impression that he was sounding out his interlocutor. But when the latter raised strong objections, Mao Tse-tung would at once agree and say that perhaps he himself had been wrong. This is mentioned by Vladimirov, Snow, and other people who observed Mao Tse-tung at close quarters.

Mao Tse-tung concealed his inner vacillation with compelling and mandatory slogans for the people: "The commune is a good thing!", "Ten years of hard work and 10,000

years of happiness!", "Rebellion is righteous!", "The atomic bomb is a paper tiger!", "Bombard the headquarters!", "Convulsion is a law of life!", These and other slogans were blueprinted to give the impression that the ideological and political leadership was firm, confident, and strong. But with the passage of time people realised that the outward form was inconsistent with the inner content, which was unstable, flabby, and unspecific.

Mao Tse-tung sought justification for his uncertainty, for the instability of his thinking. He said: "Marx, too, made many mistakes. Day after day he expected a revolution in Europe, but he waited in vain, for no revolution took place in his lifetime . . . Lenin, too, said that the situation had matured for a world revolution, but that revolution was never accomplished . . . Marx was at first opposed to the Paris Commune . . . Should he have been executed for this? . . . We have suffered only a partial setback when we started the wind of communism, but this was a lesson for the people and the entire country."

Mao Tse-tung's individual experience was the mainspring of the psychological premises of many of the ideological and political campaigns orchestrated by him. Throughout his life the village community was his ideal. With it were linked his memories of his childhood and youth. Also, and above all, he idealised the army, to which he owed his political career. He was deeply attached to the customs, lifestyle, and relationships exemplified by the army.

This is further confirmation of what we have said—Mao Tse-tung was first and foremost a politician, then a soldier, and lastly an ideologue. Emotion always got the better of sober thinking. As a result, there was failure after failure. Neither the "communes" nor the "cultural revolution" ended bureaucratic practices or the distinctions in the political and social status of Party, government, and military cadres of different levels, or led to the attainment of the ideals of an army-type war communism, to which Mao hoped to return. The country had changed, the times were different, and the tasks differed from those of the Yen-an period or the period of the civil war.

At this stage China could not be led by a man who offered no programme for ending the nation's backwardness. Chiang Kai-shek's downfall was due not so much to military reasons (the weakness of the army, the corruption or inept-

ness of its leadership) as to socio-political reasons: his reactionary government gave the people no programme of economic and social reforms for turning China into a developed industrial nation.

As early as the 1930s Mao Tse-tung knew that he would succeed as a political leader only if he was also accepted as an outstanding ideologue able to chart the road for China's economic and social rejuvenation. Even when his projects proved to be false or ineffective (Great Leap, "communes", "cultural revolution"), their overall outward orientation on surmounting age-old backwardness and winning a new image for China brought him the indulgence of the masses in China: the fact that the means were inadequate, ineffective, and even inhuman was justified by the majesty of the ideas behind them.

In the eyes of millions of Chinese a person endeavouring to revive the lost "golden age", to build a commune analogous to the ideal ancient Tatung society, perhaps, merited respect even if his efforts were futile. In the long run, perhaps, the blame must be imputed to his inept assistants and the entire mass of the people who did not distinctly understand the brilliant designs of the "great helmsman", teacher, and leader? The sheet of paper on which the most beautiful characters could be written proved to be not totally blank after all. The human material was inadequately prepared to accept and carry out the great projects of the great personality.

What type of political leader was Mao Tse-tung?

His place in history is determined by the peculiarities of the revolutionary movement in backward countries, where the workers had still to become a class and society's leading force, where long-standing traditions of imperial power were still alive. In other words, this is a special case.

The rise of a leader of this type can hardly be regarded as fortuitous. In the nineteenth century Marx and Engels wrote of petty-bourgeois leaders of this type who joined the communist movement. We have mentioned Bakunin and Trotsky, who typified petty-bourgeois leaders.

Force and a leader cult have always been a hallmark of "also-socialism" schools, regardless of whether they were called anarchism, Trotskyism, or some other "ism". The proponents of these schools saw force as the only instrument, even for the solution of purely economic problems.

Absolute force required absolute power, a leader cult, a dictator vested with absolute authority. That was why personal ambitions were so prominent in the views of Bakunin, Trotsky, and other petty-bourgeois spokesmen. Engels wrote of Bakunin's efforts to subordinate the proletarian movement to his inflated vanity and egoistic aims. On the pretext of winning supremacy for the working class, these people, Engels noted, sought to make themselves supreme.

In the case of Trotsky, his megalomania is comparable only to that of some of his present deliberate or unwitting followers.

But even here we have no intention of drawing parallels.

A leader of the Mao Tse-tung kind could be called in his honour a Maoist type of modern leader. It is not to be ruled out that the liberation movement in other parts of the undeveloped world may produce other leaders of this kind. To paraphrase Mao Tse-tung's above pronouncement, it may be said that he epitomises not a combination of Karl Marx and Chin Shih Huang Ti, but rather of the latter and Trotsky.

## Solitude

The newsreels taken at the mass rallies in Peking during the "cultural revolution" and shortly before Mao Tse-tung's demise, in the period between the 9th and 10th congresses of the CPC show us an old, very old and ailing man. He could scarcely drag his feet. Usually, he walked with helpers on either side. When he had to turn his head, he slowly turned his whole body like an old and battered battleship. His hand, as he stretched it out, was cold and lifeless. Today even the Peking photographers are embarrassed to show the pictures of the Chairman swimming across the Yangtze—nobody believes them.

True, in the official photographs in books about the 9th and 10th congresses of the CPC we see a young, pink-cheeked, successful Mao Tse-tung with the famous mole on his face, which according to Chinese superstition, symbolises a happy fortune. These same photographs underscored sad reality—they were such a far cry from the actual image of the Chairman, who now and again showed up at conferences, a Party congress, or a meeting with foreigners.

As the Chinese gazed at this helpless grandeur, they, perhaps, remembered the words of another peasant's son, of the great mocker Yang Chu (fourth-fifth century B.C.): "A hundred years is the limit of the human life expectancy. Of a thousand people hardly one reaches the age of 100. Let us assume, however, that there is such a person. But his childhood in the embrace of his mother and his senile years occupy almost half of this (term). Nightly oblivion in sleep and idly spent waking hours take another half (of the remaining years). Illness and suffering, sorrow and grief, disability and loss, and anxiety and fear take another half of this. The remaining less than ten years likewise (do not give) even a single moment when a person is kind and happy, satisfied and carefree—and that is all!

"In this case, what is the purpose of human life, what happiness does it bring?... People fuss, vie for hollow, transient glory, and count on unneeded honours after death... Life is what makes all things different. But death reduces them to a common denominator. In life there is a distinction between intelligence and stupidity, between the noble and the commoner. In death there is identity—an identity of stench and decay, disappearance, extinction."

But in China few people heeded the derision of Yang Chu, particularly those who acquired the sweet burden of supreme power in that vast country with its huge population. Mao Tse-tung was no exception to this rule. Weak in body, he was in his old age driven by a lust for activity, by a thirst for being constantly in the focus of the Chinese and of the peoples of other countries and continents. He never tired of breaking the peace of Chinese society, of weaving his subtle webs. One after another his former associates and friends were caught in them: Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta, and others.

Edgar Snow was, perhaps, right when in the 1930s he called him a "strong man with a charmed life". As a matter of fact, Snow had occasion to reconsider his enthusiastic appraisal of that period of his youth. He met with Mao Tse-tung in 1960 and in 1971. His main impression of these meetings was about the countless attributes of Mao's deification, of his investment with prerogatives of power unequalled by anybody in and outside China.

It would be instructive to compare the reflections of the young Snow about the 40-year-old Mao Tse-tung, whom

Snow called the "saviour of China", with the observations of the mature Snow of the 78-year-old Mao. Here is what Snow wrote at the time:

"The cult built around Mao is also no new phenomenon. Chiang (Kai-shek.—*F. B.*) made a fair start toward self-deification; before him there was the Sun Yat-sen cult, and before Sun there were the emperors and emperor worship. Nations which for centuries have been ruled by authoritarianism may cast aside one skin and pick up another but they do not change chromosomes, genes, and bodies in a generation or two.

"Today's image of Mao among the masses is hardly that of an executioner. What makes him formidable is that he is not just a party boss but by many millions of Chinese is quite genuinely regarded as a teacher, statesman, strategist, philosopher, poet, laureate, national hero, head of a family, and greatest liberator in history. He is to them Confucius plus Lao-tzu plus Rousseau plus Marx plus Buddha.

"... It is to any Westerner nauseating in the same degree. No public building, no commune, no factory or girls' dormitory is complete without its solemn statue or plaster bust of the man with the mole on his chin. They are as much a part of the furniture in any reception room as the inevitable green tablecloth and bowls of boiling tea."<sup>2</sup>

And further: "The value of a state father image in the 'democratic dictatorship' is clearly recognised by the Chinese Party. With the break-up of large families as a result of industrialisation of both town and country, as well as the replacement of family paternalism by party paternalism, the mantle of national patriarch would inevitably have descended on the shoulders of any leader in a country not far removed from ancestor worship and emperor worship. Mao has now become an Institution of such prestige and authority that no one in the party could raze it without sacrificing a collective vested interest of first importance. Probably, no one knows that better than Mao himself."<sup>3</sup>

What we thus observe is not a "strong man with a charmed life" nor the "saviour of China", as Snow wrote in the 1930s, but the inevitable continuity of the historical traditions of imperial power. Mao dressed himself in the mantle worn by the emperors and the dogma setters of the Chinese nation, despite the personality cult being nauseating to Westerners. To Snow's credit it may be noted that at his

meeting with Mao Tse-tung in 1971 he had the courage of bluntly stating his opinion about the monstrous, caricature forms assumed by the Mao cult.

Relative to the condescending attitude of many Western intellectuals to the deification of Mao Tse-tung, which they attribute to imperial traditions of power in China, this condescension is a sort of racial snobbism on the part of spokesmen of Western civilisation, for it implies that conventional standards are inapplicable to Eastern peoples. Is the continuation of the tradition of imperial power all that springs from the history of China? Why has Japan, China's neighbour, rejected this tradition?

Snow is quite wrong: the mainspring of the "magic power" was definitely not the personality of Mao Tse-tung.

The nature of this worship has been known through the ages. People worship the puissance of those who govern them, of those who have the power of killing them, tear their near ones away from them, destroy their homes, and appropriate their chattels. Men of this calibre strike fear and respect in them. From this sense of helplessness and exposure to the whims of stronger forces sprang religion, the cult of animals and gods. A god has to be propitiated with submission, flattery, homage. Worship of a man who has assumed supreme power is also a kind of religion that may outlive this power or die with his death. Recall the cult of Chiang Kai-shek, which was hardly different from the cult of Mao. Portraits of Chiang Kai-shek were to be found in almost every Chinese home, and many Chinese began their day with homage to these portraits. Yet the cult of Chiang collapsed within a few months during the Chinese revolution of 1949. This was history's stern warning to those who hope to become lasting symbols of China's national greatness.

"A friend tells us that we 'love greatness and rejoice in accomplishments, strive for merit and pursue immediate benefit, underrate the past and believe blindly in the future'. There is some truth in these words. When we say that we 'love greatness and rejoice in accomplishments' we must distinguish what 'greatness we love' and in what 'accomplishments we rejoice'." Is the person "who loves greatness and rejoices in accomplishments" a reactionary or a revolutionary?

"When we declare that we 'strive for merit and pursue immediate benefit' we must define what merits we want—

personal merit and benefit or those dictated by reality, for the sake of common achievement. As for 'underrating the past', if we do not underrate the past we shall not go far... The past should not be overrated, but it cannot be entirely rejected," so spoke Mao at sittings of the Supreme State Conference on January 28 and 30, 1958.

Note the passion of his words! His opponents had, evidently, cut him to the quick. The point is did he mean "some of the truth" or the whole truth?

He demanded a "heroic spirit" so that he and others would see him with the halo of "conqueror of heaven and earth". Europeans who visited Chinese theatres spoke with disgust of the Mao image on the stage, where he was presented virtually as a deity, and quote the words of an old Uigur, who, shaking hands with Mao Tse-tung, said that formerly people said "May god bless you!", and now say "May Chairman Mao bless you!"

This same "heroic spirit" prompted Mao to demonstrate unfading physical vigour: on July 16, 1966, at the age of 71, he allegedly swam nine miles in the Yangtze in the record time of 65 minutes. Chinese journalists reported that in that time Mao stopped to teach a young woman his swimming style.

True, Western analysts believe that the Chinese filmed an understudy of Mao: It is believed that the documentary showing this "feat" falsified both the distance and the time.

But this is the most innocuous aspect of Mao's "heroic spirit". This "heroic spirit" was of a totally different order where it concerned state policy, where it was multiplied by nationalism, which was the most characteristic feature of Mao's spiritual make-up, a feature that remained with him all his life—he associated nationalism with ideas about rejuvenating China's greatness.

Superimposed on this was Mao's cruelty (which we observed throughout his career). It was a cruelty that did not fit into the usual sense of the word. It was not a cruelty that manifests itself in readiness to do evil to fellow-men, to commit murder. It was, we would say, a specifically imperial cruelty, the cruelty of fuhrerism, prepared to sacrifice the lives of millions for the sake of specious ideas that were of no value to the world.

At a sitting of the CPC Central Committee in November 1956 Mao said:



"Chin Shih Huang Ti buried alive only 460 scholars, but we exiled 46,000 people. We are suppressing counter-revolutionaries, but have we not also killed some counter-revolutionary scholars? I have discussed this question with champions of democracy. They call us modern Chin Shih Huang Tis. But this is wrong. We are a hundred times better than Chin Shih Huang Ti. They brand us as Chin Shih Huang Tis and dictators. We acknowledge this. It is sad that they did not finish what they were saying and that they always need us to do that for them."

Sad because then it would be easier to deal with them. Obviously, Mao justified his actions by the greatness of his aims. But these aims only existed in his mind, while the means affected the lives of millions of people.

Mao once told Wang Ming that the greatness of a historical personality was measured by the amount of blood shed by him. We are inclined to believe that this was not a casual observation but Mao's deep conviction. Only in this case can one understand his worship of personalities like Napoleon, Bismarck, Liu Pang, and Chin Shih Huang Ti. Although these personalities each had his own historical role and character, for Mao they were the supreme models of generals and rulers, who did not squeeze themselves into the framework of morals and were capable of any cruelty if it enabled them to attain their objectives.

A Western work contains a table of victims of the Maoist regime.<sup>4</sup>

According to this table, more than 1,500,000 people died during the Chinese people's just struggle for national and social liberation. This was the price paid by them for their inalienable right to independence, national unity, freedom, and socialism. But they suffered immeasurably greater losses when Mao Tse-tung put his "thought" to practice: one or two million lives during the period of the Great Leap and "people's communes"; half a million (or a million) during the campaign against ethnic minorities; a quarter (or half) a million during the "cultural revolution"; 15 (or 25) million died in the "re-education schools" (not more than several thousand were killed in border incidents). In other words, Mao Tse-tung's "heroic spirit" cost the Chinese people approximately 17 million (other estimates place the figure at 29 million) lives. This was many times more than the inevitable losses in the Chinese revolution. Moreover,

loss of life of this magnitude has no parallel in the history of China, which records innumerable devastating internecine wars.

Mao Tse-tung lived to the age of 83. His intellectual powers fell short of the dimensions, difficulties, and majesty of the tasks confronting the nation.

All the greater were the reasons for concealing this in order to avoid any suspicion of his incompetence, of his inability to cope with the growing demands of the times. All the greater were the reasons for crushing and repressing any display of intellectual superiority on the part of his former associates, writers, scholars, and statesmen. The unlimited possibilities opened up by ideological domination inevitably limit, to a growing extent, the intellectual potential of the person claiming to be the intellectual leader of a nation. The oppressive sense of inferiority, inadequacy, and deficiency finds an outlet in irritation, animosity, and hate.

This very old man, who had in his lifetime become a myth worshipped as "the wisest, greatest, and reddest sun", probably, had a bitter sense of the incompatibility of his inordinately bloated shadow. This was a sense of solitude on an Olympus that had no room for anything living, a sense of burning disappointment over hopes that remained unattained.

His dream of an economic leap that would move China into the status of the world's most developed nation did not come true. Held in the vice of the Maoist political regime, the nation lagged increasingly behind the industrialised nations of the world, socialist and capitalist. A misguided socio-economic orientation doomed China to remaining for many decades a nation with an undeveloped economic and social structure.

China continued to be one of the poorest nations of the world. The per capita gross national product equalled \$100, while in neighbouring Japan it was more than \$1,200. According to the most optimistic estimates, by the year 2000 China's per capita GNP will remain among the lowest in the world—roughly \$300 with a population of between 1,100 million and 1,300 million. In Japan it is expected to rise to \$5,000.<sup>5</sup>

Needless to say, the Chinese economy is not at a standstill. But if the present socio-economic orientation is maintained,

even a 10 per cent annual industrial growth rate will not stop (according to the most optimistic forecasts) the steadily widening gap between China and the industrialised powers, and it will hardly allow China to narrow it in the foreseeable future.<sup>6</sup>

Mao once said: "I shall go to meet Marx only when we overtake the United States." Strange words. They combine continued hopes for an economic miracle in China, pretensions to personal greatness, and a secret sense of inescapable defeat.

The dream of a leap into communism that would make China the socially most developed nation in the world did not come true. The natural requirements of economic growth erode artificially imposed pseudo-communist forms. The supreme achievement of the people's revolution—the nation's socialist rejuvenation—was imperilled by the orientation on China's isolation from other socialist countries, on a rupture of the alliances that reinforced its independence in the present differentiated world, on the creation of a closed society standing aloof from modern civilisation.

The dream of China's intellectual superiority as the source of ideas revolutionising the world did not come true. The Maoist ideological regime led cultural life in China itself into decline, while Maoism was rejected by the world communist movement; it was not accepted as the guiding doctrine by any major contingent of the national liberation movement, by any developed nation.

It is not hard to foretell the collapse of Mao Tse-tung's last dream of military superiority. China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964 and its first hydrogen bomb in 1967, and in 1970 it placed in orbit an earth satellite weighing 170 kilos. Throughout this period China worked feverishly to develop its own thermonuclear weapons and missiles, but even this frantic race, this last stake of Mao Tse-tung on greatness, cannot close the enormous gap between China's military strength and the military-industrial capability of the economically developed powers.

What then has remained? The glorification and deification of Mao Tse-tung, the countless plaster busts and portraits throughout the land, the song that opens the daily programme of Radio Peking: *In a Stormy Sea There Must Be a Helmsman*.

Is this much? Will it last long?

## PART FOUR

# Burden of Succession

Mao Tse-tung died at 00.10 hours on September 9, 1976. His death was not unexpected. He had not been seen in public for more than three months. In the latter half of the day it was announced officially and mourning had begun. It lasted nine days, ending on September 18 in Tienanmen Square in front of the imperial residence.

The entire nation held its breath. Mao Tse-tung had led the Communist Party of China for 40 years, and for more than 25 years that Party had ruled the country. These were among the most painful and dramatic years of China's history. The war against Japan, the great people's revolution, the agrarian reform, the first socialist transformations, and then the sudden swerve—the Great Leap, “communisation”, and the “cultural revolution”. All these developments, with their ups and downs, were associated with and bore the indelible brand of Mao Tse-tung.

Whatever assessment is made of Mao's role, it is unquestionable that his death stirred great hopes and expectations of change. First and foremost, there were the hopes of the Chinese Communists and the ordinary people. They had every justification to expect that with Mao gone the way of all flesh the nation would at last have a respite from the interminable fever and enter a normal channel of development, that the conditions would be created for its all-round progress.

The change of leadership generated some expectations throughout the world: China's friends still remembered the

good days of close alliance with it. China's leaders had the rare chance of closing one of the nation's most bitter chapters and meeting the people's ardent desire for a turn to a sensible socialist policy of economic advancement, public welfare, peace, and good-neighbourliness.

Are these hopes destined to come true? It is still too early for final conclusions. What are a few years compared with 15 years of upheaval? But enough has happened to form some idea of the struggle over the political and ideological heritage of Mao Tse-tung and to articulate new apprehensions.

On October 9, 1976 the CPC Central Committee passed a decision, which was published soon afterwards, to erect a memorial building—"Monument to the Everlasting Glory of the Great Leader and Teacher Chairman Mao Tse-tung"—and to publish the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung. Moreover, it was planned to publish a complete collection of his works. This project was assigned to Hua Kuo-feng. At the burial of Mao Tse-tung on September 17 Hua Kuo-feng declared that the nation would remain faithful to the thought and policies of Mao and that the entire Party and people were uniting around the Party leadership. But instead of uniting Mao's successors, his death aggravated the political struggle.

As early as October 13 a ranking CPC official told a foreigner in Peking that Chiang Ching and over 30 of her supporters had been taken into custody by Hua Kuo-feng's guards while they were in secret conference with the aim of seizing power in China and appointing Chiang Ching to the Party chairmanship.

Official announcements soon followed that the "gang of four"—Chang Chun-tsiao, Wang Hung-wen, Chiang Ching, and Yao Wen-yuan—had been plotting to seize power and establish a "fascist dictatorship".

Was there indeed a conspiracy in favour of the late CPC Chairman's widow, and if there was what form did it take? Foreign media were full of rumours drawn from the most diverse sources.

According to more or less trustworthy information, an enlarged sitting of the Politburo was held in October 1976. It, evidently, witnessed a furious clash between the Chiang Ching and Hua Kuo-feng factions. A campaign was started against the above-mentioned four members of the Politburo.

On May 17, 1977 the Hsinhua News Agency gave the following details of the power struggle that flared up in the Party after the death of Mao. It reported that on September 10, the day after Mao Tse-tung died, Wang Hung-wen, acting behind the back of Hua Kuo-feng and other Politburo members, ordered local Party committees, in the name of the Central Committee Office, to refer major issues directly to him. This was an attempt to rupture the CC's contacts with the provincial Party committees.

The "four" used the newspaper *Kwangming jihpao* to publish an article containing the words that "he who dares to distort the course laid down by Chairman Mao Tse-tung will come to a bad end."<sup>1</sup> This, Hsinhua noted, was a direct hint at Hua Kuo-feng. At the same time, the "four" ordered their accomplices in Shanghai to arm the militia without delay. On the second day after Mao's death they distributed six million cartridges to the Shanghai militia. On September 27 Chang Chun-tsiao sent an aide to Shanghai with verbal orders to organise an armed rising. "Shanghai is on the threshold of a great test," he said. "We must prepare to fight." If the agency is to be believed, in early October Chang openly put forward a plan for "suppressing the counter-revolution". He had in mind striking at Hua Kuo-feng and his supporters. He took over control of the entire propaganda machine. The "four" used all the media—newspapers, the radio, films, news agencies, television, the theatre, and so on—to influence public opinion and attack the late Chou En-lai, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, other leaders of the Party, the army, and the government officials.

The "four" had arbitrarily organised a group of authors for mass criticism with its headquarters at Peking University and the Tsinghua Polytechnical Institute, and a group of authors for mass criticism at the Shanghai City Party Committee. We have already seen what these articles of the group of authors were about. It now turns out that they were the creatures of the "four". The news agencies reported that the group of authors for mass criticism at Peking University and the Tsinghua Polytechnical Institute had published 168 articles in the press. On the direct instructions of Chiang Ching, one of these articles headed "What Sort of Man Was Confucius?" contained a veiled attack on Chou En-lai, while another, headed "Wu Kiang

tien, an Outstanding Woman Political Leader of Ancient China", was designed to prepare public opinion for a possible take-over of power by Chiang Ching. A few days before the arrest of the "four", her accomplices in Shanghai, acting on their own, began transferring troops, setting up command points, planning "operations", and formulating slogans. According to the agency, they intended to blow up bridges, halt supplies, cut off electricity, and thereby instigate an armed coup. However, Hua Kuo-feng and his supporters acted quickly and nipped all these actions in the bud.

Many China analysts had predicted that the death of the man who wielded supreme power and reigned by the principle of division would sharply aggravate the struggle in the leadership. However, hardly anybody expected that developments would unfold so swiftly, that the contending forces would clash so quickly, and that one of them would be crushed so rapidly.

The alignment of the rival forces in the CPC had taken shape long before Mao Tse-tung died. The struggle for the succession surfaced while the ailing CPC Chairman was still alive.

This struggle was mainly between two groups. The first, the "lefts" or extremists, stuck to the ideology of the "cultural revolution". Their leader was Chiang Ching. The other group, the "pragmatists", were determined to stabilise the situation in the country and promote industry. Their spiritual leader was Chou En-lai. The military, who acted in their own interests and were inclined to support the "pragmatists", formed an independent group. Defence Minister and Politburo member Yeh Kiang-ying became their leader while Mao was still alive.

Chou En-lai, a veteran of the Chinese Communist Party who had been a member of the top leadership since the 1920s, died on January 8, 1976. Although he had never claimed the role of No. 1 in the Party, he was the most probable contender to the succession after Mao. For that reason the same fate was prepared for him as for the other disgraced or murdered (Lin Piao) claimants to the Party leadership.

After Chou's death the foreign press reported that he had declined medical attention: he had cancer of the lungs. He learned that Mao had criticised him at a secret meeting. His doctor, a specialist of Chinese origin invited from

abroad, told him a few days before his death that Mao had said that Sun Kiang, one of the heroes of the ancient novel *Water Margin*, was a capitulator. Knowing Mao's methods, Chou assessed this as an indirect attack on himself. In reply he said: "China is afflicted with the most dangerous disease—the political disease. If anybody is ill politically he is doomed." Further, Chou noted that his own illness was only 30 per cent physical and 70 per cent political. The same report stated that Chou's wife feared her husband would be poisoned. She tasted all the food brought him.

The Chinese press carried a report alleging that Chou had fallen a victim to the "four". More, Chiang Ching was mentioned as allegedly having ordered poisoning his medicine. Can this be believed? For the moment nobody knows. But it is unquestionable that Chou En-lai's death meant the removal of the main contender to the succession of the leading post on China's political Olympus.

Soon another member of the old guard died. He was Chu Teh, hero of the Long March and legendary Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist army during the civil war. Teng Hsiao-ping was now the most prominent representative of that generation of leaders.

It was subsequently learned that with Chou En-lai's backing Teng was appointed Deputy Premier of China in 1974, and when Chou En-lai became bedridden he in fact carried out the duties of Premier. He was made the principal target of the campaign that was launched after Chou En-lai's death. This campaign is now increasingly attributed to the "four" and personally to Chiang Ching. It was alleged that he had the imprudence of making sceptical remarks about the new Chinese operas composed under her direct guidance.

But it was not, of course, a matter of divergences in aesthetic tastes. Teng was, perhaps, the only major personality of the "old guard" who could really claim the role of Mao's successor. He had to be removed before the Chairman's death. Thus, a campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping lasted through 1975-1976. He was relieved of his posts and exiled to a remote province.

Hua Kuo-feng was groomed for the post of Premier while Mao was alive. This confused Western China analysts. They leafed through *Who's Who in China* for basic information about the new leader. It was known that during the



"cultural revolution" he headed the Party organisation in Hunan, Mao Tse-tung's native province. Soon after this campaign ended he was appointed Minister of Public Security. Although he held that post, he was regarded as a leading specialist in an entirely different field—agriculture. He had delivered the report at the National Conference on the Dissemination of the Advanced Experience of Tachai (September 15, 1975).

But what about Chiang Ching? Had there been a conspiracy in her favour after the death of Mao? A point beyond dispute is that the 64-year-old widow had put in a claim to succeed her husband.

Just before Mao's death the Chinese press carried one article after another to prepare the "platform" for a family succession to power. In accordance with the accepted practice in China, this was done indirectly, with references to China's ancient and modern history. In the official Party press transparent parallels were drawn with ancient empresses who had succeeded their husbands and faithfully abided by their injunctions.

Mao Tse-tung's death led to logical denouement of the unprincipled sectarian struggle of the Chiang Ching group for power in the Party and the country.

The Acting Premier Hua Kuo-feng quickly gained control of the key posts in the Party, the army, and the government. On October 9, 1976 *Jenmin jihpao* wrote for the first time that the Politburo was headed by Hua Kuo-feng. In its editorial on the next day the newspaper called him head of the Party Central Committee. He was called Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and the CC Military Council for the first time at a rally in Tienanmen Square on October 21.

Translators were hard put to it to interpret the verb *jen*, used in the report about the rally. *Jenmin jihpao* wrote: "Today a million and a half soldiers and civilians gathered at a rally to acclaim the occupation by Comrade Hua Kuo-feng of the post of Chairman of the CC and Chairman of the CC Military Council" The character *jen* was translated by everybody as "occupation of the post" and not as "election" or "appointment".

Motivating this approach to the procedure of nominating the new leader, the same newspaper wrote: "The leader of the proletarian Party is not appointed, he is promoted by

the masses in the course of struggle and action" (October 31, 1976).

Less than within a month after Hua Kuo-feng took over his new posts, the army newspaper *Chiehfangchun pao* carried an editorial headed "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng—Worthy Leader of Our Party". It stated: "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng is a fitting successor selected personally by Mao Tse-tung as the helmsman advancing the cause of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, wise leader of the Communist Party of China, founded by Chairman Mao Tse-tung."<sup>2</sup> And further: "The fact that Hua Kuo-feng is the leader of our Party is the demand of the revolution, a historical necessity, the common desire of millions of people, and the dependable guarantee of the further triumphant advance of our Party and country in accordance with the proletarian revolutionary line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung."

Later (in September 1977) the Hsinhua News Agency printed a hitherto unknown directive of Mao Tse-tung, dated 1963, to the leadership of the CPC. Mao Tse-tung allegedly urged them to study a report compiled by Hua Kuo-feng, who was the Party leader in Hunan at the time. Mao commended Hua Kuo-feng and other members of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee for their efforts in studying advanced methods of farming in Kwangtung Province. The following words were attributed to Mao: "This attitude, this modest study of the successful experience of other provinces merits praise. This is an important way of facilitating our economic, political, ideological, military, cultural, and Party work." Obviously, the document was published to boost Hua Kuo-feng's prestige as the successor of Mao.

What was the explanation for the relatively quick defeat of the "lefts" in the Politburo? The support of the military had tipped the scales in favour of Hua Kuo-feng. The principal part was played by Yeh Kiang-ying, an ageing man, and also by the commander of the Peking Military District Chen Hsi-lien, and other ranking officers. But this was not all. The main thing was the mood among large segments of Party, government, and military cadres, and also among the population.

People were sick and tired of the endless reshuffles, convulsions, and tensions, the savage factional struggles, the political and ideological campaigns, and the unrelenting purges that kept the administration and the people on

edge. The "four" led by Chiang Ching could offer the 30 million *kanpu* nothing but more trouble. Moreover, the "lefts" could not agree on unity: radicalism of their brand tended to create super-radicalism in its midst. This was by no means conducive to unity.

At a conference on the Tachai experience on December 25, 1976 Hua Kuo-feng enunciated a four-point programme for 1977: smash the "gang of four"; bring law and order; promote economic development; organise a mass movement for the study of the thought of Mao Tse-tung.<sup>3</sup>

Two months after Mao's death a wall-poster was hung at Peking University attacking Chiang Ching. It said: "For her crimes she deserves ten thousand deaths, but even that will not wash away her crimes. She is a sworn enemy."

In Peking, Shanghai, and many other cities demonstrators, beaming with joy, burned effigies of Chiang Ching and her three henchmen. Every conceivable charge was made against this woman who was for 37 years wife and private secretary of a man revered as a deity to this day.

To believe the Chinese press, her greatest crime was that by means of sectarian intrigues she had set out to be the "empress of China".

She is supposed to have said: "There can be an empress in communist society as well." On assignment from Chiang Ching a servile group of writers produced a book devoted to the empresses Liu and Wu Kiang-tien; it was to be published after Chiang Ching's installation as a "communist empress".

According to the media, Chiang Ching had a robe made after the model of the one worn by the empress Wu Kiang-tien. Whenever she left Peking she was accompanied by a cohort of doctors, secretaries, medical nurses, cooks, and servants. Where she stopped for the night all noise was suppressed: the roar of aircraft, conversation, the crowing of cocks, the quacking of ducks, the squealing of sucking-pigs, and the barking of dogs. The local *kanpu*, specially alerted for the purpose, drove away birds from the environs of Chiang Ching's residence. The guards were so zealous that when she bathed armed divers swam in the water. The press played up the story that when Chiang Ching went to Hainan Island for some amusement she had three horses brought by special plane. The empresses of the past were devoted to horseback riding.

In China they like to refer to precedents perhaps even more than in British legal practice. In this spirit the official press drew historical parallels between Chiang Ching and concubines who had usurped power. One parallel is from the seventh century A.D., when a concubine of the Tang Emperor Tai-tsung ruled the country as empress for 15 years after his death.

Why, one may ask, was Chiang Ching depicted as a concubine. For the same reason that she had unlawfully replaced Mao's previous (respected) wife.

In full conformity with another stereotype, the press wrote that Mao was constantly displeased with Chiang Ching and other members of her group. An editorial in *Jenmin jihpao* in October 1976 quoted the following four pronouncements by Mao addressed to Chiang Ching and her group: "Do not form a narrow-sectarian quartette," he was supposed to have said on July 17, 1974. "Do not engage in sectarianism. You will trip up on it," he said on December 24 of the same year. Preparations for the National People's Congress were started in November or December 1974, on which occasion Mao was alleged to have declared: "Chiang Ching has careerist ambitions: she in fact wants Wang Hung-wen to be Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and is intent on becoming Chairman of the Party." At a Politburo meeting on May 3 of the same year, Mao, according to the Chinese press, warned the "lefts": "Do not form a 'gang of four'! Do not do this! Why are you so stubborn about it?"<sup>4</sup>

Why, indeed? It is all so incomprehensible. Why had Chiang Ching, despite all this, been in Mao's lifetime one of the most influential members of the top leadership and even the principal interpreter of Mao's guidelines?

As the Hsinhua News Agency reported on March 20, 1977, the CC mass criticism group published an article in the Peking press that "exposed and criticised Chiang Ching's ill-intentioned attacks on Dr. Sun Yat-sen" and her "negation of the policy charted by Mao Tse-tung".

In 1971 Chiang Ching went to the Piyungsu Temple on Mount Sanshan, where she outraged the memory of Sun Yat-sen. She allegedly called him "scum" and ordered the portrait of Sun and a plaque inscribed by Mao in honour of Sun to be taken down in the Memorial Home. Later

she ordered the closure of that Home. The Piyunsu Temple was closed for the same reason.

US Professor Roxana Witke wrote a biography of Chiang Ching, which was in effect dictated word for word personally by the "dowager empress", who spoke to Witke for a total of over 60 hours. Foreigners who visited Shanghai some years ago saw a cartoon depicting Chiang Ching in a long dress and a crown, admiring herself in a mirror, with the blonde American authoress, in jeans and holding a tape-recorder, approvingly saying: "Okay!"

What was the reaction of the Chinese people to this denigration of the "great helmsman's" widow? Reports from all over the country indicate that the ordinary Chinese were not only pleased but overjoyed. It is not to be excluded that for many of them this was psychological retribution for the nauseating attributes of worship of old gods.

Chiang Ching's fall into disgrace was accompanied by sharp criticism of the political views and activities of the entire ill-starred "group of four". Let us run through the list again.

Wang Hung-wen, 40, the youngest member of the Politburo and a former Shanghai leader, who won recognition during the "cultural revolution". At the 10th Congress of the CPC he was elected one of the five deputy chairmen of the CPC. At that congress he delivered a report on amendments in the CPC Constitution stressing the special role of Mao and his ideology in the Party.

Chang Chun-tsiao, member of the Politburo, delivered the report on the new Constitution at the first session of the fourth National People's Congress in 1975. The basic provision of the new Constitution, he said, was: "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought is the theoretical foundation and the underlying idea of our country."

Yao Wen-yuan, Mao Tse-tung's son-in-law, was regarded as the most zealous proponent of Mao's "thought". The following is from an official report delivered by him in August 1967: "We are living in an epoch whose banner is the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." For some years Yao was a central figure of China's official press, signalling the start of new ideological campaigns.

In April 1977 *Jenmin jihpao* and *Chiehfangchun pao* contained some information of the inquiries into the activi-

ties of the "gang of four". Special attention was drawn to their "counter-revolutionary past".<sup>5</sup>

Let us consider some of these sensational exposures, which are interesting not so much as such (their trustworthiness cannot be checked) as from the standpoint of the continuity of the methods of political struggle in China.

From the article referred to above we learn that Chang Chun-tsiao's father was a rich landlord and that he became a secret Kuomintang agent in the early 1930s when he was still in secondary school. In the spring of 1933 he helped to found a fascist local in his home province. In 1938 he went to Yen-an, allegedly on instructions from the Kuomintang intelligence. There he "concealed his counter-revolutionary past and wormed his way into the Party".

The press wrote that Chiang Ching, too, came from the family of a landlord. She began her "counter-revolutionary career" in February 1933, when she joined the CPC, but soon afterwards lost contact with the Party. In the autumn of the same year she rejoined the Party in Shanghai and became active in left-wing organisations: the Association for Enlightenment and the Communist Youth League. In 1934 she was arrested by Kuomintang agents, but she soon regained her freedom. In that period she was a stage and screen actress and curried favour with the Kuomintang. In 1937 she went to Yen-an, where she "again penetrated the Party".

It turns out that Yao Wen-yuan's father, Yao Peng-tsu, was arrested in 1934. He obtained his release by betraying the Party and acted under the guidance of the chief of the Kuomintang's control agency, into which he gradually drew his son. In 1948 Yao Wen-yuan "concealed that he knew about his father's activities as a secret agent, and his bourgeois origin, and edged into the Party". It was reported that although Wang Hung-wen wrote that he was of working-class origin and had himself been a worker, he made a "bad impression" at his factory. It turns out that he "did not read the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism and the works of Mao Tse-tung". In Shanghai he spent his time feasting and running around with dissolute characters and behaving like a hooligan. During the "cultural revolution" he formed a gang of "small brothers" in Shanghai and then, using his contacts as a secret agent, formed a careerist clique.

On another occasion *Jenmin jihpao* wrote that during the "cultural revolution" both Chang Chun-tsiao and Chiang Ching went to all lengths to erase all traces of their former activities. For instance, in 1968 Chiang Ching sent her secret agents, disguised as *hungweipings*, to search houses where there could be documents and photographs related to the 1930s and destroy everything that might incriminate her.

In 1964 she met a person who knew her past. She immediately contacted one of Lin Piao's agents, telling him: "You must use these turbulent times and seize my enemy. If you have enemies, tell me and I'll deal with them." The newspaper reported that Chiang Ching came across a woman who had been her servant in the 1930s. She ordered her arrest, following which the woman was held in prison for a long time.

Further, the media reported that when Chiang Ching was arrested by Kuomintang agents in 1934 she was interrogated by one Chao Yao-shang. She confessed to everything and "betrayed the revolution". Chiang Ching always concealed this and was on the look out for Chao. She calmed down only after she learned that he was allegedly dead. In 1964 she circumspectly asked the head of the security agency whether there were documents concerning her arrest in 1934 in the archives.

In 1966 she made the same request to the chief of Mao's bodyguards. Fearing that documents might be found, she asked Chang Chin-tsiao to arrest the two above-mentioned persons—the servant and the detective who had interrogated her: the latter died in prison.

The "cultural revolution" with all its excesses was the banner of the "gang of four". The "gang" was labelled "right elements". But if they were "rights", then who were the "lefts" in the CPC? They were certainly leftists and are criticised for "leftism" and extremism. In issue after issue *Jenmin jihpao* printed letters from Party organisations, ministries, government departments, universities, schools, theatres, and hospitals about the "pernicious" interference of the "gang of four" in the affairs of these institutions.

What were the charges against the "group of four"? They were charged with clandestine attacks on the line of Mao and with attempts to poison Chou En-lai; they were

charged with opposing the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng after Mao's death and with an attempt to make Chiang Ching Mao's successor; they were charged with systematic persecution of cadres, of collecting "vilifying material", of compiling dossiers on all leading cadres; they were charged with an attempt to seize power in the militia and to use it against the army; they were charged with denying the priority significance of economic development and insisting on "deepening the revolution"; they were charged with evolving the theory that "knowledge is useless" and destroying the education and research system; they were charged with having proclaimed many intellectuals, particularly writers and artists, "poisonous weeds" and subjecting them to persecution.

In other words, the "gang of four" was blamed for all the setbacks and ills of Maoist policy, but whether they wanted it or not the new leaders of the CPC thereby questioned the main orientation of the Party's entire domestic policy of the Mao period.

Many of the charges against the "four" are that they persecuted cadres whom they found to be objectionable. In Canton it was reported that from their place of detention Chiang Ching and Chang Chun-tsiao had asked for a meeting with Hua Kuo-feng. The latter is alleged to have replied that he would "meet with Chiang Ching only after she has satisfactorily explained the deaths of Ten Fucheng, Li Cheng, and Pi Ting-chun". These men had been ranking provincial officials and had died in suspicious circumstances.

Further, it was reported that Wang Li, who was close to Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping, was removed from the post of Minister of Railways at Chiang Ching's instigation (Wang Li later got a new post).

The "gang of four" was charged with attempting to reshape the foundations of the CPC—its ideology and policy. This was one of the most symptomatic charges, for it indirectly mirrored the actual purpose of the "cultural revolution", which was to finally turn the Marxist Party into a Maoist organisation.

A *Jenmin jihpao* article headed "What Party Had the Gang of Four Wanted to Form?" says that although "the great, glorious, and correct Communist Party of China was founded and fostered" by Chairman Mao, the "gang of



four" sought to destroy it; "for ten years they kept declaring" that "our Party had to be reorganised, that its character had to be remoulded, and its organisational structure destroyed". The opposition conducted this work under the slogan of "change of dynasty".<sup>6</sup>

As early as 1967, if we are to believe the article, Chang Chun-tsiao declared that "we cannot depend on the present Party organisations", that "the Party must be reorganised", that "we can do without provincial and city Party committees". And in January 1968 he bluntly put the question: "I want to know finally whether we need or do not need the Party? Can it be replaced by public organisations?" When the restoration of the Party organisations commenced in 1969, he suggested his own plan for reorganisation: "In the centre there should be a revolutionary committee, while at the lowest level Party affairs should be assigned to a few persons. Shanghai is the main centre of liaison of the *tsaofans*; the revolutionary committee should replace the city committee, while at the grassroots the *tsaofan* detachments should be given the role of Party organisations."

It was Chang Chun-tsiao's design that the leading role should pass from the Party to the *tsaofan* detachments. He contended that the CPC had degenerated into an old state apparatus, which "should be destroyed, beginning with the Central Committee and ending with the executive organs".

When this most extremist tack of the "cultural revolution" was rejected (probably by Mao Tse-tung), Chang Chung-tsiao declared that "evidently, the Party is still needed, but we must build it up anew". As he saw it, the following were to be the lines along which the Party was to be restructured. First and foremost, it was to be purged of old cadres, who had come from the liberated regions and all of whom had been labelled "capitalist-roaders". Moreover, it was to be purged of between 50 and 80 per cent of its intellectuals.

Who was to be accepted into the Party in their stead? First, the *tsaofans*, who would become "numerically superior". "With the *tsaofan* detachments at hand, all problems would be resolved"—this was the motto, according to *Jen-min jihpao*, under which Chang Chun-tsiao attacked the principles of the Party's structure. The newspaper drew

the conclusion that the slogan of rebuilding the Party "meant turning it into a fascist party", into a "Menshevist, Trotskyite organisation".

What was so assiduously concealed during the "cultural revolution" has now become public knowledge. Its principal organisers had indeed planned to reshape not only the ideological but also the social and organisational foundations of the Party. Of course, as we expected, they had no intention of abandoning reliance on the Party as an instrument of the power of Mao Tse-tung and his supporters. Still, they were determined to remould the Party in such a way as to make it utterly subservient to the group of "lefts" and extremists.

But this was beyond their strength. With the active support of the military, the moderate wing opposed to them prevented the total destruction of the Party itself and the extermination of its old cadres during the "cultural revolution". This was, evidently, one of Chou En-lai's main services to the present successors of Mao Tse-tung. By protecting Teng Hsiao-ping, Yeh Kiang-ying, and many other old cadres of the Party, the army, and the state apparatus he cleared the way for the downfall of the "lefts" after the death of Mao Tse-tung. The gerontocracy thus had its revenge on the generation of new leaders lusting for power. Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-tsiao, and the other members of the "gang of four" could only remember wistfully their uncompleted work to reconstruct the CPC from top to bottom.

As regards Mao, his aims were, apparently, not so far-reaching as those of his zealous associates in the "gang of four". He was content with the total assertion of the cult of his personality and, more importantly, with the elimination of all whom he could suspect of betraying his ideology and policies. While limping heavily on his left foot and actively supporting the extremists, Mao remained true to his principle of "walking on both feet", of not abandoning the more moderate wing in the Party, which had demonstrated its total submission to his power.

The Chinese press noted that the "gang of four" had attached particularly great significance to asserting their ideological influence in the Party. One of their methods in this sphere was to set up an "authors' group" at the Shanghai City Party Committee. *Jenmin jihpao* now called this group the strike force of the "gang of four" in the

efforts to usurp power in the Party and the country.<sup>7</sup> "With the help of this group and some other persons they published smears against individual Chinese leaders." According to the newspaper, Chang Chun-tsiao planned to form a numerous "theoretical nucleus" in Shanghai. He said: "In the same way that Chiang Kai-shek set up the Lushan Officers' School, we must build up and educate our own group of theorists."

The Shanghai "authors' group" attacked Chou En-lai, and after his death they turned their attention to Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng. The article in question noted that the most reactionary part of this campaign was that in August 1976, on instructions from Chang Chun-tsiao, the "four's" supporters from among the members of the disbanded "authors' group" wrote a book entitled *Diary of a Nepman*, in which "comrade Hua Kuo-feng was attacked" in the form of narration by an old bourgeois about the situation in the Soviet Union at the close of the 1950s. On the pretext of "drawing lessons from the Soviet experience" the authors branded leading cadres, who were making every effort to modernise the country, labelling them revisionist elements preaching the theory of the priority of the productive forces.

Moreover, they suggested scientifically substantiating the need for the "cultural revolution" and thereby sought, with the purpose of defending it, to bring down all who had opposed that "revolution" and the "gang of four". The newspaper recounted the dramatic resistance of the Shanghai "theorists" to the downfall of the "four". Fearing for their own lives, they planned a counter-revolutionary rising in Shanghai. One of the group's ringleaders said: "Do not fear death!" Another said: "We shall act together. I am not afraid of dying." "In the middle of the night this ringleader rushed to the editorial offices of a newspaper and to the radio station". The conspirators and their Shanghai accomplices planned to destroy railways and bridges to prevent the PLA from entering the city and to drown the population of Shanghai in a sea of blood. However, this unprecedented military adventurism of the "theorists" ended in a fiasco. The rising in Shanghai was quickly quelled, and two first secretaries of the City Party Committee were stripped of their posts. The "authors' group" likewise disappeared from the political scene.

Western analysts believe that more than 30 per cent of the CC members were "lefts" and their supporters. Moreover, they had considerable support among the urban militia, which numbers approximately 50 million, and also among millions of successors to the *hungweipings* among the Chinese youth.

There is little doubt that most of the *kanpu*, as the entire population of China, want stability and order, normalisation of political life, and a reasonable, rational economic and social policy. However, the "gang of four", which the public mind associated personally with Mao, had a large following. Hence the ferocity of the struggle against its supporters.

Active resistance to Peking broke out in many provinces. There were over 150 major armed clashes with considerable loss of life in Shantung Province in October 1977. Reports from the Shantung Provincial Party Committee stated that more than 1,600 "military cadres" were killed or wounded. The official press alleges that 17 secretaries of district committees in seaboard provinces were relieved of their posts on instructions from the "four". At least 30 per cent of the factories were placed out of commission and there was no communication between some cities for a whole month. The scale of this obstruction was so great that 80 per cent of the factories in Shantung Province ceased work. The authorities had to send troops to suppress subversion by "criminal counter-revolutionaries".

Similar reports came from other regions. According to *Reuters*, 29 "active counter-revolutionaries" were sentenced to death in Shanghai and Kwangchow (Canton).

Also an indication of the purge of "gang of four" supporters in the provinces was that at least a hundred "lefts" from among the middle echelon leadership were arrested in October 1976. They included more than ten members and alternate members of the CPC Central Committee and members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

In parallel, a campaign was started to rehabilitate and reinstate many ousted functionaries in their former Party and government posts.

This concerned not only the top leaders, who had been persecuted. Day after day the press wrote of middle echelon functionaries—Party, government, and military—who had

been undeservedly dishonoured and stripped of their posts. Many have since been reinstated.

Further, it was reported that people who had demonstrated for Chou En-lai in Tienanmen Square, Peking, on April 5, 1976, were released from custody. According to unofficial reports, between 300 and 600 people had been arrested. It will be recalled that the demonstrators protested against the sudden cessation of the ceremony in memory of Chou En-lai on the traditional day of remembrance, and against Maoist policy as a whole.

The tide of rehabilitation of victims of the "four" rose ever higher, reaching the pinnacles of power in China.

Initially, after Mao's death the campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping continued by inertia. However, it soon subsided. It was said off the record that this campaign was not quite justified. Then cautious mention was made of Teng's possible rehabilitation, and then of his imminent return to a leading post.

A talk Chou En-lai had with commanders of PLA military districts on January 6, 1976, a few days before his death, was leaked to the foreign press. In this talk Chou urged the military to unite, for "there will certainly be a severe struggle against the careerists seeking to usurp power in the Party". "Their end goal is to depose old comrades and reign supreme. A great responsibility devolves on you. You should not become servile political bootlickers, careerists. You must be implacable and unite from top to bottom."

Chou spoke at length about Teng Hsiao-ping. He said that the army commanded by Liu Po-cheng and Teng Hsiao-ping (2nd Field Army) had served the nation well. He said that he had known Teng for a long time and had always found common language with him. "You must support Teng Hsiao-ping and look after him. You must look after old comrades." And further: "This is possibly our last meeting. You must not weep. Tears will not help... My death will possibly lead to the political death of Teng Hsiao-ping and some other comrades. You must not be afraid. You must fight. You can say that this is my testament."

Is this report to be believed? It rings true. In any case, it is quite obvious that the question of Teng Hsiao-ping's exoneration and reinstatement in leading positions was not merely a personal issue. It was a question of the "old

guard", of the cadres who rose to the Party leadership in the 1930s, of the people who fought in the civil war, in short, of all who had been targets of the "cultural revolution" orgy. Unlike Party leaders, most of the military cadres had survived the purges. They were the main elements demanding the reinstatement of deposed leaders notably Teng Hsiao-ping.

Here are two more rather curious reports about the period preceding Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation.

The first was a meeting said to have taken place between Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping in a Peking hospital on October 26, 1976. They had come separately to visit the ailing Marshal Liu Po-cheng. Hua arrived when Teng was already at Marshal's bedside. When Hua took a seat Teng said he was leaving. But Hua stopped him with the words: "You believe I may push you away?" Marshal Liu (one of China's greatest military leaders) intervened, saying: "The days of the 'gang of four' are past. We should unite." When Teng jestingly called himself a "capitalist-roader", Hua noted that this accusation had been invented by the "gang of four", that it had not been approved by Mao. Before leaving, Hua asked the sick Marshal if there was anything he could do for him. The Marshal replied that his last wish was that Teng Hsiao-ping should officiate at his funeral for they had worked together for more than fifty years.

The second report, also widely commented in the Western press, is about an exchange of messages between Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng. The Teng message allegedly declared:

"1. I wholeheartedly support Comrade Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of our Party. 2. I wholeheartedly support the measures taken by our Party's CC, headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, against the anti-Party 'gang of four'. 3. I am in good health and request Chairman Hua to assign me to the front line of work."

Hua Kuo-feng is said to have replied: "1. You have made mistakes which must be criticised. 2. The Tienanmen events have nothing to do with you. 3. You must go not to the line of work but to the line of battle."

A circular, reportedly sent by the CPC Central Committee to local Party committees after the dislodgement of the "gang of four", stated that Hua Kuo-feng's appointment as Acting Premier by Chairman Mao did not mean that Teng

Hsiao-ping had to be removed from the deputy premier-ship. The question of Teng Hsiao-ping would be decided at the third plenum of the tenth Central Committee. The circular is said to have contained the words: "Teng was an associate of Chou En-lai. The estimation given of him by Chou En-lai must be trusted."

In early 1977 *Jenmin jihpao* carried on its front page an article in defence of Party veterans unfairly repressed or attacked during the "cultural revolution". This article was a programme not only for the exoneration of Teng Hsiao-ping but also the reinstatement of many middle and lower echelon leaders. Many people returned to government and Party work at the level of ministers and heads of government departments, provincial Party committees, universities, and factories.

## The New Leadership

The third plenum of the tenth Central Committee sat in Peking from July 16 to 21, 1977. It was presided over by Hua Kuo-feng, who, according to Hsinhua News Agency, made an "important speech". "Important speeches," the agency said, were also made by Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Yeh Kiang-ying and by Teng Hsiao-ping.

The plenary meeting endorsed Hua Kuo-feng's appointment to the post of Chairman of the CPC. "In keeping with Mao Tse-tung's instructions, the plenary meeting unanimously considers Hua Kuo-feng a worthy pupil and successor to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, outstanding leader and distinguished Commander-in-Chief."

Hsinhua reported that the plenary meeting unanimously passed a "resolution reinstating Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping in his posts". Further, it said that on May 7, 1977 Teng Hsiao-ping had written two letters to Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Kiang-ying, but there was no word about the contents of these letters. The plenary meeting reinstated Teng Hsiao-ping in all his former posts: member of the CPC Central Committee, member of the Politburo, member of the Politburo's Standing Committee, Deputy Chairman of the CC CPC Military Council, Deputy Chairman of the

CPC Central Committee, Deputy Premier of the State Council, and Chief of the PLA General Staff.

Further it passed a resolution on the anti-Party group of Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-tsiao, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan.

This resolution stated that the Central Committee headed by Hua Kuo-feng had crushed the "gang of four" and thereby eradicated a great evil in the Party, delivered the country from a great split and a great step back. It saved the revolution and the Party. "This was a great victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution, a great victory of Mao Tse-tung Thought. This was a great victory of the proletarian revolution of Mao Tse-tung."

The resolution declared that the "four" were a counter-revolutionary group, that at the outset of the "cultural revolution" they had conspired with "Lin Piao and company", and after the 10th CPC Congress "had planned to seize leadership of the Party, the government, and the army, and deprive Chairman Mao Tse-tung of his strongest support"; that during the preparations for the second plenum of the CPC Central Committee and the fourth National People's Congress they had attempted to form their own government and depose Chou En-lai; that contrary to instructions from Mao Tse-tung they had frenziedly persecuted and vilified Comrade Teng Hsiao-ping; that they had savagely opposed the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng, and then planned to oust him; that when Mao Tse-tung's health deteriorated sharply, "they, in their wickedness, went to the point where they began to torment him". On the political level the "four" were charged with having sought to turn the Marxist Communist Party into a revisionist party, turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a fascist dictatorship, and reduce socialist China to a semi-colonial agrarian country. The "four" were charged, as before, with having conducted an "ultra-right, counter-revolutionary, revisionist policy". According to the resolution, the social basis of this opposition consisted of landlords, kulaks, and other evil elements, and the new and old bourgeoisie.

Credit for breaking the "four" was given not only to Hua Kuo-feng but also to Yeh Kiang-ying. It was noted that "on the basis of abundant evidence, corroborated by investigation, it has been established that Chang Chun-



tsiao was a Kuomintang special agent, Chiang Ching a traitress, Yao Wen-yuan a class alien element, and Wang Hung-wen newly born bourgeois element".

The plenary meeting expelled the "four" from the Party and stripped them of all their posts.

Of the other principles proclaimed by the plenary meeting, attention is attracted by the guideline for the ideological and organisational preparations for the 11th Congress of the CPC. "In line with Chairman Mao Tse-tung's instructions to 'rely on collective experience and collective thought' the plenary meeting has fully implemented the principles of Marxism-Leninism." The principle of collective leadership, proclaimed by the plenary meeting, harmonised poorly with the statement about the special position of the "wise leader" Hua Kuo-feng.

On foreign policy the plenary meeting reaffirmed that China would continue the struggle against the "hegemonism of the two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the USA"—underscoring that it was necessary to "complete the struggle against modern revisionism", of which the CPSU was proclaimed the centre.

On July 23, 1977 a *Jenmin jihpao* editorial commenting on the results of this plenary meeting called the exposure and criticism of the "gang of four" a "great political revolution". Following the precedent set by Mao Tse-tung, the term "revolution", which cannot be other than great, is used more and more frequently to designate any political campaign. The point is not the word itself but the meaning given to it in the campaign against the "four". Its architects saw it as affecting all vital aspects of life in the CPC and the entire nation.

The present Chinese leaders insisted that the "four" were right elements. It would be interesting to consider their arguments in support of this questionable contention. One of the most verbose motivations was articulated by Li Hsien-nien, Deputy Premier, in an interview to *The Times Literary Supplement* in the spring of 1977. Some people in the West, he said, were confused when they heard the "gang of four" spoken of as an "ultra-right group" and their actions called "ultra-left". They were supported by landlords, prosperous peasants, counter-revolutionaries, and right elements. They could, therefore, not be called "lefts",

Sensing the flimsiness of his arguments, because it was well known that the "four" had pursued the most extremist, leftist line, Li Hsien-nien tried to substantiate the official assessment of the "four" by the "rule of contraries".

China's friends, he said, drew the strange conclusion that they were genuine radicals and lefts, and that the Premier of the State Council was a moderate pragmatist. Saying this, he struck the arm of his chair, adding, that he had known Chou En-lai for more than twenty years, and that if people said he was a moderate, they would accuse Chairman Mao of moderation. Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai, he said, headed the revolution and drove out the capitalists, Chiang Kai-shek, and the feudal lords. It was wrong to call them moderates.

This argument could hardly convince anybody. It was a fact that there were some differences in the views of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, especially during the last period of their lives when Chou En-lai stressed the need for industrial development and not for vocal political campaigns. Moreover, it is not hard to prove that compared with the Chiang Kai-shek clique both Mao and Chou maintained a left stance. But the point is about something entirely different: the correlation of the policy of the present leaders with the policy of the deposed "four", the internal demarcation of forces in the CPC over the past decade.

Of course, the new Chinese leadership is reluctant to admit that anybody was more left than they, for leftism has always been a sign of good tone in the CPC, while rightism signified direct fraternisation with the bourgeoisie and the landowners. They have good reason to fear this. The history of the liberation movement knows of innumerable instances of extreme "leftists" propounding the most reactionary platforms. Significantly, Lenin's major post-October work, *"Left-Wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, was aimed not at the right but at the leftist danger. Indeed, the policy of the new Chinese leaders, particularly their economic policy, shows an inclination towards a more moderate course, which was viciously attacked by the "four".

The 11th Congress of the CPC, at which the new leadership consolidated its position, was held on August 12-18, 1977. The main report was delivered by Hua Kuo-feng.

Needless to say, one of the main points in the report was about the struggle against the "four", which, as Hua put it, was the eleventh "major battle of two lines" in the history of the CPC. Hua drew an analogy between the deposed leftists and the former opposition, and entirely ignored the different stance and total divergence of aims set by the opposing sides throughout the history of the CPC. Suffice it to mention Wang Ming, Liu Shao-chi, and Chiang Ching to understand how ludicrous it was to bracket them together. For Wang Ming it was a struggle of an internationalist against nationalism. The struggle of Liu Shao-chi was a struggle against the voluntarism and extremism of Mao Tse-tung; the struggle of Chiang Ching was a struggle to continue and deepen the extremist course in and outside China (if it were at all possible to intensify this unprecedented extremism).

The figure 11 was used in yet another context. Hua Kuo-feng declared that the "cultural revolution" went on for 11 years and that it was at last ending. In support of this formulation, which was risky in view of the situation in the CPC, he referred to words said to be spoken by Mao Tse-tung in 1974 that after eight years of "cultural revolution" it was time for the nation to calm down and unite.

Thus, the "cultural revolution" begun in 1966 was ending in 1977. What did that mean? It, evidently, meant a call for stabilisation, for order, for an end to the factional struggle.

At the congress Hua Kuo-feng declared in passing that the campaign of criticising Confucius, to which immense significance was attached while it was in progress, was a camouflaged attack on Chou En-lai and Yeh Kiang-ying. He spoke derisively of the attempt to draw contemporary parallels with the heroes of the novel *Water Margin* and ridiculed the attacks on the "empiricism" of the people branded as "capitalist-roaders". He was emphatic in his defence of the old guard, which had only recently been charged with spreading opportunist ideology. True, he made the reservation that there still were "capitalist tendencies" in the Party, but that this concerned only a small number of people.

Moreover, at the 11th Congress Hua Kuo-feng cast a shadow on the "cultural revolution" by saying that Lin Piao and the "four" had distorted Mao's thought. But he did not say what lessons were to be drawn from the "cultural revo-

lution", what the attitude to its aims should be, and what the relationship of the new stage was to the preceding one.

Hua Kuo-feng spoke at length about the critical remarks that Mao Tse-tung was said to have made about Chiang Ching and the other "leftists". Prominence was given to the story, mentioned above, that during the preparations for the fourth session of the National People's Congress the "four" had named Chiang Ching to succeed Chairman Mao, and Wang Hung-wen to the post of Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. This plan, Hua said, was rejected by Mao Tse-tung, who took Teng Hsiao-ping under his wing and discounted as rubbish Chiang Ching's political actions.

It was not easy for Hua Kuo-feng to answer coherently why after the events of April 6 in the Tienanmen Square Mao Tse-tung had approved Teng Hsiao-ping's total removal and decided to institute the post of First Deputy Chairman of the State Council, to which Hua Kuo-feng was appointed.

All he accentuated was that the decision to institute that post had strategic implications in that it guaranteed successiveness in the Party after Mao Tse-tung's death.

One of the weakest places in Hua Kuo-feng's political report was the assertion that the guideline set by the 10th CPC Congress had been organisationally correct. At that congress, it will be recalled, the "four" substantially strengthened their position. Wang Hung-wen was appointed to the third highest post in the Party, while on the political level the ideology of extremism triumphed consummately.

Hua Kuo-feng emphasised that veteran cadres had to be protected. He spoke of the ins and outs of the campaign of criticism of Confucius and stigmatised the claim of the "four" that veteran cadres were degenerating into a bourgeoisie, declaring that to agree with their conclusions would mean that the PLA was a bourgeois army, and that from the very outset the CPC had been a party of bourgeois democrats, that it had now become a bourgeois party. "This is the height of absurdity," he said.

The rejuvenation of public organisations in 1973—the Chinese Communist Youth League, the trade unions, and the Women's Federation—was given a new interpretation. According to Hua Kuo-feng, this was one of the principal elements of the "four's" plan to undermine the Party's influence.

It was stated for the first time that Mao Tse-tung's illness and death "were circumstances that aggravated the complexity and difficulties of the latest stage of the struggle". It was thereby acknowledged that the "four" had consolidated their position when Mao Tse-tung was no longer capable of performing his duties in the Party and the government.

At the 11th Congress Hua Kuo-feng advanced an eight-point programme:

1. Totally expose and criticise the "gang of four" within a year or a little longer.
2. Unite and strengthen the Party, for the "four" had impaired it as an integral organisation and injected elements of disintegration into it.
3. Consolidate the leading organs of the Party at all levels, for "decay had penetrated" these organs.
4. Correctly understand the ideals of the revolution and promote industrial development with the objective of converting China into a powerful socialist state by the close of the twentieth century.
5. Successfully consummate the revolution in culture and education, for "only a minority of the intellectuals" understood Marxism, maintained a true proletarian stand, and were patriotic.
6. Strengthen the state apparatus.
7. Consolidate democracy and the principle of democratic centralism. "The 'four' had trampled upon democracy among the people and in the Party".
8. Pursue a policy of taking all factors into account, of harmonious concord, a cadre policy of combining experience with youth, and also of taking the requirements of the ethnic minorities into account.

The foreign policy section of the Hua Kuo-feng report contained nothing new in comparison with what had been proclaimed officially after Mao's death. The principal thesis was that another world war was inevitable, and would be caused by rivalry between the USSR and the USA. "War is the continuation of politics, i.e., the continuation of peace. Peace, too, is politics," Hua Kuo-feng said, quoting Mao Tse-tung. What remained unclear was why China refused to assert itself on the platform of peaceful continuation of policy.

While speaking against the export of revolution, Hua Kuo-feng attempted to justify the CPC's support for Maoist

parties and other organisations opposed to the socialist community and the world communist movement. Further, he showed some flexibility in his approach to the question of relations with capitalist states. He quoted Lenin to the effect that use had to be made of every, even the least possibility to win an ally, even the most vacillating, unreliable, and conditional ally. Strange, but these words were used to justify China's efforts to unite with any country of Western Europe and other parts of the world against the USSR and other socialist countries.

The report on the Party's new Constitution was delivered by Marshal Yeh Kiang-ying. In the new Constitution greater stress was laid on inner-Party discipline, on stricter subordination of lower to higher organisations. It included the provision on the four modernisations as the cardinal task of the Party.

Military leaders remained predominant in the new Politburo elected at the 11th CPC Congress. Economists and other specialists were also included in it. Twelve of the 23 members were military men.

The 11th Congress thus reaffirmed the policy shaped in the preceding period. It called for surmounting the effects of the activities of the "four" in ideology and in economic and social policy, but circumvented the fact that the "four" had articulated the guidelines and thought of Mao Tse-tung. This line continues to be oriented on Maoism: on the slogan of order and modernisation in domestic policy, and on the course set by Mao Tse-tung in foreign policy.

The 2nd National People's Congress was in session in Peking from February 26 to March 5, 1976. It was preceded, on February 18-23, 1976 by the second plenum of the CPC Central Committee, which approved a report on the work of the government, the draft of a ten-year plan of economic development 1976-1985, the new Constitution and a report on it, the list of officials to be elected at the National People's Congress and also by the People's Political Consultative Council (PPCC).

At the NPC session the main report was delivered by Hua Kuo-feng under the heading: "Let Us Unite in the Effort to Build a Powerful Modern Socialist State!" It consisted of six sections: 1. The Work Over the Past Three Years and the General Line for the New Period; 2. Con-  
summate the Exposure and Criticism of the "Gang of Four";

3. Speed Up Socialist Economic Development; 4. Ensure the Blossoming of Socialist Science, Education, and Culture; 5. Intensify the Build-up of Organs of State Power and Strengthen the Great Unity of All the Peoples of This Country; 6. The International Situation and China's Foreign Policy.

Relative to the activities of the "four", Hua Kuo-feng focussed attention on economic damage and cited sensational statistics: in the period from 1974 to 1976 industry had fallen short of its target by 100,000 million yuans in terms of value. The entire economy, he said, was on the brink of collapse. In other words, the "four" were blamed for the economy policy that had been, in its main outlines, unquestionably formulated by Mao Tse-tung.

What were the plans for economic development? By 1985 the grain crop had to reach 400 million tons, and the output of steel 60 million tons. From 1978 to 1985 the total farm product had to show an annual growth rate of 4-5 per cent, and gross industrial output an annual growth rate not exceeding 10 per cent, or 18.5 per cent in terms of value. By and large, the guideline of economic policy would be the earlier formulated four modernisations: agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology.

On the tasks in education Hua Kuo-feng declared: "Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought will retain its advanced position in science and culture and no bourgeois liberalism, of which reactionaries in and outside the country dream, will be permitted." In other words, Maoism was to remain the foundation of ideology and culture.

There would be no change in foreign policy. However, Hua Kuo-feng noted that the dispute between China and the Soviet Union over fundamental issues should not hinder peaceful coexistence between them. But on this point he set obviously unacceptable terms for talks with the USSR—withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Chinese frontier and the Mongolian People's Republic—knowing full well that this conflicted with the USSR's commitments and with the will of the Mongolian People's Republic.

The second report, delivered by Yeh Kiang-ying, contained an analysis of the amendments to the 1975 Constitution. The new Constitution was twice as long, having 60 articles instead of the former 30. There were few fundamental changes. The 1975 Constitution spoke of a "continuation of the

revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Introduction). The Introduction in the 1978 Constitution likewise speaks of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and Article 2 declares that the Communist Party of China is the leading nucleus of the Chinese people. Both constitutions have the words: "The Armed Forces of the People's Republic of China shall be headed by the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Article 15 of the 1975 Constitution and Article 19 of the 1978 Constitution).

Note must be made also of other amendments. The Procurator's Office, abolished in 1975, was reinstituted; the system of people's courts, that had functioned in 1954, was restored; of the 16 articles in the chapter on the basic rights and duties of citizens, 14 repeat the 1954 Constitution.

A new element was added to the old list of "bad elements" alien to the people (Hua Kuo-feng mentioned "four elements": landlords, kulaks, counter-revolutionaries and "bad elements"). Article 18 of the new Constitution speaks of "landlords, kulaks, reactionary capitalists", and also of traitors, counter-revolutionaries, and new bourgeois "elements". In explaining the Constitution, Yeh Kiang-ying said that the suppression of landlords, kulaks, counter-revolutionaries, and other bad elements would be continued, but he mentioned also "reactionary capitalists".

In other words, he meant further radical campaigns of the "cultural revolution" type.

The session elected Hua Kuo-feng Premier of the State Council, Yeh Kiang-ying Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and Teng Hsiao-ping Chairman of the PPCC.

Thus ended the first act of the political drama of taking over from Mao Tse-tung. Time will show what the next act will be and how long Hua Kuo-feng, who represents the new generation of leaders, will remain in partnership with Teng Hsiao-ping and Yeh Kiang-ying, who are members of the "old guard".

Who is in the present leadership alongside Hua Kuo-feng?

Deputy Chairman of the CPC and Defence Minister Yeh Kiang-ying is, following the 11th Congress of the CPC, the No. 2 in the Party and the government. He was prominent in crushing the conspiracy of the "four". The foreign press has



given a new and more detailed version of the dramatic events on the night of September 6, 1976. According to this version, Yeh Kiang-ying was in command of the entire operation, while Wang Tung-hsing had the responsibility of carrying out the plan drawn up by Hua Kuo-feng and his supporters. At the start of the operation Yeh Kiang-ying and Wang Tung-hsing set up their headquarters at the House of the People's Congress. Wang Tung-hsing telephoned Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-tsiao, and Yao Wen-yuan, summoning them separately to the House of the People's Congress. There they were individually arrested. Then Wang Tung-hsing went to Chiang Ching's residence in Chungnanhai and personally took her into custody.

Little is known about the political views of Yeh Kiang-ying (over 80). All that is known is that he was closely linked with Chou En-lai and pressed for the exoneration of Teng Hsiao-ping.

The next in official stature but second in actual status in the Party and the state is Teng Hsiao-ping, a man with a remarkable political biography. Exonerated and reinstated in all his posts after his second disgrace, which followed quickly on the heels of the first, he has re-emerged as one of the most influential and prestigious leaders of the CPC.

In a talk with foreign visitors in October 1977 he answered some ticklish questions about his recent past. In particular, he was asked where he lived and what he did when he was relieved of his posts in April 1966. "When I was removed," he replied, "I lost contact with the external world. As a matter of fact, I wanted no contacts. You all know that they were out to kill me. At the time the Gang of Four was in a position of exceptional power." He went on: "However, it was my luck that as a member of the Party I was protected by Chairman Mao. He assigned bodyguards to me. He told everybody that his decision on this question was not subject to discussion. I thus lived in safety." This hardly rings true. It is well known that Teng was saved and protected by the military, by his comrades of the civil war period.

However, he did not say where he lived in exile. But this, too, is important for an understanding of the alignment of forces in the Chinese leadership. From various reports it may be concluded that Teng lived on the seaside near Kwangchow, South China, where he was invited by

his friends, one of whom was Hsu Shi-yu, commander of the Kwangtung Military District. Another person who saw to Teng Hsiao-ping's safety was the First Secretary of the Kwangtung Provincial Committee of the CPC Wei Kuo-hsing, now a member of the Politburo.

*United Press International* reported an interesting detail about a meeting between Teng Hsiao-ping and US Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. At the meeting Teng exuded energy and confidence. He answered every question promptly.

"I've read something of what you have written," he said walking past the file of newsmen and shaking hands with each. "Some of it is true, and some isn't."

When security men escorted the correspondents out of the room Teng said loudly enough for all of them to hear: "They are certainly a big force." After Teng left, one of the newsmen said: "I should not like to be in the boots of those who imagined they had put the lid on Teng."

Despite the swift rises and falls, Teng Hsiao-ping remains politically viable. It is hard to say if this should be attributed to some special personal qualities or some other factors. But there is no doubt that Teng Hsiao-ping holds a special place among the political leaders who rose to power in the CPC after the death of Mao Tse-tung.

Western leaders and journalists have good reason for preferring to meet Teng than any other Chinese personality. In September 1977 *Newsweek* published an article by Richard M. Smith under the heading "Who Is No. 1?" Smith wrote: "...Ask any serious China watchers in Peking or Hong Kong to choose the most powerful man in China today and invariably they will not name Hua. The China watchers' choice: Senior Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping... His blunt, no-nonsense style has won him a measure of popular support reminiscent of the late Premier Chou En-lai." Smith believes that Teng is firmly entrenched as the first among equals in the Chinese triumvirate, along with Hua and Marshal Yeh Kiang-ying.

"Teng," Smith writes, "...exudes confidence. Although only 5 feet tall, he has a commanding presence, a quick sense of humor, and a sharp tongue." His talk about the need for wage increases and more attention to consumer desires made him extremely popular. Smith reports him as having said: "Each family must have a bicycle, sewing

machine, a television set. And each person should have 60 pounds of meat a year, half an apple a day, plus 2 ounces of paikan" (a fiery alcoholic drink).

Teng has long-standing, powerful allies and they are the real source of his strength. As a participant in the civil war and the people's revolution, he has maintained close friendly ties with the commanders of the armed forces in most of the provinces. Moreover, he is linked with many members of the Party and government leadership, with whom he had collaborated at different times. "Hua," Smith writes, "is not without cards to play in any showdown. As Mao's successor, he has inherited the right to interpret the late Chairman's thought, and his position gives him easy access to the media. And because 57-year-old Hua is so much younger than 73-year-old Teng, time is obviously on his side. Still, relative youth may prevent him from playing a dominant role in government over the short term."<sup>1</sup>

This evaluation of the balance of strength between Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping stands in need of correction. Hua is representative of the classic type of the second, post-revolution, generation leader. Personalities of this generation generally differ markedly from direct participants in the revolution, because they rise to power chiefly through the bureaucratic machine and not on the basis of noteworthy revolutionary activity. Well-trained bureaucrats familiar with the entire system of relations in the Party, the government, and the army, these people have some advantages over the first revolutionary generation of leaders. These are: efficiency of a high order, caution and the ability to smooth over relations in a complex leadership. They are organisers, not orators and theorists. In many cases, when methodical, well-considered, and outwardly unspectacular work is required, they prove to be much better adapted.

Some interesting information, which, evidently, merits attention even if it cannot command complete trust, seeped into the foreign press about Teng Hsiao-ping's speech at the third plenum of the CPC Central Committee. This was the meeting that decided to reinstate him in all his posts. He thanked the meeting and pledged to devote the rest of his life to being a worthy assistant of Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. He said he

had two options: one was to work, and the other to occupy an honorary position. He declared that he preferred an active life, for he had been involved in Party activity for more than 55 years. He said that he had been relieved of his posts three times and restored in his rights three times. He was relieved of his posts the last time by the "gang of four"; the reason for this was that he had not fought the "gang" as it deserved. The "gang" were now overthrown and he had the opportunity of serving the Party and the nation.

He gave a fairly self-critical assessment of his mistakes. "In the course of my career of more than 50 years," he said, "I contributed to the cause of the Party, the state, and the people. But at the same time I made mistakes. Chairman Mao's evaluation of me was: 70 per cent positive, and 30 per cent negative. However, my shortcomings are not confined to these 30 per cent. Nevertheless, when I tested myself I could say I have good points also: first, I do not engage in conspiracies; second, I try to correct my mistakes."

His speech contained another noteworthy comment on the "gang of four" and the plans they were hatching. He said that a statement made in Shanghai by Wang Hung-wen came to his knowledge in 1975. The latter was alleged to have told an official: "You watch us in ten years." "This," Teng said, "made me anxious about the future of our Party and nation, because at the time Wang Hung-wen was only 40, Yao Wen-yuan was a little over 40, Chang Chun-tsiao was 50 plus, and Chiang Ching was somewhat over 60, while we were all past 70. We conferred with Premier of the State Council Chou En-lai and Comrades Yeh Kiang-ying and Li Hsien-nien and vowed to train young successors."

This statement attracts attention on several counts. It points to the plans of the "gang of four", who had united not only on the basis of left extremism but also in the age principle, and were intent on removing representatives of the older generation from the leadership. Further, it indicates that the group determined to counter the "leftists" had grown strong as early as 1975; it was headed by Chou En-lai and included Yeh Kiang-ying and Li Hsien-nien, who, evidently, were largely responsible for Teng Hsiao-ping's return to the leadership in the CPC.

This report fits in with the report about Chou En-lai's testament, which likewise seeped into the foreign press.

It spoke of, among other things, Mao Tse-tung's attitude to Teng Hsiao-ping, which was, apparently, half-hearted, and this was turned to account by both the adversaries and the supporters of Teng Hsiao-ping.

Teng Hsiao-ping's disgrace in 1975 was the pivot of the sharp struggle for the succession to Mao Tse-tung in the latter's lifetime. It took place after the clash between crowds and security forces on April 5, 1976 on the Chou En-lai memorial day. The participants in the rally did not confine themselves to demonstrating their respect for the memory of Chou. They gave vocal support to Teng Hsiao-ping, who was then the target of attacks in the media.

Two decisions of the CPC Central Committee were published immediately after this incident: the first stripped Teng of all posts but did not expel him from the Party. The second proclaimed Hua Kuo-feng Premier and Senior Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee. The Chinese press wrote at the time that Teng Hsiao-ping had the opportunity of remaining in the leadership if he repented, but soon afterwards it was reported that he had refused to admit his mistakes and the campaign against him gathered momentum, reaching nation-wide proportions.

Following the 8th Congress of the CPC Teng Hsiao-ping did not produce any significant report or article, and it is difficult to form a judgment of the evolution of his views. However, many biting and witty aphorisms are attributed to him, and these give an idea of his personality and his political preferences. Testimony of this are the innumerable wall-posters which quoted his pronouncements at the time he was attacked.

At a student rally in the spring of 1976 he declared: "Since I have only just been disgraced, do you think I fear a second disgrace?" Hinting at his expertise, which outweighed the mocking labels pinned to him, he noted: "What difference if a cat is black or white. The important thing is that it catches mice."

When the students were getting out of hand, he threw one of his aphorisms at the crowd: "I am old and deaf. I do not hear you." This was a reference to a critical remark made about him by Mao Tse-tung back in 1965: "Teng

Hsiao-ping is deaf, but at conferences this does not prevent him from sitting farthest from me. For the past six years, beginning in 1959, he has said nothing to me about his work. He respects me, but prefers to keep away from me."

This remark by Mao was, evidently, a fairly accurate description of Teng Hsiao-ping's posture, which affected his entire destiny. He did not aspire to be a close associate of the late Chairman of the CPC. Neither did he say anything against him. He sat in silence while arguments raged over the ways and means of fighting Mao Tse-tung's opponents during the period of the Leap and the "people's communes". Teng is said to have declared: "An unending struggle tires people. These are in fact social repressions." These words were said to have been spoken in August 1965 and they affected the attitude to Teng during the "cultural revolution".

During difficult periods of the campaign Teng Hsiao-ping opposed some of its aspects, particularly the persecution of scientists and teachers. "You should not," he said, "insult and humiliate teachers as was the case in the past. You should respect teachers who have committed no mistakes. Order must be maintained. If the dissemination of knowledge is not the principal task of educational institutions, then what is their use?"

He was one of the most consistent advocates of keeping the successiveness in the leadership to representatives of the generation that fought in the civil war and the revolution. At a scientific conference in October 1975 he said: "A pendulum should swing in the other direction. The veteran-cadres should arm resolutely. They should not fear the past. They should fight for themselves with determination. We may fall into disgrace again. What of it! Do not lose courage. Even those who were removed fulfilled their tasks honourably. What difference does it make if you are removed. That is even a merit . . . Veteran cadres should have their freedom returned to them at once and they must be given posts in which they can show their abilities as organisers. Science and technology must be given priority in the state."

He was critical of the so-called revolutionary art propounded by Chiang Ching. "It is wrong", he said, "that only one flower should blossom."

When Teng Hsiao-ping was under attack the wall-posters quoted his barbed words about the situation in the armed forces. He declared: "The army has many problems. I can put them in five words: vanity, indiscipline, insolence, slovenliness, and laziness." "The armed forces enjoy immense authority. They have become a sort of ancillary authority and have entered upon factionalism."

It is hard to say whether Teng Hsiao-ping thinks of climbing higher in the political hierarchy. On this point he said, replying to a question of Japanese delegation from the New Freedom Club on September 15, 1977: "Although there are people in the Party who feel I should be Premier, I do not think in these terms. I am content with being a deputy."

There is little doubt that this energetic, dynamic man, who has got his third wind and considerably enhanced his influence among Party and military cadres, is immensely popular and will have growing influence on the shaping of the CPC policies in the immediate future.

What was Teng Hsiao-ping's attitude to Mao? He could hardly have had any personal liking or sentimental attachment. It will be remembered that he had been sharply critical of the personality cult at the 8th Congress of the CPC and, drawing upon the conclusions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, had strongly recommended the restoration of collective leadership and Party democracy. Indeed, if it had not been ordered by Mao Tse-tung, Teng Hsiao-ping's fall during and after the "cultural revolution" had certainly been sanctioned by him. Throughout the past decade Teng Hsiao-ping's sympathies were unquestionably with Chou En-lai's group of "pragmatists" or moderates, with whom he ultimately associated himself. It may be concluded that Teng's attitude to the ideology and policies of Mao was purely pragmatic. He can hardly be expected to oppose the preservation of the Mao Tse-tung cult or of any of its accessories. In politics he will hardly align himself with any of Mao's scenarios. It may be taken for granted that deep in his heart he condemns not only the Great Leap and the "people's communes" but also the "cultural revolution", which had affected him personally and cost the Chinese Communist Party and the entire nation so dear.

Teng Hsiao-ping is one of the most active proponents of a policy of accelerating China's conversion into a leading

power with a credible economy and nuclear-missile capability. Chou En-lai had him in mind when he put forward the thesis of four modernisations. Teng Hsiao-ping held that for this it was vital to enlist foreign, chiefly Western, expertise, and purchase licences and new technology, including technology for the armaments industry.

It is harder to gauge his views on foreign policy. During the past 10-15 years he has given no sign that his stand differed in any way from that of Mao Tse-tung to the USSR and other socialist countries, to relations with the communist movement, or to the superpower theory and the world's division into three groups of nations. This is, perhaps, the reason Mao Tse-tung was relatively tolerant of him. What the Chairman never tolerated was sympathy for the Soviet Union, any sign of true internationalism. This, evidently, was what Teng Hsiao-ping was never guilty of. Teng's latest pronouncements bristled with vitriolic anti-Sovietism.

A new figure appeared some time ago in the CPC political firmament. He is Wang Tung-hsing, Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and head of the CC internal security. He, too, had been a General Secretary of the Presidium of the 11th CPC Congress. At 61 (at the time of writing) he is the youngest of the CPC Chairman's deputies. He comes from a poor peasant family and began his career as one of Mao's bodyguards during the Long March.

After the people's revolution Wang Tung-hsing was appointed chief of the 8th Department of the Ministry of Public Security and in 1955 he became Deputy Minister. He began to climb politically during the "cultural revolution". When the post of General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee was abolished Wang Tung-hsing was put in charge of the CC Office, a non-statutory organ that, evidently, performed some of the functions of secretariat. In 1969 he was elected alternate member of the Politburo.

For a long time he headed the CC Office, whose function was to ensure the safety of Party leaders and have custody of Party documents, and also of Military Unit No. 8341, which guarded Chungnanhai, a special district in Peking where CPC leaders had their residences and offices. Nothing was known of the Wang Tung-hsing operation



until a year after Mao Tse-tung's death, when some information was released about the functions of the CPC Office and the Special Military Unit No. 8341.

In September 1977 *Jenmin jihpao* carried an article written by a theory study group at the CC on the occasion of the first anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's death under the heading: "Never Forget Chairman Mao Tse-tung's Behest to Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat".<sup>2</sup> It divulged one of the most closely guarded secrets of the Peking court: the work of the CC Office and Military Unit No. 8341. According to this article, after abolishing many Party and government posts Mao Tse-tung made his private office and special military unit a direct instrument for the most confidential actions in the Party, the army, and other organisations.

From this article we learn that all the officials of the CC Office, all who belonged to Military Unit No. 8341, "had for many years had the happiness of association with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and for a long time had the benefit of his heartfelt concern and instruction". The CC Office was called an "exceedingly important" working organ of the CC. Its duties were to ensure the safety of Mao Tse-tung and the CC and "guard vital secrets" in the Party. "The basic interests of the entire Party, of the entire army, of the entire people, of the entire country depended on the Office of the CPC Central Committee remaining in the hands of the headquarters headed by Chairman Mao Tse-tung and on the safety of Mao and the Party Central Committee."

The article stated that various groups—Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, the "gang of four"—had gone to all lengths to gain control of the CC Office and make it their weapon, but "Chairman Mao Tse-tung personally led us in the bitter struggle of two classes, of two lines". As early as December 1965, according to the article, Mao Tse-tung told officials of the Office: "The work of the secret unit, of the guard, is extremely important. The Party secret must be guarded closely so that it is not used by revisionism, to prevent revisionism in our ranks."

Another interesting point: in April 1966 this Office selected Chairman's pronouncements, put them together in a volume of quotations, and submitted the volume for his approval.

During the "cultural revolution" Mao Tse-tung personally looked through the wall-posters criticising Liu Shao-chi issued by the Office and the military unit. "Chairman Mao Tse-tung told us to promote the movement in accordance with the character and specifics of the work of the CC Office, to have no contact with the public, and ensure the normal functioning of the organs serving the Party CC."

It now comes to light that opponents of Mao had repeatedly tried to mute the influence of the CC Office. They demanded external contacts and insisted on a "thorough reshuffle in Chungnanhai". The "gang of four", we learn, had time and again encroached upon the influence of the CC Office. Chiang Ching had "maliciously slandered Unit No. 8341, declaring that it was undependable". But she was rebuffed by Mao Tse-tung. "Chairman Mao Tse-tung strongly denounced this brazen lie and noted sternly that if Unit No. 8341 was undependable Lin Piao would easily have killed him. He would not have had to make such an effort, using 'fleets' and 'flotillas', bombers, and flame-throwers."

The CC Office had charge of all Party correspondence, and it was the only channel through which documents could be sent to Party organisations. The article related how the CC Office combatted the attempts of the "gang of four" to disseminate their Party documents. "In line with Chairman Mao Tse-tung's instructions, we kept him informed of this. These instructions were: 'All the documents and telegrams sent in the name of the CC may be dispatched only after I have seen them, otherwise they are 'invalid'."

Mao Tse-tung let nobody, not even Chiang Ching, meddle with the leadership of the CC Office and the special military unit. To believe the article, Mao Tse-tung spoke negatively of Chiang Ching in talks with officials of the CC Office. "Chairman Mao Tse-tung said that Chiang Ching was a paper tiger, that she would burst if she were touched. She treats weak people badly, and fears those who are strong. She fears you. You must fight her. Be afraid of nothing, for I am here."

The article claimed that a special service of the CC Office and Unit No. 8341 was that they played the decisive part in arresting the "gang of four" at a key moment,

when they were planning a counter-revolutionary coup. "When, following the behests of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and the Party CC headed by him took resolute steps, Military Unit No. 8341 headed by the Party CC and Hua Kuo-feng and under the personal command of Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and Deputy Chairman Yeh Kiang-ying firmly carried out the orders of the CC and, taking immediate action, dealt the gang of four a devastating blow."

There is every indication that the Office and the special military unit are still functioning. This is seen from the closing passages in the article: "We pledge to hold high the banner of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought under the leadership of the Party CC and Chairman Hua Kuo-feng. May the revolution begun by Mao Tse-tung flourish."

Estimates of the numerical strength of Unit No. 8341 vary: from 15,000 to 45,000 men. It seems that it consists of two guards detachments, an armoured regiment, some special air-defence units, a communications unit, and engineering troops. During the "cultural revolution" this unit was in occupation of at least six large factories and two principal educational institutions—Peking University and Tsinghua Polytechnical Institute.

The revealing report about Mao Tse-tung's personal Office and about the military unit subordinated personally to him is reminiscent of a detective story, and lifts the curtain on the personality and posture of their chief, Wang Tung-hsing. In 1977 *The New York Times* wrote of an influential backstage figure in China who was beginning to play the principal role in the Chinese hierarchy. It noted that while Hua Kuo-feng was Mao's successor to the post of Chairman of the CC and Teng Hsiao-ping was the actual ruler of China, Wang Tung-hsing was influential behind-the-scenes. He headed the internal security apparatus of the CC and was the arbiter in the argument over the succession to Mao.<sup>3</sup>

Wang Tung-hsing was among the people most loyal personally to Mao Tse-tung. It would be safe to say that he showed little interest in theory and big politics. Only the future will make it possible to form a judgment of his ideological and political views.

Li Hsien-nien, Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and Deputy Premier, has been for many years occupied with economics, finance, and foreign policy. At 69 (at the time of writing) he is one of the senior members of the top CPC leadership: he was active in the civil war; he has been a member of the Politburo since 1956 and a Deputy Chairman of the CC since 1962.

He has made innumerable statements on the home and foreign policy of the CPC. On August 14, 1977 *Gnistan*, mouthpiece of the so-called Communist Party of Sweden, published an interview with him, and at the close of the same month *The New York Times* published a long interview given by him immediately after US Secretary of State Vance's exploratory visit to Peking. In these statements he gave a fairly long exposition not only of the CPC leadership's official stand but also of his own views.

He gave much of his attention to the "gang of four", declaring that their downfall was in large measure ensured by Mao Tse-tung himself. At the 10th CPC Congress Mao criticised them, and in 1974 said "that they should not form a 'faction of four'". In May 1975 Mao was said to have noted that "if the problem of the group of four is not decided in the first half of 1975 it must be decided in the second half. If it is not decided in the second half of the year, it must be decided next year, in a year." Mao was thus determined to settle the matter, but he was too ill to do it personally.

The purpose of this chronology was patently to show Mao's perspicacity, for the group was exposed precisely a year later, as allegedly predicted by Mao. Li Hsien-nien said that Mao's choice of a successor fell "on his pupil Hua Kuo-feng", who had considerable experience as a leader of the lower and middle echelon and in the centre, and also experience of theoretical and practical work.

Speaking of the "gang of four" Li Hsien-nien maintained that Mao believed 95 per cent of the veteran cadres were good, but that the "four" had insisted that all the veterans of the democratic revolution in China were accomplices of the capitalists.

He shed some light on the destiny of the four. In one of his statements he declared that Chiang Ching and the other members of the "four" were alive. "They are fed well and as long as the investigations last they will be

kept in solitary confinement." He added: "They behave as human beings when people are present, and act as mad dogs when their backs are turned."

He said that the ideological influence of the "four" had to be neutralised, believing that this would be accomplished by continuing the general line set by Mao and Chou, namely, completing the "four modernisations" during the present century.

In reply to whether the "gang of four" would be brought to trial, he said: "We shall not kill them. We shall let them live and shall feed them." Chairman Mao, he said, had always believed that the Communists "should not kill too many people". "People doing evil should be deprived of political rights, expelled from the Communist Party, and stripped of all their posts in and outside the Communist Party. In addition, they should not be permitted to enjoy freedom," Li Hsien-nien said.

Both these pronouncements were punctuated with attacks on the Soviet Union and its policy. "If we compare the Soviet Union and the United States we shall find that the USA is on the defensive in an attempt to preserve what it has acquired, while Moscow is in all respects pursuing an expansionist policy." He took pains to dangle the "Soviet threat" bogey before the eyes of the NATO leaders. "If we speak of whom the polar bear wants to bite, it is not necessarily China. It may be Europe!"

Li Hsien-nien declared that China had no interest in the Belgrade Conference and called it a "mutual fraud". "We call this meeting not a conference on security," he said, "but a conference on insecurity for Europe."

Purges and investigations have been continuing throughout China ever since before the 11th CPC Congress. In many parts of the country the political situation remains very tense indeed. Although Hua Kuo-feng promised that the unmasking of supporters of the "four" and the investigations would end at the close of 1977 the campaign goes on unabated.

Party and military leaders continue to be relieved of their posts according to the ritual scripted during the "cultural revolution". Many are denounced at rallies, and some meet their end in jail.

A rally held in Yunnan Province on March 7, 1977 and attended by 50,000 people was addressed by Chang Cheng-

hsien, Deputy Secretary of the provincial Party committee. He said that the CPC Central Committee had decided that investigations connected with the "gang of four" affair would be conducted in every government office, at every factory, in all rural communities, in all army units, and in shops. He declared that "all counter-revolutionaries who had connived at the massacres, pogroms, and plunder, all who had acted against Chairman Mao and Chairman Hua will be suppressed". He called for unrelenting action against "bad elements" guilty of subversion and contravention of public order.

A vigorous campaign against the deposed "gang of four" group has been launched in many provinces, particularly in the city of Shanghai.

Li Hsien-nien's attacks on Soviet policy relative to the border with China and on Soviet foreign policy generally, and his venomous interpretation of the conflict between China and the USSR make his pronouncements more anti-Soviet than those of the other four members of the CC Standing Committee. Having borne the responsibility for the CPC leadership's policy, chiefly on the international scene since 1959, Li Hsien-nien is, judging by all the signs, not inclined to reconsider his stand.

Of the other leaders attention is attracted by Hsu Shi-yu, commander of the Kwangchow Military District. One of the most prominent Chinese generals and a participant in the civil war, he is closely associated with Teng Hsiao-ping and Yeh Kiang-ying. He is known as a proponent of modernising the army and equipping it with advanced armaments, and in home policy he supports Teng Hsiao-ping.

A few words about the second echelon leadership.

After the 11th CPC Congress the newspapers published the names of the leaders of all 28 provinces, the major cities and districts. These lists were accompanied by detailed accounts of rallies held in the localities on the first anniversary of Mao Tse-tung's death, September 9, 1977.

With the opposition crushed, the new Chinese leaders have started a gradual change of the leadership at the provincial level. During the first year following Mao's death new first secretaries were appointed in 12 of China's 26 provinces, and in autonomous regions. The first, second, and third secretaries of the Party committees in Shanghai were replaced; the "lefts" had held particularly strong po-

sitions in the city. In violation of the CPC Constitution none of the new secretaries was elected.

The new leadership consolidated their positions in the Party, and then in government institutions. At a sitting in the House of the National Congress on October 23-24 1977, the Standing Committee of the fourth National People's Congress resolved to convene the first session of the fifth NPC in the spring of 1978 with the following agenda: 1. Report on the work of the government; 2. Amendments to the Constitution of the PRC, other amendments; 3. Election and appointment of top-echelon officials of the government.

The session was addressed by Yu Chiu-li, Deputy Premier of the State Council, who spoke of the state of the national economy. He said that under the leadership of Hua Kuo-feng and the CPC Central Committee China had within a single year ended the stagnation and even decline of industry caused by hindrances and subversion by the "gang of four". Further, he noted that there were difficulties and suggested ways and means of boosting efficiency. Speeches were delivered by other members of the Standing Committee and also by scientists and teachers. The scientists and teachers declared that they were aware of their great responsibility for the "four modernisations". They declared that they were prepared "to climb to the summits of science and technology, train as many scientific and technical cadres as possible for the nation, and mark the opening of the first session of the fifth National People's Congress with practical achievements."

The session approved the list of appointments and changes of ambassadors to foreign countries recommended by the State Council.

In a speech before members of the Standing Committee Hua Kuo-feng stated the motivations for convening the session ahead of schedule and enunciated the political guidelines of the CPC.

He said that the 11th CPC Congress had formulated a "Marxist line" for the new stage of China's development. He gave two main reasons for convening the session ahead of schedule: the first was to continue uprooting the pernicious influence of the "gang of four" on state authority and consolidate and organisationally develop the victory of the "cultural revolution", particularly in the campaign to smash this "gang"; the second was the need to carry out the line

of the 11th Congress, the strategy being to single out the principal element and establish "great order" throughout the country.

There are some points that must be noted in any overall assessment of the CPC top leadership as a body. First, the prevalence of the old guard, who have come to a certain compromise with the groups that rose to power during the "cultural revolution". Second, the assertion, at this stage at least, of the more moderate line of the pragmatists following in the tradition of Chou En-lai. Third, professions of loyalty to the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung by the entire CPC leadership. Fourth, an incipient differentiation of political and ideological views among the new CPC leadership.

## Modernisation of Maoism?

The Chairman Mao Memorial Hall was opened on September 9, 1977. According to Hsinhua, it took nine months to build. On November 24, 1976 Hua Kuo-feng threw the first spadeful of earth on the foundation, and on August 30, 1977, after the 11th Congress of the CPC ended all the delegates paid homage to the embalmed remains of Mao Tse-tung in the Memorial Hall. This building stands south of the National Heroes Memorial in Tienanmen Square. It is 33.6 metres high and occupies an area of over 20,000 square metres. White marble monoliths with gilded characters reading Chairman Mao Memorial Hall (written by Hua Kuo-feng) tower over the southern and northern entrances. There are 48 columns—12 on each side—a double-tiered roof of glazed tiles, a balustrade of white marble slabs, and a double-tiered base faced with dark-red granite. Around the Memorial Hall there are pines, palms, cedars, and other trees, and also flower-beds. The body of Mao Tse-tung, the Hsinhua News Agency said, is covered with the flag of the CPC and rests in a crystal coffin in the visitors' hall. "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's face, set in firm lines, is tranquil as in his lifetime."

The edifice, it is said, was built under the direction of the CPC Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, who "personally heard" the reports on the work, beginning with the designing and the actual building and ending with



the assembly of equipment and the finishing. After ten months of research medical workers from Peking, Shanghai, Hunan, Kwangtung, and other places "succeeded in embalming the body of Chairman Mao Tse-tung".

The memorial rally was attended by Hua Kuo-feng, Yeh Kiang-ying, Teng Hsiao-ping, Li Hsien-nien, Wang Tung-hsing, and other Party and government notables, and 10,000 representatives of Peking's population. It was addressed by Hua Kuo-feng. He called upon the Party, the army, and the people to carry out the behests of Mao Tse-tung, abide by the guidelines formulated by the 11th CPC Congress, and unite in order to attain ever greater achievements. He exhorted: "Hold aloft the great banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, firmly maintain the fundamental course set by the Party in the historical period of socialist construction with emphasis on the decisive link, establish general order in the nation, continue the revolution, and work to build a powerful modern socialist state—these are the guidelines of the Party's 11th Congress."

He spoke highly of Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, specifically of the "Great Theory of Continuing the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat". Among other ideas of the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung he mentioned the Great Leap in the economy, the "revolutionising build-up of the People's Liberation Army and preparations against the event of war", "people's democracy", and "Chairman Mao Tse-tung's strategic formula of division into three worlds". The 11th CPC Congress, he declared, had restored and developed the glorious traditions and style worked out for it by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, with the result that the Party had grown "more united, more close-knit, and stronger".

"It is our duty," he said, "to hand down the great banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung from one generation to another as the most revered heritage."

He reaffirmed the intention of the new CPC leadership to keep Mao Tse-tung on the Party's banner. He was aware that the struggle against Mao's associates in the "gang of four" would necessarily cast a shadow on the late CPC Chairman. Hence the need for greater effort to preserve the cult of Mao, and use it to prop up Hua's own prestige.<sup>1</sup>

What prompted the new CPC leadership to continue the cult of Mao Tse-tung? Was there any other choice at this

early stage of the struggle over his ideological and political heritage?

Mao's preservation as the unfading ideological and political authority was favoured, first and foremost, by tradition. For more than forty years the Chinese Communists had been used to venerating Mao Tse-tung, to treating every word uttered by him, every instruction issued by him as a law, and every act as the finger of destiny. For four decades the Party, its leaders, and the mass media, and also the army, the state apparatus, and public organisations had by common effort erected a pyramid symbolising the greatness and unquestioned prestige of the late CPC Chairman. Not a single leader and not a single rank-and-file Communist either held or could hold aloof from this colossal work, which was given perhaps more attention than the nation's economic and social development. Who would raise his hand against this pyramid and risk being crushed by its ruins? Besides, was it possible to bring it down quickly, to reshape the mass mind, and sow doubt about the sanctity of what had become the holy of holies?

The temptation was much too great to continue under the old banner, to rely on established authorities, to utilise the tradition, and move in its channel. It was hard to topple Mao from his pedestal for another reason. Mao Tse-tung had been at the head of the Party during the people's revolution, and had been involved in the creation of the People's Republic of China. His name was associated with successful early transformations such as the agrarian reform, the nationalisation of industry, and the cooperation of agriculture. Would not any attempt to denigrate him cast aspersions on the revolution itself, on the foundations of the Chinese Communist Party and state? These apprehensions were, obviously, very real to his successors.

Further, it should be borne in mind that the overwhelming majority of the present leaders in the Party had been installed by Mao-Tse-tung personally or with his consent. The downfall of his prestige would question the legality of their continued presence on the nation's political Olympus.

To reject Mao's ideological heritage would be tantamount to making it a weapon of the opposition, notably the "gang of four", and then of any potential opponent of Hua Kuo-feng, of the entire present leadership of the CPC. Indeed, the struggle over Mao could cause new splits in the

CPC, where his thought had reigned supreme for much too long, where true notions of scientific socialism had been relentlessly weeded out.

Moreover, account had to be taken of the CPC's international prestige, albeit falsely understood but nonetheless existing as a tangible fact of the political thinking of the Chinese leaders. Chinese propaganda had made for Mao the image of "ideologue and leader of the international liberation movement" among the innumerable so-called Marxist-Leninist parties in many countries. Their ideology is founded on Maoism. To destroy this foundation would mean renouncing political influence among these many small groups, whom Peking values highly.

The new CPC leadership found themselves in an exceedingly difficult position when they had to assess the personality, work, ideology, and policy of Mao Tse-tung.

It was easier to remain under the banner of Mao Tse-tung than to risk (which was, perhaps, impossible at this stage) removing his name from the banner. But that posed them with another, perhaps, similarly acute problem. This was the problem of what they were to do now, the problem of inheriting Mao's policies and methods, which had clearly driven the nation's economy, culture, and internal and external affairs into an impasse.

While the problem of inheriting power seemed to prompt the preservation and galvanisation of the cult of Mao, the problem of mapping out policy demanded a rupture with his heritage, at least, with line imposed by him after the 8th CPC Congress, namely, the Great Leap, the "people's communes", and the "cultural revolution".

In their effort to reconcile incompatibles, the new CPC leaders found themselves confronted by the dilemma of simultaneously preserving the heritage of Mao Tse-tung and renouncing obsolete or obviously unrealistic guidelines. The tradition shaped in the preceding period came to their aid: any slogan could be given a new interpretation, and any face could be given new features. Since Mao had "Sinicised" Marxism, why should his successors not venture to modernise Maoism? Of course, this would doom the resulting policy to contradiction, vacillation, and feverishness. Such are the objective and subjective difficulties of this transition period, in which the Communist Party of China has found itself.

China urgently needs some major reforms. But before these reforms can be enforced policy together with its underlying ideology must be reconsidered. No progress can be made and nothing resembling major reforms in the economy, social relations, science, and culture is conceivable on the basis of the ideology and policy of the "cultural revolution". The ideology and policy of the Great Leap leave no room for planning production and giving incentives to the workers. Agriculture cannot be modernised if the ideology and policy of the "people's communes" are continued. In other words, it is hard, probably impossible, to move in opposite directions simultaneously for any length of time—to chart a new policy and remain true to the ideology of Mao Tse-tung.

Let us see how this contradiction is today mirrored in the sphere of theory. One way or another, the new leaders are finding they have to answer the question: what heritage are they accepting and what are they renouncing?

What ideological winds are blowing on the political Olympus in the CPC?

First and foremost, note must be made of the careful sorting out of the Party's ideological luggage. To be more exact, it is not so much a sorting out as a resorting, of gradually relegating ideas that had been paramount and giving prominence to those that had been mentioned in passing. In other words, the accents are being rearranged in the propagation of the long-familiar set of "thought of Mao Tse-tung". The second point is the gradual evolution of the Party leadership's approach to the ideological heritage of Mao Tse-tung: statements made yesterday differ from those made immediately after the death of Mao, and those made today are likewise somehow different from those of yesterday. The third point is the growing diversity of assessments by members of the top CPC leadership and also by individual organs of the official Chinese press.

In this context considerable interest focusses on an article by Hua Kuo-feng headed "Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End. A study of Volume V of the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*" printed on May Day, 1977, by leading Chinese newspapers.<sup>2</sup> The highest possible praise is heaped on the work and personality of Mao Tse-tung as a statesman and ideologue. "Our great leader and teacher Chairman Mao Tse-tung was

the founder of our Party, our army, and our People's Republic and the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time. Summing up the experience of the revolutionary movement in China and of the contemporary world revolutionary movement, Chairman Mao made outstanding contributions to Marxism-Leninism in the spheres of philosophy, political economy, and scientific socialism, thus immensely enriching the treasure-house of Marxist-Leninist theory."

This is an almost word for word reproduction of the assessment given by Yao Wen-yuan in 1967 on the crest of the "cultural revolution".

All the achievements of the Chinese revolution are attributed to Mao, and all the setbacks and mistakes to his opponents, who are anonymously bracketed as "right and left opportunists of all hues and shades". But it is more than simply a matter of assessing the past. Hua Kuo-feng declared that China's successes depended entirely on the Party's fidelity to the ideology of Mao Tse-tung:

"During Chairman Mao's lifetime, we united under his banner and fought victorious battles. Since he passed away, loyalty to his banner has become a guarantee for the victory of our revolutionary cause. All our comrades should fully understand this. We must always hold aloft and resolutely defend Chairman Mao's banner so that our revolutionary cause, under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung Thought, will continue to advance triumphantly along Chairman Mao's revolutionary line."

Further, he related how Volume V of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* was prepared. Mao is said to have delegated Chou En-lai and Kang Sheng to take charge of the compilation of the volume as early as 1969, but "interference and sabotage" by the revisionists—Lin Piao and Chen Po-ta and, more recently, the "anti-Party 'gang of four'"—had prevented this volume from being published. The purpose of this obstruction, if the press is to be believed, was that the "four" were determined to take over the compilation and publication of the volume in order to "tear down the great banner" of Chairman Mao and thereby achieve their criminal aim of seizing Party and state leadership and restoring capitalism.

If we discount the incredible report of the "four's" attempt "to tear down the banner of Chairman Mao and to restore capitalism", it may be believed that a struggle raged over

the publication of the *Selected Works* of Mao Tse-tung. Involvement in the publication of these works was considered the surest proof of close association with Mao and strengthened the claim to succeed him.

But this is only a particular. It is much more interesting to follow how Hua Kuo-feng placed his accents in expounding Mao's fundamental ideas.

The first was the question of the character of power in China following the people's revolution. We remember that on the eve of the revolution Mao Tse-tung advanced the concept of a new democracy and maintained that at the first stage, the stage of the democratic revolution, there would be a dictatorship of the main forces: workers, peasants, intellectuals, petty bourgeoisie, and even the national bourgeoisie. This concept was revamped by Hua. He said: "This concept of Chairman Mao's meant the leadership of the proletariat, upon the day of bringing the democratic revolution to victory, should without vacillation develop into state power led by the proletariat. That in fact is what happened. The people's democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat thus established was in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat."

This is an obvious "straightening out" of the concept of "new democracy", which for practical purposes nullifies its significance. If in China power had from the outset been a dictatorship of the proletariat, what sense was there in the existence of the stage of the democratic revolution, much less in the concept "new democracy" so dramatically presented by Mao Tse-tung as a specific feature of China in contrast to the experience of the Soviet Union.

It now transpires that the new democracy concept was expounded not by Mao Tse-tung at all but by Liu Shao-chi. Hua declared that the chief manifestations of Liu Shao-chi's opportunism were his advocacy of "firmly establishing the new democratic order, refusal to effect the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, abandoning leadership by the state economy, negating the necessity and possibility of unfolding the mutual aid and co-operation movement immediately after land reform and permitting class polarisation in the countryside". But precisely this was the line laid down by the 8th Congress of the CPC, envisaging the gradual and planned building of socialism in town and countryside in accordance with the obtaining

economic and social conditions. Entirely in keeping with this approach, Mao Tse-tung is given full credit for the quick transition of 500 million peasants to socialism—"thanks to Chairman Mao's correct leadership, this change was effected swiftly". On the question of the dispute over the rates for cooperating the peasants, preference is thereby given entirely to Mao Tse-tung's haste.

Then follows a strikingly indicative act of "straightening out" the "thought" of Mao Tse-tung. After reviewing Mao's pronouncements and the political developments of the latter half of the 1950s, Hua Kuo-feng focussed attention on contradictions in the nation with hardly any mention of the Great Leap and the "people's communes". Renunciation of these slogans would only have been welcomed as an indication of China's new leadership drawing some lessons from the past and feeling they could not subscribe to the economic and social utopias that had so adversely affected the nation's development. But what about the theoretical postulates underlying that policy? Is it not ludicrous to regard these postulates an "outstanding contribution of Mao Tse-tung to the international experience of socialism"?

"China," Hua Kuo-feng wrote, "completed in the main the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production in 1956. From then on, a new question confronted the Chinese revolution—whether contradictions, classes and class struggle still exist in socialist society, whether it remains necessary to continue the socialist revolution and how this revolution is to be carried on. This was also a question for which no correct answer had been found in the international communist movement for a long time . . .

"Marx and Engels . . . had no experience of the victory of the proletarian revolution and, therefore, such a question had never been posed for them in a concrete way . . .

"Lenin died too early to see with his own eyes the completion of the socialist transformation of the ownership of the means of production and it was impossible for him to answer the question clearly and definitely . . .

"In practice, he (Stalin—*Ed.*) waged resolute struggles against various counter-revolutionary bourgeois representatives who had wormed their way into the Party. Yet, theoretically he did not acknowledge that after the collectivisation of agriculture, the contradictions still existed between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the socialist

road and the capitalist road in the Soviet Union." This, he asserted, was used by Liu Shao-chi and Chen Po-ta to "spread the theory of the dying out of class struggle precisely for the purpose of writing off the socialist revolution".

It was only Mao Tse-tung who "gave the first scientific answer in the history of the international communist movement" to this question affecting the historical destiny of the dictatorship of the proletariat and evolved the great theory of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. "On the basis of this theory, Chairman Mao formulated in 1962 the Party's basic line for the whole historical period of socialism. The practice of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution which began in 1966 has augmented and enriched the theory."

Note the date—1962. The Liu Shao-chi-inspired "regulation" campaign, which had replaced the Great Leap and the "people's communes" line, was in progress at the time. According to the new version, the campaign was initiated by Mao Tse-tung. In that case, who was responsible for the Great Leap and the "people's communes"? Liu Shao-chi? We are concerned not so much with the responsibility of those who no longer figure on the political scene but with the fact that by approving the "cultural revolution" the present Chinese leadership virtually bypass the calamitous Great Leap and "people's communes" policy which preceded it.

True, this tangles up other dates. As Hua Kuo-feng quite rightly noted, the postulate that the class struggle escalates was enunciated by Mao mainly in key works written in 1956 and 1957. We remember Mao's widely publicised article "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People", which was written in 1957. It transpires that while the theory was evolved in 1957, its practical implementation as a new political line had to wait until 1962. The five dramatic years between these two dates vanish, despite the fact that a new theory had materialised and been refuted by experience.

We may further ask how are we to assess the scale of the massive repressions in and outside the Party, which were the practical expression of the postulate of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat"? Are these repressions to be justified entirely or only partially, or are they to be recognised as having been unwarranted?



Here a certain "straightening out" of Mao's political postulates begins again. "Basing himself on the experience of the anti-rightist struggle in 1957, Chairman Mao pointed out that the people who favour socialism account for 90 per cent of the total population of the country, while those who do not favour or oppose socialism make up 10 per cent, of whom 8 out of 10 may be won over through work so that the people who favour socialism may reach 98 per cent, and the diehards who are absolutely opposed to socialism make up only 2 per cent... The scientific concept of Party persons in power taking the capitalist road, put forward by Chairman Mao in 1965, clearly pointed out that the chief danger of capitalist restoration comes from the capitalist-roaders inside the Party. Generally speaking, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been a struggle waged by the proletariat and the revolutionary masses against the capitalist-roaders inside the Party who were represented by Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and the Wang-Chang-Chiang-Yao 'gang of four'... Like the contradictions between our Party and Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, the contradiction between the 'gang of four' and our Party is also a contradiction between the enemy and ourselves."

The suggested arithmetic relative to the number of enemies of the revolution and the mention of their main address—the Party leadership—divulges the political objective of Hua's article. Its aim is thus to justify Mao's attacks on his political adversaries in the CPC leadership and, at the same time, suggest that it had not been necessary to take the struggle so far—to encompass the entire Party and the non-Party mass of intellectuals, workers, and peasants. Also, Hua's purpose was to exonerate that slice of the old guard that contributed to the triumph of the new leadership and became part of it.

This is quite apparent: "Wielding the cudgel of 'opposing empiricism', the 'gang of four' tried to strike down all the cadres who had experienced long years of revolutionary struggles; they wanted to overthrow all the cadres, who had stood the test of the new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution, by labelling them 'democrats' and 'capitalist-roaders'... The gang knew that, before they could smash the revolutionary cause of the Chinese people and destroy our Party, they must first of all eliminate this body of cadres of our Party, including those new cadres who had

come to the fore during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and who had opposed the gang."

Needless to say, this apologia of the old guard was immediately justified with a reference to Mao. "Chairman Mao said: 'With such cadres as ours who have been tested in different periods of the revolution, we are able to sit tight in the fishing boat despite the rising wind and waves.'" We are thus asked to believe that Mao protected the old guard, vested it with power, and relied upon it. In that case, who conducted the "cultural revolution" against the old guard? It remains for us to assume that this was done by the "four" along with Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, who accidentally became victims of the "cultural revolution" in spite of Mao Tse-tung who sat "tight in the fishing boat" and watched the "rising wind and waves".

The considerations and interests at the back of these convolutions of political thought are quite simple. Hua Kuo-feng had himself come into prominence during the "cultural revolution" and was one of the new cadres who had had a hand in denouncing some of the old guard, chiefly Lin Piao. On the other hand, Teng Hsiao-ping's rehabilitation and the reinstatement of some of the old guard following Mao's death had to have some theoretical substantiation. This necessitated a close look at the developments of the past 15 years; where necessary to retailor, darn, shake out the dust, obscure or bury one thing and accentuate another.

Hua's pronouncement, from which we have quoted, was prompted chiefly by the political struggle, the continued criticism of the "gang of four", and the problem of forming a new leadership. In it one still finds nothing approaching a weighing of pressing economic, social, cultural, or foreign policy problems. What we find is still the general guideline of "continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" as the justification for the new round of political struggle, this time against the "gang of four". The further reassessment of the Mao ideological heritage is prompted not only by the direct interests of this struggle or by cadre problems but also by the very content of the new leadership's policy. From this springs the urgent need for reconsidering the underlying principles of the ideology used as the foundation for the "cultural revolution".

The rehabilitation of members of the old guard visibly embarrassed Chinese propaganda, above all over its dissemi-

nation of Mao's vituperations against members of the old guard. It began a feverish reinterpretation of pronouncements such as: "Some people came to the socialist revolution without the least knowledge of where the bourgeois class is to be found. Yet it is in the Communist Party. It consists of authorities in the Party taking the capitalist road. The capitalist-roaders likewise continue to follow this road." These words, printed in *Jenmin jihpao* on March 10, 1976 and directed specifically at Teng Hsiao-ping and other members of the old guard, are now given an entirely different meaning.

In March 1977 the same *Jenmin jihpao* wrote that the "gang of four" had distorted Mao's words. As the newspaper put it, the distortion lay in Yao Wen-yuan's comment that in the light of Mao's words the capitalist-roaders "should be called a class". Actually, again referring to Mao Tse-tung, the newspaper asserted that it was not a case of a class in a political party, but of "representatives of the bourgeois class". And further: "The gang of four endeavoured to prove that over 70 per cent of the old cadres still imagined they were living in the period of a democratic revolution (prior to 1949) and belonged to the bourgeois class." It turns out that the Mao quotation was misunderstood and hence the excesses committed during the "cultural revolution".<sup>3</sup>

An analogous interpretation is given of Mao's well-known words: "It is a Marxist principle to go against the stream." The Chinese press contends that the "gang of four" used these words to precipitate chaos and anarchy, to direct the entire Party against its leaders. The significance of these words proves to be the following: "The Marxist-Leninist principle of necessarily going against the stream and maintaining discipline is an integral thought: to go against the stream means to counter anarchism, which weakens and undermines discipline."<sup>4</sup>

Covert discussion of Mao's ideological heritage has lately begun to spread gradually and circumspectly to assessments of the "cultural revolution" as well. Whereas in the initial pronouncements of the new CPC leadership the "cultural revolution" was assessed admiringly, we now discern an effort to run a dividing line between the positive and negative aspects of that "revolution".

In April 1977 the press published a sensational statement by Mao Tse-tung about the "cultural revolution". It runs:

"Mao Tse-tung said that in the 'cultural revolution' seven parts must be differentiated from three—70 per cent achievements, and 30 per cent mistakes." These extraordinary words drawn from a Mao statement nobody knows about, got the following comment in the Chinese press: "The achievements, comprising the 70 per cent, were won under the leadership of Chairman Mao; the 30 per cent errors were due to interference and subversion by Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta, and also Chang Chun-tsiao, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan, and Wang Hung-wen." Further, the article cites data on the results of an inquiry into the activities of the "gang of four", specifically their counter-revolutionary past.

This attempt on the "purity" of the "cultural revolution" ideology is extremely significant, even if it is only half-hearted and partial. It indicates the direction in which the Mao ideological heritage is unfolding. Indeed, incoherence on the question of this campaign cannot last forever. Since its proponents, among whom the "four" unquestionably numbered, are being sternly and justly criticised not only for their attempt to usurp power but also for mistakes in the past, obviously their main brainchild, the "cultural revolution", cannot remain sacrosanct. Happily, the words of Mao, who allegedly did not entirely approve the "cultural revolution" and its results, were found quite suitable. One may expect to find that this was not his last assessment of the "cultural revolution". As time passes new pronouncements will surface in which the correlation between the positive and negative elements of the "cultural revolution" will change further in favour of the latter.

In "Continue the Revolution Under the Dictatorship of the Proletariat to the End", Hua Kuo-feng wrote of the time required for industrialisation and the building of socialism in China. He maintained that as early as 1954 Mao Tse-tung noted that it would take roughly 50 years, or a period of ten five-year plans, for China to achieve socialist industrialisation and agricultural mechanisation and become a great socialist power. In 1956 Mao had set the aim of overtaking and outstripping the USA. Hua quoted the following words of Mao: "This is an obligation. You have such a big population, such a vast territory and such rich resources, and what is more, it has been said that you are building socialism, which is supposed to be superior; if after much ado for 50 or 60 years you are still unable to overtake

the United States what a sorry figure you will cut. You should be read off the face of the earth. Therefore, to overtake the United States is not only possible, but absolutely necessary and obligatory. If we don't we the Chinese nation will be letting the nations of the world down and we will not be making much of a contribution to mankind."<sup>5</sup>

The reader will remember that we have mentioned the rates of industrialisation and socialist construction in China. We have followed the evolution of Mao's views on this question. It will be recalled that in the latter half of the 1950s, when he asserted that a Great Leap was both possible and necessary Mao Tse-tung named different time limits than were mentioned in the Hua Kuo-feng article. At an enlarged CC plenum in October 1955 he said that China would, in the main, build socialism in 12 years, and that it would take from 50 to 70 years, in other words a period of between 10 and 15 five-year plans, to overtake and outstrip the United States. Roughly the same time limits are given in the Hua article. But at a conference in Wuchang in 1958 Mao named entirely different time limits and pronounced the significant words: "If even after ten years, by 1968, we are ready to enter communism, we shall not do it. We shall wait at least two or three years after the Soviet Union enters communism, and we shall then enter it ourselves."

The present Chinese leaders are, of course, quite correct when they speak of a longer period of industrialisation and economic modernisation. However, we should not forget the confusion that was injected into this problem during the Great Leap and the "people's communes" period.

The month of September—the first anniversary of Mao's death—brought new curious elements into the official appraisal of his personality and heritage.

In a speech on that anniversary of Mao's death Hua Kuo-feng declared: "It is our duty to pass on the great banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung from one generation to another as the most precious heritage. The Memorial House of Chairman Mao Tse-tung towering over the Tienanmen Square is a great and noble symbol of this, of our determination and sacred pledge."<sup>6</sup>

An article, "Great Achievements in the History of the Proletarian Revolution", in the journal *Hungchi* contains a revealing passage about Mao Tse-tung. It stated: "Chairman Mao Tse-tung said that in his life he accomplished two

things: first, he deposed Chiang Kai-shek and threw him out onto Taiwan, defeated Japanese imperialism and drove it out of China; second, he victoriously conducted the great proletarian cultural revolution." Commenting this statement, the article noted: "After his first great accomplishment Chairman Mao Tse-tung resolved the question of the transition of semi-colonial countries to socialism through the national-democratic revolution. His second great accomplishment is of signal importance not only for continuing the revolution and for the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country but also for the world communist movement."

"Chairman Mao Tse-tung," the article further stated, "did much for the Chinese people and for all the other peoples of the world. But why did he say that in his life he accomplished only two things? Because he wanted to remind us that we should consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in order to advance the cause of the proletarian revolution begun by Chairman Mao Tse-tung . . . All this is the treasure left to us by Chairman Mao Tse-tung."<sup>7</sup>

Thus, of the entire Mao heritage the author of the article is attracted by the idea of a democratic revolution being significant for oppressed nations and peoples, and also by the selfsame idea of continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat. What about the rest of Mao's ideological luggage? Have his innumerable pronouncements on domestic and foreign policy and on the strategy and tactics of the communist movement lost their topicality?

The answer to this question is to be found in an article printed on September 10, 1977 simultaneously in *Jenmin jihpao*, *Hungchi*, and *Chiehfangchun pao*. This article seems to have been the first to give currency to a thought which will, evidently, underlie the approach of the Chinese leadership to the ideological heritage of Mao Tse-tung. This thought is that the ideology of Mao should be regarded as a system and not as a collection of individual quotations applicable to all circumstances and at any time.

"Mao Tse-tung Thought," the article states, "is an integral scientific system, the continuation and development of Marxism-Leninism. Chairman Mao Tse-tung developed Marxism-Leninism not in individual but in all areas". The implication is: "When Lin Piao attacked Mao Tse-tung Thought he reduced the study of its harmonious ideological system to the learning by heart of 'three articles' or 'five arti-

cles', and tore Mao Tse-tung Thought away from Marxism-Leninism. For their part, the Gang of Four had recourse to pragmatic methods and, proceeding from their own special aim, picked out individual phrases from the works of Mao and gave them an arbitrary interpretation. Mao Tse-tung Thought was thus fragmented and distorted beyond recognition. They engaged even in falsifying the instructions of Chairman Mao Tse-tung. In words they, too, stridently called for the study of the works of Mao Tse-tung, but in fact every 'study' movement started by them was used for a shameless distortion, undermining, and mangling of this Thought, for treachery. Such was the case with the criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius, and with the study of the theory of the proletarian dictatorship, and with the analysis of the novel *Water Margin*."

Further, the article quoted from Hua Kuo-feng's political report to the 11th CPC Congress: "We must diligently study works by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and by Chairman Mao and have a comprehensive and accurate grasp of Mao Tse-tung Thought as a system." "This," the article continued, "means that we should not operate mechanically with individual words and phrases lifted out of the works of Mao Tse-tung without considering the specific time, place, and conditions, without understanding them as a system. Tse-tung's words, spoken on this or that matter, were correct at a specific time, under specific conditions. Also correct were the words spoken by him on the same matter at a different time. However, words spoken by him on one and the same matter at different times and under different conditions may sometimes differ in their formulation of the matter. For that reason questions of one aspect or one sphere should be understood correctly in the light of the theme as a whole." <sup>8</sup>

Thus, every word of the Maoist gospel is no longer sacred. The quotation juggling, in which many commentators of Mao were engaged most zealously during the past two decades, has, evidently, caused not only its consumers but also its exponents to belch. Moreover, the present policy cannot be justified in every instance by a set of quotations, many of which come into conflict quite fundamentally with the present economic policy and even with each other. Hence the conclusion, one that cannot be denied subtly, is that the Mao ideological heritage should be studied as a system.

This conclusion may be useful provided the "system" of Mao Tse-tung "thought" is indeed analysed and if it is compared with the scientific system of the founders of Marxism-Leninism. But this is out of the question, of course. In casting aspersions on the method of quoting individual propositions from the works of Mao Tse-tung which are themselves full of contradictions, the Chinese leaders do not raise the question of the correlation between Mao Tse-tung's views as a whole and Marxist-Leninist ideology. The very formulation of this question would land them in a difficult position for it would completely deflate trust in Mao as the "greatest Marxist-Leninist of our epoch".

So it is quite evident that the new leaders of the CPC are now making an inventory of the Mao ideological heritage and carefully selecting the propositions and tenets that they feel meet with present-day requirements. While conserving Mao Tse-tung as a symbol of the CPC's ideological unity, they look for a way of relying on some of his guidelines, at the same time obscuring others or giving them an interpretation that clashes with what they actually mean. However, there is no hiding the fact that Maoism remains the source of the sharpest collision of forces, attitudes, and opinions in the CPC.

Suffice it to recall that the Mao ideology was used as a cover by the "gang of four" and is used today by its proponents. Both sides insist that they are giving the most orthodox interpretation of the Mao "thought" and charge each other with undisguised revisionism. But this matter goes beyond the "gang of four". Among the CPC's present top leadership, too, there is no consensus over the assessment of the Mao ideological heritage and, in particular, of the "cultural revolution". While Hua Kuo-feng speaks highly of it, other leaders eagerly quote the newly discovered Mao pronouncement, in which he is alleged to have declared that the "cultural revolution" was 70 per cent good and 30 per cent bad. As for Teng Hsiao-ping, he side-steps this issue altogether. He certainly has little cause for lauding the "cultural revolution", for had that not been the period when he was stripped of all his posts and proclaimed "bandit No. 2"?

It will be recalled that the keynote of that campaign was "to deepen the revolution" with concern for industrial development relegated to the background. Today the accents are being changed. Hua Kuo-feng speaks of deepening the



revolution in the sense of developing and modernising industry, agriculture, science, and the armed forces. Faced with the dilemma of choosing between revolution and production, many other leaders unceremoniously give priority to the latter. This, too, is the angle from which they criticise the "gang of four".

However, all this is still a far cry from disowning the Mao cult. On May 31, 1977 the Hsinhua News Agency reported that the latest output of the Peking publishing houses included many works of literature and art: an anthology of poems *Chairman Mao Will Always Live in Our Hearts*; seven books devoted to the late Chairman; reproductions of 27 paintings (including *Grand Inauguration of the People's Republic*, with the spotlight on Mao Tse-tung; *With You in Charge, I'm at Ease*, showing "Chairman Mao instructing Chairman Hua Kuo-feng"; *Comrades-in-Arms*, showing the one-time close relationship between Mao Tse-tung and his wife Yang Kai-hui); an anthology *Premier Chou En-lai Is Always With Us*, containing more than 90 "moving poems venerating the memory of Chou"; a collection of folk-songs entitled *Song of Our Esteemed Chairman Hua Kuo-feng*; a collection of songs *Hearts Burn With Love for Chairman Hua Kuo-feng*; *Selected Folk-Songs on Learning from Tachai*, and others.

The subject matter and political orientation of these publications hardly require comment. The deep channel dug in art by the "gang of four" and others during the "cultural revolution" has proved to be quite suitable today. The stream is directed to officially designated political addresses. If the renewal of art continues in this manner, it will be hard to find any essential changes compared with the past: only the faces are somewhat touched up or given fresh make-up; the principles and content remain unaltered. As a matter of fact, there have always been a surfeit of people eager for this sort of skimming.

## Mummification of the Cult

All the outward trappings of the Mao cult have seemingly remained intact. Nevertheless, this conclusion is not quite correct. In the first place, it is obvious that the pres-

ent worship of Mao can in no way be compared with what it was like during his lifetime and especially in the period of the "cultural revolution". Mao Tse-tung is accorded reverence as a man who headed the people's revolution and helped to found the People's Republic, as the leading theorist of the CPC. He is said to retain a special place in the international communist movement, where he had allegedly continued and even promoted the cause of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin. But around his name one no longer sees the endless hymn-singing observed in his lifetime. The cult has been set in a frame and acquired ritual and routine rather than religious forms. "The dead sleep peacefully in the grave, and the living delight in the joy of living." Some of the present CPC leaders are receiving almost the same praises as Mao Tse-tung: "wise leader", "outstanding Marxist-Leninist", and so forth.

This is also seen in the fact that the present Chinese leaders, like the press, have now begun paying tribute to Mao Tse-tung's former associates, whose role had been studiously ignored during the "helmsman's" lifetime. Above all, this concerns Chou En-lai. This outstanding personality of the CPC had always preferred to remain in the shadow; today he is brought into the limelight. The campaign around his name and intellectual heritage is conducted on such a large scale and with so much enthusiasm that many Western analysts are writing of a "cult of Chou En-lai".

The glorification of Chou En-lai started when Mao Tse-tung was still alive. We have related the events in the Tienanmen Square in 1976, when, partly led by Communists, masses of people demonstrated their affection for the late Premier against the wishes of Mao Tse-tung and his group. This conflict ended with brutal retributions against people who took part in the spontaneous rally. Many were arrested, and at least 300 were in prison until the death of Mao Tse-tung. Today all the blame for these reprisals is imputed to the "gang of four".

It seems the "four's" downfall broke the dam holding the flood of laudation for Chou En-lai, which is kept up not only spontaneously but also with encouragement from above. It is hard to say what the new Chinese leaders hope to gain from this. Quite probably each of the groups in the present leadership has its own objectives. For Teng

Hsiao-ping this is not only a political but also a sentimental issue, because his rehabilitation after the "cultural revolution" was due exclusively to Chou En-lai and because his personal and ideological intimacy with the famous pragmatist is common knowledge. For other members of the CPC leadership the glorification of Chou En-lai is an important means of shoring up Mao Tse-tung's shaken prestige. While for the entire leadership this glorification is, undoubtedly, a means of combatting the "gang of four", who hated and feared him. But the most important thing is that Chou's views, i.e., the views of the moderate wing of Maoism, are shared by the nation's present leaders.

The Chinese press finds that Chou En-lai's chief merit was that in all the political battles that convulsed the CPC he consistently sided with Mao Tse-tung and faithfully implemented the "helmsman's" policies. Was this actually the case? Indeed, as we have seen, since the close of the 1930s Chou En-lai did in fact collaborate with Mao. Cautious and circumspect, he never ventured to set his own views in opposition to those of Mao or openly support his adversaries. At the 9th and 10th CPC congresses, he levelled sharp criticism at Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta, and other disgraced Chinese leaders. What is untrue is that Chou En-lai was the "closest", "most loyal", and "most consistent" associate of Mao Tse-tung. Despite their more than 40 years' collaboration, there was never anything akin to genuine friendship between Mao and Chou. Mao never said a kind word about Chou En-lai. The role of No. 2 in the nation was given by Mao to Liu Shao-chi and then to Lin Piao, but never to Chou En-lai. Even after the downfall of all the top men in the CPC, when Chou was in effect alone on the political horizon, Mao Tse-tung had no intention of sharing power with him or somehow strengthening his position as a successor in the event of his (Mao's) death. More, shortly before Chou En-lai died, Mao in fact left him to the mercies of the "gang of four". When the loud campaign against Confucius ended, and the criticism of *Water Margin*, a campaign Mao Tse-tung personally orchestrated, commenced, many people in the CPC realised that this time Chou En-lai was the target.

The Chinese press now offers innumerable examples characterising the relations between the "gang of four" and Chou En-lai, relations which give a good idea of Mao's

attitude to him. One of these examples is an episode linked with the fourth session of the National People's Congress. The story, repeated in many articles, is that on assignment from the "four" Wang Hung-wen went to Mao Tse-tung in order to "smear" Chou En-lai and attempt to form a "cabinet of ministers". If this story is to be believed, Mao rejected the solicitations of the "four" and took Chou En-lai under his wing. However, Wang Hung-wen continued attacking Chou without any hindrance from Mao. This took place in October 1974. At his meeting with Mao Wang Hung-wen told him that Chou En-lai was the chief spokesman of the bourgeoisie in the Party and asked approval for a list, he had brought along with him, of new leaders for the State Council. This would have placed the entire executive power and most of the ministries and committees into the hands of the "four".

Mao sent this list to Chou En-lai, who was in a hospital, requesting his opinion. Of course, Chou ventured no objections. But when this question was discussed by the Politburo, the veteran cadres and the military protested. Chu Teh declared that if Chou En-lai was not elected Premier, that office should go to himself. Nothing was decided at that meeting. The veteran cadres and the military sent their representatives to Chou En-lai in the hospital with the demand that he remain in office and at least modify the submitted State Council list. It is said that a bitter quarrel took place at Chou En-lai's bedside between representatives of the two groups. In this situation Mao Tse-tung did not risk acceding to all the demands of the "gang of four". The veteran cadres retained most of the key posts in the new State Council. Chou En-lai remained Premier, and Teng Hsiao-ping was appointed Deputy Premier. On the eve of the fourth National People's Congress (January 1975) Teng Hsiao-ping was appointed Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, and Senior Deputy Premier.

One more fact gives the lie to the present claims that there were friendly relations between Mao and Chou. When it became known that Chou En-lai was gravely ill, the CC set up a group to supervise his medical treatment. None other than Wang Hung-wen was appointed head of this group. He insisted on surgery, despite the opposition of the doctors, who declared that an operation would hasten

Chou En-lai's death. The operation was never performed, and Chou En-lai died a year later. A wall-poster hung in Peking some time ago demanded the building of a Chou En-lai Memorial House separate from the Mao Memorial House. Further, it demanded a Chu Teh Memorial Room in the Chou Memorial House. This showed the actual feeling of the bulk of the Communists and non-Communists for Chou En-lai as a member of the old guard who had always championed a more constructive policy for the building of a new China.

This cannot be discounted. Chou En-lai, correctly characterised by foreign analysts as the "most consistent pragmatist", did not oppose Maoism, but he invariably came forward in the role of a shock-absorber during the implementation of Mao Tse-tung's fitful, spasmodic, and frequently ill-considered economic, social, and cultural policies. At the 8th CPC Congress he suggested reasonable guidelines for the methodical building of socialism; he was not enthusiastic about the Great Leap and the "people's communes" and was active in enforcing the succeeding "regulation" policy. He was a member of the Committee for the Cultural Revolution, but there, too, he refrained from initiatives. After the "cultural revolution" he did what he could, covertly and overtly, to keep veteran cadres in the leadership, stabilise the economic and political situation, and focus attention on production. Mao Tse-tung needed Chou's work and prestige in order to govern the nation efficiently, something he was not inclined to do, preferring to give his mind to ideology, general policy, and, in particular, his favourite pastime of setting his former associates against each other and destroying them.

There are, of course, no grounds for illusions about the independence of Chou's line. In major political and ideological issues he acted in unison with Mao Tse-tung and shared the responsibility for the policy of splitting the world communist movement and for anti-Sovietism.

Nevertheless, whereas during Mao's lifetime Chou was indeed a mainstay of the personality cult, after Mao's death the situation changed radically. Whatever many of the present CPC leaders may think, the glorification of Chou En-lai objectively operates against the Mao Tse-tung cult and represents a moderate alternative to the policy of the extremists.

The same purpose is served by the laudation of the memory of other members of the old guard, whose names and work were obscured during Mao Tse-tung's lifetime. In August 1977 the journal *Hungchi* published a long article, "In Memory of the Esteemed and Beloved Chairman Chu Teh", to mark the 50th anniversary of the PLA. This official article, written by the ideological group of the PLA General Staff, is the first-ever tribute in the history of the CPC to the outstanding soldier who commanded the Chinese Communist armies during the civil war. It stated that Chu Teh "made immortal contributions to the Party and to the people in building and developing the invincible people's army, in building and expanding the revolutionary base areas, in overthrowing the reactionary rule of imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism, in winning the victory of the new democratic revolution, in building up the revolutionary power of our country, in consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in developing the socialist revolution and construction." "The illustrious name of Comrade Chu Teh will shine forever in the history of the Chinese Revolution!", the article declared, calling Chu Teh "an old revolutionary hero and a loyal servant of the people". It asserted that Chu Teh was a close associate of Mao Tse-tung, that the former was loyal to the policy pursued by Mao at all stages of the history of the CPC. The blame for the secret and open attacks on Chu is, of course, imputed not to Mao Tse-tung but to the "gang of four" and Lin Piao. "They," the article stated, "had for a long period viciously attacked Comrade Chu Teh and wilfully tampered with history. Lin Piao and company had the effrontery to claim that it was he, and not Commander-in-Chief, who had led the armed forces to join Chairman Mao in the Ching Kang Mountains. The 'gang of four' banned any mention of Commander-in-Chief Chu when anyone wrote about the Nanchang Uprising and the Long March. They wanted to write off the historical role played by the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries and negate the splendid history of our Party so that they could realise their criminal aim of usurping the supreme leadership of the Party and state."<sup>1</sup>

A questionable interpretation of history indeed. Chu Teh's role as the most outstanding commander of the period of the Long March and of the struggle against Japan-

ese aggression and the civil war was passed over in silence because that role was claimed by Mao Tse-tung. This is common knowledge. Similarly, it is common knowledge that after the civil war Chu Teh was relegated and had to reconcile himself to a secondary role in the CPC Central Committee.

The restoration of the truth about Chu Teh, regardless of the objectives of any of the Chinese leaders, will likewise hardly help to bolster the posthumous cult of Mao. The same orientation is followed by the rehabilitation of many other CPC personalities. In August 1977 *Jenmin jihpao* carried a long article devoted to the memory of Chen Yi, who was a member of the Politburo and China's Foreign Minister. The heading speaks for itself: "A Man Open and Aboveboard. A Revolutionary All His Life". After Chen Yi's death, the article declared, the sectarian "gang of four" continued to revile him. They even went to the length of ordering organised criticism of the revolutionary cadres and people of Shanghai who mourned Chen Yi.<sup>2</sup>

It is interesting that today Chen Yi is praised for having opposed the excesses of the "cultural revolution". It now transpires that Chen Yi condemned the "gang's" slogan of "Down with everything!" and the "general civil war" planned by them.

The Mao cult will hardly gain anything either by the rehabilitation of the men who fell victim to the "four" in subsequent years. At the close of August 1977 Teng Hsiao-ping attended a rally in memory of Chou Jung-hsin, former Minister of Education, who died at the hands of extremists in 1976 and has been posthumously rehabilitated. Like Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou Jung-hsin was disgraced during the "cultural revolution", while in January 1975 he was reinstated in his rights and became Minister of Education. When the campaign against Teng commenced, Chou Jung-hsin was one of its first victims. He was jailed, and during his imprisonment he was exhibited at "struggle rallies" several times a day with his hands tied at his back and his head bowed. It is now known that as a result of these insults and indignities, he had a brain haemorrhage at one of these rallies and died in a hospital on April 13, 1976. This death is imputed solely to the "gang of four". But it is hard to believe that the identity of the person

who actually orchestrated and inspired mockeries of this sort does not occur to many Chinese.

The endless laudatory references to the "beloved Premier Chou En-lai" and the "beloved Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh", and the rehabilitation of many of members of the old guard mirror the efforts of the present CPC leaders to consolidate the continuity of their power and policies. The inheritance hence consists not only of Mao Tse-tung and his "thought", but also of many other deceased personalities, especially those whose views, like those of Chou En-lai, were closer to the present policy of the CPC.

We have tried to pinpoint elements of the past to be found today in the ideology of the present leadership. We shall now try to trace elements of the present in it.

The Mao ideological heritage could not and did not become the platform uniting his successors. On the contrary, it generated savage rivalry. This concerns chiefly the group of leftists, whom, in accordance with the existing pattern, the moderate pragmatic group now labels "rightist elements". Both sides vowed fidelity to Mao Tse-tung. This fidelity did not save some of the leadership from total political defeat. The victorious side is using every argument to prove that far from having been faithful to Mao Tse-tung and his "thought", the "gang of four" had during his lifetime waged a covert struggle against him and had speciously interpreted his "thought" and distorted his guidelines. But here it is hard to answer the simple question of why this was tolerated by Mao Tse-tung. The latest writings claiming that Mao Tse-tung repeatedly warned the "gang of four" about its divisive, anti-Party activities leave no room for the assumption that he knew nothing of this backstage work. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that he could do nothing to curb them. But even this assumption is refuted by the fact that Mao Tse-tung wielded so much power up to the day of his death that despite the resistance of the "four" he nominated Hua Kuo-feng, who was little known in the Party at the time, as his successor. The interpretation of this development thus contains a gaping hole which no logic can fill.

Indeed, people who had been closest to Mao Tse-tung suffered defeat. They had been closest not only as kin (wife, son-in-law), but also as ideological and political associates. All these people had been brought into the



limelight personally by Mao Tse-tung, who took steps to consolidate their positions during the last years of his life, and relied on them to conduct the "cultural revolution" and an extremist policy on the world scene. Unquestionably, Mao had promoted them to the role of guarantors against any revisionism of Maoism after his death. Their speedy downfall was due to their inadequate support in the Central Committee and the Party as a whole and also to the obvious unpopularity of many aspects of Mao's domestic policy during the last years of his life. In other words, the defeat of the "gang of four" was a defeat of the most odious aspects of Maoism.

But Maoism was quite eclectic and broad, encompassing both the "left" and "right" orientations from the outset. Therefore, this was a partial, not a complete defeat of Maoism. Fearing, more than anything else, the charge of revising Maoism, the triumphant CPC leaders are beating their breasts to show their loyalty to the "thought" of the late CPC Chairman, but their interpretation of the Mao ideological heritage increasingly demonstrates the contradictory nature of their incipient ideological and political line.

Noteworthy in this respect is an article by Nieh Jung-chen, CC Politburo member and Deputy Chairman of the CC Military Council, published in *Hungchi* in September 1977. In defining key questions concerning the restoration and development "of the better style worked out for the CPC by Chairman Mao", he names three elements: realistic approach, line of the masses, and democratic centralism. Relative to the "line of the masses", the reader will recall its interpretation during the "cultural revolution", when the *hungweiping* masses were used to deal summarily with cadres in the Party itself. But a realistic approach and democratic centralism are clearly principles that Mao Tse-tung had seriously fought during the last 10-15 years of his life. To justify these elements Nieh Jung-chen had to quote works written by Mao in the 1930s—*On Practice* and *On Contradictions*, which were heavily edited before their inclusion in the *Selected Works*.<sup>3</sup>

Nieh Jung-chen's interpretation of these works is also interesting. In studying and applying Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung "thought" in practice, he wrote, we should understand their essence, adopt their approach, views, and methods, regard them as the basic guide for action,

and denounce the practice of people for whom individual words and phrases from the classics of Marxism-Leninism and from Mao Tse-tung "thought" are no more than bare formulations, of people who regard everything in the world without any definite link to time, place, and conditions.

This platform for the modernisation of Mao Tse-tung "thought" is based on new tasks and new policies. Needless to say, this formulation of the question would never have been possible in the lifetime of Mao Tse-tung. Nieh Jung-chen wrote that Marxism-Leninism could not be regarded as the "supreme and absolute authority". His contention is that Mao Tse-tung "thought" is incompatible with dogmatism, empiricism, idealism, and metaphysics, and he denounced verbiage and, particularly, lies. He linked this approach with the "line of the masses" and urged the verification of the correctness and wisdom of the actions of all organs in conformity with the practice of the masses. While championing the principle of democratic centralism, he again had to have recourse to the propositions made by Mao Tse-tung mainly in 1937. His interpretation of democratic centralism was accompanied by a call to cadres to take part in collective productive work and spend at least one-third of their time with the people to investigate the situation in the localities, and by a demand for steps against abuses of authority in order to receive privileges, and for exchanges of cadres between higher and lower organisations.

A large range of assessments of the Mao ideological heritage will be seen quickly if we compare this article with the official reports of Hua Kuo-feng. The new CPC Chairman's unending vows of fidelity are finding diminishing sympathy among some top Chinese leaders, who are thinking of a more radical revision of Mao Tse-tung's guidelines. They are committed to realism and rationalism. It is symbolic that in the Nieh Jung-chen article there is not a word about the "cultural revolution" and its main slogan—continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat—which still receives an admiring assessment in the pronouncements of Hua Kuo-feng.

These anti-Maoist trends are particularly strong outside the supreme CPC leadership. There is some indirect evidence of this. Anonymous novels, short stories, and political

documents directed against Mao, his ideology, and his placement began to circulate in China in manuscript form. One of these novels, entitled *Ah Hsia*, is about a girl factory worker who was raped by the head of the Party organisation at her factory. Another underground novel, *The Hunan River's Waters Turn Red*, tells of the suicide of the son of a Party functionary nauseated by his father's life-style. Love songs using the tunes of hymns devoted to Mao Tse-tung are also circulated. Many underground documents are directed against the new CPC leadership.

On August 30, 1977 *Sankei Shimbun* published an article headed "Riddles of Mao's Will". Noting what was said in a Hua Kuo-feng report about the "gang of four" and quoting him as saying that "it is very bad that they forged the will of Chairman Mao Tse-tung when he was on his death-bed", the Japanese newspaper printed the content of this forged will. The Italian weekly *L'Espresso* published this document under the head "Will of Mao". It is a copy of a letter purported to have been written by Mao Tse-tung to Chiang Ching on June 10, 1976, roughly three months before his death. It states in part: "Thirty years have passed since our marriage. What I tell you now may astonish you. From this moment our roads part, but despite this we shall remain tranquil." And further: "If you act skilfully, your enemies will ultimately fail however hard they resist you. If you are defeated, you will return to the mountains and continue the guerrilla war to implement the policy we have chosen. I have been turning this thought over for ten years."

The Italian journal questions the authenticity of this "will" and asks: "Was this document, as Hua Kuo-feng's supporters maintain, not forged by the four malefactors to bring disorder into the international communist movement?"

From the angle of all these considerations it is hard to go along with many Western appraisals of the post-Mao developments in China. An article, headed "Peking on a National Course", in *Frankfurter Allgemeine* on August 26, 1977, states: "Peking has set a new general line. The Mao era has ended. A new, essentially different, era is expected to begin. The people's respect and veneration for Mao Tse-tung is due not so much to the Marxist ideas adapted to Chinese conditions as to his success in satis-

fiying the people's profound aspiration for national appeasement. The communist victory in 1949 enabled Mao to restore unity in the nation. The rupture with Moscow in 1963 gave it independence. The testing of its first atomic bomb placed the China of Mao Tse-tung in a position to defend its independence. These were stages on the road to national rejuvenation following centuries of indignities and humiliation.

"The present decade of internal disorder triggered by the 'cultural revolution' has led to stagnation in the national question... Chou En-lai was the first to see this danger. In January 1975, a year before he died, he delivered his last programme speech, in which he reasserted the priority of national aims. This has been reaffirmed by the new Party leadership. Having attained unity and independence, the task was now to achieve equality with the world's leading powers".

This interpretation of the post-Mao developments in China and appraisal of China's past has one or two valid points, but mostly it is inaccurate. It is true that China is increasingly steering a national or, to be more exact, nationalistic course. It is also true that this course is undergoing some modification compared with the Mao era. However, the other assessments are unacceptable. The assertion that national freedom commenced in 1963 with the conflict with the USSR must be rejected entirely as untenable. China's national freedom dates from 1949, when the struggle was directed against those who had reduced it to dependence—the imperialist colonialist powers and the subservient Kuomintang. The conflict with the USSR and other socialist countries, started in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Mao Tse-tung and his entourage, was the outcome of that selfsame internal power struggle screened by the revolutionary phrase of "era of Mao Tse-tung". The conclusion that that era has come to a close is in all probability a hasty one. China is only at the commencement of a new stage of its history, a stage that may bring possibilities for major changes. And the power struggle itself is not, as Western appraisals note in passing, over the "surmounting" of Marxist or, in other words, socialist principles, but over their restoration and assertion, over the continuation of the line set by the 8th CPC Congress. The trouble is that in the CPC political leadership one can see

no forces championing this approach, an approach that can ring in a new era in China.

In the bourgeois press there are symptomatic speculations over the expected evolution in China's relations with the West. On July 28, 1977 *The Washington Post* wrote that the political interregnum under a provisional government had come to an end and that China was now embarking upon a new domestic programme. Further, there were signs that it was about to launch a foreign policy programme that would make it possible to improve relations with Washington. During Mao's long reign, the newspaper wrote, there was a succession of people holding second place and bringing with them the most diverse changes in political accents. The last government under Mao's rule was headed by Chou En-lai. It existed roughly from 1971 to Chou En-lai's death in 1976.

In accordance with the modernisation theme, Chou set about establishing contacts with the West, and this resulted in US President Nixon's visit to Peking in 1972. Further, *The Washington Post* predicted that domestic considerations would induce the new leaders to resume the contacts initiated by Chou. In their view Teng Hsiao-ping's domestic programme called for knowhow, equipment, and credits from Japan, Europe, and, to a lesser degree, the USA.

Writing in a similar vein on July 27, 1977, *The Japan Times* asserted that China had at last restored internal order and had charted the course for its national efforts. The new Chinese leaders, it wrote, were continuing the campaign of denouncing the "gang of four" and the ideological excesses as the first step towards rigid guidance of the nation's life, production, and education.

The change of leaders in the CPC signified no more than the implementation of the general line laid down by Mao Tse-tung. It would, probably, be unrealistic to expect any quick and dramatic change of this line. The cumbersome political ship with its enormous cargo of Mao ideology and policies can hardly steer a new course quickly, although there are indisputable signs of some change, of course.

Judging by everything, the new Chinese leaders are counting on confining themselves to a pragmatic reappraisal of policy in some areas, particularly the economy, and have no desire to revise the basic aims of the ideology of Maoism.

But one cannot be effected without the other. If they decide on radical changes in policy they will sooner or later have to renounce the fundamentals of Maoist theory. But will they want this? I doubt it.

## Problems, More Problems

What does the future augur? What will be China's orientation in home and foreign policy, its programme of further development, and its long-term prospects? So far two things strike the eye: the new leadership's drive for order and modernisation.

No other slogan meets the approval of the people more than law and order. It is, essentially speaking, the basic platform and main asset of the nation's new leadership. Peking is offering the Party and the nation not fragmentation, not the stimulation of the "class" struggle that went on in the Party during the last 15 years of Mao's reign, and was enshrined in the decisions of the CPC's 9th and 10th congresses, but general order and discipline in all areas of life. True, to all appearances this slogan has been borrowed from the same ideological source as the former ideas about "universal disorder under the heavens".

*Jenmin jihpao* published an article headed "For a New Victory in the Establishment of General Order in the Country Under the Unfading Great Banner of Chairman Mao Tse-tung".<sup>1</sup>

The victors and the vanquished, those who are "plotting" and those who are suppressing them, vow fidelity to one and the same banner. Here one can ask: Is this banner the basis of unity or disunity? Is it a course of cohesion or of unending dissension?

In fact, the situation now is that political alternatives for the policies of the Party and the government have not been meaningfully analysed.

In the West they frequently write of a "straightening of Peking's course" and even of a "de-Maoisation process". Are there grounds for these conclusions? It is undeniable that there are symptoms of some changes in domestic policy, but it is much too early to speak of a fundamental reappraisal of policy, much less of de-Maoisation.

First and foremost, in the new leadership's official statements there is no hint of criticism of the late Chairman Mao. On the contrary, every act by the new leadership and every recommendation for reform is carefully equipped with a set of Mao quotations and precepts. True, from the abundant ideological heritage they select what strikes at the "gang of four", or, to be more exact, at pseudo-revolutionary leftism.

As a matter of fact, an entirely new image of Mao is being drawn: proponent of planned, balanced economic development, of economic modernisation, of the use of economic and moral incentives, of a modern system of education and research, and so forth. The face of Mao is suddenly acquiring the features of Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-ping, and, to some extent, Liu Shao-chi.

"The King Is Dead, Long Live the King!" They are, obviously, creating a new myth. They use prestige and tradition to erode this tradition from within.

But one thing the Western analysts lose sight of is that Maoism does not boil down to the "thought" of Mao. Throughout the history of the CPC two trends have been locked in struggle under the dome of Maoism: moderate and extremist, "right" and "left". Mao himself was inclined towards extremism, but did not refuse to flirt with the "moderates", especially during the early period of China's socialist development.

The wave of criticism of acute problems of economic and social development creates favourable conditions for implementing the pressing reforms. But to give effect to these reforms there must be determination and a lucid programme.

Criticism of the "gang of four" brings to the surface those burning problems that had accumulated during the preceding period. The economy receives particularly close attention.

The Chinese press constantly writes of "temporary difficulties" and draws attention to the economy. Foreigners who have visited China report that food is now rationed more stringently. A critical situation in agriculture is indicated by the fact that in 1977 wheat purchases abroad grew to six-eight million tons.

At the beginning of the 1970s industrial production showed an average increment of 10 per cent; in 1976 it increased by only 4 per cent.

In unofficial talks Chinese planners said that in 1976 steel production diminished by 15-20 per cent. Steel output totalled 21 million tons, or five million tons less than in 1975. Coal output increased by 4 per cent, which is half the increment in 1975.

The railways are also in difficulties. They were run on the principle of "better a late proletarian train than a punctual capitalist". This dislocated the railways and hit the Chinese economy hard because 80 per cent of the nation's freight is carried by rail.

A poorer showing was made in 1976 also by the oil industry, which registered an increment of 13 per cent. It should be borne in mind that new large oil deposits have been explored in China and that for at least ten years before 1976 the annual oil output increment stood at 20 per cent.

The situation is difficult also in capital construction and in the engineering industry.

Expert opinion believes that 1976 was the hardest year for the Chinese economy since the people's revolution. This was due mainly to economic causes, the death of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, and the resultant aggravation of the power struggle. Then there was the devastating earthquake (force 8.2 by the Richter scale) in the Tangshan area. An official Party document circulated among the Chinese Communists put the earthquake death toll at 650,000. Western analysts believe that this and some other objective causes seriously slowed down China's economic development. In 1976 the nation's gross national product rose by only 3.5 per cent (other experts hold that the growth did not exceed 3 per cent) compared with 5-7 per cent in 1975. American official agencies estimate the 1975 GNP at 299 billion dollars. As a result, China started its fifth five-year plan belatedly, in 1977.

The 1975 grain harvest totalled 277 million tons (the Chinese include sweet-potatoes and, possibly, soybeans in this figure). Hsinhua reported that there was a "record crop" in 1976. Foreign experts believe that almost as much grain was harvested as in 1975. But the population increment compounded the food situation.

In industry the difficulties mounted, one of the causes being that factory workers were enlisted by the "leftists" into a campaign against "bourgeois elements", one of whom was Teng Hsiao-ping. This created a wage vacuum, particu-



larly in the latter half of 1976. Railways did not operate to timetable, and this was a further blow to industry. As a result, the industrial output increment was 4 per cent according to the most optimistic estimates; in 1975 foreign economists had put down the industrial growth rate at about 11 per cent.

The complex political situation affected China's foreign trade as well. The Jetro organisation, of Japan, believes that in 1976 China's trade was 6.8 per cent below the 1975 level.

We tend to accept the assessments given in an economic survey published in Paris under the heading *Science and Technology in China*. It notes the shattering crisis generated by the Great Leap at the close of the 1950s and also the serious economic dislocation caused by the "cultural revolution", and writes: "Present-day Chinese policy embodies the post-1949 experience and some compromises between the Maoists and the non-Maoists. Nevertheless, economic strategy receives priority consideration in post-Mao China. The Chinese leadership is faced with the task of finding the money to finance agricultural development, the modernisation of armaments, town development, the problems of millions of young people banished to the countryside, the training of scientists and technologists, and the improvement of the balance of payments. The character of China's development in the immediate future depends on who gains the upper hand: the pragmatists or the radicals."

The political convulsions and also the earthquakes are justifiably regarded as the principal factor behind the economic crisis. It has been computed that the earthquake, which devastated parts of the Tientsin-Tangshan-Peking area, cost China 25 per cent of the output of this area, which accounts for about 10 per cent of the national product. As a result of the earthquake there was a dramatic decrease of the output of coal, steel output fell by about a million tons, and large sections of the railways were destroyed.

Two other long-term factors, holding up industrial output in China, were named. The first is the ineffective utilisation of major resources, notably non-ferrous metals, and the second is the plight of the factory workers. There has been practically no wage rise since the 1950s. The growth of agricultural output is almost entirely absorbed by the annual population increment of 2 per cent.

Quoting officials of the tractor factory in Nanchang, the

administrative centre of Kiangsi Province, *The Daily Telegraph* wrote that in 1975 and 1976 the factory was idle for 21 months (the management was headed by supporters of the "gang of four"). Workers armed with clubs, stones, and bottles filled with acid, formed factional militant groups convinced that the accent on production was politically wrong. People who thought otherwise were manhandled. Some were imprisoned. The same officials said that on one occasion more than 50 workers were detained by the management for more than 80 hours. Supporters of the "gang of four" cut off the electricity and water supply to the town's factories, dragged workers away from the machine-tools, plunged the tractor factory into chaos, and sent gangs of hooligans to smash the premises of the provincial and town organs of authority and to beat up officials. With 10 detachments of the local militia under their control, the "leftists" tried to gain possession of weapons and ammunition. As a result of the stoppage, the Nangchan factory failed to produce 12,000 tractors, and its output in 1976 only came to 85 per cent of the 1973 level. The management claimed that during the first five months of 1977 the factory produced nearly three times as many tractors as in the whole of 1976. The story was the same at many other factories.<sup>2</sup>

A working conference of the Chinese Academy of Sciences attended by officials of the academy, provinces, and major cities, and also by scientists, was held from June 20 to July 7, 1977. Hua Kuo-feng and other political leaders were present. The speakers denounced the "gang of four", who, they said, had sabotaged scientific development and confused the correlation between ideology and science. The "gang of four" had prohibited research, banned the study of foreign technology, and thereby slowed down important research. Scientists were unable to show their abilities because the "gang" had labelled them "reactionary authorities" and the "foundation of restoration".

Wu Wen-chui, a leading Chinese mathematician, declared: "Due to hindrance from the sectarian gang of four, the rate of scientific advancement in our country has slowed down in recent years."

Chou Pei-yuan, the well-known Chinese physicist and Chairman of the National Scientific Society, maintained in an article dedicated to the first anniversary of the death of Mao Tse-tung that in 1956 "with wholehearted support from Mao

Tse-tung and under the guidance of Chou En-lai we drew up a 12-year plan for scientific and technological development". Due to the Great Leap, he claimed, this plan was carried out in 1968 with the result that the foundations were laid for the modernisation of science and technology in China. However, the "gang of four", he wrote, had wrought havoc with this work.<sup>3</sup>

A modern culture—efficiency in work, management, education, and research—is vital to China, where nearly 400 million people are illiterate. But more problems exist in this than in any other sphere. The trouble is that Mao's ill-starred widow had personally supervised the "reform" of the education system and all fields of culture. She put all her belated passion into this work. Along with the other members of the "gang of four" (and possibly not only with them), she shook this sphere of the nation's life to its very foundations within a period of ten years. The following is indicative of her "success".

All educational establishments (schools and institutions of higher learning) were turned over to the "revolutionary committees of educational establishments", subsequently reconstituted into Party committees consisting of "revolutionary workers and soldiers". The term of study was shortened in accordance with Mao's learned precept: "The more books you read, the sillier you become." The term of study at institutions of higher learning was set at three years.

Entrance exams were in fact abolished. Enrolment was based on the "recommendation-selection" principle. The main criterion was devotion to the tenets of the "cultural revolution".

Former curricula were proclaimed "feudal and bourgeois poison weeds" and annulled. They were replaced with curricula drawn up by "revolutionary teachers and students".

On orders from the "gang of four" the annulled humanities were replaced with the works of Mao Tse-tung. Children in elementary schools had to study three early articles, in secondary schools they had to study "individual works" of Mao, while students of institutions of higher learning had to study the volumes of *Selected Works*. Considerable time was given to military and physical training.

Teachers of all levels were proclaimed proponents of revisionism and bourgeois philosophy. Together with the *hung-weepings*, the revolutionary committees set about forming

a "new army of teachers", recruiting them from demobilised soldiers and militia chiefs. They seized key positions in the teaching staffs at schools and institutions of higher learning.

In other words, the entire education system was restructured in keeping with the "class struggle and the line of the masses". One can imagine how this affected the training level of young people.

The "gang of four" did not confine their activities to the education system. They invaded science, literature, and art.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences sponsored a conference at which scientists and engineers exchanged views about the policy of "let a hundred schools compete". Scientists of the older generation took part in this conference. They said that science's replacement by idealistic philosophy discredited and throttled the initiative of scientists and destroyed the careers of many of them. They declared that the "gang of four" had subverted research into the fundamental theory of the natural sciences on the grounds that that theory was only a "thought" of Mao Tse-tung.

The crusade against the outrages committed by the "four" was joined by officials of China's Ministry of Culture. In an article headed "Restore the Historical Truth" (February 1977), *Jenmin jihpao* wrote that Chang Chun-tsiao, one of Chiang Ching's aides, had paraphrased Mao's words as follows: "Here, in Shanghai, one hundred schools compete, but only one school is supreme. Ultimately, the last word belongs to Chiang Ching."

However, these attacks on the "gang of four" tie in poorly with any attempt to define a constructive economic and social policy. The contradictory approach to the Mao ideological heritage, based on attempts to use the Mao cult to consolidate the new leadership, creates considerable difficulties for a realistic economic, social, and cultural policy. The Chinese economy's need for progress comes into conflict with the economic guidelines of the late Chairman Mao. If the line of the Great Leap, the "people's communes", and the "cultural revolution" continues to be used as the starting point, no progress will be made in restoring the economy. What, then, is the solution? How is this to be harmonised with political aims? How is progress to be made under the banner of Mao Tse-tung without taking the risk of

debunking the Mao cult or at least adopting a differentiated approach to the Mao heritage.

Held in the vice of this obvious contradiction between actual economic requirements and their own political plans, the new CPC leaders are trying to find a way out in a partial, mostly secret, reappraisal of the economic guidelines laid down by Mao Tse-tung. Essentially speaking, they are endeavouring to apply the formula, attributed to Mao, about the 70 per cent positive and 30 per cent negative effects of the "cultural revolution" to an assessment of the economic and, possibly, also the social and cultural, policy of recent years. But to set out on a 30 per cent rectification of the line means to remain in the vicious circle that brought China's economy to an impasse. Moreover, the most important point is the aim of economic policy. Continued militarisation as the main aim of economic policy is bound to halt modernisation.

From this angle attention is attracted by Hua Kuo-feng's speech on May 9, 1977 at the National Conference on Learning From Taching in Industry. That conference, he said, "holds high the great banner of Chairman Mao... and adheres to China's own road of industrial development".<sup>4</sup> What is that "own road"?

According to the new CPC Chairman it is based on Mao Tse-tung's "great theory" that the "revolution must be continued under the dictatorship of the proletariat". On the basis of this theory Mao evolved a set of political guidelines and methods for socialist industrialisation on the principle of "more, quicker, better, cheaper".

Underlying the Chinese approach to this task is the notion that in socialist society there are contradictions between the productive forces and the relations of production, between the superstructure and the economic basis. That segment of the relations of production that does not harmonise with the productive forces and that segment of the superstructure that does not harmonise with the economic basis make it imperative to promote the productive forces. "That is why we must take class struggle as the key link, continue the revolution in the realm of the superstructure to make it harmonise with the economic basis, continue the revolution in the realm of the relations of production to make them harmonise with the development of the productive forces, make big efforts to carry out technical innovations and

a technological revolution, and develop the productive forces rapidly, so as to provide an ever stronger material basis for our socialist, political, and economic system."

Hua Kuo-feng talks sense when he says that there are contradictions in Chinese society between the basis resting on state ownership of the implements and means of production in the towns and on cooperative ownership in the countryside, on the one hand, and the superstructure, on the other, which was deformed under Mao Tse-tung with the resultant voluntarism and chaos in economic and social policy. There are glaring discrepancies between the forms and methods of general economic management, and between the relations in production on the one hand, and the requirement of production on the other. The virtual fold up of China's mechanism of economic planning and the management of factories through a network of militarised Party committees signified rejection of socialist methods of economic management based on a scientific approach and requiring competence and constructive analysis. In parallel with the abolition of planning, there was a drastic decline of socialist forms of material incentives in production and the enlistment of the workers themselves into management. The objective need for economic development thus demands the restoration of the genuine socialist principles of managing production. This is the chief problem confronting the Chinese economists. Had Hua Kuo-feng this in mind? Apparently, not.

As he put it, the revolution's basic task in the realm of the superstructure at factories was to "consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in the primary organisations" in an unrelenting struggle between two classes, between two lines. To achieve this aim "it is necessary to carry out resolutely Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in enterprises" and "work unceasingly to promote the revolutionisation of people's thinking". It is hard to see the distinction between this and the guidelines preached during the "cultural revolution".

The Taching oilfields are regarded as a model for the nation's industry. How does Hua Kuo-feng assess this model? "Taching," he said, "has a tempered revolutionary contingent cast in the mould of the Iron Man and nurtured in Mao Tse-tung Thought..." This contingent is noted for its revolutionary spirit and staunchness, its power to press for

its ends, and its unshakable will to overcome whatever obstacles arise on its way. "The Taching spirit of 'do it by hand and carry it on the shoulder' when machines are not yet available, its spirit of 'starting a revolution with five shovels', and its spirit known as the 'ten no's', that is, fearing neither hardship nor death, seeking neither fame nor fortune, paying no heed to whether working conditions are good or bad, whether working hours are long or short, whether pay or position is high or low, and giving no thought to whether work is assigned or voluntary, whether it is work at the front or service in the rear—what kind of spirit is this? It is the spirit of serving the revolution wholeheartedly."

His further pronouncements left even less doubt about what was wanted from the Taching model, namely, the transfer to industry of the methods used in the army and of the experience of political work in the PLA. "... And thereby build up a contingent of industrial workers who are highly revolutionised, both Red and expert, and especially good at fulfilling fighting tasks... The Taching spirit has the same vigour, the same revolutionary enthusiasm, and the same death-defying spirit as in the years of revolutionary wars."

In economic policy the main orientation is thus on revolutionary enthusiasm and dedication. For what purpose? For what aim? To promote labour productivity and improve the life of the people or to ensure militarisation? Hua Kuo-feng left no doubt that top priority would be given to militarisation.

This is also seen in his statement that the Taching management was expertly sustaining a high revolutionary spirit and combining it with a strictly scientific approach to production with rational order and rules; economic and ideological education with the implementation of economic policy of the socialist stage; encouragement of dedicated work with concern for the living standard of the people. In these issues the Peking leaders are clearly reappraising the economic experience of the "cultural revolution", whose sole guideline was to "deepen the revolution". Hua denounced the "four's" vilification of Taching as an "example advocating the theory of productive forces".

The rates of industrialisation and socialist construction in China were also examined by Hua Kuo-feng in a context

running counter to Mao Tse-tung's directives in the period of the Great Leap, the "people's communes", and the "cultural revolution". None other than Mao, he declared, had "time and again noted that China had to be turned into a great modern socialist power within a not very long span of time". He said that Chou En-lai referred to Mao's directives at the fourth National People's Congress when he set the task of modernising agriculture, industry, defence, and science and technology, and turning China into a great socialist state by the end of the century. We have analysed Mao's "thought" on this question after the 8th CPC Congress and found that it followed the opposite course, in the direction of sporadic development and forced building not of a socialist but of a "communist" society.

Looking into past experience, Hua Kuo-feng sees significant achievements and serious shortcomings in it. On account of "obstructions" by Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao, and later by the "gang of four", the achievements were not as great as might have been expected, and the set rates had not been attained. "This is a bad thing, yet it can be turned into a good thing. We can draw valuable experience and lessons from this. The whole Party has also paid a tuition for learning the objective laws governing the economic growth of socialist society and for learning to follow China's own road for developing pointed out by Chairman Mao".

What lessons does Hua Kuo-feng suggest drawing? The principal lesson is that the "revolutionary line of Chairman Mao Tse-tung" had to be implemented correctly. The "revolutionary vigour of the cadres and the masses" had to be enhanced. The "red banner of Taching" had to be held on high.

It is questionable, to say the least, that these are the principal lessons of the past 10-15 years in the economic field. The main thing, actually, is to restore the line of the 8th CPC Congress, pursue it at the present stage of China's development in accordance with a correctly charted programme for China's economic modernisation. The economic experience of China and other socialist countries has shown that this aim is served by the means of socialist industrialisation, by combining planning with incentives in production, and by involving ever larger numbers of people in economic management. Here the ideology of the Great Leap and



the "cultural revolution" must give way to a genuinely socialist approach to economic management.

Even fewer elements of a new economic policy are to be found in the speech of Vice-Chairman of the CPC Central Committee Yeh Kiang-ying at the same conference. He declared that the two red banners of Taching and Tachai, raised by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, were the orientation for the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people, that held aloft these banners would most certainly lead to the swift burgeoning of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, during which the people would overtake and surpass each other and which would result in a "continuous leap" of the national economy. The idea of a leap, this time of a "continuous" leap, is again holding the attention of the Chinese leaders. Yeh Kiang-ying is impressed by the idea, advanced by Mao Tse-tung in 1958, of "uniting the people in a huge commune" that would be the basic unit of Chinese society. He spoke admiringly of the "selfless communist 'ten no's' of Taching".

The new Chinese leaders recommend the use of military methods in economic management and also of the army in production and in work among the people. However, Yeh Kiang-ying realistically assessed the tasks and rates of socialist construction. He said that socialist society would exist for a long time, that communism would be achieved only in a hundred or several hundred years.

The former Defence Minister was concerned mostly with the problem of strengthening and enlarging the defence industry. In 1964 Mao Tse-tung said: "We have two fists and one rump. One fist is agriculture, the other the defence industries. If we want the fists to pack a wallop, our rump must be firmly anchored. The rump is the basic industries." Yeh Kiang-ying declared that China should "ceaselessly strengthen national defence capabilities", motivating this with the existence of imperialism and "social-imperialism", meaning the Soviet Union. Contrary to the orientation, predominant during the last years of Mao Tse-tung's life, that the people were the backbone of military strength, Yeh Kiang-ying set the course towards the modernisation of the defence industries. "Without powerful modern basic industries, we will not have adequate modern arms and equipment, means of transportation and supply, means of reconnaissance and highly developed communications and command sys-

tems—in a word, we will not be able to modernise our national defence. We must take steel as the key link and speed up the development of the basic industries so as to put our defence industries on a strong basis and enable them to make greater progress.”

What are the implications of these pronouncements of China's top leaders? They are that the quest for the most expedient ways and means of modernising the economy has just begun. They are that the continuity of the Mao ideology hinders this quest. The new approach to economic policy is stated more freely by Teng Hsiao-ping and, particularly, by many economic experts in the State Planning Commission, in the various ministries and departments, and in scientific institutions.

Teng Hsiao-ping's thinking is exemplified by words spoken at a meeting with John B. Adams, Director-General of the European Organisation for Nuclear Research, to the effect that in China the purpose of scientific and technological advancement is to bring the nation close to the world level by the end of the twentieth century, to achieve that level in some industries, and surpass it in others. “To attain this goal we have to acknowledge our backwardness. This is the only way we can make headway. We must . . . learn diligently and conscientiously, adopt everything that is advanced in science and technology, and develop new forms of study.”

An article by staffers of the State Planning Commission devoted to the first anniversary of the death of Mao Tse-tung restates Hua Kuo-feng's theses about the contradictions between the relations of production and the productive forces, between the superstructure and the economic basis, and all his theoretical guidelines for economic management. It examines practical questions of the rates of socialist construction and recommends ways and means of accelerating these rates on the basis of the objective laws of such construction. These recommendations include regulating the relationship between industry and agriculture, and also between various branches of industry and agriculture; harmonising industrial development in the centre and in the localities; fostering industriousness and thrift, and striking a balance between accumulation and consumption; promoting a growth of production; improving the life of the people; using up-to-date machinery; encouraging technical innovations; building up

a uniform system of socialist planning; and achieving a nation-wide balance in the economy. The fundamental difference between a socialist and capitalist economy, the article states, is that the former is based on planning. It accentuated the task of creating an independent integral system of industry and of the national economy as a whole in order to ensure the nation's political independence.<sup>5</sup>

Although this article dutifully uses Maoist political phraseology, it demonstrates a more realistic approach to economic management, evidently reflecting the present reinvigoration of the planning bodies. So far this work has had little practical results. Although fulfilment of the fifth five-year plan was slated to commence in 1976, the plan itself was never drawn up. Much time is still needed to draft some kind of a nation-wide economic plan and, possibly, a longer-term programme.

In economic policy, the priority task, as stated by Yu Chiu-ei, Chairman of the State Planning Commission and elected member of the CC Politburo, is to demarcate China into six large economic regions: Northeast, North, Southeast, Central-South, Southwest, and Northwest. These regions would have their own specifics, and they would be dependent on and cooperative with each other. This is supposed to ensure a balanced development of agriculture and of the light and heavy industries. Actually, this division is a return to the old administrative system (abandoned in 1965), under which the local authority grew strong and was in many cases not subordinated to the centre.

The discussion among Chinese economists in the summer and autumn of 1977 in the Chinese press, and among Chinese scientists and economists generally provides much food for thought. The newspaper *Kwangming jihpao*<sup>6</sup> wrote that the Chinese Communists were discussing the principles of distribution according to work in order to end the confusion brought into economic science by the "gang of four". This discussion, conducted under the slogan "let a hundred schools contend", showed that there were two viewpoints on two aspects of this problem. One aspect was the delimitation between distribution according to work and material incentives. The first viewpoint was that these were antipodal concepts that had nothing in common with each other. Thus, the principle of distribution according to work gave precedence to politics, while material incentives—money and bo-

nuses—struck a balance between the interests of the state, the collective, and the individual. The second view gave precedence to personal, material interests.

These views hardly differ from each other. The second view only accentuates attention on the fact that apart from distinctions these phenomena have elements in common. Both are realised in the form of wages and deal with remuneration, with the link between labour and personal material incentive. Proponents of yet another view declare that it is hard to draw a clear dividing line between distribution according to work and material incentives. They contend that it is wrong to ignore the principle that "politics is the commanding force", to underline personal material interest unilaterally, to interpret it as the principal motor of production.

There is disagreement over whether distribution according to work is the material basis for the emergence of bourgeois elements of a new type. Some believe that although this principle spells out a certain inequality in the distribution of material goods, it has nothing to do with exploitation and does not lead to polarisation. Others, on the contrary, hold that implementation of this principle gives rise to bourgeois elements.

It is indicative that this discussion flared up soon after the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping, known as a champion of the socialist principle of material incentives for social production. It can only be regretted that Chinese economists are given no opportunity for using, as objective data for analysing, this and other problems, the experience of other socialist countries, which have worked out the mechanism of material incentives for production and of distribution according to work in keeping with the requirements of socialist production and the interests of the people.

These new trends were articulated by Chinese officials interviewed by a Kyodo Tsushin News Agency delegation. They said that a large body of workers would be given a 15-20 per cent wage rise in October 1977. This was to be the first pay increase in 14 years. If official statements are to be believed, the wage rise will affect about 40 per cent of the factory workers, who come under eight wage ratings. This system became effective in 1956 and has since remained practically unchanged. It is reported that teachers are to get the largest rise.

If this report is true, it may be taken as a triumph of the proponents of a more consistent application of the principle of remuneration for labour and of material incentives, and consequently, as a defeat of the leftists inspired by Mao Tse-tung himself.

Let us briefly examine the Mao heritage in the field of defence and the switch to modernisation of the Chinese army that we hear so much about from the Chinese leaders. To date, the most detailed characteristic is to be found in the testimony given by Lieutenant-General Samuel V. Wilson, Director of the US Defence Intelligence Agency at a hearing before a Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee.

He said that the nuclear delivery potential of the Chinese strategic forces consisted of a small number of bomber-borne missiles. Although most of this potential was deployed along China's periphery, the addition of intercontinental ballistic missiles with a limited radius of operation would enable China to bring more distant areas, including Australia, but not the USA, into its target zone. The TU-16 bomber remained the principal nuclear delivery system, and there were no indications that it would be replaced.

China's conventional armed forces likewise have a long-term modernisation programme. In the land forces the accent remains on a qualitative improvement of armaments, but there is to be only a small increase of combat divisions by 1980. China is not expected to be a major naval power during the next few decades. The Chinese Navy is undergoing significant modernisation. With the world's third largest fleet of submarines, China would, probably, continue to expand that fleet. Wilson believed that the future pattern of China's defence spending would be determined largely by the growth of the production of aircraft and offensive missiles. In any case, it was expected that with the replacement of obsolete armaments as the target, China would increase its purchases of military hardware.

*Figaro* estimated the Chinese Army at 3,000,000 poorly trained effectives. The 20,000,000-strong militia, it wrote, had no training at all. The PLA's 15,000 pieces of artillery and 9,000 armoured vehicles were obsolete. Its force of nearly 1,000 Mig-17s and Mig-19s was clearly below modern technological standards, while its 300 bombers, of the Il-28 type, were likewise dated. China, *Figaro* wrote, was faced

with the problem of remoulding the thinking of its senior officers, who remained proponents of guerrilla warfare, in order to be able to increase the army's technological strength. That, the French newspaper believed, was why Teng Hsiao-ping wanted to increase the defence budget from 8-9 to 15 per cent of the GNP and form a professional army in the true sense of the word.<sup>7</sup>

In September 1977 French newspapers printed statements made in France by a Chinese military delegation led by Acting Chief of the General Staff Yang Cheng-wu, who is close to Teng Hsiao-ping. It was admitted by the delegation that the Chinese army was in a pitiful state, that China had lagged far behind in military hardware, that its aircraft were 15 years old and its artillery was obsolete, and that there was chronic indiscipline due to political disorder.

Interesting comments on China's military modernisation programme have been made in *The Financial Times* of London. Under the heading "Military Voices in the Corridors of Power" Colina MacDougall wrote, that the government was coming under growing pressure from the military: "It looks more than ever as if Mao's teaching on the superiority of men to machines in warfare is due for dramatic revision... Both the air force and naval chiefs are now on the all-powerful Politbureau as well as the army leaders... The row of military uniforms among the top people is impressive."

In military planning the accent is mainly on a nuclear programme. Since the 1950s, when the Chinese began developing the atomic bomb, they have tested more than 20 nuclear devices. In November 1976, for instance, they tested a 4-megaton nuclear bomb. But the means of delivery still lag behind seriously. They have now started the production of medium and intermediate range missiles (maximum range—1,750 miles). According to the newspaper, about 40 long-intermediate range missiles are deployed in Northwest China, near the Soviet frontier. The main shortcoming of the Chinese missiles is that they use liquid fuel. It takes nearly 36 hours to launch them, missiles using solid fuel are airborne within minutes.

China put its first satellite in orbit in 1970, and since then it has made seven launchings. The Chinese are now able to return capsules to earth. But apart from missiles, the Chinese armaments are outdated. The PLA, the same British

newspaper believes, has only 10,000 tanks (heavy, medium, and light) and all are obsolete models. The Chinese Air Force consists of 5,000 dated aircraft. It is predicted that some share of the allocations for research and development and also for purchases abroad, which have hitherto been absorbed entirely by the nuclear sector, may be channelled into the development of conventional armaments.

*The Financial Times* concluded that one could be sure that while the high command might not actually get much more cash now, it might with time lay its hands on a far more significant sum. "Since even Chairman Hua sometimes turns out in army uniform, a sign of the newly acquired status of the military, it seems likely to get it."<sup>8</sup>

What is the impact of this difficult situation in the Chinese Armed Forces on military ideology? China's military and political leaders are burdened with Mao Tse-tung's people's war doctrine that dominated Chinese military strategy for four decades. Articles contributed to the press by Chinese military leaders are indicative of their efforts to somehow adapt this doctrine to the idea of modernising the armed forces and equip them with sophisticated hardware.

One of these articles, published in *Jenmin jihpao*, was written by General Su Yu, member of the Standing Committee of the CC's Military Council.<sup>9</sup> It is, of course, headed "Great Victory of Mao Tse-tung's Line in the Leadership of the Conduct of War", and was written to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the PLA. This was the most significant recent statement in the Chinese press on military matters.

While proclaiming fidelity to the people's war doctrine, which "gives us a basic advantage", Su Yu, who supports the trend towards the army's stepped-up modernisation, meaningfully modified this doctrine. He wrote that the main condition for conducting a people's war was to provide the PLA with the most up-to-date armaments. "We fully appreciate the importance of using modern armaments and, while relying on our own resources, we are improving our equipment. We must have what our enemy has and also what he does not have." He subjected other Mao military concepts to the same covert revision. He rejected passive defence, on which Mao had always insisted, in favour of active defence with, of course, a tribute to Mao Tse-tung, and

instead of positional warfare, which he called "an ancillary form of conducting hostilities", he favoured manoeuvrable warfare. "We should constantly study and master the latest tactics of combat consistent with the development of technology and armaments."

Further, he wrote that "imperialism may start a war of aggression, particularly Soviet social-imperialism, which may attack us suddenly. We should, therefore, not relax vigilance, and maintain our morale and material preparedness on a high level". Similar political attacks were made in an article by the theoretical group of the PLA Academy published in *Jenmin jihpao* on August 5, 1977. "The Soviet revisionists do not for a moment abandon their ambition of subjugating our country. The collision between the Soviet Union and the USA for supremacy will sooner or later erupt into a world war". The article urged speeding up industrialisation and the modernisation of the PLA in order "to win time in the struggle against the enemy".<sup>10</sup>

It is quite evident that the economic policy of the CPC's new leadership has many points in common with the Chou En-lai line. In China today there is, perhaps, no more popular document than Chou En-lai's speech on China's economic tasks at the first session of the fourth National People's Congress (January 1975). In that speech he urged the modernisation of agriculture, industry, defence, science, and technology with the goal of making China a major world power and a military superpower.

These are also the aims of the new policy outlined by Hua Kuo-feng. "In the present century we must comprehensively modernise agriculture, industry, defence, science, and technology."

This return to the modernisation slogan signifies rejection of the irrational economic and social policy pursued under the influence of the "leftists". But it does not answer the question of the programme, orientation and the specific plans for socio-cultural construction.

How is the modernisation of the economy to be accomplished? By the planned building of socialism or by capitalist methods? Or in some third, neither capitalist nor socialist, way in the quest for which the "leftists" broke their necks? Should China cooperate with the socialist countries and have their economic support or should it rely on links with capitalist countries? In other words, the



modernisation slogan defines the goal but does not offer a concrete programme. Many lances will be broken before it is drawn up.

## Foreign Policy

In China the burden of succession is heaviest in foreign policy. Generally speaking, it is always difficult to reorient foreign policy. The nation's former leaders took more than 15 years to turn from an alliance with the socialist community to opposition to it. This switch was reinforced by the removal of supporters of unity with the socialist countries and by the long indoctrination of cadres and the entire population in an anti-Soviet spirit.

It cannot be said that nothing has changed in China's international relations. On the contrary, there are many facts to indicate that significant changes have been introduced in China's foreign policy by its new leaders.

The main orientation revealed in all of China's current actions on the international scene is towards an improvement of relations with the West, particularly with the USA, and efforts to form an alliance against the USSR and the rest of the socialist community.

Hua Kuo-feng has said that in international affairs China was guided by Mao Tse-tung's three worlds doctrine and is doing everything to bring the struggle against "superpower hegemonism" to the end. The international situation, he declared, was quite good, but alongside the growth of factors of peace there was an appreciable growth of factors of war. To attain unchallenged supremacy in the world the two superpowers were everywhere locked in struggle that would sooner or later lead to war. "We are firm in our belief that the people are the force behind world history. Victory will most certainly be won by the peoples of the whole world."<sup>1</sup>

Attacks on the Soviet Union and its policy are a favourite occupation of China's new leaders. They feel they can say anything and use any lie against the Soviet Union, whose only "fault" before China is that for 30 years it supported China in its struggle against the Kuomintang and rendered every possible political, economic, and mili-

lary assistance to the people's power after the revolution triumphed.

Interviewed by the editor-in-chief of *Times Newspapers Limited*, Deputy Chairman Li Hsien-nien spoke solely of the "threat" from "Soviet imperialism", saying that Russia was mostly interested in the West and that at the moment its strategic accent was on Europe and the Middle East. However, its plans were particularly dangerous in Africa. He then made the absurd allegation that the Soviet Union would like to attack China, and accompanied this allegation with the thinly veiled threat: "It will go bad for Russia if it starts a war with China."<sup>2</sup>

Li Hsien-nien made no attempt to support these insinuations with facts. The Chinese leaders need these insinuations for an entirely different purpose. Almost in the same breath Li Hsien-nien spoke of a possible Soviet attack on Western Europe. To back up this monstrous charge he argued that Russia had shown its intentions in Africa. But then he had to justify Chinese policy in Africa. "China does not supply large quantities of arms to Africa. We gave some weapons to three groups in Angola when we acted against the Portuguese, and we did so free of charge. We do not want to be merchants of death. We also helped Pakistan. But we do not have the resources to render aid on a large scale." (If these resources increased China, evidently, could be expected to increase its arms sales!)

"If the Russians attempt to expand anywhere in the world China will not stand aloof," Li Hsien-nien said. What do words of this kind imply? More than anything else they are suggestive of the irresponsibility of some of China's rulers, who feel they can have recourse to any invention such as they frequently use in their power struggle in China itself.

From Tokyo the Hsinhua News Agency transmitted a *Jinmin Shimbun* article devoted to Mao's three worlds strategy and unequivocally calling for unity not against the two superpowers but against the Soviet Union. The following is a sample of the ludicrous arguments fabricated by Hsinhua in collaboration with Japanese extremists. "There are distinctions and contradictions between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. Soviet social-imperialism is the imperialism that sprang up in the latter half of the 1960s. US imperialism is an imperialism of the

old type, which began its global supremacy after World War II.

"The first is on the offensive, the second is on the defensive. US imperialism has had to somewhat withdraw its tentacles, which it had stretched much too far in all parts of the globe, so as to try to muster forces and cling to its main objectives." Hence the conclusion that in the struggle against the hegemonism of the superpowers the peoples of the world "should be more vigilant, especially relative to Soviet social-imperialism".

To this end they suggest enlisting most of the countries of the "second" and "third" worlds and employing the tactics of a united front and not isolation. They thus blurted out Peking's main guideline, namely, unprincipled unity and collision with any ally against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In their efforts to form a united front against "social-imperialism" the Chinese leaders have gone to the extent of offering themselves as allies on an anti-Soviet platform to the USA, which not very long ago they classed as a superpower seeking world supremacy. On May 22, 1978, at a reception for the Assistant to the US President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski the Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua declared: "The world today is full of contradictions and the international situation is undergoing swift convulsions and changes. The struggle for hegemony is the principal source of anxiety in the world. The shadow of social-imperialism is to be seen practically in all the changes and unrest taking place in different parts of our planet. Under the guise of 'detente', 'cooperation', and 'disarmament' it is preparing for war everywhere, and it is everywhere engaged in expansion and aggression to establish its supremacy in the world. In the face of this reality all nations should unite, be prepared for sudden developments, and not let themselves be deceived by illusions of peace. They should act against the policy of appeasement and pursue 'spear against spear' policy in order to wreck the strategic plans of the hegemonists."

The most amazing part of all this was Brzezinski's reply. It was as though he accepted the platform of struggle against hegemonism as common for China and the USA. He said that the USA's commitment to friendship with

China was based on common concern and on long-term strategic considerations. The USA did not regard its attitude to China as a tactical expediency. It was aware of and shared China's determination to resist the efforts of any country to establish global or regional hegemony. The nations of the world wanted sovereignty and the observance of human rights. In this context, the USA was confident that in such a world no attempt at hegemony would succeed. The aims and determination of the USA were a solid foundation for this confidence. The smoke screen was thus lifted over the meaning of the words about China's principled struggle against superpower hegemonism. The USA was invited to play the role of the potential ally against its own self.

China's policy in foreign trade shows more eloquently than anything else the orientation of its foreign policy. *The China Quarterly* published by the Contemporary China Institute and the School of Oriental and African Studies of London University, printed a survey of the economic situation in China in its 2nd issue in 1977. The section on trade contains revealing statistics on China's economic relations with capitalist countries.

The tendencies that took shape in Mao's lifetime continued to operate in 1977. China's main trading partners were Japan, Hongkong, the FRG, Singapore, and the USA. China was making a particularly vigorous effort to expand trade with the EEC. The vice-chairman of the Bank of China, Ming, told the vice-chairman of the EEC Commission that China would be interested in increasing its trade with the EEC to the level of its trade with Japan. China was the only socialist country that in November 1974 accepted the EEC's proposals for talks on a trade agreement. In 1976 EEC imports from China grew by 21 per cent, and the Chinese are looking for ways of widening the circle of their potential suppliers in Europe.

During the first half of 1976 the EEC-Japan correlations in trade with China improved substantially in favour of the Common Market. The EEC imports came to \$465,000,000, while Japan's imports from China totalled \$603,000,000. A similar pattern was to be observed in EEC exports to China. They amounted to \$1,422 million in 1975. Japanese exports to China reached \$2,258 million. In the first half of 1976 Japanese exports to China added

up to \$1,080 million, or somewhat above the volume of EEC exports to that country (\$814 million). During the same period trade with socialist countries either showed no increase or diminished, although its level was already very low.

In January 1977 *Le Monde Diplomatique* carried an article by Banning Garrett, editor of the *International Bulletin*, published by *Internews*, under the heading "Evolution of US-Chinese Relations".<sup>3</sup>

It divulged a secret decision taken by the Ford Administration and the National Security Council on October 12, 1976, to sell China two Sybers-172 electronic computers of the Control Data firm, suitable for military purposes. This top secret decision was leaked by a ranking Pentagon official and published in *Aviation Week*. Banning asserts that the idea of establishing military relations with China has won supporters at all levels of the US Government. In particular, two of Carter's economic advisers urged a gradual rapprochement with China by selling it military technology and also developing other relations in the field of defence.

On November 8, 1976 *The Financial Times* published an article significantly headed: "China Looks West Again". It declared: "China has just bought 1.3m-1.5m tons of finished steel from Japan for delivery during the remainder of the year, and the Japanese are expecting to sell more next year . . . Possibly this means a return to large purchases of sophisticated foreign technology. The difficulty is just how China can afford it."<sup>4</sup>

A spate of articles is appearing about the West's hunger for Chinese oil following the discovery of new deposits in China. It is predicted that by 1980 China will be producing up to 400 million tons of oil and that at least one-fourth of this quantity will be available for export. At present China's principal trading partners are Japan, followed by the FRG, France, Canada, and the USA in that order. Western purchases of Chinese oil, analysts believe, will sharply increase China's trade with the USA and other countries.

What political price will China have to pay for Western economic and military aid? It will, evidently, include China's active support for NATO, action on the side of the reactionary forces in Angola, fraternisation with the Pino-

chet regime in Chile, attacks on the Communists in Portugal and, for that matter, in all of Western Europe, the planting of "Marxist-Leninist" parties, and attacks on the policy of detente and peace of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and the international communist movement.

Recent developments have spotlighted the foresight and principled posture enunciated by Leonid Brezhnev at the 25th Congress of the CPSU when he declared that the Soviet Union was prepared to improve relations with the People's Republic of China not only on the maximum desired but also on the possible minimum level. "We are prepared to normalise relations with China in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence," he said. "What is more, we can say with assurance that if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy towards socialist countries and takes the road of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, there will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for developing good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism. The matter rests with the Chinese side."<sup>5</sup>

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We must now draw some conclusions. Very little time has passed since the death of Mao Tse-tung. It is still much too early to judge and much less to draw final conclusions about the orientation of the home and foreign policy pursued by Mao's successors and about their attitude to the ideological and political heritage of the late CPC Chairman. Yet some tendencies are quite evident.

However, the first and most obvious conclusion, that begs itself, is that it is futile to hope that the death of the "great helmsman" will lead to greater unity among his successors. Mao Tse-tung toiled might and main, with unparalleled cruelty, to eliminate everybody who could in any way be suspected of opposing his ideology, policies, and cult. One of the cardinal aims of the "cultural revolution", which dramatically affected the political system, the top leadership and the entire Chinese Communist Par-

ty, was to guarantee the total eradication of opposition to Mao in his lifetime and after his death, and ensure unity on the platform of "Mao Tse-tung thought".

We can now see how illusory that hope was and how unproductive were the colossal efforts and toll of life. Mao's death sparked an acute power struggle on China's political Olympus. The Maoist ideological platform, like the "eleven great political campaigns" mentioned by Hua Kuo-feng at the 11th CPC Congress, did not create even the minimum guarantee against a new round of a sharp power struggle, for influence, and over the problems of ideology and policy.

The second, and to a certain extent sensational, development was the catastrophic downfall of the "leftists", of precisely those political leaders who were closest to Mao Tse-tung. The defeat of the "gang of four" was a defeat of people who had influenced Mao most strongly during the last ten years of his life. Mao's widow and son-in-law, the man he promoted during the "cultural revolution", Wang Hung-wen, and Chang Chun-tsiao, whom Mao entrusted with delivering the report on China's new Constitution, were the mainstay of Mao's extremist home and foreign policies. The first blow in the struggle for the Mao heritage was struck precisely at them.

It is even more amazing how easily they were crushed. Essentially, everything smacked of a "palace coup". The arrest of the "leftist" leaders almost paralysed their supporters, who according to Western observers, numbered about one-third of the members of the CPC Central Committee; and, consequently, in the entire Party. We see in this denunciation of Mao Tse-tung's extremist policies, especially on the domestic scene, which began with the Great Leap and culminated in the "cultural revolution". Even if this assessment is not proclaimed by the new leaders, it suggests itself. The defeat of the "leftists" spelled out the defeat of the policy Mao pursued during the last 10-15 years of his life.

The third conclusion is that there has been some stabilisation of the CPC's new political leadership. The rapport of Teng Hsiao-ping, Yeh Kiang-ying, and other members of the "old guard" with Hua Kuo-feng, who entered the limelight during the "cultural revolution", has strengthened the Party and state leadership. But for how long? Funda-

mental problems of policy have yet to be examined closely; domestic and, particularly, foreign policy are still to be defined and many lances will be broken before it is stabilised in the long term. Unquestionably, as had been the case before, the struggle over policy and ideology closely intertwines with the struggle for power and influence.

The fourth conclusion is that there has been a certain modification of domestic policy compared with the Mao line.

Above all, this concerns economic policy, and policy in science, culture, and military affairs. The "four modernisations" proclaimed, incidentally during Mao's lifetime, underlie the domestic policy of the present leaders. Essentially, a struggle is proceeding for a return to the platform of the 8th CPC Congress (1956), which charted the proper guidelines for industrialisation and the building of socialism in China.

The Mao ideology and especially his cult present much more difficult problems. The CPC leaders have found it expedient to rely on that cult in the hope of strengthening their power and consolidating their forces in the Party. While revising various, clearly ineffective and irrational Mao guidelines, the new leaders are nevertheless "saving face" and endeavouring to use Mao against his own extremes. The foundations of the ideology of Maoism have as yet not been shaken. This is the main contradiction because with the preservation of Maoism as the ideology of the CPC and the Chinese state it is becoming less and less possible to implement the proclaimed "four modernisations".

Further, it may be noted—and this is a most regrettable point—that there has been no change in China's foreign policy directed against the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, against their policy of easing international tension. If anything, this policy has been in some respects intensified.

The year 1979 provided fresh evidence of Maoism's hostility to Marxism-Leninism and the socialist countries, especially in the case of China's direct armed aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. From their ideological assault against the socialist states the Peking leaders went over to political and even armed struggle.

Here they are following the Mao line in toto. Here con-



tinuity is especially strong. Can this be a source of pride for Maoism? I doubt it very much. Besides, will this triumph of the Mao heritage last long?

China is now faced with a historical choice of paths.

The first is to restore friendship and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. This is the natural path for China if it wants to return to socialist construction and desires disinterested assistance and cooperation for the modernisation of its economy.

The second is the path of a "brigde" between the two world systems, about which Mao Tse-tung spoke as far back as 1956. This is a path of manocuvring between the USSR and the USA, a path of drawing economic and political benefits by playing on the contradictions between the two world systems.

The third is the path China has been following during the past 15 years, a path of rapprochement with the capitalist West on a platform of joint struggle against the USSR, world socialism, the international communist movement, and all the other peace forces.

Let us leave aside the moral aspects of the last two variants. They are self-evident. Let us take as our basis the model of direct national benefit recommended by Mao Tse-tung. We shall not close our eyes to the simple fact that the second and, in particular, the third path can bring China certain economic and, possibly, political dividends. But how will this affect the future?

Will this strengthen China's independence or reduce it to brutal vassalage to the West? Will China find allies in the capitalist world or is it vainly losing its natural allies on the other side of the social barrier? Will this socio-political orientation be compatible with the actual struggle for socialism in official China? China is bound to ponder these questions, as even Mao Tse-tung pondered them twenty years ago.

China's new leaders have a unique historical opportunity. They are still in a position to make their choice in favour of a new foreign policy orientation for their country. Will they want to use this opportunity? The next few years will show.

## NOTES

### Foreword

- <sup>1</sup> Edgar P. Snow, born 1905, US journalist. First visited China in 1936 and subsequently resided in that country for 13 years. He was on friendly terms with Mao Tse-tung and wrote a biography as related by Mao Tse-tung. Published several books about China.
- <sup>2</sup> Agnes Smedley—US writer and journalist. Was a news correspondent in China. Died in China in 1950.
- <sup>3</sup> Anna Louise Strong, born 1885, US journalist and writer. Held a Ph. D. degree at Chicago University. Lived and worked in China, and was a witness of the events of the "communes" and Great Leap period. Wrote some books about Mao Tse-tung.
- <sup>4</sup> Emi Hsiao (pen name of Hsiao San), born 1896. Noted Chinese author. Joined the CPC in 1921. Lived in Moscow from 1928 to 1939. Was a deputy to the National People's Congress. Author of a book about Mao Tse-tung.
- <sup>5</sup> P. P. Vladimirov (1905-1953)—a leading Soviet journalist and diplomat. Was in Yen-an from May 1942 to November 1945 in the capacity of a Comintern liaison official at the CPC Central Committee and a TASS war correspondent.
- <sup>6</sup> Wang Ming—prominent figure in the CPC. Held internationalist views. Headed the Chinese delegation to the Communist International. Was a member of the CPC Central Committee in the 1930s-1960s. Author of reminiscences and essays about Mao Tse-tung and Maoism. Died in Moscow in 1974.
- <sup>7</sup> Otto Braun, born 1900. German Communist, Comintern representative at the CPC. In China was known as Li Teh and Hua Fu. Was a military adviser to the CPC Central Committee from 1932 to 1937. Was on the Long March with the Chinese Red Army and completed his mission in Yen-an. Wrote a book about the CPC.
- <sup>8</sup> Stuart R. Schram, born 1924 in the USA. Holds B. A. and Ph. D. degrees. Lecturer at London University. Wrote some books about Mao Tse-tung.

- <sup>9</sup> Robert Lifton, born 1926 in the USA. Doctor of medicine, practised psychiatry in New York. Made frequent visits to Hongkong. Wrote studies of China, specifically about the "cultural revolution".
- <sup>10</sup> Stanley Karnow—US journalist, wrote a number of books, including *Mao and China* (New York, 1972). Beginning from 1960 lived for 11 years in Hongkong, where he spoke to Chinese diplomats, journalists, and refugees. Visited the People's Republic of China on several occasions.
- <sup>11</sup> Chang Kuo-tao, born 1895. Was a leading personality in the CPC. Joined the revolutionary movement in 1918-1919. Was active in the preparations for the 1st Congress of the CPC in 1921. Opposed Mao Tse-tung during the power struggle in the Chinese Red Army. A leader of the CPC in 1929-1935. Expelled from the CPC in 1938. At present resides in Hongkong in a private capacity.
- <sup>12</sup> Chiang Ching, born 1912, Shantung Province, wife of Mao Tse-tung (from 1939). Real name Lo Chi-yun. Joined the CPC in 1938. Until 1964 was not active in politics. Elected deputy to the 3rd National People's Congress in September 1964. During the "cultural revolution" (1966-1969) addressed many *hungweiping* rallies and was appointed deputy chairman of the Cultural Revolution Group. Member of the Politburo of the ninth and tenth CPC Central Committees. A month after Mao Tse-tung's death was arrested on a charge of planning a coup.
- <sup>13</sup> Chin Shih Huang Ti—Chinese Emperor, third century B.C. (for details see Note 4 on p. 372).
- <sup>14</sup> Talk with journalists on March 10, 1957. Quoted from *Maoism. Ideological and Political Adversary of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1974, p. 91 (in Russian).

## PART ONE

# Ideological Infantilism

- <sup>1</sup> A major source on Mao's early career recorded from Mao's own words in 1936 and published in *Red Star Over China* (London, 1937).
- <sup>2</sup> I. Kurland, *Mao Tse-tung: the Founder of Communist China*, New York, 1972, p. 5.
- <sup>3</sup> There were three other children in the family: two boys and a girl—Mao Tse-tung's younger brothers (Mao Tse-min and Mao Tse-tan) and his sister (Mao Tse-hung). All became Communists and were killed during the years of revolution.
- <sup>4</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century. Mao Tse-tung*, New York, 1966 (further Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*).

- <sup>5</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, London, 1937, p. 131.
- <sup>6</sup> Kang Yu-wei—Chinese scholar who advocated liberal reforms. In 1898 the Emperor Kuang Hsu gave him an administrative appointment. But he was soon afterwards ousted by the reactionary Tzuhsi clique (See S. L. Tikhvinsky, *The Movement for Reforms in China at the Close of the Nineteenth Century and Kang Yu-wei*, Moscow, 1959 (in Russian)).
- <sup>7</sup> Emi Hsiao, *Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh*, Moscow, 1939, pp. 3, 5-6 (Russian translation).
- <sup>8</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, pp. 18, 19.
- <sup>9</sup> See V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 18, p. 165.
- <sup>10</sup> Edgar Snow, *Op. cit.*, p. 133.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 136.
- <sup>12</sup> See Emi Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.
- <sup>13</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, London, 1956, p. 67.
- <sup>14</sup> Edgar Snow, *Op. cit.*, p. 142.
- <sup>15</sup> Emi Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>16</sup> See Edgar Snow, *Op. cit.*, p. 143.
- <sup>17</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 25.
- <sup>18</sup> Hsiao Yu, *Mao Tse-tung and I Were Beggars*, Syracuse, 1959, p. 132.
- <sup>19</sup> *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, Moscow, 1954 (Russian translation) and *Water Margin*, Moscow, 1958 (Russian translation) are among the most outstanding Chinese historical novels. In *Water Margin* the author—Shih Nai-an (fourteenth century)—describes peasant insurgencies without criticising the imperial administration, confining himself to stigmatising abuses of authority.
- <sup>20</sup> Robert Payne, *Portrait of a Revolutionary: Mao Tse-tung*, London, New York, Toronto, 1961, p. 54. Payne used Emi Hsiao's manuscripts.
- <sup>21</sup> Chen Tu-hsiu—one of the founders of the Communist Party of China and a leading CC member in 1921-1927. Accused of a "right" deviation and expelled from the Party in 1929. Died in 1942.
- <sup>22</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 36.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 39.
- <sup>24</sup> Emi Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, p. 11.
- <sup>25</sup> Li Ta-chao (1888-1927)—professor at Peking University and one of the first exponents of Marxism-Leninism in China. Organiser of the first Marxist study circles, was prominent among the founders of the CPC. Brutally killed by reactionaries in Peking in 1927.
- <sup>26</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 44.

## The Pendulum Begins to Swing

- A. M. Romyantsev, *Mainsprings and Evolution of "Mao Tse-tung Thought"*, Moscow, 1972, p. 12 (in Russian).
- <sup>2</sup> Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 56.
- <sup>3</sup> See Chang Kuo-tao, "My Reminiscences", *Minbao*, No. 6, Hongkong, 1966, p. 63.
- <sup>4</sup> Edgar Snow, Op. cit., p. 156.
- <sup>5</sup> See Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 65.
- <sup>6</sup> See *Hsiang Tao*, Nos. 31-32, 1923, pp. 233-34.
- <sup>7</sup> Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 65.
- <sup>8</sup> Howard L. Boorman, "Mao Tse-tung: the Lacquered Image", *The China Quarterly*, No. 16, London, October-December 1963, pp. 14-15.
- <sup>9</sup> See Edgar Snow, Op. cit., p. 156.
- <sup>10</sup> Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 71.
- <sup>11</sup> *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution on the Example of China*, Moscow, 1934, pp. 114-16 (in Russian).
- <sup>12</sup> Edgar Snow, Op. cit., p. 157.
- <sup>13</sup> See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, Peking, 1965, pp. 13-21.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 14; L. P. Delyusin, "Regarding Mao Tse-tung's Article 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society'", *Voprosy filosofii*, No 6, 1969.
- <sup>16</sup> *Revolyutsionny Vostok*, No. 2, Part I, 1927, pp. 119, 121.
- <sup>17</sup> See Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 93.
- <sup>18</sup> *Materialy po kitaiskomu voprosu*, No. 9, 1927, pp. 4-9.
- <sup>19</sup> See *The China Quarterly*, No. 2, April-June 1960, pp. 32-33.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 8.
- <sup>21</sup> *Materialy po kitaiskomu voprosu*, No. 10, 1928, p. 9.
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>23</sup> Stuart R. Schram believes that in his choice of Chinggangshan as a stronghold Mao Tse-tung was influenced by his boyhood attraction for *Water Margin*, whose heroes operated in this region (Stuart R. Schram, Op. cit., p. 115).
- <sup>24</sup> Edgar Snow, Op. cit., p. 166.

<sup>25</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 117.

<sup>27</sup> Chu Teh, born 1886 in a poor peasant family. Was prominent in the CPC. In 1922, at the age of 36, joined the CPC. In 1946-1954 was Commander-in-Chief of the PLA. In 1954 was elected Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. He was Deputy Chairman of the CPC Central Committee and a member of the CC Politburo Standing Committee. Held the military rank of marshal.

## Forces Are United

<sup>1</sup> See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, Peking, 1965, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, London, 1956, p. 179.

<sup>4</sup> *6th Congress of the CPC. Verbatim Report*, Book 4, Moscow, 1930, p. 13 (Russian translation).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 27.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Strategy and Tactics of the Comintern in the National-Colonial Revolution on the Example of China*, pp. 286-87 (in Russian).

<sup>8</sup> *Materialy po kitaiskomu voprosu*, No. 10, 1928, p. 19. Resolution of the November 1927 plenum of the CPC Central Committee "On the Immediate Organisational Tasks of the CPC".

<sup>9</sup> EMI Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, p. 33.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 34-36.

<sup>11</sup> Word for word translation.

<sup>12</sup> Word for word translation.

<sup>13</sup> EMI Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, pp. 46-47.

<sup>14</sup> See *A Dangerous Policy. Relative to the Developments in China*, Issue I, Moscow, 1969, p. 67 (in Russian).

## "Political Person"

<sup>1</sup> *Daily Herald*, March 11, 1937.

<sup>2</sup> EMI Hsiao, *Op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>3</sup> See P. P. Vladimirov, *Special Region of China, 1942-1945*, Moscow, 1973 (in Russian).

- <sup>4</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, pp. 79-80.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 83.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 88.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 87.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 386.
- <sup>9</sup> Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, New York, 1962, p. 68.
- <sup>10</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, Op. cit., pp. 228-29.
- <sup>11</sup> These gangs were formed by the landlords as a sort of bodyguard.
- <sup>12</sup> Emi Hsiao, Op. cit., pp. 23-24.
- <sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 29-30.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 31.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp. 73-74, 106-07.
- <sup>16</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, Op. cit., p. 14.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 79-80.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 111-12.
- <sup>20</sup> Emi Hsiao, Op. cit., p. 51.
- <sup>21</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, Op. cit., p. 208.
- <sup>22</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, New York, 1958.
- <sup>23</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, Op. cit., pp. 122, 150.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp. 471-72, 503, 632.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., pp. 463-64.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 464.

## Leader and Party

- <sup>1</sup> *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 5, 1973.
- <sup>2</sup> Robert S. Elegant, *China's Red Masters. Political Biographies of the Chinese Communist Leaders*. Twayne Publishers, New York, 1954, p. 199.
- <sup>3</sup> *Literaturnaya gazeta*, December 5, 1973.
- <sup>4</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, Op. cit., pp. 77-78.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 11.
- <sup>6</sup> Stefan Zweig, *Joseph Fouché. Bildnis eines politischen Menschen*, Im Insel-Verlag Zu Leipzig, 1929, p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> P. P. Vladimirov, *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 342.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 83.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 539.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 306.

<sup>15</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 208.

## “National Marxism”

<sup>1</sup> *A Dangerous Course. Maoist Policy and Tactics*, Issue IV, Moscow, 1973, p. 65 (in Russian).

<sup>2</sup> See *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., London, 1954, p. 260.

<sup>3</sup> Stuart R. Schram, “Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution”, *The China Quarterly*, No. 46, April/June 1971, p. 223.

<sup>4</sup> See M. Altaisky, V. Georgiev, *Anti-Marxist Essence of Mao Tse-tung's Philosophy*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 22-26 (in Russian).

<sup>5</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 65.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>10</sup> The term “Yenan syndrome” was coined in the article “China Convulsed”, *Foreign Affairs*, Washington, January 1967, pp. 246-59.

<sup>11</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 28-29.

<sup>14</sup> See Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1954, p. 22.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> This is a reference to the Three People's Principles enunciated by Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the 1st Kuomintang Congress, January 1924.



- <sup>17</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Op. cit.*, p. 55.
- <sup>18</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*. Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1954, p. 45.
- <sup>19</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. IV, Lawrence & Wishart, Ltd., London, 1956, p. 49.
- <sup>20</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 9, p. 443.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 56.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, Vol. 31, p. 150.
- <sup>23</sup> *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. I, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1965, p. 165.
- <sup>24</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy*, pp. 22-23.
- <sup>25</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1951, pp. 13-14.

## PART TWO

# The Knot Is Tied

- <sup>1</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, Simon Schuster, New York, 1966, p. 232.
- <sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, February 9, 1953.
- <sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, February 14, 1953.
- <sup>4</sup> *Problems and Contradictions of China's Industrial Development*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 145-46 (in Russian).
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 147-48.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 149.
- <sup>7</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 259.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 260.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 267.
- <sup>10</sup> Prosper Mérimée, *Selected Works* in two volumes, Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, pp. 400-01 (Russian translation).
- <sup>11</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 24, 1951.
- <sup>12</sup> Kao Kang (1891-1954), joined the CPC in 1926 and was one of the organisers and leaders of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region. He and Mao Tse-tung met for the first time in the autumn of 1935 when the Red Army units participating in the Long March reached North Shensi. Was elected a Central Committee member at the 7th Congress. From 1945 to 1953 headed the Party organisation and People's Government of Northeastern China. Was known

as an advocate of close friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Jao Shu-shih, born 1905. Joined the CPC when he was a student, and until 1927 headed the working-class movement. When the Red Army withdrew from Kiangsi, remained in Shanghai to work in the underground. In the 1940s commanded the 4th Army along with Chen Yi. After the revolution was Chairman of the East Chinese Military-Administrative Committee, First Secretary of the Central Committee's East China Bureau, First Secretary of the Shanghai City Committee of the CPC, and head of the CC Organisation Department. Was imprisoned in February 1954.

<sup>13</sup> Resolution of the eighth plenum of the CPC Central Committee, August 6, 1959.

<sup>14</sup> The "Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih affair" is described in James P. Harrison, *The Long March to Power. A History of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921-1972*. Macmillan, New York, 1972, p. 468.

<sup>15</sup> *Documents of the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Moscow, 1956, p. 76 (Russian translation).

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 132.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 67.

## Fear Complex and Megalomania

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, April 7, 1956; December 30, 1956.

<sup>2</sup> Here and further the references are to Mao Tse-tung's speeches and articles never published earlier in the Chinese press and intended solely for "internal use". It has since been learned that the Peking leadership had intended to bring out Vols. 5 and 6 of Mao Tse-tung's *Selected Works* for the general reader before the convocation of the 9th CPC Congress. This was intimated by Mao aides. However, these volumes were not published. A collection of these speeches and articles stamped "for internal use" appeared outside China and was commented on in the foreign press. Quotations from Mao Tse-tung's pronouncements at CC plenums and to Party activists and government officials appeared also in *Hungweiping pao*, *Tungfanghung pao*, and other *hungweiping* newspapers during the "cultural revolution".

<sup>3</sup> 960-1276 A.D.

- <sup>4</sup> Chin Shih Huang Ti (259-210 B. C.)—fourth monarch of the Chin Dynasty. After a long war subjugated the independent kingdoms that existed on the territory of China in the fifth-third centuries B. C. and set up China's first-ever despotic empire. In 213 B. C. he ordered a massacre of Confucian scholars, whom he suspected of treason: private libraries of Confucian literature were burned; 460 scholars were buried alive.
- <sup>5</sup> Chang Liang and Chen Ping—Chinese statesmen (third century B.C.).
- <sup>6</sup> Kao-tung—dynastic name of Liu Pang, who founded the Western Han Dynasty after internecine wars (c. 206 B.C.). Assumed title of Kao Ti.
- <sup>7</sup> *Der Spiegel*, October 7, 1974.
- <sup>8</sup> In Peking's political cant the "north wind" implies the Soviet Union, and the "west wind" the USA and Western Europe.

## "Diseased Shadow" of Communism

- <sup>1</sup> See Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China. From Revolution to Revolution*, Macmillan, New York, 1972, p. 99.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 95-96.
- <sup>3</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, pp. 276-77.
- <sup>4</sup> See *Problems and Contradictions of China's Industrial Development*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 154-56 (in Russian).
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 156-57.
- <sup>7</sup> Tibor Mende, *China and Her Shadow*, New York, 1962, p. 71; Stanley Karnow, *Op. cit.*, p. 96.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 101, 102.
- <sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 107.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- <sup>14</sup> Tibor Mende, *Op. cit.*, p. 71.
- <sup>15</sup> See *Problems and Contradictions of China's Industrial Development*, pp. 160-61 (in Russian).

- <sup>16</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 1, 1958.
- <sup>17</sup> *Problems and Contradictions of China's Industrial Development*, pp. 162-63.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 170.
- <sup>21</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Op. cit.*, p. 316.
- <sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322.
- <sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 330.
- <sup>24</sup> *Der Spiegel*, October 7, 1974.
- <sup>25</sup> Stanley Karnow, *Op. cit.*, p. 93.
- <sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 96.
- <sup>28</sup> *World Marxist Review*, No. 10, 1959.
- <sup>29</sup> *A History of China From Ancient Times to the Present*, p. 487 (in Russian).

## Permanent Convulsions

- <sup>1</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Articles, 1956-1967*, Issue II, Moscow, Progress Publishers, pp. 154-55.
- <sup>2</sup> *Mainichi Shimbun*, Tokyo, January 5, 1967.
- <sup>3</sup> See *Communist China. Policy Documents and Analysis*, Cambridge, Mass., 1958, pp. 487-88.
- <sup>4</sup> See Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 300.
- <sup>5</sup> Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, Random House, New York, 1968, pp. 11-15.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>7</sup> *A History of China From Ancient Times to the Present*, Moscow, 1975, p. 479 (in Russian).
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 497-98.
- <sup>9</sup> See *Mainsprings of Present Developments in China*, Moscow, 1968, p. 49 (in Russian).
- <sup>10</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, November 16, 1967.
- <sup>11</sup> Stanley Karnow, *Op. cit.*, p. 239.
- <sup>12</sup> See A. Zhelokhovtsev, *The "Cultural Revolution": A Close-Up*, Moscow, 1975.

- <sup>13</sup> *A History of China From Ancient Times to the Present*, pp. 503-04.
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>15</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, July 9, 1966.
- <sup>16</sup> Robert J. Lifton, *Op. cit.*, p. 36.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>18</sup> Stanley Karnow, *Mao and China. From Revolution to Revolution*, p. 227.
- <sup>19</sup> Robert J. Lifton, *Op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 40.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> *A History of China From Ancient Times to the Present*, p. 506.
- <sup>23</sup> See L. M. Gudoshnikov, *China's Political Mechanism*, Moscow, 1974; L. P. Delyusin, *The "Cultural Revolution" in China*, Moscow, 1967 (both in Russian).
- <sup>24</sup> *A History of China From Ancient Times to the Present*, p. 511.
- <sup>25</sup> Stanley Karnow, *Op. cit.*, pp. 312-26.
- <sup>26</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>27</sup> Atrocities committed during the "cultural revolution" are described in L. M. Gudoshnikov, *Op. cit.*, from p. 126 onward.
- <sup>28</sup> Stanley Karnow, *Op. cit.*, p. 445.
- <sup>29</sup> Robert J. Lifton, *Op. cit.*, p. 131.

## Ideology and Power

- <sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 5, 1967.
- <sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, February 1, 1964.
- <sup>3</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, March 3, 1967.
- <sup>4</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, August 9, 1966.
- <sup>5</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 16, 1968.
- <sup>6</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, April 29, 1969.
- <sup>7</sup> See L. M. Gudoshnikov, *Op. cit.*, p. 152.
- <sup>8</sup> Donald W. Klein and Lois B. Hager, "The Ninth Central Committee", *The China Quarterly*, No. 45, January/March, London, 1971, pp. 37-56.
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 42.
- <sup>10</sup> See L. M. Gudoshnikov, *Op. cit.*, p. 174.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>12</sup> Lin Piao, "Report to the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China" (delivered on April 1 and adopted on April 14, 1969), *Peking Review*, No. 18, April 30, 1969, pp. 28-29.
- <sup>13</sup> *Constitution of the Communist Party of China*. Adopted by the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of China on April 14, 1969, *Peking Review*, No. 18, April 30, 1969, p. 36.

## Philosopher and Ruler

- <sup>1</sup> M. Altaisky, "What the Maoists Conceal From the People", *Literaturnaya gazeta*, October 10, 1973.
- <sup>2</sup> See *Ancient Chinese Philosophy, A Two-Volume Selection*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1972, p. 139 (Russian translation).
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 147-65.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139-40; Vol. 2, p. 99.
- <sup>5</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, August 1, 1974.
- <sup>6</sup> See *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)*, special supplement to *China Reconstructs*, December 1973, Peking, pp. 12-19, 20-26.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.
- <sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>9</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 27, p. 291.

### PART THREE

## Marxist or Nationalist?

- <sup>1</sup> Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 135.
- <sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 133.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 102.
- <sup>4</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 236.
- <sup>5</sup> See Stuart R. Schram, *Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century. Mao Tse-tung*, London, 1966, p. 16.
- <sup>6</sup> Stuart R. Schram, *Mao Tse-tung*, p. 13.
- <sup>7</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *On New Democracy*, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1954, p. 80.

- <sup>8</sup> Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and the Theory of the Permanent Revolution", *The China Quarterly*, No. 46, London, 1971.
- <sup>9</sup> *The Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)*, special supplement to *China Reconstructs*, November 1973, Peking, pp. 12-13.
- <sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- <sup>11</sup> Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 703.
- <sup>12</sup> *Peking Review*, No. 16, April 19, 1974, p. 6.
- <sup>13</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, pp. 42-43.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ancient Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 2, pp. 264-83.
- <sup>15</sup> *Selected Material on the History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 3, Peking, 1964, pp. 1036-037 (in Chinese).
- <sup>16</sup> *Ninth Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), March-April, 1920, Minutes*, Moscow, 1960, pp. 93, 96 (in Russian).

## Ideologue or Politician?

- <sup>1</sup> This is how the Chinese text has it.
- <sup>2</sup> See *Maoism: Ideological and Political Adversary of Marxism-Leninism*, p. 13.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 28.

## Solitude

- <sup>1</sup> *Ancient Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 1, pp. 214-15.
- <sup>2</sup> Edgar Snow, *The Other Side of the River*, pp. 122, 150.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>4</sup> See G. Morabini, *Mao et ses Puritieres. Ombres chinoise dans le monde*, Paris, 1972.
- <sup>5</sup> I. Deleyme, *L'economie chinoise*, Paris, 1971, p. 127.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

## PART FOUR

# Burden of Succession

<sup>1</sup> *Kwangming jihpao*, October 4, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> *Chiehfangchun pao*, October 29, 1976.

<sup>3</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, December 28, 1976.

<sup>4</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 25, 1976.

<sup>5</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, April 27, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, July 12, 1977.

<sup>7</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 28, 1977.

# The New Leadership

<sup>1</sup> *Newsweek*, September 12, 1977, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 9, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> See *The New York Times*, March 26, 1977.

# Modernisation of maoism?

<sup>1</sup> *Hsinhua Agency Bulletin*, September 9, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, May 1, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, March 14, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> *Kwangming jihpao*, March 22, 1977.

<sup>5</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, May 1, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 9, 1977.

<sup>7</sup> *Hungchi*, No. 9, 1977.

<sup>8</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 10, 1977.



# Mummification of the cult

<sup>1</sup> *Hungchi*, No. 8, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, August 16, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> *Hungchi*, No. 9, 1977.

## Problems, More Problems

<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, October 12, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> *The Daily Telegraph*, September 4, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> *Hungchi*, No. 9, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, May 10, 1977.

<sup>5</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 12, 1977.

<sup>6</sup> *Kwangming jihpao*, August 15, 1977.

<sup>7</sup> *Figaro*, September 3, 1977.

<sup>8</sup> *The Financial Times*, September 14, 1977.

<sup>9</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, August 6, 1977.

<sup>10</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, August 5, 1977.

## Foreign policy

<sup>1</sup> *Jenmin jihpao*, September 27, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> *Times Newspapers Limited*, September 16, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> *Le Monde Diplomatique*, No. 1, 1977.

<sup>4</sup> *The Financial Times*, November 8, 1976.

<sup>5</sup> *Documents and Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 14-15.

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